Carbone v. Limited Run Games Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JOHN CARBONE, RYAN ADKINS,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, 	MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against- 	24-cv-08861 (JMW)
LIMITED RUN GAMES, INC.,
Defendant.
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WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiffs John Carbone (“Carbone”) and Ryan Adkins (“Adkins” and collectively, the
“Plaintiffs”) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, commenced this class
action against Defendant Limited Run Games, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Limited Run Games” and
collectively, the “Parties”) alleging violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), 18
U.S.C. § 2710. (See generally, ECF Nos. 1, 11.) Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendant
caused Plaintiffs’ personally identifiable information to be sent to Facebook and other third
parties without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent. (ECF No. 11 at ¶ 9.) On August 21, 2025, this
Court preliminarily approved the Class Action Settlement and conditionally certified the Class1
1 The Class Members are “[a]ll persons who accessed the Limited Run Games Service in the United
States and watched a pre-recorded video or purchased a video game containing a ‘Cut Scene’ between
January 1, 2016 and June 20, 2025.” (ECF No. 28-1 at 6.) The following are excluded from the Class,
(1) the Judge or Magistrate Judge presiding over this Action and members of their families;
(2) the Defendant, its subsidiaries, parent companies, successors, predecessors, and any
entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or
former officers, directors, agents, attorneys, and employees; (3) persons who properly
execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class; and (4) the legal
representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons.
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for settlement purposes. (See ECF Nos. 16, 21). Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for
attorneys’ fees, costs, expenses, and individual service awards (ECF No. 23), as well as
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Settlement Approval (ECF No. 28). Both motions are unopposed. A
Fairness Hearing2 was held on March 11, 2026, and no objections to the Settlement were heard
or filed. (See Electronic Order dated 3/11/2026.) For the reasons stated on the record at the
Fairness Hearing and those set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motions (ECF Nos. 23, 28) are
GRANTED,3 and the settlement is approved.
THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
Settlement Amount and Other Relief
The total settlement amount is $2,720,000.00 (“Settlement Fund”). (ECF No. 28-1 at 2.)
This amount covers Class Member awards for those who timely submitted valid claims, “after
deduction of Court-approved attorneys’ fees and costs, service awards, [] notice and
administration expenses.”4 (Id.) Each Member receives their “pro-rata share” of the Settlement
Fund. (Id.)
(Id. at n.1.)
2 A Fairness Hearing is the final step prior to settlement approval, where the Court provides members
with the opportunity to be heard and object, and ensures that the settlement is fair and reasonable. See
What's Market: Process of Settling Class Actions, Practical Law Practice Note w-000-4398; Settling Class
Actions: Process and Procedure, Practical Law Practice Note 3-541-8765.
3 Familiarity with the procedural history and background of this action is assumed herein. The Court
points the reader to ECF Nos. 16 and 21, for a full recitation of the factual and procedural histories. In
addition, the parties have consented to the undersigned for all purposes. (See ECF Nos. 24-25.)
4 Kroll in support of final approval provides that “[a]s of February 19, 2026, Kroll has billed $93,219.04
for Settlement Administration Expenses incurred in the administration of this matter, which includes
media costs. Kroll estimates that it will bill an additional $75,000 to $85,000 to complete the
administration of this Settlement. The current estimate is subject to change depending on factors such as
the number of Claim Forms remaining to be reviewed and/or any Settlement administration scope change
not currently under consideration. This estimate is based on Kroll’s many years of experience
administering class action settlements” (ECF No. 28-3 at 6.)
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In addition, upon final approval,
Defendant shall not knowingly resume operation of the Meta Pixel, TikTok tracking
technologies, Google tracking technologies, or the X pixel (formerly Twitter) on
any portion of the Limited Run Games Service accessible in the United States to
disclose to third parties the specific video content requested or obtained by a
specific individual, unless and until the VPPA is amended, repealed, or otherwise
invalidated, or unless Defendant first obtains VPPA-compliant consent.
(Id. at 7.)
Notice
Kroll LLC (“Kroll”), the Settlement Administrator, previously and preliminarily
approved by the Court, has provided “direct notice … via email and, where appropriate, postal
mail, reaching the vast majority of identifiable Settlement Class Members.” (ECF No. 28-1 at 3.)
The following numbers illustrate the efforts made by Kroll to reach the class—“24,092
Settlement Class Members submitted timely Claim Forms, and 3,772 additional Claim Forms
were accepted but untimely. This means a total of 27,864 claims have been accepted.” (Id.) There
are roughly 600 claims under review, and there have been only seventeen requests to opt-out.
(Id.)
Class Member Release
In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the “Releasing Parties” 5 “shall be deemed
to have fully, finally, and forever released and discharged the “Released Parties” 6 “from any and
5 “Releasing Parties” refers to “Plaintiffs, those Settlement Class Members who do not timely opt out of
the Settlement Class, and all of their respective present or past or future heirs, executors, estates,
administrators, predecessors, successors, assigns, parent companies, subsidiaries, associates, affiliates,
employers, employees, agents, consultants, independent contractors, insurers, directors, managing
directors, officers, partners, principals, members, attorneys, accountants, financial and other advisors,
underwriters, shareholders, lenders, auditors, investment advisors, legal representatives, successors in
interest, assigns and companies, firms, trusts, and corporations.” (ECF No. 15-9 at § 1.28.)
