Flagstar Financial & Leasing, LLC v. Run Roadlines, Inc. et al

United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
-----------------------------------X
FLAGSTAR FINANCIAL & LEASING, LLC
f/k/a Signature Financial, LLC
Plaintiff,
- against -
RUN ROADLINES, INC. d/b/a RUN
INC/RRI, and MANPREET RANDHAWA,
Defendants.
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Memorandum and Order
No. 2:25-cv-00714 (KAM)
(SIL)
Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff 	Flagstar 	Financial 	& 	Leasing, 	LLC 	f/k/a 	Signature
Financial, 	LLC 	(“Flagstar” 	or 	“Plaintiff”) 	brought 	this 	action
against 	Run 	Roadlines, 	Inc. 	d/b/a 	Run 	Inc/RRI 	(“Roadlines”) 	and
Manpreet 	Randhawa 	(“Randhawa”) 	(together 	with 	Roadlines, 	the
“Defendants,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”) alleging
breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and replevin/possession of
collateral. 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	monetary 	damages, 	pre-judgment
interest, 	attorneys’ 	fees 	and 	costs, 	and 	replevin/possession 	of
collateral. Upon Defendants’ failure to appear or otherwise defend
this 	action, 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	entered 	a 	Certificate 	of
Default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(a).
(ECF Nos. 9,17.) Plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of default
judgment 	against 	Defendant 	Randhawa 	(ECF 	No. 	14, 	the 	“Randhawa
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Mot,”) 	for 	breach 	of 	guaranty 	and 	replevin/possession 	of
collateral, 	and 	Defendant 	Roadlines 	(ECF 	No. 	19, 	the 	“Roadlines
Mot.”, 	together 	with 	the 	Randhawa 	Mot. 	the 	“Motions”) 	for 	breach
of contract and replevin/possession of collateral. 	For the reasons
stated herein, the Randhawa Mot. for default judgment as to breach
of 	guaranty 	and 	the 	Roadlines 	Mot. 	for 	default 	judgment 	as 	to
breach 	of 	contract 	is 	GRANTED 	as 	to 	liability. 	The 	Motions 	are
DENIED as to replevin/possession of collateral and DENIED without
prejudice 	to 	refiling 	as 	to 	damages, 	pre-judgment 	interest 	and
attorneys’ fees.
BACKGROUND
The 	following 	facts 	are 	taken 	from 	Flagstar's 	Complaint,
Flagstar's 	Motions, 	and 	the 	supporting 	memoranda, 	affidavits 	and
attachments 	filed 	in 	support 	of 	Flagstar's 	Motions. 	Given
Defendants’ 	default, 	the 	Court 	accepts 	as 	true 	all 	well-pleaded
factual 	allegations 	in 	the 	Complaint 	to 	establish 	liability,
except as to damages, which requires Plaintiff to make an adequate
evidentiary showing. 	See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop,
LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128-29, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).
I. 	Factual Background
Flagstar is a New York limited liability company principally
based 	in 	Hicksville, 	New 	York 	of 	which 	Flagstar 	Bank, 	N.A., 	a
national association with its main office in New York, is the sole
member. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	4; 	ECF 	Nos. 	21 	¶ 	13(a), 	21-2 	¶ 	2, 	Ex. 	A.)
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Defendant Roadlines is a California corporation principally based
in 	Elk 	Grove, 	California. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	5; 	ECF 	No. 	21 	¶¶ 	13(b), 	14,
Ex. 	A.) 	Defendant 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	is 	domiciled 	in 	California 	and 	is
the President of Roadlines. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7; ECF No. 21 ¶ 13(c).)
On June 18, 2021, Flagstar entered a financing arrangement as
the Secured Party with Roadlines as the Debtor under which Flagstar
would 	make 	certain 	loans 	and 	extensions 	of 	credit 	to 	Roadlines
under 	the 	terms 	of 	each 	applicable 	note. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	8; 	ECF 	Nos.
14-12 	and 	19-12 	(the 	“Agreement”) 	at 	1.) 	To 	secure 	payment 	due
under 	any 	note, 	Roadlines 	granted 	Flagstar 	a 	first 	position
security interest in “[f]ifteen (15) Wabash National model DVCVHPC
dry 	van 	trailers” 	and 	any 	proceeds 	arising 	from 	such 	equipment
(the “Collateral”). (See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11; Agreement § 1; ECF Nos.
14-14 and 19-14 (“Schedule A”).)
On 	the 	same 	day, 	Roadlines 	executed 	a 	Promissory 	Note 	under
which Roadlines agreed to repay Flagstar $629,000.00 at an interest
rate of 4.75% per year. (Compl. ¶ 8, 10; ECF Nos. 14-13 and 19-13
(the “Note”) § 2.) 	The Note set a repayment schedule split across
forty-eight consecutive months, with the first payment due on July
20, 	2021. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	10; 	Note 	§ 	3.) 	The 	same 	day, 	Mr. 	Randhawa
executed 	a 	Continuing 	Guaranty 	under 	which 	Mr. 	Randhawa
“absolutely 	and 	unconditionally” 	guaranteed 	full 	and 	prompt
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payment 	of 	Roadlines’ 	obligations 	under 	the 	Agreement 	and 	Note.1
(Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15; ECF No. 14-17, the “Guaranty.”)
Upon an event of default, Flagstar may, inter alia, (1) cease
advancing money or extending credit; (2) declare the entire unpaid
indebtedness 	of 	Roadlines 	to 	be 	immediately 	due 	and 	payable; 	(3)
enter 	any 	premises 	of 	Roadlines, 	or 	any 	other 	party, 	with 	or
without judicial process and take possession of any or all of the
Collateral; 	and 	(4) 	dispose 	of 	the 	Collateral 	at 	a 	public 	or
private 	sale. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	16; 	Agreement 	§ 	15.) 	Defendants 	also
agreed to pay Flagstar’s attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the
enforcement 	of 	Flagstar’s 	rights 	under 	the 	Agreement, 	Note, 	and
Guaranty. 	(Compl. ¶ 17; Agreement § 21; Guaranty at 1.)
Under the Note, any payment that remains unpaid 10 days after
its due date is subject to a late charge of the greater of $25.00
or 	5% 	of 	the 	delinquent 	payment, 	but 	not 	more 	than 	the 	highest
rate 	allowed 	by 	law 	(“Late 	Fees”). 	(Compl. 	¶ 	19; 	Note 	§ 	7.) 	In
the 	event 	of 	default, 	an 	interest 	rate 	of 	six 	percent 	per 	year
above the Note rate of 4.75%, 10.75%, applies to “the entire unpaid
balance 	of 	principal 	and 	accrued 	interest.” 	(Compl. 	¶ 	20; 	Note 	§
8.)
1 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	also 	signed 	both 	the 	Agreement 	and 	Note 	as 	the
President of Roadlines. 	(Agreement at 6; Note at 4.)
