Douglas v. Rosado et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Kareem Douglas,
Plaintiff,
-v-
Rossana Rosado, et al.,
Defendants.
2:25-cv-6529
(NJC) (LGD)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by pro se
Plaintiff Kareem Douglas, with a Complaint and a motion seeking entry of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. (See Compl., ECF No. 1; IFP App., ECF No. 2; Inj.
Rel. Mot., ECF No. 3.) For the reasons that follow, the application to proceed IFP is denied
without prejudice and with leave to renew upon filing the enclosed AO 239 Long Form IFP
application (“Long Form”). Alternatively, Douglas may pay the $405.00 filing fee within
fourteen (14) days in order for this case to proceed.
To qualify for IFP status, the Supreme Court has long held that “an affidavit is sufficient
which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs [inherent in
litigation] and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.”
Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (quotation marks and
alterations omitted). “The federal in forma pauperis statute represents a significant effort to
ensure the ability of impoverished litigants to prosecute meritorious claims or defenses without
disadvantage.” Rosa v. Doe, 86 F.4th 1001, 1004 (2d Cir. 2023). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of the
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statute permitting litigants to proceed IFP is to insure that indigent persons have equal access to
the judicial system.” Velasquez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-cv-2035, 2024 WL 3202974, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2024). Determining whether an applicant qualifies for IFP status is within
the discretion of the district court. See Rosa, 86 F.4th at 1007 (explaining IFP application denials
are reviewed for abuse of discretion). When a litigant’s application fails to establish the level of
poverty required under the IFP statute, such application is properly denied. See, e.g., Miller v.
Smith, No. 21-cv-2949, 2021 WL 2894973, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021) (denying IFP motion
where the plaintiff did not disclose the balance in her checking account). The court may dismiss
a case brought by a plaintiff requesting to proceed IFP if the “allegation of poverty is untrue.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A).
Here, Douglas’s application does not provide sufficient information for the Court to
reasonably conclude that Douglas is unable to afford the filing fee. Douglas has responded with
“N/A”, “NONE” or “0” in response to almost every question on the application. (IFP App.)
Douglas has included a residential address and telephone number in his Complaint (see Compl.
at 3), but does not identify any expenses associated with that residence or any other regular
living expenses for items such as food, transportation, or other utilities. (IFP App.) Further, given
that Douglas reports that he is unemployed and has not received any income from any source in
the past twelve months, the IFP application provides no explanation as to how he supports
himself. (Id. ¶¶ 2–4.) Thus, Douglas’s application raises more questions than it answers and does
not demonstrate that Douglas is qualified to proceed IFP.
Accordingly, the IFP motion is denied without prejudice and with leave to renew on the
enclosed Long Form IFP application. Given that Douglas’s wife has submitted a letter, dated
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November 19, 2025 (see Compl., Ex. I at 63), he shall include her financial information in the
spaces marked “spouse” on the renewed application. Fridman v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp.
2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court
may consider the resources that the applicant has or can get . . . such as from a spouse, parent,
adult sibling or other next friend.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Alternatively,
Douglas may pay the $405.00 filing fee.1 Douglas shall either file the renewed IFP application
or remit the filing fee within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order or the Complaint will be
dismissed without prejudice. The motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction is denied without prejudice and with leave to renew upon resolution of the filing fee.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
1 Once the filing fee is paid, there are no refunds regardless of the outcome of the case. Celestin
v. U.S. Dep’t State Bureau of Consular Affs., No. 20-cv-947, 2020 WL 6901081, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 23, 2020) (“[T]he law does not permit a judge to refund a filing fee. Once the filing fee has
been collected, it cannot be waived or refunded, regardless of the outcome of the action”).
Accordingly, Douglas is encouraged to consult an attorney or to avail himself of the free legal
resources provided by the Pro Se Legal Assistance Program run by Hofstra Law School at the
Central Islip Courthouse. Douglas may schedule an appointment there by calling (631) 297-2575
or by e-mailing PSLAP@Hofstra.edu. The Court notes that the Pro Se Clinic is not part of, nor
affiliated with, the United States District Court.
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The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Order to Douglas at his address of record
and shall note such mailing on the docket.
Dated: 	Central Islip, New York
December 4, 2025
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
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