6 “Released Parties” refers to “Defendant Limited Run Games, Inc., as well as any and all of its respective
present or past or future heirs, executors, estates, administrators, predecessors, successors, assigns, parent
companies, sister companies, subsidiaries, divisions, licensors, licensees, associates, affiliates, employers,
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all claims, demands, causes of action, damages, or liabilities of any kind whatsoever, whether
known or unknown, accrued or unaccrued, suspected or unsuspected, arising out of or relating to
the alleged disclosure, interception, use, or transfer of information through the use of the Meta
Pixel or other pixels, cookies, tracking, or analytics technologies on the Limited Run Games
Service.” (ECF No. 15-9 at §§ 1.26, 3.) These claims include any under the VPPA, and any other
claims that could have been asserted in this action. (Id.)
Allocation of Settlement Fund and Fees
Following final approval,
Defendant shall pay or cause to be paid into the Escrow Account the amount of the
Settlement Fund ($2,720,000.00 USD), … within thirty (30) days after the later of
(a) Preliminary Approval; and (b) Defendant’s receipt of the payee’s name, address
for payment, and Form W-9. Settlement Class Members shall have until the Claims
Deadline to submit an Approved Claim. Each Settlement Class Member with an
Approved Claim shall be entitled to a pro rata portion of the Settlement Fund by
electronic payment method approved by the Settlement Administrator or check
after deducting the Settlement Administration Expenses, any Fee Award, and any
incentive award, provided that they satisfy the criteria for the cash payment portion
set out in the definition of Approved Claim. The Settlement Administrator shall pay
from the Settlement Fund all Approved Claims by (i) electronic payment method
approved by the Settlement Administrator or (ii) check with said checks being sent
via first class U.S. mail to the Settlement Class Members who submitted such
Approved Claims. Payments to all Settlement Class Members with Approved
Claims shall be made within ninety (90) days after the Effective Date.
All cash payments issued to Settlement Class Members via check will state on the
face of the check that it will expire and become null and void unless cashed within
one hundred eighty (180) days after the date of issuance. To the extent that any
checks issued to a Settlement Class Member are not cashed within one hundred
eighty (180) days after the date of issuance, such uncashed check funds shall be
redistributed on a pro rata basis (after first deducting any necessary settlement
administration expenses from such uncashed check funds) to all Settlement Class
Members who cashed checks during the initial distribution, but only to the extent
employees, agents, consultants, independent contractors, insurers, reinsurers, directors, managing
directors, officers, partners, vendors, joint ventures, principals, members, attorneys, accountants, financial
and other advisors, underwriters, shareholders, lenders, auditors, investment advisors, legal
representatives, successors in interest, assigns and companies, firms, trusts, and corporations.” (Id. at ¶
1.27.)
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each Settlement Class Member would receive at least $10.00 in any such secondary
distribution and if otherwise feasible.
(ECF No. 15-9 at 9-10.)
ANALYSIS
This Court previously found that Rule 23 was satisfied and certified the Class for
settlement purposes. (See ECF Nos. 16, 21.) Likewise, the conditional approval of the collective
action was granted. (Id.) The basis for approval and certification remains the same at this stage.
See In re GSE Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 19-CV-1704 (JSR), 2020 WL 3250593, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2020) (“The Court in its opinion and orders providing the basis for its preliminary
approval of the five settlements has already explained in detail why the Rule 23 and Grinnell
factors support approval of each of the settlements. The Court re-adopts that analysis here….”)
Rather, the focus now at this final stage is fairness, reasonableness, and whether the settlement is
adequate. See id. (“Because these subsequent developments only further support the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlements, the Court gives its final approval to all five
settlements.”) Thus, for settlement purposes only, the Class and Collective are certified.
Approval of the Class Settlement
[T]o grant final approval of a Settlement, the Court must determine whether the
Proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. Fairness is determined upon
review of both the terms of the settlement agreement and the negotiating process
that led to such agreement. Courts examine procedural and substantive fairness in
light of the strong judicial policy favoring settlements of class action suits.
Spagnuoli v. Louie's Seafood Rest., LLC, No. 13-CV-4907 (JMA) (ARL), 2018 WL 7413304, at
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Rule 23(e)(2) provides certain factors for the court to consider upon approval.
Specifically, whether:
(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
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class;
(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length;
(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the
class, including the method of processing class-member claims;
(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of
payment;
(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and
(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
Prior to the 2018 amendment, Rule 23(e)(2) the Second Circuit examined “the fairness,
adequacy, and reasonableness of a class settlement according to the ‘Grinnell factors.’” Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005); see City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds, Goldberger v.
Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000). Now, the four Rule 23(e)(2) factors are the
“procedural considerations and substantive qualities that should always matter to the decision
whether to approve [a settlement] proposal.” Moses v. New York Times Co., 79 F.4th 235, 243 (2d
Cir. 2023). These factors do not displace the “traditional” Grinnell factors. Therefore, the Court
must review the factors outlined in Rule 23(e)(2) in conjunction with the Grinnell factors. Id.;
see Ramon Hernandez, et al., v. Between the Bread 55th Inc., et. al., No. 17-CV-9541 (LJL), 2021
WL 12279220, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2021) (“Additionally, courts in the Second Circuit
consider the factors set forth in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir.
1974), to determine whether the standards of Rule 23(e)(2) have been met.”) The Grinnell
factors include:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation;
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(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement;
(3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed;
(4) the risks of establishing liability;
(5) the risks of establishing damages;
(6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial;
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment;
(8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible
recovery; and
(9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in
light of all the attendant risks of litigation.
Id.
The “Rule 23(e)(2) factors [] add to, rather than displace, the Grinnell factors. In re
Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 F.R.D. 11, 29 (E.D.N.Y.