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On June 18, 2021, Flagstar perfected its security interest in
and 	to 	the 	Collateral 	by 	filing 	a 	UCC-1 	financing 	statement 	with
the 	Secretary 	of 	State 	of 	California. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	13; 	ECF 	No. 	14-
16, 19-16)
Flagstar 	alleges 	that 	Roadlines 	has 	failed 	to 	make 	monthly
payments on the Note since September 2024. (Compl. ¶ 21.)
II. 	Procedural History
On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging
breach of contract (Count 1) and replevin/possession of collateral
(Count 	3) 	against 	Roadlines 	and 	breach 	of 	guaranty 	(Count 	2) 	and
replevin/possession of collateral (Count 3) against Mr. Randhawa.
(Compl. 	¶¶ 	23-41.) 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	damages, 	possession 	of 	the
Collateral, and attorneys’ fees. 	(Compl. ¶¶ 1, 28-29, 32-33, 41.)
On 	March 	20, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	affidavit 	of 	service
stating 	that 	on 	February 	28, 	2025 	“deponent 	served” 	the 	summons
and complaint on a “Jane Doe” who "deponent... knew said individual
to be the Authorized Agent thereof an authorized person to accept
service 	of 	process" 	for 	Roadlines. 	(ECF 	No. 	5.) 	Plaintiff 	filed
two 	affidavits 	of 	service 	regarding 	service 	on 	Mr. 	Randhawa.
First, on March 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service
stating: (a) on March 15, 2025, a process server affixed a copy of
the action and complaint to the door of 1326 Como Drive, Manteca,
CA 	95337 	after 	calling 	multiple 	times, 	and 	after 	“server 	spoke
with wife on 2/20/2025 . . . who confirmed residency;” and (b) on
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March 	18, 	2025, 	the 	server 	also 	mailed 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	summons 	and
complaint 	to 	the 	1326 	Como 	Drive, 	Manteca, 	CA 	95337 	address 	(ECF
No. 	6.) 	Second, 	on 	May 	2, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	affidavit 	of
service stating that on April 11, 2025, Flagstar personally served
Mr. Randhawa with a copy of the summons and complaint at the same
address. (ECF No. 7.)
On May 22, 2025, Flagstar filed a Request for Certificate of
Default 	against 	Defendants. 	(ECF 	No. 	8.) 	On 	May 	27, 	2025, 	the
Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	entered 	a 	certificate 	of 	default 	against 	Mr.
Randhawa, 	(ECF 	No. 	9), 	but 	denied 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	as 	to
Roadlines, 	because 	“[i]t 	did 	not 	appear 	from 	the 	affidavit 	of
service 	that 	proper 	service 	was 	effectuated 	as 	a 	‘Jane 	Doe’ 	was
served on behalf of [Roadlines],” (Dkt. Entry dated May 27, 2025.)
On 	June 	3, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	letter 	arguing 	that 	Roadlines
was 	properly 	served. 	(ECF 	No. 	10.) 	On 	June 	13, 	2025, 	the 	Court
found 	that 	service 	on 	Roadlines 	was 	not 	proper 	because 	the
affidavit 	of 	service 	did 	not 	state 	"[h]ow 	the 	deponent 	knew 	that
[Jane 	Doe] 	was 	authorized 	to 	accept 	service." 	(Dkt. 	Order 	dated
Jun. 	13, 	2025.) 	The 	Court 	extended 	Flagstar’s 	deadline 	to 	serve
Roadlines and 	directed Flagstar to effectuate service on Roadlines
by 	June 	27, 	2025. 	(Id.) 	Flagstar 	failed 	to 	effect 	service 	on
Roadlines 	by 	June 	27, 	2025, 	and 	the 	Court 	directed 	Flagstar 	to
effectuate 	service 	by 	July 	17, 	2025. 	(Dkt. 	Order 	dated 	Jul. 	10,
2025.)
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On 	July 	1, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	properly 	effectuated 	service 	on
Roadlines through service of the summons and complaint on a “John
Doe” 	who 	“advised 	they 	were 	authorized 	to 	accept 	[service] 	for
[Roadlines].” 	(ECF 	No. 	12; 	see 	also 	Dkt. 	Order 	dated 	Jul. 	17,
2025.) 	On July 23, 2025, Flagstar filed a Request for Certificate
of Default as to Roadlines following Roadlines’ failure to appear
or 	otherwise 	respond 	(ECF 	No. 	15), 	which 	the 	Court 	denied 	for
failure to attach a certificate of service showing that the request
for certificate of default documents was served on Roadlines, (Dkt.
Order 	dated 	Jul. 	23, 	2025.) 	That 	same 	day 	Plaintiff 	re-filed 	a
request for a certificate of default against Roadlines. 	(ECF No.
16.) 	On July 28, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered a certificate
of default against Roadlines. (ECF No. 17.)
On February 26, 2026, the Court ordered Flagstar to show cause
why the case should not be dismissed for failure to properly plead
facts 	establishing 	the 	Court's 	diversity 	jurisdiction 	because
Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	allege 	(i) 	the 	citizenship 	of 	Plaintiff
Flagstar’s 	sole 	member, 	Flagstar 	Bank 	N.A.; 	(ii) 	Defendant 	Run
Roadlines Inc.'s principal place of business; and (iii) Defendant
Manpreet Randhawa's state of citizenship. 	(Dkt. Order dated Feb.
26, 	2026.) 	On 	March 	3, 	2026, 	Flagstar 	responded 	to 	the 	Court’s
Order 	to 	Show 	Cause, 	(ECF 	No. 	21), 	and 	the 	Court 	found 	that
Plaintiff 	pleaded 	facts 	establishing 	the 	Court's 	diversity
jurisdiction and thus showed why the action should not be dismissed
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,(Dkt. Order dated Mar. 4,
2026.)
On March 4, 2026, the Court advised Flagstar that the Randhawa
Motion’s 	sole 	reliance 	on 	the 	process 	server’s 	affirmation 	that
Randhawa 	was 	not 	in 	active 	military 	service 	without 	independent
post-default investigation was insufficient. See Jimenez v. Green
Olive Inc., 744 F. Supp. 3d 221, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting that
Plaintiff's 	reliance 	on 	the 	process 	server's 	inquiries 	during
service and failure to note subsequent post-default investigations
to support the process server's representations, was insufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
(“SCRA”)); 	L. 	Civ. 	R. 	55.2(a)(1)(B). 	That 	same 	day, 	Flagstar
submitted 	a 	supplemental 	affirmation 	attesting 	that 	upon
investigation 	in 	the 	Department 	of 	Defense 	Manpower 	Data 	Center,
Mr. Randhawa was not an active service member. 	(ECF No. 23, ¶ 4,
Ex. A.)
