Daly v. The Incorporated Village of Port Jefferson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JAMES DALY,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
v. 	AND ORDER
23-CV-9179-SJB-JMW
THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF PORT
JEFFERSON, BRETT BAILEY,
and MARGOT GARANT,
Defendants.
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BULSARA, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff James Daly (“Daly”) filed this Section 1983 action for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process against the Incorporated Village of Port Jefferson (the
“Village”), Brett Bailey, and Margot Garant (collectively, “Defendants”), based on their
2017 prosecution of him for property-related violations of the Village Code. The parties
have each moved for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
dated May 10, 2025 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 70-6; Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. & in
Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. dated July 3, 2025 (“Defs.’ Mot.”), Dkt. No. 70-12). For
the reasons explained, Daly’s motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendants’
motion is granted.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
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“A genuine issue of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). “In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, [the
Court] must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the
moving party.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “This is true even though the court [is]
presented with cross-motions for summary judgment; each movant has the burden of
presenting evidence to support its motion that would allow the district court, if
appropriate, to direct a verdict in its favor.” Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 236 (2d
Cir. 1988). “When both parties have moved for summary judgment, the court must
evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Alta
Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc., 165 F.4th 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2026) (quotation
omitted).
“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
the assertion” in one of two ways. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). It may cite to portions of the
record “including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Id. R.
56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, it may show that “the materials cited do not establish the
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absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. R. 56(c)(1)(B); cf. Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d
917, 924 (2d Cir. 1988).
In moving for summary judgment or answering such a motion, litigants are
required by the Local Rules to provide a statement (a Rule 56.1 statement) setting forth
purported undisputed facts or, if controverting any fact, responding to each assertion.
See Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a)–(b). In both instances, the party must support its position by
citing to admissible evidence from the record. Id. R. 56.1(d); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(requiring reliance on admissible evidence in the record in supporting or controverting
a purported material fact). “The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is to streamline the
consideration of summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to
hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the parties.” Holtz v.
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
Where claims in opposing Rule 56.1 statements are “genuinely disputed,” the
Court will consider the evidentiary sources of the claims. Halberg v. United Behav.
Health, 408 F. Supp. 3d 118, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (adopting report and recommendation).
In evaluating the sources of claims made in dueling Rule 56.1 statements, the Court
cannot—as is true for the summary judgment motion as a whole—weigh evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634, 644 (2d Cir.
1994). Furthermore, “[l]egal arguments are impermissible in any Rule 56.1 Statement
and are to be disregarded.” Taveras v. HRV Mgmt., Inc., No. 17-CV-5211, 2020 WL
1501777, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); Lawrence v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-412, 2013
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WL 4458755, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (“Both parties have submitted Local Rule
56.1 statements and responses to each other’s statements that mix factual assertions
with legal argument and therefore fail to meet the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. The
facts . . . are taken from those assertions contained in the Local Rule 56.1 statements that
comply with Local Rule 56.1[.]” (citations omitted)). The court may not grant summary
judgment based on a fact in a Rule 56.1 statement—even if undisputed—not supported
by admissible evidence. E.g., Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 142–43 (2d Cir.
2003) (vacating grant of summary judgment to defendants based on facts enumerated in
Rule 56.1 statement supported only by arguments in briefs rather than admissible
evidence). The Court must also disregard conclusory denials that lack citations to
admissible evidence. Rodriguez v. Schneider, No. 95-CV-4083, 1999 WL 459813, at *1 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (“Rule 56.1 statements are not argument. They should contain
factual assertions, with citation to the record. They should not contain conclusions[.]”),
aff’d, 56 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2003). Also, where the opposing party fails to
specifically controvert a numbered paragraph in the Rule 56.1 statement, the statement
by the moving party “will be deemed to be admitted.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(c). The Court
also does not give any consideration to hearsay, speculation, or inadmissible evidence
in evaluating declarations or affidavits. Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App’x 128, 130 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“[A] court is obliged not to consider inadmissible evidence at the summary
judgment stage[.]”); Crawford v. Dep’t of Investigation, No. 05-CV-5368, 2007 WL 2850512,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (“[A] non-moving party ‘must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial;’ he or she ‘may not rely on mere
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conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence
showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.’” (quoting Woodman v.
WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2005))), aff’d, 324 F. App’x 139, 143 (2d Cir.
