S.G. v. Synchrony Bank

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------X
S.G., on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
- against -
SYNCHRONY BANK,
Defendant.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
AND ORDER
24-CV-5788(GRB)(SIL)
---------------------------------------------------------X
STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Presently before the Court in this putative class action alleging violations of
New York state usury laws and consumer protection statutes, on referral for Report
and Recommendation from the Honorable Gary R. Brown, is Defendant Synchrony
Bank’s (“Synchrony” or “Defendant”) motion to compel arbitration. See Docket Entry
(“DE”) [20]. Plaintiff S.G. (“Plaintiff” or “S.G.”) opposes the motion.1 DE [20-3]. For
the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that the Motion to
Compel Arbitration be granted and this action be stayed.2 	Plaintiff also seeks to
compel Defendant to participate in a discovery planning conference pursuant to Rule
26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), DE [24], which
1 In his Complaint, without providing a basis for doing so, Plaintiff identifies himself merely by his
initials, “S.G.,” and the case is captioned accordingly. Defendant uses Plaintiff’s actual name in the
instant motion, see, e.g., DE [20-2] at ¶¶ 5-15, without objection from Plaintiff.
2 As Defendant has requested that the matter be stayed during arbitration, DE [20-1] at 14, the Court
recommends that the case be stayed pending arbitration as opposed to being dismissed. See Smith v.
Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 478, 144 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 (“When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves
an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the [Federal Arbitration
Act] compels the court to stay the proceeding.”).
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Defendant opposes. DE [26]. Given the Court’s recommendation that the motion to
compel arbitration be granted, Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant to participate
in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference before this Court, is denied without prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Relevant Facts3
1. 	The Parties
At the time Plaintiff S.G. commenced this action, he was a resident of the
District of Columbia. See Complaint (“Compl.”), DE [1], ¶ 9. He alleges that, while
he was domiciled in New York, but temporarily living in Connecticut, he applied for
and received a loan from Defendant that violated the usury laws of the states of New
York and Connecticut and the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Synchrony is a
National Banking Association with a principal place of business located at 170
Election Road, Suite 125, Draper, Utah. Id. at ¶ 12. Defendant describes itself as “a
premier 	consumer 	financial 	services 	company 	delivering 	customized 	financing
programs across key industries . . . .” Id. at ¶ 15. Relevant here, “[o]ne of Synchrony’s
most popular financial products is called CareCredit,” which Synchrony claims “is
accepted at more than 250,000 enrolled provider and health-focused retail locations
and is used by more than 11 million+ cardholders.” 	Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16. 	Plaintiff has
had a CareCredit account with Synchrony since 2021. 	Id. at ¶ 10. 	S.G. enrolled in
3 Unless otherwise stated, the facts are drawn from the pleadings, the Declaration of Angel Nayman,
DE [20-2], and the admissible evidence relied upon in support thereof.
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his account online and concedes that the online terms of use govern his account with
Defendant. Id.
In or about March 2021, Plaintiff sought emergency veterinary care for his pet
cat, which he was unable to afford. Id. at ¶¶ 49, 52-53. S.G. alleges that, in order to
obtain the necessary veterinary treatment, he obtained a “high-interest rate loan
from Synchrony Bank,” the type of which “often carr[ies] extraordinarily high interest
rates above and beyond what is permitted by New York’s state usury law” (the
“Loan”). Id. at ¶ 2. Specifically, the Loan’s interest rate was 32.99% per year. Id. at
¶¶ 2, 17.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Account and the Relevant Arbitration Agreement
In 2021, Plaintiff created an account with Synchrony. 	Id. at ¶ 10; see
Declaration of Angel Nayman (“Nayman Decl.”), DE [20-2], ¶ 6, Ex. A. 	Before
submitting his application, S.G. was presented with “Terms and Conditions” (the
“Terms and Conditions”). 	Nayman Decl. Ex. A at 4. 	On this screen, Plaintiff was
presented with a copy of his Synchrony Bank CareCredit Credit Card Account
Agreement (“Account Agreement”). 	Id. 	Plaintiff had the opportunity to click
hyperlinks titled “Download All” and “Credit Terms” and save a copy of the Account
Agreement. Id. at ¶ 7.
To create his account, Plaintiff was required to check a box stating “I have read
and agree to all Terms and Conditions set forth below. Selecting ‘Agree & Submit’
constitutes my electronic signature.” 	Id. at Ex. A at 4. 	Plaintiff would have been
unable to proceed with his application without checking this box. Nayman Decl. ¶ 8.
