Badr v. New York Institute of Technology et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------------X
MARWA BADR,
Plaintiff,
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
-against- 	24-CV-05333 (JMA) (JMW)
NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
NYIT-COM COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC
MEDICINE,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------X
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Stewart Lee Karlin
Stewart Lee Karlin, Law Group PC
111 John Street 22 nd Floor
New York, NY 10038
Attorney for Plaintiff
Douglas Peter Catalano
Stefanie Robin Toren
Clifton Budd & DeMaria LLP
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6110
New York, NY 10118
Attorney for Defendants
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Marwa Badr, also known as Sarah Adams (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action
against Defendants New York Institute of Technology (“NYIT”) and NYIT-COM College of
Osteopathic Medicine (“NYIT-COM” and collectively, “Defendants”),1 alleging discriminatory
1 Defendants previously informed the Court that NYIT’s College of Osteopathic Medicine, incorrectly
named as “NYIT-COM College of Osteopathic Medicine,” is a college within NYIT and is not a separate
legal entity. (ECF No. 23 at 1.)
12/10/2025
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
conduct in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(d), et seq.
(“Title VI”) and “any other cause(s) of action that can be inferred from the facts set forth herein”,
and seeks damages as well as injunctive relief. (See generally, ECF No. 19.) Before the Court by
way of referral from the Hon. Joan M. Azrack is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 28). (See Electronic Order dated
10/21/2025.) Plaintiff opposed the motion (ECF No. 29), and Defendants filed their reply (ECF
No. 30). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
The Court details the following allegations from the Amended Complaint. which are
assumed true for the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff’s suit arises
from her time as a medical student at NYIT-COM from 2018 until March 22, 2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-
14.) Plaintiff, a Muslim woman originally from Egypt, was a fourth-year medical student, when
she was expelled from her program two months before her scheduled graduation. (Id. at ¶¶ 6,
25.) Plaintiff was part of the NYIT-COM’s Émigré Physicians Program (“EPP”), “a unique
initiative designed to retrain internationally educated doctors as a Doctor of Osteopathic
Medicine in residency training.” (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff primarily alleges that she was expelled
from the program due to the Defendants’ discriminatory practices related to her religious and
national origin. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff was informed that the reason for her dismissal was “[her]
failure of the last clinical rotation at Cedar Sinai and the incident in another rotation at Catholic
Health System.” (Id. at ¶ 27.)
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Plaintiff, however, disputes that this was the true reason for her dismissal; rather, she
alleges that her expulsion was the result of a conspiracy between her medical school and the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACCGME), aimed solely at covering up
the “discriminatory practices in southern universities against” International Medical Graduates
that she personally complained of in her prior medical program in Alabama. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-21, 28-
32.) Plaintiff believes that her expulsion was a result of this conspiracy based on four reasons:
(1) The disciplinary action started after she mentioned her prior expulsion from
residency 	in 	the 	south2, 	(2) 	NYIT-COM 	demonstrated 	a 	pattern 	of
discriminating against Muslim Middle Eastern medical students who sought
surgical specialties. Students from Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan, compared to
non-Muslim students, were not under the same discriminatory treatment, (3)
NYIT targeted the student, using a classmate who asked the student to convert
to Christianity after expulsion, [and] (4) Capricious expulsion with evidence of
external influence is the strongest evidence to support the systematic targeting
of Muslims in educational settings. A sudden interruption of the Plaintiff's
education defamed her character as a Muslim scholar.
(Id. at ¶ 47.) Based on this alleged discriminatory conduct, Plaintiff asserts one claim against the
Defendants for a violation of Title VI and “any other cause(s) of action that can be inferred from
the facts set forth herein.” (Id. at ¶ 1.)
II. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff commenced this action on July 30, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants requested a
pre-motion conference to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff thereafter amended the
Complaint on November 22, 2024. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants again filed a pre-motion
conference letter to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21), which Plaintiff opposed
(ECF No. 22). Judge Azrack initially granted a pre-motion conference (see Electronic Order
dated 3/14/2025), and shortly after, waived the required and set a briefing schedule. (Electronic
Order dated 4/1/2025.) On April 7, 2025, Defendants subsequently moved to stay discovery
2 It remains unclear why Plaintiff was expelled from the Alabama University.
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
pending the outcome of their anticipated Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23), Plaintiff took no
position as to the stay (see Electronic Order dated 4/8/2025) which the Court ultimately granted
(ECF No. 25). On June 12, 2025, Defendants filed their moving papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 28), Plaintiff filed her opposition (ECF No. 29), and Defendants filed their
reply (ECF No. 30). 3 On October 21, 2025, the Motion to Dismiss was referred to the
undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. (See Electronic Order dated 10/21/2025.) Oral
argument on the Motion was originally scheduled for December 17, 2025, but due to a conflict in
the Plaintiff’s schedule, oral argument was cancelled. (See ECF Nos. 32-33; Electronic Order
dated 12/9/2025.)