Before 	the 	Court 	are 	Plaintiff’s 	July 	22, 	2025 	Motion 	for
Default 	Judgment 	against 	Mr. 	Randhawa, 	(ECF 	No. 	14), 	and
Plaintiff’s 	August 	28, 	2025, 	Motion 	for 	Default 	Judgment 	against
Roadlines, 	(ECF 	No. 	19), 	both 	of 	which 	were 	duly 	served, 	as
required 	by 	the 	Local 	Civil 	Rules 	of 	the 	Eastern 	District 	of 	New
York, 	(see 	ECF 	Nos. 	14-18, 	19-18.) 	To 	date, 	Defendants 	have 	not
appeared, 	answered, 	or 	otherwise 	responded 	to 	the 	Complaint, 	nor
the motions for entry of default judgment.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 55, courts follow a two-step process to enter
default judgment. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128. First, once
the 	defendant 	has 	been 	properly 	served 	with 	process 	but 	fails 	to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit
or 	otherwise, 	the 	Clerk 	of 	Court 	enters 	the 	defendant's 	default.
See 	Rule 	55(a). 	The 	plaintiff 	may 	then 	move 	the 	court 	to 	enter 	a
default judgment against the defendant. See Rule 55(b)(2). “Before
entering 	a 	default 	judgment, 	the 	court 	must 	ensure 	that 	(1)
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, (2) the plaintiff took
all 	required 	procedural 	steps 	in 	moving 	for 	a 	default 	judgment,
and 	(3) 	the 	plaintiff's 	allegations 	establish 	the 	defendant's
liability as a matter of law.” 	Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as
trustee 	of 	Aspen 	Holdings 	Tr. 	v. 	Fernandez, 	712 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	324,
330 (E.D.N.Y. 2024).
Discussion
I. 	Jurisdiction
A court “may not enter a default judgment unless it has both
subject-matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	action 	and 	personal
jurisdiction 	over 	each 	defendant.” 	Guerra 	v. 	Steelstone 	Grp.,
LLC, No. 22-CV-7191 (KAM) (SJB), 2024 WL 2319685, *3 (E.D.N.Y. May
22, 	2024) 	(citing 	Covington 	Indus., 	Inc. 	v. 	Resintex 	A. 	G., 	629
F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court has diversity jurisdiction over the instant action.
District 	courts 	“have 	original 	jurisdiction 	. 	. 	. 	where 	the
[amount] 	in 	controversy 	exceeds 	. 	. 	. 	$75,000” 	and 	the 	action
arises 	between 	“citizens 	of 	different 	States.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). 	"[A]ll 	of 	the 	adverse 	parties 	in 	a 	[diversity] 	suit
must 	be 	completely 	diverse 	with 	regard 	to 	citizenship." 	E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 930
(2d Cir. 1998) (citation modified).
Flagstar, 	a 	New 	York 	LLC, 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	New 	York. 	“[A]
limited liability company [ ] takes the citizenship of each of its
members.” 	Bayerische Landesbank, New York Branch v. Aladdin Cap.
Mgmt. 	LLC, 	692 	F.3d 	42, 	49 	(2d 	Cir. 	2012) 	(citation 	modified).
Flagstar’s 	sole 	member, 	Flagstar 	Bank, 	N.A., 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	New
York because its articles of association state that Flagstar Bank
N.A.’s main office is in New York. 	See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt,
546 	U.S. 	303, 	318 	(2006) 	(holding 	that 	national 	banking
associations 	are 	citizens 	of 	the 	“the 	State 	designated 	in 	its
articles 	of 	association 	as 	its 	main 	office”); 	(see 	also 	Compl. 	¶
4; 	ECF 	Nos. 	21 	¶ 	13(a), 	ECF 	No. 	21-2 	¶ 	2, 	Ex. 	A.); 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1348. 	Flagstar is thus a citizen of New York. 	See id.
Both 	Defendants 	are 	citizens 	of 	California. 	Defendant
Roadlines 	is 	a 	California 	corporation 	with 	a 	principal 	place 	of
business in California. 	(See Compl. ¶ 5; ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 13(b), 14,
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Ex. 	A)); 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1332(c)(1). 	Defendant 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	is 	an
individual 	domiciled 	in 	California 	at 	1326 	Como 	Drive, 	Manteca,
California 95337, where he was personally served with the Summons
and Complaint. 	(See Compl. ¶ 5; ECF Nos. 7, 21 ¶ 13(c).)
Flagstar alleges that Defendants owe at least “$332,905.38 .
. . 	under the Note and Guaranty.” 	(Compl. ¶ 22.) Thus, there is
diversity jurisdiction between Plaintiff and Defendants.
B. 	Personal Jurisdiction
“In diversity cases brought against non-domiciliaries in New
York federal courts, the New York long-arm statute, Section 302(a)
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (‘CPLR’), governs the
personal 	jurisdiction 	analysis.” 	LG 	Cap. 	Funding, 	LLC 	v. 	M 	Line
Holdings, 	Inc., 	422 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	739, 	753 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2018). 	Under
CPLR § 302(a)(1), “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
any 	non-domiciliary 	... 	who 	in 	person 	or 	through 	an 	agent 	...
transacts 	any 	business 	within 	[New 	York].” 	“Courts 	have 	found
sufficient 	business 	contacts 	to 	support 	personal 	jurisdiction
under CPLR § 302(a)(1) in situations where non-domiciliaries have
entered into contracts with New York-based [entities].” 	LG Cap.,
422 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	753. 	“Parties 	can 	[also] 	consent 	to 	personal
jurisdiction 	through 	forum-selection 	clauses 	in 	contractual
agreements.” 	D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
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Defendants 	entered 	contracts 	with 	Flagstar, 	a 	New 	York
entity. 	Roadlines 	executed 	and 	delivered 	to 	Flagstar 	the 	Note
that “was executed, made and is to be performed in Nassau County,
New 	York.” 	(Note 	§ 	11; 	see 	also 	Agreement 	§ 	21; 	Compl. 	¶ 	10.)
Mr. Randhawa’s financial “guaranty of promissory notes payable in
New York” to a New York LLC is also “a contract to perform services
within 	the 	meaning 	of 	CPLR 	302(a)(1).” 	A.I. 	Trade 	Fin., 	Inc. 	v.
Petra 	Bank, 	989 	F.2d 	76, 	80-81 	(2d 	Cir. 	1993). 	Defendants 	thus
had “‘fair warning of the possibility of [Defendants] being subject
to 	the 	jurisdiction 	of 	New 	York.’” 	LG 	Cap., 	422 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
753 	(quoting 	D.H. 	Blair, 	462 	F.3d 	at 	105). 	The 	Agreement, 	Note,
and 	Guaranty 	thus 	constitute 	business 	transacted 	in 	New 	York
sufficient 	for 	this 	Court 	to 	exercise 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over
Defendants.
Defendants also consented to this Court’s jurisdiction. Under
the 	Agreement 	and 	Note, 	Roadlines 	“consents 	to 	the 	personal
jurisdiction 	of” 	the 	“U.S. 	District 	Court 	located 	in 	the 	Eastern
District 	of 	New 	York.” 	(Agreement 	§ 	21, 	Note 	§ 	13); 	see 	also 	LG
Cap., 	422 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	753-54 	(holding 	that 	the 	Court 	had
personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	foreign 	corporation 	pursuant 	to
contract). 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	also 	agreed 	that 	“an 	action 	to 	enforce
the 	Guaranty” 	may 	be 	“joined 	with 	an 	action 	against 	[Roadlines]”
and 	that 	the 	Guaranty 	“shall 	be 	governed 	by 	and 	construed 	in
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accordance with the internal laws . . . of the State of New York”
(Guaranty at 2, 3.)