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After checking the box, S.G. was prompted to click an additional box that said “Agree
& Submit.” Id. Plaintiff clicked the box and created his account. Id. The Terms and
Conditions contain an arbitration agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), which
states in bold, capitalized font:
PLEASE READ THIS SECTION CAREFULLY. IF YOU DO NOT
REJECT IT, THIS SECTION WILL APPLY TO YOUR ACCOUNT,
AND 	MOST 	DISPUTES 	BETWEEN 	YOU 	AND 	US 	WILL 	BE
SUBJECT TO INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION. THIS MEANS THAT:
(1) NEITHER A COURT NOR A JURY WILL RESOLVE ANY SUCH
DISPUTE; (2) YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A
CLASS 	ACTION 	OR 	SIMILAR 	PROCEEDING; 	(3) 	LESS
INFORMATION 	WILL 	BE 	AVAILABLE; 	AND 	(4) 	APPEAL
RIGHTS WILL BE LIMITED.
Id. at ¶ 13, Ex. B. (emphasis in original). Relevant here, the Arbitration Agreement
states that it applies to “disputes about an account transaction, fees, charges or
interest . . . .” Id. at ¶ 15. Instructions as to how to reject the Arbitration Agreement
state:
You may reject this Arbitration section. If you do that, a court will
resolve any dispute or claim. To reject this section, send us a notice
within 45 days after you open your account or we first provided you with
your right to reject this section. The notice must include your name,
address, account number, and personal signature, and must be mailed
to Synchrony Bank, P.O. Box 965012, Orlando, FL 32896-5012. This is
the only way you can reject this section.
Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff did not reject the Arbitration Agreement and continued to use
his card. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.
Finally, the Terms and Conditions prohibit class actions, stating:
NO 	CLASS 	ACTIONS. 	IF 	EITHER 	YOU 	OR 	WE 	ELECT 	TO
ARBITRATE A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE
RIGHT 	(A) 	TO 	PARTICIPATE 	IN 	A 	CLASS 	ACTION, 	PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTION OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION IN COURT OR IN ARBITRATION, EITHER AS A CLASS
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REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS MEMBER, OR (B) 	TO JOIN OR
CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS WITH CLAIMS OF ANY OTHER PERSONS
EXCEPT ACCOUNTHOLDERS ON YOUR ACCOUNT. THUS, YOU
MAY NOT BRING CLAIMS AGAINST US ON BEHALF OF ANY
ACCOUNTHOLDER WHO IS NOT AN ACCOUNTHOLDER ON YOUR
ACCOUNT, AND YOU AGREE THAT ONLY ACCOUNTHOLDERS
ON YOUR ACCOUNT MAY BE JOINED IN A SINGLE ARBITRATION
WITH ANY CLAIM YOU HAVE.
Id. at ¶ 16 (emphasis in original). On March 22, 2021, Synchrony approved Plaintiff’s
application for a CareCredit account. 	Id. at ¶ 9. Between 2021 and 2023, Plaintiff
used loans from Synchrony for his and his cat’s healthcare. Compl. ¶¶ 52-53.
B. 	Procedural Background
By way of a Complaint filed on August 19, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this
putative class action. DE [1]. S.G. asserts causes of action on behalf of himself and
a putative class including “[a]ll CareCredit account holders who signed up on
CareCredit’s website in the United States and accrued interest above 16% per annum
during the applicable statutory period.” Compl. ¶ 64. Plaintiff alleges that his Loan
and loans issued to other individuals violate New York’s usury laws, id. at ¶¶ 56-72,
and asserts causes of action for: (1) “violations of New York’s usury laws,” including
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §§ 5-501, 5-511, and 5-521; N.Y. Banking Law § 14-a(1); and
N.Y. Penal Law § 190.40;4 (2) violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349; (3) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) unjust enrichment. Id. at ¶¶ 73-102.
Plaintiff alleges that subject matter jurisdiction exists based upon the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), because the amount-in-controversy exceeds
4 Plaintiff asserts these statutory violations in a single cause of action.
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$5,000,000 and there are at least 100 class members. 	Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. 	Moreover,
Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of Washington D.C., but was a citizen of this
District when he entered the Account Agreement, and that Synchrony is a citizen of
Utah. Id.