2009).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As a threshold matter, the Court addresses a number of disputes about the
parties’ respective Rule 56.1 statements. The parties dispute whether Daly served a
statement upon the Defendants. Daly contends that he served a copy of his statement
on or about May 5, 2025 via U.S. mail. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. & Reply in Supp. of
Summ. J. dated July 29, 2025 (“Pl.’s Opp’n & Reply”), Dkt. No. 70-14 at 6). He provides
no evidence (like a declaration attesting to the mailing) for the assertion. Defendants
maintain that they were not served with the statement with the remainder of Daly’s
submissions, which were served via email, on May 12, 2025. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8; see also
Decl. of Chelsea Weisbord in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 70-15 ¶ 3). Daly
provided a physical copy of an eight-paragraph Rule 56.1 statement to the Court along
with courtesy copies of the briefs. Notably, it was not filed on the docket. In any event,
despite the evidence suggesting that no statement was ever timely filed or served, even
accepting Daly’s statements as true, Daly’s motion is denied and Defendants’ motion is
granted.
Separately, Daly failed to counter or respond to Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement.
(See Defs.’ Reply in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply”), Dkt. No. 70-16 at 2).
Daly addresses Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement in his reply brief, a procedurally
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improper means of raising disputed issues of fact. (E.g., Pl.’s Opp’n & Reply at 8–9); see
Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(b),(e). Those attempts also fail on their own because he does so
without any citation to admissible evidence and makes assertions based solely on legal
argument. As such, all of Defendants’ facts are, therefore, deemed admitted. See Loc.
Civ. R. 56.1(c); Aptive Env’t, LLC v. Village of East Rockaway, No. 21-677, 2022 WL 211091,
at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2022) (“So long as the moving party’s Rule 56.1(a) statement
includes citations to admissible evidence, [i]f the opposing party then fails to controvert
a fact so set forth in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement, that fact will be deemed
admitted.” (quotation omitted)).
In 2017, Edward Hyshiver (“Hyshiver”), Daly’s neighbor, complained that Daly
was clearing trees on his property. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement dated July 3, 2025
(“Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 70-11 ¶¶ 6, 21). Around that time, Lorne Taichman
(“Taichman”), another neighbor, made similar complaints about clearing and grading
work being done on the property. (Id. ¶ 22). On March 8, 2017, Village Ordinance
Inspector1 Andrew Smith (“Smith”) issued an Order to Remedy Violation against Daly
for clearing trees and vegetation in violation of the Port Jefferson Village Code (“PJV”)
§ 241-2(A), and directed Daly to make an application to the Planning Department to
1 A Village Ordinance Inspector is tasked with enforcing the Village Code, the
New York State Uniform code pertaining to property maintenance, the fire code, and
the building and housing code. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8). When a citizen makes a
complaint of a possible violation, a code enforcement official is expected to look into the
complaint by visiting the site or checking the Village records. (Id. ¶ 10). Inspectors may
issue orders to remedy or summonses and appearance tickets for violations. (Id. ¶¶ 9,
11–12).
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proceed with his work. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 18–19). Daly then received a separate, additional
order to remedy that also alleged improper tree removal. (Id. ¶ 20).
On May 11, 2017, Smith observed that Daly had a large area on his property
lacking vegetation and trees, and inferred a clearing was done without first obtaining a
permit from the Planning Board. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 32). Smith personally served Daly with
Appearance Ticket 1833 on May 22, 2017, documenting the violations. (Id. ¶ 33). Smith
also issued an Order to Remedy Violation to Daly for having two or more inoperative
or unlicensed motor vehicles on his property in violation of the New York State
Property Maintenance Code (“NYS PMC”) § 302.8 and directed removal of the vehicles
from the property. (Id. ¶¶ 38–39). Smith also issued an Order to Remedy Violation
against Daly for a prohibited sign—a “No Parking” sign for which Daly had no
permit—and directed Daly to remove the sign. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–54).
On June 19, 2017, a Stop Work Order for clearing and grading of the property
was posted on Daly’s garage. (Id. ¶ 34). On June 28, 2017, Smith observed and
documented Daly’s property being cleared without the required approval and contrary
to the Stop Work Order in a summons and Appearance Ticket 1870, which he
personally served on Daly the same day. (Id. ¶¶ 35–37). Smith also observed multiple
unregistered vehicles parked on Daly’s property in violation of NYS PMC § 302.8,
which he documented in a summons and Appearance Ticket 1855 and personally
served on Daly. (Id. ¶¶ 40–42).
On August 16, 2017, Smith observed and documented a prohibited tow-away
sign on Daly’s property, in violation of PJV § 250-31G, and recorded his observations in
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Appearance Ticket 1856. (Id. ¶¶ 55–56). Smith also observed a flagpole on Daly’s
property that exceeded 15 feet in height that had been placed without the required
variance in violation of PJV § 250-28 A. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 60). Smith documented his
observations in a summons and Appearance Ticket 1869, which noted that Daly had
been issued a prior written notice about the flagpole. (Id. ¶ 61).