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also CompassCare v. Hochul, 125
F.4th 49, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014) (“a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”)).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Annabi v. New York Univ., No.
24-cv-2601, 2025 WL 1066083, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). To
that end, complaints are properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, “the allegations in a
3 Plaintiff, ex-parte, filed a letter to the Court regarding the instant motion. As Plaintiff is represented by
counsel, the Court will not include this entry in its recommendation. (See ECF No. 31.)
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
558. When considering a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), the Court must assume all well-
pleaded facts to be true, “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Koch v.
Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012). However, this tenet does not apply to
legal conclusions or “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
663. Pleadings that offer only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. More is required. Put differently,
“while a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions. … Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level. To survive dismissal, a complaint must provide enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Go New York Tours Inc. v. Gray Line New York
Tours, Inc., No. 24-cv-2392, 2025 WL 947083, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (quoting Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the grounds that (i) Title VI
does not prohibit discrimination based on religion, and (ii) Plaintiff fails to plead facts supporting
a plausible claim of discrimination or retaliation in connection with religion or national origin
under Title VI. (ECF No. 28-4 at 1, 11.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff relies solely on
conclusory assertions that NYIT-COM treated her differently because of her religion and
ethnicity following two clinical incidents involving professionalism and performance concerns.
(Id. at 1-2.) Further, Defendants assert that the allegations amount to a speculative conspiracy
theory. (ECF No. 30 at 1-2.) In sum, Defendants aver that since Plaintiff identifies no derogatory
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
remarks connected to her dismissal, alleges no similarly situated comparator outside her
protected class, and fails to show a nexus between her protected status and the adverse action, the
Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim under Title VI. (ECF Nos. 28-4 at 1-2; 30 at
1-3.)
Under Title VI, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Salem v.
New York Univ., No. 22-CV-5112 (VEC) (SLC), 2023 WL 8438713, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-CV-5112 (VEC), 2023 WL 8253026
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (emphasis added). With that, only entities
receiving federal assistance may be sued under Title VI. Khen v. US Coachways, Inc., No. 23-
CV-10762 (JLR), 2025 WL 252901, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2025). For a claim to survive
under Title VI, particularly in the education context, “direct evidence of discriminatory conduct
[is required].” Koumantaros v. City Univ. of New York, No. 03-CV-10170 (GEL), 2007 WL
840115, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007). Direct evidence is “evidence sufficient to allow the jury
to find that the decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on [the plaintiff’s national
origin] in reaching their decision.” Astraee v. Villanova Univ., 509 F. Supp. 3d 265 (E.D. Pa.
2020) (citing Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F. 3d 335, 338 (3d. Cir. 2002) (alteration in original)).
However, in cases where no such evidence exists, courts have allowed a plaintiff to show:
(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse action in
pursuit of her education by defendant; (3) she was treated differently from
similarly situated students who are not members of the protected class; and (4)
she was qualified to continue in her educational pursuit.
Koumantaros, 2007 WL 840115, at *8.
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Importantly, the discrimination alleged must have been intentional. Tolbert v. Queens
Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases); Salem, 2023 WL 8438713, at *6 (same);
see also Canaan v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 760 F. Supp. 3d 306 (W.D. Pa 2024) (citing Blunt v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F. 3d 247, 272 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Intentional discrimination may be
established by showing deliberate indifference without satisfying a higher burden of proving
spite, ill-will, or other indicia of animus.”)).
I. 	Title VI – Discrimination based on National Origin
To establish a claim under Title VI, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) the
defendant discriminated on the basis of national origin; (2) the discrimination was intentional;
and (3) discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the defendant’s actions.” New
York by Schneiderman v. Utica City Sch. Dist., 177 F. Supp. 3d 739, 752 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)
(citing Manolov v. Borough Of Manhattan Cmty. Coll., 952 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D.N.Y.