2019). Indeed, there is significant overlap between the two sets of factors. Id. Both sets of
factors are considered below.
i. 	Adequate Representation by Class Representative and Class Counsel
As set forth in this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order (ECF No. 21 at 3, 11-12),
Plaintiffs and Co-Class Counsel remain adequate representation for the Class, as circumstances
at this time are unchanged. Plaintiffs’ interest is adequately aligned with the Class members, as
Plaintiffs shares the same claims, and Plaintiff has played a large role in assisting Class Counsel
with this matter since its inception. (ECF No. 21 at 10-11.) Likewise, Plaintiffs’ counsel, are
sufficiently experienced and qualified to represent the class. (ECF No. 28-1 at 10-11.) Class
Counsel has expended numerous hours on this matter and has handled hundreds of similar cases.
(ECF No. 23-1 at 16.) This factor remains in favor of granting final approval.
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Accordingly, the Court confirms the appointment of Plaintiffs as Class Representatives,
as well as Gucovschi Rozenshteyn, PLLC (“GR”) and Levi & Korsinsky LLP (“Levi”) as Class
Counsel for settlement purposes.
ii. 	Arms-Length Negotiations After Meaningful Discovery
At this final stage, “Rule 23(e)(2) prohibits courts from applying a presumption of
fairness to a settlement agreement based on its negotiation at arm's length.” Moses, 79 F.4th at
243. Rather, the Court “must pay close attention to the negotiating process, to ensure that the
settlement resulted from arm's-length negotiations.” Marin v. 310 Bowery Grp. LLC, No. 24-
CV-1340 (SLC), 2025 WL 2267785, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025) (internal citations omitted).
This factor addresses the same substance as Grinnell Factor 3 (the stage of the proceedings and
the amount of discovery completed).
Here, the parties did negotiate at arms-length. Indeed, extensive settlement discussions
were had with the assistance of mediator, Justice Robert Dondero (Ret.) of JAMS, 7 leading to
the settlement. (ECF No. 28-1 at 2.) Plaintiffs aver that the settlement only occurred after the
meaningful formal mediation as well as further mediation statements addressing the legal issues,
positions and risks. (Id. at 4) This factor weighs in favor of final approval. See Buchanan v. Pay-
O-Matic Check Cashing Corp., No. 18-CV-885 (FB) (SMG), 2020 WL 8642081 at *6–7
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2020).
iii. 	Adequate Relief for the Class
The Court is required to consider whether the settlement provides adequate relief to the
putative class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(3)(2)(C). This includes a consideration of “(i) the costs,
risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing
7 The Court recognizes and appreciates the good work and efforts of Justice Robert Dondero (Ret.) in
helping resolve the dispute.
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relief to the class ...; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees ...; and (iv) any
agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3).” Id. As set forth in this Court’s
Preliminary Approval Order (ECF No. 21 at 19-20), the above factors to be considered are
evaluated in tandem with the applicable Grinnell factors.
a. 	Costs, Risks, and Delay of Trial and Appeal
This Rule 23(e)(2) factor “subsumes several Grinnell factors,” including the complexity,
expense and likely duration of litigation (Grinnell Factor 1), risks of establishing liability
(Grinnell Factor 4), the risks of establishing damages (Grinnell Factor 5), and the risks of
maintaining the class through trial (Grinnell Factor 6). See Mikhlin v. Oasmia Pharm. AB, No.
19-CV-4349 (NGG)(RER), 2021 WL 1259559, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting In re Payment
Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 F.R.D. at 36.) “Class action suits
have a well-deserved reputation as being most complex.” Rosenfeld v. Lenich, No. 18-CV-6720
(NGG)(PK), 2021 WL 508339, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2021). This case is no exception.
Here, it is apparent that prolonging litigation would only generate additional cost and
delay. If the case proceeded, there would have been extensive motion practice to dismiss, class
certification, and summary judgment, all of which would be costly. (See ECF No. 15-1 at 8.) The
risk of not receiving class certification or any recovery also weighs in favor of approving
settlement. (See id.) Notably, VVPA claims are not as common and create a significant risk to
Plaintiffs if trial proceeded. (Id. at 9; 23-1 at 10.) Additionally, Defendant denies any wrongdoing
and does not believe that Plaintiffs can support their claims. (ECF No. 23-1 at 2.) Proceeding to
trial or protracted proceedings in this matter would result in substantial disputes over damages,
thereby exposing the Class to significant risk and expenses. Taking into account the risks, costs
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and delay of trial and possible appeal, the Court finds this factor to weigh heavily in favor of
final settlement approval. See Rosenfeld, 2021 WL 508339 at *5.
b. 	Effectiveness of the Proposed Method of Distributing Relief to the Class
An adequate distribution method is one that can “deter or defeat unjustified claims”
without imposing an undue demand on class members. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee's note to 2018 amendment). The method “need not be perfect,” but rather merely
needs to have a reasonable, rational basis, especially when recommended by experienced
counsel. Id. (quoting In re EVCI Career Colleges Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 05-cv-10240
(CM), 2007 WL 2230177, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007)); see also In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 288 F. Supp. 2d 319, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Here, Kroll, as the Class Administrator, was provided with a list of “358,383 available
names, email addresses, and addresses of potential Settlement Class Members.” (ECF No. 28-1
at 20.) The notices were emailed and/or sent via postcard notice, as approved by the Court,
reaching “98.95%” of the Class. (Id.) Kroll provides a helpful chart to summarize the notices.
(ECF No. 28-3 at 5.)