On January 1, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration
on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the Arbitration Agreement to
which Plaintiff agreed. 	DE [20]. 	In opposition, S.G. claims: 	(1) New York law
mandates that the interest rate charged was usurious, (2) the Arbitration Agreement
provides that the state and federal courts of New York have “exclusive jurisdiction,”
and (3) the Arbitration Agreement violates public policy. 	See Plaintiffs’ Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), DE [20-3], at 5-15. For
the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration be granted. 	The motion to compel a Rule 26 initial
conference is denied without prejudice.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), “a written provision in . . . a
contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “[A]s a matter
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration.” 	Collazos v. Garda CL Atl., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 3d 249, 260
(E.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S. Ct. 927, 943 (1983)); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Christie’s Inc.,
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535 F. Supp. 3d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). Arbitration agreements
“are a matter of contract” and, “[w]hen enforcing an arbitration agreement, as with
any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.” Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F.
Supp. 3d 527, 533-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Accordingly, “[i]n deciding whether a dispute
is arbitrable, [the Court] must answer two questions: (1) whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the
claims at issue.” 	Holick v. Cellular Sales of N.Y., LLC, 802 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.
2015). “There is a ‘strong presumption in favor of arbitration’ and waiver of the right
to arbitration ‘is not to be lightly inferred.’” Boustead Secs., LLC v. Leaping Grp. Co.,
656 F. Supp. 3d 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc.
v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Loc. 812, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s Claims are Subject to the Arbitration Agreement
Initially, there is no plausible dispute that, if applicable, the Arbitration
Agreement applies to Plaintiff. S.G. created his own account and acknowledges that
the Terms and Conditions, including the Arbitration Agreement, apply to him.
Compl. ¶ 10. The Court further concludes that arbitration of Plaintiff’s specific claims
is appropriate and that the motion to compel arbitration should be granted.
Relevant here, “[a] ‘clickwrap’ or ‘click-through’ agreement ‘requires users to
click an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use.’”
Zheng v. Live Auctioneers LLC, No. 20-CV-9744(JGK), 2021 WL 2043562, at *4
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(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021) (quoting Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017)).
To be bound by a clickwrap agreement, “the web user must have ‘reasonable notice of
the arbitration provision.’” 	Zheng, 2021 WL 2043562, at *4 (quoting Starke v.
SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 292 (2d Cir. 2019)); see Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
237 F. Supp. 3d 36, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[I]n the context of agreements made over the
internet, New York courts find that binding contracts are made when the user takes
some action demonstrating that [she has] at least constructive knowledge of the
terms of the agreement, from which knowledge a court can infer acceptance.”) (citing
Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2010)).
In evaluating whether a user had adequate notice and assented to the terms
of an arbitration agreement, courts “look to the design and content of the relevant
interface to determine if the contract terms were presented to the offeree in a way
that would put [the offeree] on inquiry notice of such terms.” 	Teta v. Go New York
Tours, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 3d 502, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Starke, 913 F.3d at
289). 	A party will be bound to an arbitration agreement if he has “sufficient
opportunity to read the . . . agreement, and assents thereto after being provided with
an unambiguous method of accepting or declining the offer.” Serrano v. Cablevision
Sys. Corp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see Whitt v. Prosper Funding
LLC, No. 15-CV-136(GHW), 2015 WL 4254062, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015)
(holding that constructive knowledge is established when a user “affirmatively
click[s] a box on [a] website acknowledging awareness and agreement to the terms of
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[a contract] before . . . [being] allowed to proceed with further utilization of the
website”) (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)).
When 	creating 	his account 	with 	Defendant, 	S.G. 	was 	presented with a
hyperlink that contained the Arbitration Agreement in bold-faced, capitalized font.
Nayman Decl. Ex. A. 	By creating his account and affirming that he had read and
consented 	to 	the 	Terms 	and 	Conditions, 	S.G. 	affirmatively 	consented 	to 	the
Arbitration 	Agreement. 	See 	Lewis 	v. 	Samsung 	Elecs. 	Am., 	Inc., 	No. 	22-CV-
10882(JLR), 2023 WL 7623670, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2023) (“While it may be the
case that many users will not bother reading the additional terms, that is the choice
the user makes; the user is still on inquiry notice.”) (citing Meyer, 868 F.3d at 79);
Feld v. Postmates, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 3d 825, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Whether [the
plaintiff] actually clicked on the hyperlink to read the [Terms of Service] or the
Privacy Policy is immaterial; what matters is that notice of these terms was
reasonably conspicuous.”).