2013)); see also Cain v. Mercy Coll., No. 20-CV-2262 (LLS), 2020 WL 4194637, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2020) (quoting Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 69) (same); Muhammad v. Trs. of
Columbia Univ., No. 24-CV-7852 (JGK), 2025 WL 2781383, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025)
(outlining the elements).
A plaintiff need only provide “plausible support [for] a minimal inference of
discriminatory motivation.” Johnson v. New York Univ., No. 17-CV-6184 (VEC)(GWG), 2018
WL 3966703, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-
6184 (VEC), 2018 WL 4908108 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018), aff'd, 800 F. App'x 18 (2d Cir. 2020)
(citing Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015)). However,
conclusory and speculatory allegations are insufficient. Id.; see Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d
561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a “naked allegation that appellees ‘selectively enforc[ed]
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
the College rules ... against plaintiffs ... because they are black [or] Latin’ is too conclusory to
survive a motion to dismiss”); see also Bhatnagar v. Parsons Sch. of Design at the New Sch., No.
20-CV-2321 (LGS), 2021 WL 2333243, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2021) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Port
Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (“a discrimination complaint
must still at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to nudge its claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible to proceed”)).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts supporting an inference of intentional discrimination
based on national origin or any “intertwined” identity. (ECF No. 29 at 10.) The only far-fetched
allegation is that after Plaintiff was expelled from the program, faculty member Felecia Bruno of
the Ethical Committee, allegedly stated that Plaintiff should return to Egypt. (ECF No. 19 at ¶
104.) While if true, is unacceptable behavior on any level, there is no evidence that this faculty
member was part of the decision making leading to Plaintiff’s expulsion. Indeed, the March 3,
2022, expulsion letter to Plaintiff lists two “charges” that Defendants found Plaintiff “guilty” of.
(See ECF No. 28-3.) The two charges were based on inappropriate social media posts,
unprofessional behavior, and false information on Plaintiff’s application. (Id.) These incidents –
not discrimination – led to the unfortunate consequence of expulsion.
In Bhatnagar, the court dismissed similar allegations where the plaintiff claimed
discrimination based on national origin but failed to support her claim with factual detail. 2021
WL 2333243, at *4. The Court found that the complaint did not plausibly allege even a minimal
inference of discrimination and merely recited the legal standard, noting that the defendant’s
actions were more plausibly explained by concerns about the plaintiff’s mental stability than by
any discriminatory motive. Id. at *3. The same reasoning applies here. Plaintiff’s allegations
rests on speculation rather than factual detail. See Kajoshaj v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 543
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
F. App’x 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (finding that plaintiff did not
plead a Title VI claim) (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.”)
Furthermore, Plaintiff provides no direct or statistical evidence that similarly situated
non-Muslim students were treated more favorably, nor does she identify any specific incidents
demonstrating disparate treatment. See Ikedilo v. Statter, No. 19-CV-9967 (RA), 2020 WL
5849049, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (finding that plaintiff’s complaint lacked any facts that
“would give rise to an inference of discrimination”); Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., 618
F.3d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs failed to identify “a person not a member of
the same allegedly protected class—who was treated more favorably than the plaintiffs…”).
In fact, Plaintiff offers only conclusory assertions that NYIT-COM’s actions were
motivated by her national origin, unsupported by any specific comparators, incidents, or
statements evidencing bias. Cf. Minto v. Molloy Coll., No. 16-CV-276 (KAM)(AYS), 2021 WL
1394329, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-276,
2021 WL 804386 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021) (denying a motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs
provided the Court with four comparators who were not expelled from the program) (“In sum,
Plaintiffs point to a variety of students, none of whom are African-American females over the
age of forty, and all of whom are alleged to have been treated differently and afforded specific
opportunities denied to Plaintiffs.”); New York by Schneiderman, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (finding
plaintiffs stated a plausible claim where the complaint alleged that the defendant district directed
subordinates to divert immigrant students to alternative and unequal education settings).
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
Plaintiff’s speculation that disciplinary decisions stemmed from discriminatory animus,
rather than legitimate academic or professional considerations, is insufficient. See Vengalattore
v. Cornell Univ., 36 F.4th 87, 110 (2d. Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal of Title VI claim as
allegations did not demonstrate that the decisionmaker who denied tenure to plaintiff “harbored
any national origin bias.”) The mere existence of an adverse action – her expulsion – may not
alone give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. See Pierce v. Woldenburg, No. 11-CV-
4248 (SJF)(AKT), 2012 WL 3260316, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012) (“plaintiff offers no factual
allegations supporting his belief that he suffered discrimination on the basis of his ethnic origin
and/or religion. … Of course, such a flimsy set of allegations, coupled with such sheer
speculation, is insufficient to state a claim under Title VI.”)
Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) is
misguided. That case addressed the Alabama Department of Public Safety administering state
driver’s license examinations only in English. Id. at 279-80. That Court held that “there is no
private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI.” Id. at
293. It did not concern, much less support, claims of intentional discrimination in an educational
context. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a plausible claim of discrimination
based on national origin under Title VI.
II. 	Title VI – Discrimination based on Religion
In response to Defendants’ arguments that “Title VI does not, by its terms, proscribe
religious discrimination” (ECF No. 28-4 at 11), Plaintiff invokes the guidance of the Office of
Civil Rights (“OCR”), asserting that Title VI may apply to religious discrimination when it is
based on a group’s “actual or perceived: (i) shared ancestry or ethnic characteristics; or (ii)
citizenship or residency in a country with a dominant religion or distinct religious identity.”
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
(ECF No. 29 at 10.) However, apart from that, Plaintiff does not offer any legal authority to
support her claims. To that very end, the Court has not independently found any authority
indicating that a discrimination claim under Title VI includes religion. Case law directs quite the
opposite conclusion. See Bibliotechnical Athenaeum v. Am. Univ. of Beirut, 527 F. Supp. 3d 625,
632 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-1642, 2022 WL 710896 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 2022) (“Unlike
Title VII, Title VI does not refer to discrimination because of sex or religion.”); Am. Ass'n of
Univ. Professors v. United States Dep't of Just., No. 25-CV-2429 (MKV), 2025 WL 1684817, at
*15 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2025) (“Title VI does not mention religion.”); see also Mohamed for
A.M. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 300 F. Supp. 3d 857, 895 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff'd sub
nom. Mohamed as Next Friend for A.M. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 758 F. App'x 352 (5th Cir.
2019) (internal citations omitted) (finding that plaintiff’s conclusory allegations did not meet the
intentional discrimination requirement for a Title VI claim based on race) (“Title VI does not
proscribe discrimination based on religion”); Lubavitch-Chabad of Illinois, Inc. v. Nw. Univ., 6
F. Supp. 3d 806, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff'd, 772 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding plaintiffs’
claim failed because their claims rested entirely on alleged religious discrimination) (“Title
VI does not provide for protection against discrimination on the basis of religion—only on the
basis of race, color, or national origin”).
Plaintiff argues that she has plausibly alleged intentional discrimination based not solely
on religion, but also on national origin, stating an alleged pattern of disproportionately harsh
disciplinary measures against Muslim and Middle Eastern students (e.g., Egyptian, Pakistani,
Syrian) at NYIT-COM compared to non-Muslim students. (ECF No. 29 at 11.) She further
contends that her “shared ancestry and ethnic characteristics from Egypt,” where “Islam is the
dominant religion or distinct religious identity,” support her claim by demonstrating the
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
connection between her religion and national origin. (ECF Nos. 28-4 at 11; 29 at 10.) Yet
Plaintiff advances no facts suggesting that NYIT-COM’s actions were actually motivated by her
religion or her national origin, rather than legitimate concerns regarding performance and
professionalism. See Kajoshaj, 543 F. App’x at 14 (“Their ‘naked allegation’ that they were
treated differently from non-Muslim, non-Albanians cannot demonstrate a plausible entitlement
to Title VI relief.”) Plaintiff’s assertion that NYIT-COM perceived her religion and ethnicity as
intertwined does not transform a religion-based claim into one actionable under Title VI,
particularly absent factual allegations or legal authority showing that the school’s actions were
motivated by her national origin or religion.
Accordingly, upon a plain reading of Title VI, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not
stated a claim for discrimination based on religion.
III. 	Plausibility of a Retaliation Claim
Defendants argue that, to the extent the Court construes the Complaint as asserting a
retaliation claim under Title VI, that claim should too be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(ECF Nos. 28-4 at 17; 30 at 8.) A retaliation claim under Title VI requires a plaintiff to “allege
that [he] engaged in protected activity, [Defendants] knew about [his] protected activity, [he]
suffered an adverse action, and there was ‘a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse action.’” DuBose v. SUNY Mar. Coll. Off. of Fin. Aid, No. 24-CV-05547 (JLR), 2025
WL 1488983, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2025) (citing Bloomberg v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 119
F.4th 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2024)).