The forum selection clauses thus also establish that venue is
proper 	in 	this 	District. 	Weber 	Capital 	LLC, 	v. 	Racaniello, 	No.
24-CV-6258 	(EK)(JAM), 	2026 	WL 	522339, 	at 	*14 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Feb. 	25,
2026) (holding venue was proper pursuant to guarantor’s consent to
jurisdiction 	in 	this 	District). 	Although 	the 	forum 	selection
clauses 	are 	in 	the 	Agreement 	and 	Note 	and 	not 	the 	Guaranty, 	Mr.
Randhawa 	agreed 	in 	the 	Guaranty 	that 	any 	action 	to 	enforce 	the
Guaranty 	may 	be 	“joined 	with 	an 	action 	against 	[Roadlines]” 	and
signed as President of Roadlines the Agreement and the Note, which
both 	include 	this 	Court 	as 	a 	proper 	agreed 	upon 	venue. 	(Compl. 	¶
3; 	Agreement 	§ 	21; 	Note 	§ 	13; 	Guaranty 	at 	2).2 	Moreover, 	a
“substantial 	part 	of 	the 	events 	. 	. 	. 	giving 	rise 	to 	the 	claim
occurred” 	in 	this 	District. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1391(b)(2). 	“The 	Note
was 	executed, 	made 	and 	is 	to 	be 	performed 	in 	[this 	District],”
2 The Court also notes that “numerous courts have concluded that a
defaulting party waives the defense of improper venue.” 	LG Cap.,
422 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	754 	n.5 	(collecting 	cases). 	A 	Court 	may 	thus
“enter a default judgment against a non-appearing party that could
otherwise 	assert 	an 	affirmative 	defense 	based 	on 	contractual
limitations 	on 	the 	plaintiff's 	right 	to 	sue.” 	Id. 	at 	755. 	Here
Defendants 	were 	properly 	served 	with 	the 	summons, 	complaint,
relevant 	default 	judgment 	motion 	papers, 	and 	all 	subsequent
filings 	(see 	ECF 	Nos. 	14-4, 	14-5, 	14-18, 	19-5, 	19-6, 	19-18, 	20,
21-4, 22, 23 at 2.), but have failed to appear or otherwise assert
their 	rights. 	Defendants 	have 	thus 	also 	waived 	any 	defense 	of
improper venue.
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(Note 	§ 	11), 	and 	the 	debt 	is 	payable 	to 	a 	New 	York 	LLC 	with 	its
sole member located in this District, (see Compl. ¶ 4; ECF No. 21
¶ 13(a).)
Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over Defendants and
is a proper venue for the instant action.
II. 	Plaintiff Complied with Procedural Requirements
“A motion for default judgment will not be granted unless the
party making the motion adheres to all of the applicable procedural
rules.” 	Century 	Sur. 	Co. 	v. 	Atweek, 	Inc., 	No. 	16-CV-335 	(ENV)
(PK), 	2018 	WL 	10466835, 	at 	*1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Jan. 	9, 	2018). 	Flagstar
must 	show 	that 	defendants 	were 	properly 	served 	with 	process 	and
that 	entry 	of 	default 	was 	appropriate. 	See 	Sik 	Gaek, 	Inc. 	v.
Yogi's 	II, 	Inc., 	682 	F. 	App'x 	52, 	54 	(2d 	Cir. 	2017) 	(summary
order). 	Local 	Rule 	55.2 	impose 	the 	additional 	requirements 	that
the plaintiff attach certain materials to the motion and file proof
that all motion papers were mailed to the Defendants.3
A. 	Service of Process
On 	April 	11, 	2025, 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	was 	personally 	served 	with
the summons and complaint and was thus properly served. 	(See ECF
No. 7); Rule 4(e). 	Regarding service on Roadlines, service for a
“corporation, 	. 	. 	. 	partnership, 	or 	other 	unincorporated
3 This Order applies the Local Civil Rules of the Eastern District of New York
as stated, prior to changes to the relevant local rules effective January 2,
2026.
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association” can occur “by delivering a copy of the summons and of
the 	complaint 	to 	an 	officer, 	a 	managing 	or 	general 	agent, 	or 	any
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of process.” 	Rule 4(h)(1)(B).
Following 	the 	Court’s 	Order 	extending 	Flagstar’s 	time 	to
serve Roadlines to July 17, 2025, Flagstar served the summons and
complaint 	on 	a 	“John 	Doe” 	authorized 	to 	accept 	service 	on 	behalf
of 	Roadlines 	on 	July 	1, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	12.) 	The 	service 	was
completed 	at 	the 	principal 	business 	address 	listed 	for 	Roadlines
on the California Business Search website, and the John Doe served
by 	the 	process 	server 	“advised 	they 	were 	authorized 	to 	accept
[service] 	for 	the 	corporation.” 	(Id.) 	Service 	was 	thus 	properly
effectuated 	on 	Roadlines. 	(See 	Dkt. 	Order 	dated 	Jul. 	17, 	2025);
Home Loan Inv. Bank, F.S.B. v. Goodness & Mercy, Inc., No. 10-cv-
4677 	(ADS), 	2011 	WL 	1701795, 	at 	*7-8 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	30, 	2011)
(finding 	a 	corporate 	defendant 	was 	properly 	served 	where 	“the
process server left a copy of the summons and complaint with ‘Ann
Doe 	Manager’, 	who 	indicated 	that 	she 	was 	authorized 	to 	accept
service 	on 	behalf 	of 	the 	corporation”); Old 	Repub. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v.
Pac. Fin. Servs. Of Am., Inc., 301 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) (“In
tendering 	service, 	the 	process 	server 	may 	rely 	upon 	the
corporation's employees to identify the individuals authorized to
accept service.”); Feng Lin v. Quality Woods, Inc., No. 17-cv-3043
(DLI) (SJB), 2019 WL 1450746, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019) (“An
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affidavit 	of 	a 	process 	server 	creates 	a 	presumption 	of 	proper
service.”).
B. 	Entry of Default
The Court finds that the Clerk of the Court properly entered
default against each Defendant. Because Mr. Randhawa was properly
served 	on 	April 	11, 	2025, 	(see 	ECF 	No. 	7), 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	was
required to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint by May 2,
2025. 	See 	Rule 	12(a)(1)(A)(i). 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	failed 	to 	respond,
and on May 22, 2025 Flagstar filed a request for a Certificate of
Default, (ECF No. 8), which the Clerk of Court granted on May 27,
2025, (ECF No. 9.)
Because 	Roadlines 	was 	properly 	served 	on 	July 	1, 	2025, 	(see
ECF No. 12), Roadlines was required to answer or otherwise respond
to the Complaint by July 22, 2025. 	See Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i); (Dkt.