Plaintiff does not plausibly dispute the conspicuousness of the Arbitration
Agreement and, by providing a hyperlink that took Plaintiff to the Arbitration
Agreement, Synchrony provided adequate notice. Feld, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 831 (“The
Supreme Court has found contract terms enforceable where a consumer was directed
elsewhere to review the relevant terms.”) (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585, 587-88, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991)); see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 80 (holding
that providing a hyperlink was sufficient to establish that “the user was agreeing to
be bound by the linked terms”); Borukh v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 24-CV-
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6022(NRM)(JRC), 2025 WL 1220042, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2025) (enforcing
arbitration agreement where “the conspicuousness and placement of the Terms of
Use hyperlink, along with the general design, provided plaintiff with reasonably
conspicuous notice of the arbitration agreement”); Hu v. Whaleco, Inc., 779 F. Supp.
3d 265, 285-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding that a conspicuous hyperlink to terms and
conditions near a registration website provided adequate notice of an arbitration
agreement); Kern v. Stubhub, Inc., No. 24 Civ. 871(AT), 2024 WL 5283923, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2024) (holding that an arbitration agreement was enforceable
where a prominently displayed hyperlink “open[ed] the User Agreement, which
contain[ed], in bolded and capitalized text, a prominent notice of the arbitration
agreement”).
To this end, in Feld, the Court held that an arbitration agreement was
sufficiently conspicuous where a hyperlink containing the terms of service next to a
“sign up” button “put reasonably prudent users on inquiry notice.” 	442 F. Supp. 3d
at 831; see Zaltz v. JDATE, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“As to the fact
that plaintiff had to click on a hyperlink to view the Terms and Conditions of Service
(rather than view the terms on the same page where she had to indicate her assent
to the terms), the Court agrees with the Fteja court’s analogizing this situation to
cruise 	tickets—plaintiff 	was 	shown 	precisely 	where 	to 	access 	the 	Terms 	and
Conditions of Service before she agreed to them . . . .”); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the Plaintiff was bound by the terms
of an arbitration agreement where he “was informed of the consequences of his
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assenting click and he was shown, immediately below, where to click to understand
those consequences”). 	Accordingly, the Arbitration Agreement provided adequate
notice of the requirement to arbitrate.5
The 	Court 	must 	next 	consider 	“whether 	the 	scope 	of 	that 	agreement
encompasses the 	claims at issue.” Holick, 802 F.3d at 394 (citation omitted);
NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Secs., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1033 (2d Cir. 2014) (“‘[I]t
is 	the 	language 	of the 	contract 	that 	defines 	the 	scope 	of 	disputes 	subject 	to
arbitration.’”) (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289, 122 S. Ct. 754,
762 	(2002)). 	When 	analyzing 	a 	“broad” 	arbitration 	agreement, 	there 	is 	a
“presumption that the claims are arbitrable.” Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995); see Bechtel do Brasil Construções Ltda. v.
UEG Araucária Ltda., 638 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that ambiguities as
to the scope of an arbitration clause must be “resolved in favor of arbitration”). Given
the preference for arbitration where an enforceable arbitration agreement exists, see
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 3d at 121, and because Plaintiff asserts claims
related to the interest rate related to his agreement with Synchrony, his claims fall
within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. 	See Alvarez v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc., 661 F. Supp. 3d 18, 32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (granting motion to compel arbitration
even where issue of arbitrability was in question); Mawing v. PNGI Charles Town
Gaming, LLC, No. 09-CV-68(JPD), 2010 WL 11520680, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 18,
5 Plaintiff did not submit an affidavit stating that he did not review or have knowledge of the
Arbitration Agreement.
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2010) (observing the “well-established presumption that any doubts regarding the
scope of arbitrable issues are to be resolved in favor of arbitration”). 	As Plaintiff’s
claims arise out of the Loan’s allegedly usurious interest rate, see Compl. ¶¶ 73-102,
the Arbitration Agreement applies.
Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition primarily address the merits of his claims
and the appropriate law to be applied. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-10. This is an issue that falls
squarely within the authority of an arbitrator to consider and decide.6 	Diaz-Roa v.
Hermes L., P.C., 757 F. Supp. 3d 498, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“It is well established that
‘[c]hoice-of-law provisions . . . generally designate only the substantive law to be
applied by the arbitrators and do not displace application of federal arbitration law
to determine the arbitrability of claims or any defenses thereto . . . .’”) (quoting
Boustead Secs., LLC, 656 F. Supp. 3d at 450 n.6); see Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG
Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 327 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] general choice of law provision will not
be construed to impose substantive restrictions on the parties’ rights under the
Federal Arbitration Act.”) (internal quotation omitted); Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo,
107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[E]ven the inclusion in the contract of a general
choice-of-law clause does not require application of state law to arbitrability issues,
unless it is clear that the parties intended state arbitration law to apply on a
particular issue.”); see also Pierno v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, No. 20-3711, 2021
WL 5986763, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2021) (“This is especially true because [the
6 Plaintiff’s reliance on United States v. Moseley, 980 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2020), see Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-10, is
misplaced, as Moseley is a criminal law case that does not reference arbitration.