Even assuming that Plaintiff’s complaints about discrimination constitute a protected
activity, Defendants correctly observe that there are no allegations that NYIT was aware of any
purported or protected activity or that she ever reported such activity to NYIT. (ECF No. 30 at
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
8–9.) Awareness is necessary for a retaliation claim; without it, there can be no basis for
asserting that any adverse action was taken in response to a protected activity. The keyword in
cases analyzing retaliation claims is “known” and thus, if a defendant is unaware of a protected
activity, the first element is not met. See Diaz v. City Univ. of New York, No. 15-CV-1319
(PAC)(MHD), 2016 WL 958684, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added) (“A Title VI claim can also be brought for retaliation, which requires that a plaintiff
plausibly allege: ‘(1) participation in a protected activity known to the defendants; (2) adverse
action by the defendants against the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the plaintiff's
protect[ed] activity and defendants' adverse action.’”); Morales v. NYS Dep't of Lab., 865 F.
Supp. 2d 220, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Morales v. New York State Dep't of Lab.,
Div. of Emp. Servs., 530 F. App'x 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); see also Peters v. Molloy Coll. of
Rockville Ctr., No. 07-CV-2553 (DRH)(ETB), 2008 WL 2704920, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 8,
2008) (“The Complaint alleges that upon information and belief, all Defendants were aware of
Plaintiff's vocal opposition to the adverse treatment afforded Dr. Pemberton. These allegations
are sufficient to satisfy the awareness element of a retaliation claim.”); Ellis v. Univ. of
Rochester, No. 19-CV-6380 (CJS), 2024 WL 493504, at *26 n. 117 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2024)
(internal citations omitted) (“A retaliation plaintiff must show that the funding recipient or its
representatives took an adverse action against him because he complained of discrimination.
That typically means the funding recipient itself signed off on the adverse action.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that could establish a causal connection
between an alleged protected activity and the adverse action.
Plaintiff may show a causal connection either (1) indirectly, by presenting evidence
of temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse action, or through
other evidence such as different treatment of similarly situated students, or (2)
directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against ... plaintiff by the
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
defendant. Even if plaintiff satisfies the prima facie test for retaliation, if defendant
offers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action, the presumption
of retaliation drops from the case. Plaintiff still may succeed on the retaliation
claim, but only if she can show that defendant's legitimate reason for the adverse
action 	was 	in 	fact 	merely 	a 	pretext 	for 	retaliation.
Koumantaros, 2007 WL 840115, at *10 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Amended Complaint contains no support for allegations of temporal proximity,
disparate treatment, or any direct evidence of retaliatory animus. (See ECF No. 19 at ¶ 47.)
Rather, Plaintiff speculates and states “[she] believes that she was expelled in retaliation for
speaking up … [and the] disciplinary action started after she mentioned her prior expulsion from
residency in the south.” (Id.) Absent here is any direct or indirect evidence of retaliation and
thus, Defendants do not need to offer a legitimate reason. See Koumantaros, 2007 WL 840115,
at *10; Johnson, 2018 WL 3966703, at *8 (“Johnson has alleged no facts suggesting a causal
connection, either directly or indirectly, between the filing of his lawsuit and the denial of his
application for readmission. Essentially, all that he has alleged is that he engaged in protected
activity at one time and that an adverse action occurred later.”) Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion
that there is a causal connection is without merit. (ECF No. 29 at 17.) And, as noted earlier,
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not explicitly assert a retaliation claim under Title VI. Thus, a
retaliation claim under Title VI if pled properly, would also lead to a recommendation of
dismissal for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28) be GRANTED.
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served through ECF
on all counsel. Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of service of this Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), 72(b); see also Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group LLP, No. 24-1103 (2d Cir.
Oct. 28, 2025) (addressing timing and scope of objections to Reports and Recommendations).
Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to the District Judge
assigned to this action prior to the expiration of the fourteen (14) day period for filing objections.
Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days precludes further review of this Report and
Recommendation either by the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 145 (1985) (“a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to
appeal”); Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008) (“failure to object timely
to a magistrate's report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate’s
decision”); see Monroe v. Hyundai of Manhattan & Westchester, 372 F. App’x 147, 147–48 (2d
Cir. 2010) (summary order) (same).
Dated: Central Islip, New York.
December 10, 2025
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED,
/S/_James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 2:24-cv-05333-JMA-JMW Document 34 Filed 12/10/25 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>