Order 	dated 	Jul. 	17, 	2025.) 	Roadlines 	failed 	to 	respond, 	and
Flagstar filed a request for a Certificate of Default on July 23,
2025, 	(ECF 	No. 	16), 	which 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	granted 	on 	July
28, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	17.) 	Both 	Defendants 	were 	also 	served 	with
Flagstar’s 	requests 	for 	certificates 	of 	default. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	8-6,
16-4.)
C. 	Local Civil Rule 55.2
Local 	Civil 	Rule 	55.2 	sets 	out 	four 	procedural 	requirements
for 	Plaintiff’s 	Motions. 	First, 	Plaintiff 	must 	file 	an 	affidavit
or declaration showing that the clerk has entered a Certificate of
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Default, that the movant has complied with the Servicemembers Civil
Relief 	Act, 	and 	that 	the 	defaulting 	party 	is 	not 	known 	to 	be 	a
minor 	or 	an 	incompetent 	person. 	L. 	Civ. 	R. 	55.2(a)(1)(A)-(C).
Second, 	Plaintiff 	must 	comply 	with 	Local 	Civil 	Rule 	7.1(a)’s
procedural requirements by filing notices of motions, memoranda of
law, 	and 	supporting 	affidavits 	and 	exhibits. 	L. 	Civ. 	R.
55.2(a)(2). 	Third, 	Plaintiff 	must 	also 	file 	a 	certificate 	of
service 	indicating 	the 	Motions 	and 	all 	supporting 	documents,
including the Clerk's Certificate of Default, have been personally
served 	on 	or 	mailed 	to 	the 	last 	residence 	(for 	a 	natural 	person)
or 	business 	address 	(for 	an 	entity) 	of 	the 	defaulting 	party. 	L.
Civ. R. 55.2(a)(3). 	Fourth, Plaintiff must also file “a statement
of 	damages, 	sworn 	or 	affirmed 	to 	by 	one 	or 	more 	people 	with
personal knowledge, in support of the request” because damages and
attorneys’ fees and costs are at issue. L. Civ. R. 55.2(c).
First, Flagstar complied with Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)’s
procedural 	requirements 	by 	filing 	declarations 	showing 	that 	the
Clerk 	entered 	Certificates 	of 	default 	as 	to 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	and
Roadlines. 	(See 	ECF 	Nos. 	14-1 	¶¶ 	4-8, 	19-2 	¶¶ 	4-10). 	As 	to
Roadlines, Flagstar need not demonstrate compliance with the SCRA
or 	confirm 	minor 	or 	incompetent 	status 	because 	Roadlines 	is 	a
corporate 	entity 	and 	not 	a 	natural 	person. 	See 	Wells 	Fargo 	Bank
Nat’l Ass’n v. 366 Realty LLC, 806 F. Supp. 3d 356, 367 (E.D.N.Y.
2025). 	With 	regards 	to 	Mr. 	Randhawa, 	Flagstar 	affirmed 	that 	Mr.
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Randhawa 	is 	not 	a 	minor 	or 	incompetent 	person, 	(ECF 	No. 	14-1 	¶
10), 	and 	filed 	a 	supplemental 	declaration 	establishing 	that 	Mr.
Randhawa 	is 	not 	in 	active 	military 	service, 	(see 	ECF 	No. 	23);
Jimenez, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 244 (“obtain[ing] a report certifying
active-duty 	military 	status 	through 	the 	[SCRA] 	website” 	is
sufficient to satisfy the SCRA).
Second, 	Flagstar 	complied 	with 	Local 	Civil 	Rule 	7.1(a)’s
procedural 	requirements 	by 	filing 	notices 	of 	motion 	(ECF 	No. 	14,
19), 	memoranda 	of 	law 	(ECF. 	No. 	14-10, 	19-1), 	and 	affidavits 	and
exhibits 	(ECF. 	Nos. 	14-1-14-9, 	14-11-14-18, 	19-2–19-18), 	in
support of Plaintiff’s Motions.
Third, 	Flagstar 	filed 	affidavits 	of 	service 	demonstrating
that all documents in support of the request for default judgment
have been mailed to Mr. Randhawa’s last known residence, (ECF No.
14-18), 	and 	Roadlines’ 	last 	known 	business 	address, 	(ECF 	No. 	19-
18). 	See L. Civ. R. 55.2(a)(3).
Fourth, Flagstar also complied with Local Civil Rule 55.2(c)
by 	filing 	sworn 	statements 	of 	damages 	affirmed 	by 	persons 	with
personal 	knowledge, 	demonstrating 	the 	damages 	and 	basis 	for 	each
element, including the damages arising from the breach of contract
claim 	(ECF 	Nos. 	14-10-14-17, 	19-1, 	19-11-19-16), 	and 	attorneys’
fees and costs (ECF Nos. 14-1, 14-7-14-8, 19-2, 19-8-19-9.) See L.
Civ. R. 55.2(c).
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III. Liability
Because 	Flagstar 	has 	met 	the 	jurisdictional 	and 	procedural
prerequisites 	for 	default 	judgment, 	the 	Court 	now 	must 	assess
whether 	Flagstar's 	“well-pleaded 	allegations 	in 	a 	complaint
establishes . . . 	defendant[s’] liability.” 	Trans World Airlines,
Inc. 	v. 	Hughes, 	449 	F.2d 	51, 	69 	(2d 	Cir. 	1971), 	rev’d 	on 	other
grounds, 	409 	U.S. 	363 	(1973). 	Flagstar 	must 	“establish 	that 	on
the law it is entitled to the relief it seeks, given the facts as
established 	by 	the 	default.” 	Finkel 	v. 	Triple 	A 	Group, 	Inc., 	708
F.Supp.2d 277, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation modified).
A. 	Choice of Law
“At the outset of its analysis, ‘[a] federal court sitting in
diversity jurisdiction applies the choice of law rules of the forum
state.’” 	AEI 	Life 	LLC 	v. 	Lincoln 	Benefit 	Life 	Co., 	892 	F.3d 	126,
132 	(2d 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quoting 	Forest 	Park 	Pictures 	v. 	Universal
Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 433 (2d Cir. 2012)). This
Court, 	sitting 	in 	diversity, 	is 	thus 	bound 	to 	apply 	New 	York 	law
to 	determine 	the 	validity 	and 	scope 	of 	any 	choice-of-law 	clause.
Under 	New 	York 	law, 	“courts 	will 	generally 	enforce 	choice-of-law
clauses,” 	because 	“contracts 	should 	be 	interpreted 	so 	as 	to
effectuate the parties’ intent,” Ministers & Missionaries Benefit
Bd. 	V. 	Snow, 	45 	N.E. 	3d 	917, 	919 	(2015). 	This 	“obviates 	the
application 	of 	both 	common-law 	conflict-of-laws 	principles 	and
statutory choice-of-law directives.” 	Id. at 918; cf. Aguas Lenders
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Recovery 	Grp. 	v. 	Suez, 	S.A., 	585 	F.3d 	696, 	700 	(2d 	Cir. 	2009)
(concluding 	that 	a 	forum-selection 	clause 	is 	“entitled 	to 	a
presumption of enforceability” in a foreign dispute).