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Indeed, at the Fairness Hearing, Class Counsel confirmed the Notice Program and the
process thereto. All cash payments will be sent within ninety (90) days of final approval. (See
ECF No. 15-9 at § 2.) The cash payments issued to the Settlement Class Members will state on
the face of the check that they will expire and become null and void after one hundred eighty
(180) days after the date of issuance. (Id.) Kroll will also have the responsibility of processing
the payment of Approved Claims to the Settlement Class (Id. at § 1.30.) Therefore, the
undersigned finds this factor to weigh in favor of approval.
c. 	Terms of Any Proposed Attorneys’ Fees
Class Counsel seeks an award of 33.3% ($906,666.67)8, representing a third of the
Settlement Amount. (ECF No. 28-1 at 8; see also ECF No. 23.) “[I]t is very common to see 33%
contingency fees in cases with funds of less than $10 million.” In re Payment Card Interchange
Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 991 F. Supp. 2d 437, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). “Courts in this
Circuit routinely find that requests for attorney's fees totaling one-third of the settlement fund are
well within the range of reasonableness.” Rosenfeld, 2021 WL 508339 at *6 (quotes omitted)
(collecting cases); Cohan v. Columbia Sussex Mgmt., LLC, No. 12-CV-3203 (AKT), 2018 WL
4861391, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
Here, the proposed request for attorneys’ fees limited to one-third of the Settlement
Amount is well within the range of reasonableness. Azogue v. 16 for 8 Hosp. LLC, No. 13-CV-
7899, 2016 WL 4411422, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Yuzary v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No.
12 CIV. 3693 PGG, 2013 WL 5492998, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Class Counsel’s request for
8 Upon review of the instant motions, it appears that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees includes a sum of
$906,666.00, whereas the Motion for Final Approval states a sum of $906,666.67. One-third of the
settlement fund is $906,666.67, which is the amount the Court will use.
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one-third of the Fund is reasonable and ‘consistent with the norms of class litigation in this
circuit.’”)). Therefore, the undersigned finds this factor weighs in favor of approval.
d. 	Any Agreement Required to be Identified under Rule 23(e)(3)
This factor requires the Court to consider any agreements made in connection with the
proposed settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3). Plaintiffs aver that no such agreement exists
apart from the Settlement. (ECF No. 28-1 at 13.) However, the Court must review the provisions
within the Settlement Agreement. As accepted in the preliminary review, and pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement, the parties have agreed that the Class Representatives may receive,
subject to Court approval, incentive or service awards of up to $2,500. (ECF No. 15-9 at § 8.3.)
With two Class Representatives, Carbone and Adkins, the total amount of $5,000 taken from the
Settlement Fund is more than reasonable. Service payments have routinely been awarded to
named plaintiffs. See e.g., Campbell v. Bukhari Grp. LLC, No. 22-CV-2813 (PK), 2025 WL
1874485, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2025) (preliminary approving service award) (“Courts
routinely grant requests for service awards in federal class actions”); Buchanan, 2020 WL
8642081, at *8 (“‘incentive’ or ‘service’” award[s] [are] not uncommon in class action cases and
[are] ‘meant to compensate the named plaintiff for any personal risk incurred by the individual or
any additional effort expended by the individual for the benefit of the lawsuit’”) Cohan, 2018
WL 4861391, at *6 (“Service awards are common in class action cases”).
Further, as it relates to the Settlement Agreement's release provisions, “[a] settlement
cannot be fair, reasonable and adequate if the Class-wide release is overbroad.” Oladapo v. Smart
One Energy, LLC, No. 14-CV-7117 (LTS) (BCM), 2017 WL 5956907, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-7117 (LTS)(BCM), 2017 WL 5956770
(S.D.N.Y. 2017). The Settlement Agreement provides that each Class Member agrees to release
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the Releasees “of all arising out of any facts, transactions, events, matters occurrences, acts,
disclosures, statements, representations, omissions or failures to act regarding the alleged
disclosure, use, interception or transfer of information of or related to the Settlement Class
Members through use of the Meta Pixel, or other pixels, cookies, or tracking or analytics tools on
the Limited Run Game Service.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 5.) This release language is directed at the
conduct that occurred with disclosure of the members’ PII and as such, is limited to those claims.
Therefore, it is not overbroad.
Accordingly, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approval.
iv. 	Equitable Treatment of Class members Relative to One Another
This factor calls the Court to consider whether the proposed settlement “treats class
members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In other words, “whether
the apportionment of relief among class members takes appropriate account of differences
among their claims, and whether the scope of the release may affect class members in different
ways that bear on the apportionment of relief.” 2018 Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(e)(2)(D).
The Settlement Agreement as discussed supra, each Class Member receives a “pro-rata”
share of the Settlement Fund when Kroll issues their checks. See Meredith Corp v. SESAC, LLC,
87 F.Supp.3d 650, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that a pro rata allocation plan “appear[ed] to
treat the class members equitably… and has the benefit of simplicity”); Cymbalista v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 20-CV-456 (RPK)(LB), 2021 WL 7906584, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)
(same); see also Jackson v. Ampac Paper, LLC, No. 22-CV-3120 (NSR) (JCM), 2025 WL
2346065 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (stating that pro rata distributions of a net settlement
amount is evidence of equitable treatment). Plaintiffs aver “all Class Members have suffered the
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same injuries with little to no difference in injuries between individual Class Members.” (ECF
No. 28-1 at 13.) Further the scope of the release applies uniformly to all Class Members. Thus,
this factor weighs in favor of approval.
v. 	Ability of Defendants to Withstand Greater Judgment
This is Grinnell Factor 7, which “does not fit neatly within any of the factors enumerated
in Rule 23(e)(2)(C) but adds value to the Court's analysis.” Cymbalista, 2021 WL 7906584, at
*10. The principle underlying this factor is that if a defendant could not withstand a judgment
greater than the amount provided for in the settlement, the settlement is more likely to be
reasonable, fair, and adequate. Flores v. CGI Inc., No. 22-CV-350 (KHP), 2022 WL 13804077,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2022).