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plaintiff] could have secured his ‘day in court’ if he had initiated arbitration
proceedings.”) (emphasis in original); Steele v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 864 F.2d 1, 3
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a “party who has been compelled to arbitrate will have
her chance to argue that the arbitral forum was the incorrect one when the arbitral
award is before the district court in an action for enforcement”).
Plaintiff’s claim that the Arbitration Agreement violates public policy is
similarly meritless. 	Where, as here, “a party claims that an underlying contract is
invalid for violating public policy, that claim is ‘to be determined exclusively by the
arbitrator . . . .’” AKF Inc. v. Skybell Techs. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 473, 483 (S.D.N.Y.
2025) (citing Commodities & Mins. Enter. Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A., 49
F.4th 802, 819 (2d Cir. 2022)); Bennett v. Barclays Bank Delaware, No. 24 Civ.
6549(LGS), 2025 WL 2690390, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025) (granting motion to
compel arbitration where an arbitration clause did not prevent the plaintiff from
effectively vindicating his Section 349 claim). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that
the contract is void may be properly addressed by an arbitrator and does not support
denying Defendant’s motion.
The same is true with respect to Plaintiff’s argument that the parties agreed
that “exclusive jurisdiction” lies with the state and federal courts of New York. Pl.’s
Opp’n at 10-14. The agreement to which S.G. cites is titled “Synchrony Bank Online
Credit Site Terms and Conditions for the Synchrony Bank Online Credit Site” and
relates to the use of the Synchrony website. See Declaration of Arturo Peña Miranda
in Opposition to Motion to Compel (“Peña Decl.”), DE [20-4], Ex A. It does not relate
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to the terms of Plaintiff’s underlying agreement with Synchrony, which form the basis
of his claims of alleged usury, and which are subject to the Arbitration Agreement
contained in the Terms and Conditions. 	Nayman Decl. Ex. A at 4-5. 	Indeed, the
Terms and Conditions specifically state that state or federal law applies “[e]xcept as
provided in the Resolving a Dispute with Arbitration section . . . .” Id. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s argument regarding the “exclusive jurisdiction” of New York courts fails.
Ultimately, given the parties’ agreement to arbitrate the claims at issue,
Plaintiff’s claims in this action, as well as his objections to proceeding in arbitration,
are best considered by an arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends
that Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration be granted.
B. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a Rule 26(f) Conference is Denied
Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to participate in a Rule 26(f) discovery
planning conference, which Defendant opposes. DE [24], [26]. Having recommended
that Synchrony’s motion to compel arbitration be granted, an Initial Conference
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) would not be an efficient use of the Court’s or the
parties’ time or resources. See Paniccioli v. Northstar Source Grp. LLC, No. 24 Civ.
9763(DEH)(GWG), 2025 WL 1427007, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2025) (staying
discovery where the matter was referred to arbitration); Palladino v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., 730 F. Supp. 3d 4, 13-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (granting motion to stay
discovery “pending Defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration”); see also
Vassell v. SeatGeek, Inc., No. 24-CV-932(NCM)(JRC), 2025 WL 240912, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2025) (“[A] district court must stay the judicial proceedings upon
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‘application of one of the parties’ where the asserted claims are ‘referable to
arbitration.’”) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3); Fadlelseed v. ABM Aviation JFK, 751 F. Supp.
3d 207, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (“When all claims have been referred to arbitration and
a 	stay is 	requested, the 	Court 	must 	grant 	the 	stay.”) 	(emphasis 	in 	original).
Accordingly, the motion to compel Defendant to participate in a Rule 26(f) conference
is denied without prejudice.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein:
(1) 	the Court respectfully recommends that Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration, DE [20], be granted;
(2) 	Plaintiff’s motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference, DE [24], is denied
without prejudice; and
(3) 	By February 6, 2026, both parties are instructed to submit a letter, not
to exceed two pages, as to whether Plaintiff should remain anonymous
or be identified in the caption by his actual name.
VI. 	OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served on all parties by
electronic filing on the date below. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of the
Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation.
Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 72; Ferrer v.
Woliver, No. 05-3696, 2008 WL 4951035, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2008); Beverly v.
Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60
(2d Cir. 1996).
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Dated: 	Central Islip, New York
January 27, 2026
s/ Steven I. Locke
STEVEN I. LOCKE
United States Magistrate Judge
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