The Court sees no reason to upset the Parties’ agreement that
New 	York 	law 	applies, 	especially 	given 	that 	the 	Parties 	agreed
that New York law applies without applying conflicts of law rules.
(See 	Agreement 	§ 	19 	(The 	Agreement 	“shall 	be 	governed 	by 	and
construed 	in 	accordance 	with 	the 	laws 	of 	the 	State 	of 	New 	York,
without 	reference 	to 	principles 	of 	conflicts 	of 	laws”); 	Guaranty
at 3 (“[W]ithout applying the conflict of law rules,” the Guaranty
“shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the internal
laws 	. 	. 	. 	of 	the 	State 	of 	New 	York.”).) 	The 	Court 	thus 	will
adhere 	to 	the 	Parties’ 	intent 	and 	assess 	Defendants’ 	liability
under New York law.
B. 	Breach of Contract against Roadlines (Count 1)
“To state a claim for breach of contract under New York law,
the complaint must allege: (i) the formation of a contract between
the 	parties; 	(ii) 	performance 	by 	the 	plaintiff; 	(iii) 	failure 	of
defendant 	to 	perform; 	and 	(iv) 	damages.” Orlander 	v. 	Staples,
Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation modified).
Flagstar 	has 	alleged 	sufficient 	facts 	to 	allege 	Roadlines
breached 	the 	Agreement 	and 	Note. 	On 	June 	18, 	2021, 	Flagstar 	and
Roadlines 	agreed 	to 	an 	ongoing 	financing 	arrangement 	in 	which
Flagstar 	would 	“make 	loans 	and 	advances 	to 	Roadlines 	. 	. 	. 	as
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evidenced 	by 	one 	or 	more 	promissory 	note(s)” 	to 	be 	repaid 	with
interest. 	(Compl. ¶ 8; Agreement § 1(a).) 	Pursuant to the Note,
Flagstar 	lent 	Roadlines 	a 	principal 	sum 	of 	$629,000, 	which
Roadlines 	agreed 	to 	repay 	over 	the 	course 	of 	48 	monthly 	payments
starting 	on 	July 	20, 	2021 	at 	an 	interest 	rate 	of 	4.75% 	per 	year.
(Compl. ¶ 10; Note at 1, §§ 2, 3.) 	In September of 2024, Roadlines
failed to make payments and defaulted. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 24; ECF No.
19-11 ¶ 14.) 	Because of Roadlines’ default, Flagstar alleges that
as 	of 	February 	6, 	2025, 	it 	was 	damaged 	in 	the 	amount 	of
$332,905.38. 	(Compl. 	¶ 	22.) 	Thus, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Flagstar
has 	sufficiently 	pleaded 	that 	Roadlines 	is 	liable 	for 	breach 	of
contract.
C. 	Breach of Guaranty against Mr. Randhawa (Count 2)
Under 	New 	York 	law, 	a 	breach 	of 	guaranty, 	requires 	“(1) 	an
absolute and unconditional guaranty, (2) the underlying debt, and
(3) the guarantor's failure to satisfy the unpaid debt.” CDS Bus.
Servs. Inc. v. Sebbag, No. 21-cv-1992 (JS) (ST), 2023 WL 7181646,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2023) (citation modified); see also Chem.
Bank v. Haseotes, 13 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
Here, 	Flagstar 	alleges 	that 	Flagstar 	is 	owed 	a 	debt 	from
Roadlines, (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, 28-29.); Mr. Randhawa “absolutely and
unconditionally” guaranteed payment of Roadlines’ debt, (Compl. ¶¶
14, 21; Guaranty at 1); and Mr. Randhawa has failed to pay, (Compl.
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¶ 	33.) 	Accordingly, 	Flagstar 	has 	sufficiently 	pled 	that 	Mr.
Randhawa is liable for breach of guaranty.
D. 	Possession as to both Defendants (Count 3)
Flagstar in Count Three requests possession of the Collateral
against 	Defendants 	but 	does 	not 	refer 	to 	any 	federal 	or 	state
statute 	or 	any 	other 	procedural 	mechanism 	to 	gain 	possession.
Flagstar 	appears 	to 	be 	alleging 	replevin, 	(see 	Compl. 	¶ 	1 	(“this
is 	an 	action 	. 	. 	. 	[for] 	replevin/possession”), 	or 	specific
performance for breach of the Agreement and Note. 	Flagstar fails
to allege “whether it is seeking the [Collateral] through a remedy
of 	specific 	performance 	under 	the 	[Agreement 	and 	Note], 	replevin
under 	California 	law, 	replevin 	under 	New 	York 	law, 	or 	some 	other
mechanism.”4 	Ascentium 	Cap. 	LLC 	v. 	Full 	Speed 	Auto 	Grp., 	Inc.,
No. 	22-cv-7559 	(DG) 	(SJB), 	2023 	WL 	6168277, 	at 	*7 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug.
28, 	2023). 	“Without 	such 	explanation—given 	the 	disparate
requirements for each of these mechanisms—the Court cannot at this
time grant this relief.” Id.
Flagstar has, moreover, failed to plead facts that establish
Defendants’ 	liability 	on 	Count 	Three 	as 	to 	replevin 	or 	specific
performance. 	“[A] 	replevin 	action 	must 	be 	brought 	in 	the
4 The Court also advises that in the case of a secured transaction,
Uniform 	Commercial 	Code 	§ 	9-609 	provides 	a 	“self-help” 	remedy 	by
which 	the 	secured 	creditor 	may 	peaceably 	take 	possession 	of 	the
collateral 	without 	the 	need 	for 	judicial 	intervention, 	but 	it 	is
unclear if Flagstar has attempted to exercise this remedy.
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jurisdiction in which the collateral is located.” 	Santander Bank,
N.A. 	v. 	Contreras, 	414 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	650, 	653 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2019)
(citation 	modified); 	see 	also 	Ascentium, 	2023 	WL 	6168277, 	at 	*8
(same); 	Encompass 	Aviation, 	LLC 	v. 	Surf 	Air 	Inc., 	No. 	18-cv-5530
(CM), 2018 WL 6713138, at *3–*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) 	(denying
replevin 	request 	because 	[t]he[] 	aircraft 	are 	located 	in
California” 	and 	“a 	New 	York 	court 	cannot 	replevy 	aircraft 	. 	. 	.
unless 	the 	aircraft 	are 	located 	in 	New 	York 	State.”). 	Flagstar
has 	not 	alleged 	that 	the 	Collateral 	is 	currently 	within 	this
Court’s jurisdiction.