As previously found in the preliminary approval,
Plaintiffs contend that they are unaware whether the Defendant could withstand a
greater judgment. (ECF No. 15-1 at 11.) As mentioned, the Parties have agreed to
settle for $2,720,000.00. Although the agreed upon payment is relatively large, it is
less so when considering the size of the Settlement Class. Therefore, this factor is
neutral. However, as Plaintiffs point out, a “defendant[’s] ability to withstand a
greater judgment, standing alone, does not suggest that the settlement is unfair.”
Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 874 F.Supp.2d 179, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Carbone v. Ltd. Run Games, Inc., No. 24-CV-08861 (NJC) (JMW), 2025 WL 3481450, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2025).
vi. 	Reaction of the Class
“‘It is well-settled that the reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the most
significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.’” Schutter v. Tarena Int’l, Inc., No
21-CV-3502 (PKC), 2024 WL 4118465 at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2024) (quoting Maley v. Del
Glob. Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). In evaluating Grinnell Factor 2,
“[c]ourts have found this factor to weigh in favor of approval where the majority of class
members have not objected to or opted out of a settlement.” In re Sinus Buster Prods. Consumer
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Litig., No. 12-CV-2429 (ADS) (AKT), 2014 WL 5819921, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2014). Here,
out of the 358,383 known Class Members, of which 98.95% received direct notice, only
seventeen timely mailed exclusions, and no objections were filed by the notice deadline of
January 20, 2026. (ECF No. 28-3 at 6.) Indeed, no objections were filed by the deadline date of
January 20, 2026, nor were any objections presented at the Fairness Hearing. Therefore, the
Court finds this factor to weigh heavily in favor of approval of this Settlement.
vii. 	Reasonableness of the Settlement
Grinnell Factors 8 and 9 require the Court to consider the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery and the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. These two
factors are often combined for the purposes of analysis. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee &
Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 F.R.D. at 47–48.
Determining whether a settlement amount is reasonable does not necessarily involve “a
mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum.” Henry v. Little Mint, Inc., No. 12-CV-
3996 (CM), 2014 WL 2199427, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Rather, it considers a range of
reasonableness which recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact and the accompanying costs of
litigation. Id. For instance, a settlement which allows Class Members to be immediately paid is
reasonable even if it means sacrificing a hypothetically larger amount if the matter were to
proceed. Id.
The Settlement Fund is $2,720,000. The Class will receive their settlement payments
shortly after the final approval and “will yield a significant benefit to each of the participating
Class Members.” Carbone, 2025 WL 3481450, at *13. “[S]ettlements have been approved as
reasonable where the settlement provides a ‘meaningful benefit’ to the class.” In re 3D Sys. Sec.
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Litig., No. 21-CV-1920 (NGG)(TAM), 2024 WL 50909, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2024) (internal
citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]his method is undoubtedly sooner than if each Class Member
waited to receive payment after trial, assuming they were successful.” Abarza v. Spirit Pharms.
LLC, No. 23-CV-03637 (JMW), 2025 WL 1519147, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2025). It therefore
follows that if the Class were to continue litigation, it may be subject to motion practice (i.e.,
motion to dismiss, summary judgment) and the other uncertainties that could ensue. See Schutter,
2024 WL 4118465, at *12 (“Given the many legal and factual uncertainties involved in litigation,
this factor favors settlement approval.”) This settlement amount reflects a balance of the strength
of the Class Members’ claims versus the risk of trial and thus appears to fall within the “range of
reasonableness” set out in the eighth and ninth Grinnell factors. See Henry, 2014 WL 2199427
at *10.
Considering the foregoing, the Court grants final settlement approval.
D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
In class actions, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs “that are
authorized by law or by the parties' agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). In addition, Rule
23(e)(2)(C)(iii) also requires the Court to look at “the terms of any proposed award of attorney's
fees,” which includes the timing of such payments. In re PPDAI Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 18-
CV-6716 (TAM), 2022 WL 198491, at *14 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(2)(C)(iii)). “Under Rule 23(h), district courts have discretion to choose between the
‘lodestar’ and the ‘percentage of the fund method’ for assessing the reasonableness of attorney's
fees, although the trend in the Second Circuit is towards the latter method.” Caccavale v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 20-CV-974 (NJC) (ST), 2025 WL 2960237, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20,
2025) (citing McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2010)). “Under a
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lodestar analysis, courts ‘calculate[ ] a given attorney[’s] fee by multiplying an attorney's
reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours that the attorney spent on the case.”’ Fresno Cnty.
Employees’ Ret. Ass'n v. Isaacson/Weaver Fam. Tr., 925 F.3d 63, 67 n.2 (2d Cir. 2019). The
Second Circuit encourages district courts to do a lodestar cross-check if the percentage method is
used. See C.K. through P.K. v. McDonald, No. 22-CV-1791 (NJC) (JMW), 2026 WL 220984, at
*25 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2026). Irrespective of which method is chosen, the Court must analyze
the proposed award of fees with the following well-known Goldberger factors: (1) the time and
labor expended by counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of
the litigation; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement;
and (6) public policy considerations. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir.
2000); Hasemann v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 15-CV-2995(EK)(JAM), 2025 WL 2773748, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (same). These Goldberger factors are used when there is a common
fund for the benefit of the Class. See In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 12 F. Supp. 3d 485,
492 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 47) (“It bears emphasis [however,] that
whether calculated pursuant to the lodestar or the percentage method, the fees awarded in
common fund cases may not exceed what is ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.”); see also
Fresno Cnty. Employees' Ret. Ass'n v. Isaacson/Weaver Fam. Tr., 925 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“[W]here a class action results in a common-fund settlement for the benefit of the class, the
common-fund doctrine applies and permits a district court to use its discretion to award class
counsel either an unenhanced lodestar fee or a fee calculated as a percentage of the settlement
fund.”) It is within these legal principles that the instant fee application is analyzed.