CPLR § 7102 sets forth additional requirements for a replevin
claim. 	See 	Cahill 	v. 	McInnis, 	No. 	6-cv-4411 	(KNF), 	2007 	WL
1174827, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2007) (“Article 71 of the [CPLR],
rooted in the common-law action of replevin, governs the recovery
of chattel.”). 	Under CPLR § 7102(c), a plaintiff must provide an
affidavit 	which 	includes, 	inter 	alia, 	“the 	value 	of 	each 	chattel
or 	class 	of 	chattels 	claimed” 	and 	“if 	the 	plaintiff 	seeks 	the
inclusion 	in 	the 	order 	of 	seizure 	of 	a 	provision 	authorizing 	the
sheriff 	to 	. 	. 	. 	search 	for 	the 	chattel, 	the 	place 	where 	the
chattel is located.” 	Flagstar has not alleged where the Collateral
is located or the value of the Collateral, so there are no “well-
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pleaded allegations” that establish “[D]efendant[s’] liability” on
replevin. 	Trans World, 449 F.2d at 69.5
On 	specific 	performance, 	Flagstar 	has 	also 	failed 	to 	show
that 	the 	“remedies 	at 	law” 	such 	as 	an 	award 	of 	monetary 	damages
are 	“inadequate 	to 	accomplish 	substantial 	justice” 	such 	that 	the
“extraordinary 	equitable 	remedy 	of 	specific 	performance 	may 	be
ordered.” 	Lucente 	v. 	Int'l 	Bus. 	Machines 	Corp., 	310 	F.3d 	243,
262 	(2d 	Cir. 	2002) 	(citation 	modified) 	(holding 	district 	court’s
denial 	of 	request 	for 	specific 	performance 	was 	not 	error 	where
there was “no reason why . . . money damages would not adequately
compensate 	[the 	plaintiff] 	for 	[defendant]’s 	breach 	[of
contract]”).
Count 	Three 	is 	also 	duplicative 	of 	Flagstar’s 	request 	for
monetary 	damages. 	Count 	Three 	“arise[s] 	from 	the 	same 	facts 	...
and 	do[es] 	not 	allege 	distinct 	damages”. 	NetJets 	Aviation, 	Inc.
v. 	LHC 	Commc'ns, 	LLC, 	537 	F.3d 	168, 	175 	(2d 	Cir. 	2008) 	(citation
modified); 	see 	also 	Tache 	Co. 	N.V. 	v. 	Verma 	Gold 	& 	Diamond 	LLC,
5 	The 	common 	law 	action 	of 	replevin, 	or 	an 	order 	of 	seizure, 	is
also 	a 	“‘prejudgment 	quasi-provisional 	remedy.’” 	Imaging 	Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Digital Page, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00641 LEK, 2012 WL
913257, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012) (finding defendant’s liable
for breach of contract and guaranty but denying replevin claims in
a 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment) 	(quoting 	McKesson 	Automated
Healthcare, 	Inc. 	v. 	Brooklyn 	Hosp. 	Center, 	779 	N.Y.S.2d 	765, 	766
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.2004)); 	see 	also 	Ascentium, 	2023 	WL 	6168277, 	at 	*8
(discussing 	how 	“Federal 	Rule 	64 	provides 	for 	replevin, 	but 	only
as a pre-judgment remedy”).
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No. 	21-cv-03017 	(JMA)(AYS), 	2022 	WL 	198528, 	at 	*1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Jan.
20, 	2022) 	(dismissing 	replevin 	claim 	as 	duplicative 	of 	breach 	of
contract 	claim); 	Sea 	Tow 	Servs. 	Int'l, 	Inc. 	v. 	Tampa 	Bay 	Marine
Recovery, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 3d 91, 118-19 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (same).
Moreover, 	“[o]ne 	cannot 	have 	damages 	for 	the 	breach 	of 	contract,
and 	a 	decree 	also 	for 	its 	specific 	performance.” 	Slaughter 	v. 	La
Compagnie 	Francaises 	Des 	Cables 	Telegraphiques, 	119 	F. 	588, 	588–
89 (2d Cir. 1902); see also Rhodes v. Davis, 628 F. App'x 787, 791
(2d 	Cir. 	2015) 	(summary 	order) 	(Specific 	performance 	is 	“an
equitable remedy for a breach of contract, rather than a separate
cause 	of 	action.”)(citation 	modified); 	Hadcock 	Motors, 	Inc. 	v.
Metzger, 92 A.D.2d 1, 4 (4th Dep't 1983) (“Specific performance is
a 	discretionary 	remedy 	which 	is 	an 	alternative 	to 	the 	award 	of
damages as a means of enforcing a contract.”).
Accordingly, Flagstar’s Motions for default judgment on Count
Three are respectfully denied.
IV. 	Damages
“[I]t is well established that ‘[w]hile a party's default is
deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations
of 	liability, 	it 	is 	not 	considered 	an 	admission 	of 	damages.’ 	”
Cement 	& 	Concrete 	Workers 	Dist. 	Council 	Welfare 	Fund 	v. 	Metro
Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Greyhound 	Exhibitgroup, 	Inc. 	v. 	E.L.U.L. 	Realty 	Corp., 	973 	F.2d
155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). “There must be an evidentiary basis for
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the damages sought by plaintiff, and a district court may determine
there is sufficient evidence either based upon evidence presented
at 	a 	hearing 	or 	upon 	a 	review 	of 	detailed 	affidavits 	and
documentary evidence.” Id. (citing Rule 55(b)(2)). 	Flagstar “must
prove 	its 	damages 	to 	a 	‘reasonable 	certainty’—the 	defendants’
default 	does 	not 	relieve 	the 	plaintiff 	of 	this 	burden.” 	Liberty
Mut. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Luxury 	Transp. 	Management 	Inc., 	No. 	07-CV-0608,
2009 	WL 	1033177, 	at 	*6 	(E.D.N.Y. 	April 	16, 	2009) 	(quoting 	Credit
Lyonnais Sec. (USA) Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.
1999)).
Flagstar 	has 	failed 	to 	provide 	the 	Court 	with 	sufficient
supporting 	documentation 	and 	explanation 	regarding 	the 	damages
sought. 	Plaintiff’s February 7, 2025 Complaint alleges that as of
February 	6, 	2025, 	a 	sum 	of 	“$332,905.38 	was 	due 	and 	owing,
inclusive 	of 	late 	fees 	and 	default 	interest” 	under 	the 	Note 	and
Guaranty, 	and 	merely 	lists 	various 	sections 	of 	the 	Agreement 	and
Note 	regarding 	late 	fees, 	acceleration, 	and 	interest 	rates.
(Compl. 	¶¶ 	19-22, 	28, 	35). 	Plaintiff’s 	July 	22, 	2025 	Randhawa
Mot. subsequently alleges that as of July 21, 2025, Plaintiff was
owed 	“$347,925.33 	in 	damages 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	Note, 	inclusive
of late fees and interest,” (ECF No. 14-11 ¶ 18), and “pre-judgment
interest at the default rate of interest of 10.75% per annum” from
July 	22, 	2025, 	(ECF 	No. 	14-9 	at 	2.) 	Plaintiff’s 	August 	28, 	2025
Roadlines 	Mot. 	alleges 	that 	as 	of 	August 	26, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	was
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owed “$351,202.41 with respect to the Note, inclusive of late fees
and 	interest,” 	(ECF 	No. 	19-11 	¶ 	15), 	but 	Flagstar’s 	Proposed
Judgment 	states 	that 	as 	of 	August 	27, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	is 	due
$351,293.44 in principal, late fees, and interest, (ECF No. 19-17
at 	2). 	The 	Proposed 	Judgment 	in 	the 	Roadlines 	Mot. 	also 	states
that 	Flagstar 	is 	owed 	“pre-judgment 	interest 	at 	the 	default 	rate
of interest of 10.75% per annum” from August 27, 2025. 	(Id.)