The parties have reached a settlement in principle with a Settlement Fund of
$2,720,000.00. (ECF No. 23-1 at 3.) As a result, Plaintiffs seek the following: (i) a fee award of
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$906,666.67 which represents one third of the Settlement, and (ii) reasonable, costs and expenses
in the amount of $7,564.41. (See id. at 1-2.) Each request is separately considered.
Here, class counsel consists of the firms GR and Levi. Attorney Mark S. Reich (“Reich”)
on behalf of the law firm of Levi outlines that his firm has spent 239.7 hours in connection with
the prosecution of this case. (ECF No. 23-2 at 6.) Second, Attorney Adrian Gucovschi
(“Gucovschi”), from the law firm of GR describes that his firm has spent 114.4 hours in this
matter. (ECF No. 23-8.) Counsel represents that a total of 354.11 hours to date have been spent
collectively which, based upon their current hourly rates, totals $222,767.50. (ECF No. 23-1 at
16.) However, there is much left to do, such as preparation for the fairness hearing,
administration upon final approval, and any other administrative tasks. Class counsel seeks fees
equaling a total of one-third from the Settlement, which would be $906,666.67. (ECF No. 23-1 at
4-5.)
While the requested amount is clearly higher than what would be yielded under the
lodestar analysis, such fees as requested here based upon 1/3 are routinely awarded. In
circumstances where, like here, the lodestar is lower than the requested fees, Courts have applied
a multiplier.9 The Court has reviewed the billing records provided along with counsel’s
declarations and finds the hours spent reasonable, not excessive or redundant. (See ECF Nos. 23-
2, 23-3, 23-6, 23-8.) Using the proper calculation of the lodestar multiplier by dividing the
requested one-third fee of $906,666.67 by the lodestar amount of $222,767.50, the multiplier is
4.07. “Courts regularly award lodestar multipliers from 2 to 6 times lodestar.” Morris v. Affinity
Health Plan, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases). Thus, the
9 A “lodestar multiplier” refers to the calculation of “dividing the [requested] fee award by the lodestar”
to determine reasonableness. See James v. China Grill Mgmt., Inc., No. 18-CV-455 (LGS), 2019 WL
1915298, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2019).
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multiplier of 4 is within the acceptable range of attorneys’ fees awarded in class action
settlements. See e.g., Nordhaus, No. 15-CV-6689 (JPO), 2024 WL 1514298, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
8, 2024) (collecting cases awarding multiplier of 2-6); Sewell v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., No. 9-
CV-6548 (RLE), 2012 WL 1320124, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012); Perks v. TD Bank, N.A.,
No. 18-CV-11176 (VEC), 2022 WL 1451753, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2022). Moreover, a review
of the relevant Goldberger factors suggests that such fees are reasonable and should be approved.
First, class counsel has spent 354.11 hours on this matter, which includes inter alia,
discovery, engaging in mediation, investigating the matter, drafting the settlement and
communicating with Class Members. (ECF No. 23-1 at 7-8.) In addition, “work in this litigation
is far from over” as the administration of the Settlement and holding the Fairness Hearing will
result in at least an additional “fifty hours” or so. (Id. at 8.)
Second and third, the risks of litigation are high as VPPA claims, such as here, hardly
make it to certification or very far in the litigation process. (Id. at 10.) Indeed, it was only
recently that the Second Circuit outlined the definitions under the VPPA. See Salazar v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 118 F.4th 533, 536 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-994, 2025 WL 3506972
(U.S. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The VPPA defines “consumer” to mean “any renter, purchaser, or
subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” … But the Act doesn't define
most of the words within that definition, including “goods or services” and “subscriber.” We
must construe both these terms for the first time in this Circuit.”); see also Solomon v. Flipps
Media, Inc., 136 F.4th 41 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-228, 2025 WL 3506993 (U.S. Dec.
8, 2025) (“as a matter of first impression, ‘personally identifiable information’ under VPPA
encompasses information that would allow an ordinary person to identify a consumer's video-
watching habits, but not information that only a sophisticated technology company could use to
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do so”). Moreover, the amount of potential members here – 27,864 timely confirmed claims with
600 more to be confirmed – demonstrates the great size of this action and complexities of the
litigation. (See ECF No. 28-1 at 3.) In addition, Defendant denies any and all liability here,
which if the case were to proceed, would create a high risk for Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 23-1 at 2.)
Fourth, Class Counsel’s experience demonstrates the level of representation required for
this type of case. As set forth in the Preliminary Approval (see ECF No. 21 at 11-12), counsel has
handled numerous class actions and has likewise been appointed as class counsel in such cases.
(ECF No. 23-1 at 12-13.) Indeed, the resumes attached to the application for attorneys’ fees
demonstrate Class Counsel’s expertise in handling complex class actions and having favorable
results. (See ECF Nos. 23-5, 23-7.)
Fifth, the request fee in relation to the settlement, is an amount that Courts have routinely
approved. See Cruz Guerrero v. Montefiore Health Sys. Inc., No. 22-CV-9194 (KHP), 2025 WL
100889, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2025) (collecting cases and awarding 1/3 of the settlement
fund for attorneys’ fees); In re PPDAI Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 18-CV-6716 (TAM), 2022 WL
198491, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2022) (discussing that it is very common to see one-third as
the fee award in cases having settlement funds under ten-million dollars). “It is common in this
District for the Court to approve fee awards in the range of 25%–33%.” Lee v. Springer Nature
Am., Inc., No. 24-CV-4493 (LJL), 2025 WL 3523134, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025).