However, nowhere in the Complaint or the Motions does Flagstar
explain 	how 	it 	arrived 	at 	its 	damages 	calculation 	or 	provide 	any
documentary 	evidence 	regarding: 	(i) 	any 	invoices, 	prior 	payments
or 	transaction 	history 	regarding 	the 	Note 	to 	establish 	the
remaining principal upon default; (ii) the dates of default or any
acceleration 	demands 	and 	the 	outstanding 	principal 	and 	interest
due, if applicable, on such dates; and (iii) generally what portion
of 	the 	damages 	alleged 	is 	attributable 	to 	principal, 	late 	fees,
and 	accrued 	interest 	and 	how 	such 	amounts 	were 	calculated. 	See
Ally 	Fin. 	Inc. 	v. 	Comfort 	Auto 	Grp. 	NY 	LLC, 	No. 	20-cv-1281 	(MKB)
(RLM), 2022 WL 3703955, at *9-*15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022), report
and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	No. 	20-cv-1281 	(MKB) 	(RLM), 	2022 	WL
4813505 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2022) (using such information to analyze
damages sought).
Flagstar 	also 	failed 	to 	allege 	any 	details 	regarding 	any
communications with Mr. Randhawa regarding the Guaranty. 	Without
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such 	information, 	the 	Court 	is 	unable 	to 	determine 	if 	there 	is
sufficient evidence to support Flagstar’s claimed damages.
The 	Court 	thus 	finds 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	meet 	its
burden 	in 	establishing 	that 	there 	is 	a 	basis 	for 	the 	damages
claimed 	and 	denies 	Flagstar’s 	request 	for 	damages 	without
prejudice. 	In 	any 	renewed 	request, 	Flagstar 	shall 	provide 	the
Court 	with 	a 	detailed 	affidavit 	or 	affidavits 	setting 	forth 	the
basis of the damages requested, as well as any relevant documentary
evidence.
V. 	Pre-Judgment Interest
Flagstar 	also 	requests 	prejudgment 	interest 	at 	a 	rate 	of
10.75% 	per 	year. 	(See 	ECF 	Nos. 	14, 	14-9 	at 	2, 	19, 	19-17 	at 	2).
As an initial matter, the Court is unable to calculate pre-judgment
interest 	because 	it 	is 	unable 	to 	ascertain 	the 	amount 	of 	damages
with reasonable certainty. 	The Court also advises that under New
York 	law, 	pre-judgment 	interest 	is 	calculated 	“from 	the 	earliest
ascertainable date the cause of action existed ... to the date the
verdict 	was 	rendered 	or 	the 	report 	or 	decision 	was 	made.” 	CPLR
§ 5001(b)–(c). Courts calculate the “earliest ascertainable date”
as 	the 	date 	of 	the 	contract 	breach. 	See 	Guilbert 	v. 	Gardner, 	480
F.3d 	140, 	149 	(2d 	Cir. 	2007) 	(holding 	that 	“cause 	of 	action 	for
breach 	of 	contract 	ordinarily 	accrues 	and 	the 	limitations 	period
begins 	to 	run 	upon 	breach”). 	“Where 	damages 	were 	incurred 	at
various times, interest shall be computed upon each item from the
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date 	it 	was 	incurred 	or 	upon 	all 	of 	the 	damages 	from 	a 	single
reasonable 	intermediate 	date.” 	CareandWear 	II, 	Inc. 	v. 	Nexcha
L.L.C., 	581 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	553, 	558 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2022) 	(citing 	CPLR 	§
5001(b)).
Plaintiff’s 	Motions, 	however, 	fail 	to 	identify 	the 	date
Roadlines breached the Note and Agreement and the date Mr. Randhawa
breached 	the 	Guaranty. 	Accordingly, 	Flagstar’s 	request 	for 	pre-
judgment 	interest 	is 	denied 	without 	prejudice, 	and 	Flagstar 	is
directed 	to 	include 	in 	any 	renewed 	request 	the 	information
necessary to calculate pre-judgment interest.
VI. 	Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs’ 	request 	for 	fees 	and 	costs 	is 	premature 	because
damages must still be determined. 	Accordingly, the Court reserves
judgment on this request. See Pasatieri v. Starline Prods., Inc.,
No. 	18 	CV 	4688, 	2020 	WL 	207352, 	at 	*6 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Jan 	14, 	2020)
(refraining 	from 	analyzing 	costs 	where 	plaintiff 	did 	not 	provide
sufficient evidence to support the claim for actual damages); Suk
v. 	Tastemakers 	Glob., 	Inc., 	No. 	19CV6043RPKRML, 	2020 	WL 	7774705,
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2020), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 	19CV6043RPKRML, 	2020 	WL 	7770978 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Dec. 	30, 	2020)
(same).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Roadlines Mot. for default
judgment as to breach of contract (Count 1) and the Randhawa Mot.
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for default judgment as to breach of guaranty (Count 2) are GRANTED
as to liability. 	The Motions for default judgment on Count Three
are DENIED as to possession (Count 3) and DENIED without prejudice
to 	refiling 	as 	to 	damages, 	including 	pre-judgment 	interest, 	and
attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff 	is 	directed 	to 	serve 	this 	Order 	on 	Defendants 	and
note service on the docket by March 11, 2026.
Plaintiff shall submit a supplemental memorandum, accompanied
by 	affidavits 	and 	evidence 	explaining 	its 	claimed 	damages, 	and
updated proposed orders by April 1, 2026.
Specifically, 	Plaintiff 	should 	submit 	an 	affidavit 	from 	a
person with personal knowledge, along with additional documentary
evidence, 	which 	more 	precisely 	establishes 	(1) 	the
payment/transaction history on the Agreement, Note, and Guaranty;
(2) the date of default as to Roadlines and the date of breach of
Guaranty 	as 	to 	Mr. 	Randhawa 	and 	the 	principal, 	accrued 	interest,
and 	late 	fees 	due 	upon 	such 	dates; 	(3) 	the 	dates 	and 	details 	of
any 	acceleration 	on 	the 	amounts 	due 	and 	the 	principal, 	accrued
interest, 	and 	late 	fees 	due 	upon 	such 	dates; 	(4) 	generally 	how
Flagstar 	is 	calculating 	the 	principal, 	late 	fees, 	and 	accrued
interest; (5) the earliest ascertainable date each cause of action
existed, for purposes of calculating prejudgment interest; and (6)
any 	other 	documentary 	evidence 	or 	sworn 	statements 	that 	would
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assist 	the 	Court 	in 	ascertaining 	the 	amount 	of 	damages 	with
reasonable certainty.
So ordered.
Dated: 	March 10, 2026
Brooklyn, New York 	_______________________________
Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
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