Sixth, in consideration of public policy, “‘society undoubtedly has a strong interest in
incentivizing lawyers to bring complex litigation that is necessary to protect consumer rights,
particularly where it is unlikely that the Class Members will pursue litigation on their own for
economic or personal reasons.” (ECF No. 23-1 at 14.) “Courts in this Circuit have recognized the
importance of private enforcement actions and the corresponding need to incentivize attorneys to
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pursue such actions on a contingency fee basis.” In re Grana y Montero S.A.A. Sec. Litig., No.
17-CV-01105 (LDH)(ST), 2021 WL 4173684, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-01105 (LDH)(ST), 2021 WL 4173170 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2021). “In addition to providing compensation to injured class members, the litigation and
settlement of plaintiffs’ claims incentivizes retailers to take stronger data-protection measures.
[Here, Class Counsel] also undertook this case on a contingency basis with no guarantee that its
time and expenses would be recovered.” In re Hudson's Bay Co. Data Sec. Incident Consumer
Litig., No. 18-CV-8472 (PKC), 2022 WL 2063864, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2022).
As noted, when “calculating attorneys’ fees, courts have used one of two methods: the
‘lodestar’ method and the ‘percentage-of-recovery’ method. Singh v. Anmol Food Mart, Inc., 768
F. Supp. 3d 434, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Allen v. Taylor, 795 Fed. App'x 79, 80 (2d Cir.
2020)). The Second Circuit has held that either method is available for district courts to use when
calculating attorneys’ fees. “The trend in this Circuit is toward the percentage method, which
directly aligns the interests of the class and its counsel and provides a powerful incentive for the
efficient prosecution and early resolution of litigation.” In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. &
Derivative Litig., 343 F. Supp. 3d 394, 415–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff'd sub nom. In re Facebook,
Inc., 822 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d
96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005)) (citing In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 2012 WL 3133476, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2012));
see also Sukhnandan v. Royal Health Care of Long Island LLC, No. 12-CV-4216 (RLE), 2014
WL 3778173, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2014) (internal citations omitted) (“Although the Court
has discretion to award fees based on either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery
method, in wage and hour class action lawsuits, public policy favors a common fund attorneys’
fee award.”) The lodestar method, “creates an unanticipated disincentive to early settlements,
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tempts lawyers to run up their hours, and compels district courts to engage in a gimlet-eyed
review of line-item fee audits.” In re Parking Heaters, Antitrust Litig., No. 15-MC-0940
(DLI)(JO), 2019 WL 8137325, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019) (citation omitted).
[I]t is very common to see 33% contingency fees in cases with funds of less than
$10 million. Courts … routinely find that requests for attorney's fees totaling one-
third of the settlement fund are well within the range of reasonableness. Class
Counsel's request … is reasonable and consistent with the norms of class litigation.
Abarza v. Spirit Pharms. LLC, No. 23-CV-03637 (JMW), 2025 WL 1519147, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
May 28, 2025) (citations and quotations omitted) (collecting cases); see id. (quoting Rosenfeld,
2021 WL 508339, at *5 (“Class action suits have a well-deserved reputation as being most
complex.”)).
Accordingly, in evaluating the requested fees amount in accordance with the Goldberger
factors and the trend in this Circuit, the application is approved.10
Next, reimbursement of costs and expenses in the amount of $7,564.41 is sought. (ECF
No. 23-1 at 2.) “When the lion's share of expenses reflects the typical costs of complex litigation
such as experts and consultants, trial consultants, litigation and trial support services, document
imaging and copying, deposition costs, online legal research, and travel expenses, courts should
not depart from the common practice in this Circuit of granting expense requests.” Hasemann v.
Gerber Prods. Co., No. 15-CV-2995 (EK)(JAM), 2025 WL 2773748, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2025) (quoting Pennsylvania Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 318 F.R.D.
19, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). “The court's role in this context is ‘to act as a fiduciary who must serve
as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.’” Schutter, 2024 WL 4118465, at *12
(quoting McDaniel, 595 F.3d at 419).
10 The Court has also considered the timing of the payment of fees as required under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(2)(C)(iii). Indeed, no payments shall begin prior to the Fairness Hearing, and the “Fee Award shall
be payable within five (5) business days after the Settlement becomes Final.” (See ECF No. 15-9 at § 8.2.)
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First, the Levi firm has expended a total of $3,606.25 in out-of-pocket costs and expenses
in connection with the prosecution of this case. (ECF No. 23-2 at 9.) Levi also submits
documentation of the itemized costs and expenses, which include court fees, mailing fees, the
mediation fee, and research fees. (ECF No. 23-4.) Second, the GR firm has spent $3,958.16 in
costs throughout this action. (ECF No. 23-6 at 3-4.) This sum reflects the mediation fee and
initial court filing fee. (ECF No. 23-9.) The above-mentioned fees are routinely approved. See
e.g., In re Canon U.S.A. Data Breach Litigaton, No. 20-CV-6239 (AMD)(SJB), 2024 WL
3650611, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2024) (approving costs for filing fees, travel, and process
servers); D'Angelo v. Hunter Bus. Sch., Inc., No. 21-CV-03334 (JMW), 2023 WL 4838156, at
*13 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023) (approving costs for mediation, investigations, filing fees, and
service fees); Zhu v. Wanrong Trading Corp., No. 18-CV-417 (ENV)(MMH), 2024 WL 4351357,
at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024) (same).
Accordingly, upon review of the declarations and supporting documents, the Court finds
the requested attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses are reasonable and are therefore granted.
E. Service Awards
Plaintiffs seek a service award for Class Representatives, Carbone and Adkins, of $2,500
each for their critical participation in this case by spending significant time protecting the class
members’ interests, investigating their claims, assisting in pleading drafting, and their role in
having the case progress. (ECF No. 23-1 at 18.) Indeed, no opposition to this request has been
filed, weighing in favor of approval.
Determining whether a plaintiff should be granted an additional service or incentive
award is within the court’s discretion and is meant to compensate a plaintiff for any personal risk
incurred by his or her efforts. See Cooper v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., No. 23-CV-09485
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(PAE), 2025 WL 3074337, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (discussing service awards and
awarding $2,500 to each class representative); Schutter, 2024 WL 4118465, at *12 (awarding
service awards of $2,500 to $10,000). Notably, “such service awards are common in class action
cases and are important to compensate lead plaintiffs for the time and effort expended in
assisting the prosecution of the litigation, the risks incurred by becoming and continuing as a
litigant, and any other burdens sustained.” Rodriquez v. It's Just Lunch Int'l, No. 07-CV-09227
(SN), 2020 WL 1030983, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020). The awards sought here are within
the range awarded and are fairly modest compared to others. See Hart v. BHH, LLC, No. 15-CV-
4804 (WHP), 2020 WL 5645984, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2020) (“Awards on an individualized
basis have generally ranged from $2,500 to $85,000.”); see also Rosenfeld v. Lenich, No. 18-CV-
6720 (NGG)(PK), 2022 WL 2093028, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2022) (granting $15,000 in
service awards).
Accordingly, the service awards of $2,500 each are approved. See Lee v. Springer Nature
Am., Inc., No. 24-CV-4493 (LJL), 2025 WL 3523134, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025) (“Courts
have approved service awards ranging from $2,500 to $10,000 in other VPPA and privacy
cases.”)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (ECF No.
23) and Motion for Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement (ECF No. 28) are
GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that:
(i) 	The Court incorporates by reference the definitions set forth in the Settlement
Agreement and the Preliminary Approval Order;
(ii) 	The Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant and subject-matter
jurisdiction over this matter, the Parties, and all Settlement Class Members;
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(iii) 	The Settlement was entered into in good faith following arm’s-length negotiations
and is non-collusive;
(iv) 	The Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate, and is in the best
interests of the Settlement Class, and is therefore this Court grants final approval of
the Settlement;
(v) 	Settlement Representative, Limited Run Games, the Settlement Administrator, and
Settlement Class Members shall consummate the Settlement according to the terms of
the Settlement Agreement;
(vi) 	A list of those Settlement Class Members who have timely and validly elected to opt
out of the Settlement and the Settlement Class in accordance with the requirements in
the Settlement (the “Opt-Out Members”) has been submitted to the Court in the
Declaration of Patrick M. Passarella, filed in advance of the final approval hearing,
which can be found at ECF No. 28-3, Exhibit J. The persons listed in that exhibit are
not bound by the Settlement or this Final Approval Order and Judgment, and are not
entitled to any of the benefits under the Settlement. Opt-Out Members listed in ECF
No. 28-3, Exhibit J, shall be deemed not to be Plaintiffs Releasing Parties;
(vii) 	For purposes of the Settlement and this Final Approval Order and Judgment, the
Court hereby finally certifies for settlement purposes only the following Settlement
Class:
All persons who accessed the Limited Run Game Service in the United
States and watched a pre-recorded video or purchased a video game
containing a Cut Scene between January 1, 2016 and the present. “Limited
Run 	Game 	Service” 	means 	the 	Limited 	Run 	Games 	website
(www.limitedrungames.com) and all other digital platforms or applications
owned or operated by Defendant where video content is available to be
viewed and/or video games are available for purchase.
Excluded from the Settlement Class are (1) the Judge and Magistrate Judge
presiding over this Action and their immediate family members and staff
members; (2) Limited Run Games, its subsidiaries, parent companies,
successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Limited Run Games
has a controlling interest and their current or former officers, directors, and
employees; and (3) Settlement Class Members who submit a valid Request
for Exclusion prior to the Opt-Out Deadline.
(viii) 	The Court grants final approval to the appointment of John Carbone and Ryan Adkins
as the Settlement Class Representatives. The Court concludes that the Settlement
Class Representatives have fairly and adequately represented the Settlement Class.
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The Court grants Settlement Class Representatives a Service Award in the amount of
$2,500 each. The Service award shall be paid in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement. The Court finds that this payment is justified in light of the service to the
Settlement Class;
(ix) 	Pursuant to Rule 23(g), the Court grants final approval to the appointment, of Adrian
Gucovschi of Gucovschi Rozenshteyn, PLLC, and Mark S. Reich and Michael N.
Pollack of Levi & Korsinsky, LLP as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class;
(x) 	The Court grants the Motion and awards Class Counsel (as well as any agents,
vendors or experts with which they may have worked on this matter) $906,666.67 for
their fees and expenses in the case, hereby extinguishing any claims for any such fees,
costs or expenses as against the Defendant Released Parties. Class Counsel’s fee and
expense award shall be paid in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. The Court
finds the amount of fees and expenses to be fair and reasonable;
(xi) 	This action is therefore dismissed with prejudice, without fees or costs to any Party
except as provided in this Final Approval Order and Judgment;
(xii) 	Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in any way, this Court retains
continuing jurisdiction over the Parties and the Settlement Class for the
administration, consummation, and enforcement of the terms of the Settlement
Agreement as set forth in the Settlement Agreement; and
(xiii) 	The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment accordingly and close out the
case.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
March 11, 2026
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/S/James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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