That same day, Smith also observed additional grading being done on Daly’s
property without a permit in violation of PJV § 241-2(A) and the Stop Work Order. (Id.
¶ 65). Smith documented his observations in a summons and Appearance Ticket 1879,
noting the prior violations issued to Daly. (Id. ¶ 67). Smith then personally served all
three Appearance Tickets, 1856, 1869, and 1879, on Daly. (Id. ¶ 68).
On June 18, 2018, Defendant Bailey, a Village Ordinance Inspector, observed
clearing and grading of the hillside on Daly’s property by a commercial contractor and
workers, as well as disturbance of vegetation and soil, and placement of footings for a
foundation for a retaining wall. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 86–87). Based on an interview with the
contractor, Bailey determined that Daly hired and authorized the work, which Bailey
determined went beyond normal maintenance under the Village Code, but was
conducted without written approval. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 88–89). Bailey documented
these observations in Appearance Ticket 1865. (Id. ¶¶ 86–87).
On June 20, 2018, Bailey observed additional clearing and grading on Daly’s
property, (id. ¶ 90), documenting his observations in Appearance Ticket 1864, (id.
¶¶ 92–93). Bailey again interviewed the contractor (determining Daly authorized the
work) and searched the public records (finding no written approval). (Id. ¶¶ 94–95). Six
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days later, he observed more clearing and grading and documented his observations in
Appearance Ticket 1860. (Id. ¶ 96).
Beginning in 2017, the Village initiated eight cases against Daly in the Village
Justice Court (“the Justice Court Cases”), charging 12 violations of the Village Code.2
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement dated May 5, 2025 (“Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 72 ¶ 4; Defs.’
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 84). Daly pled not guilty and denied every violation. (Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5).
In January of 2019, the Zoning Board was notified that the non-compliant
flagpole on Daly’s property was removed. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 102). On February 7,
2019, the Planning Board approved Daly’s revised revegetation plan, subject to several
conditions. (Id. ¶ 103). Daly also obtained a building permit to construct a retaining
wall on April 22, 2019. (Id. ¶ 104).
On November 18, 2022, given that “two-thirds of remedial work ha[d] been
done,” Justice Reilly dismissed the Justice Court Cases on two grounds: speedy trial and
sua sponte in the interest of justice. (Id. ¶¶ 108–09; Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7).
Daly commenced this action on December 14, 2023. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1). On
February 27, 2024, Daly filed an Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 26). On
June 27, 2024, the Honorable Gary R. Brown issued an order disposing of most of Daly’s
2 The Village also filed a lawsuit against Daly in Suffolk County Supreme Court
on June 21, 2017, regarding Daly’s work on the property. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 72). The
Village moved by Order to Show Cause for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and
preliminary injunction (“PI”). (Id. ¶¶ 77–78). The Suffolk Supreme Court granted the
Village a TRO, and later a PI, prohibiting Daly from “removing, cutting, or altering any
trees, vegetation, or grade in any manner, or by any means, at the premises[.]” (Id.
¶¶ 79–80). The parties executed a Stipulation of Settlement on March 16, 2023 to resolve
the case. (Id. ¶¶ 81–82).
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claims with prejudice but permitting the Fifth Cause of Action for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process arising out of the Justice Court Cases to proceed.3
(Mem. & Order dated June 27, 2024, Dkt. No. 46 at 9). The parties move for summary
judgment as to the remaining claims.
DISCUSSION
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under New York and federal law, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal
proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding
in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding
and (4) actual malice.” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191, 195 (2000)). To prevail on an abuse of
process claim—which in the criminal context is a procedural due process claim—a
plaintiff must establish that a defendant “(1) employ[ed] regularly issued legal process
to compel performance or forbearance of some act[,] (2) with intent to do harm without
excuse [or] justification, and (3) in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside
the legitimate ends of the process.” Zappin v. Cooper, No. 23-165, 2024 WL 3084015, at *2
(2d Cir. June 21, 2024) (quoting Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Probable cause is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim. Frost v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 242–43 (2d Cir. 2020); Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d
72, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]f there was probable cause for the prosecution, then no
3 The case was transferred from the Honorable Gary R. Brown to the
undersigned on January 8, 2025.
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malicious prosecution claim can stand.”). As to abuse of process, the Second Circuit has
not definitively answered the question. See Zappin, 2024 WL 3084015, at *2 (citing
Mangino v. Inc. Village of Patchogue, 808 F.3d 951, 958 (2d Cir. 2015)). However, here,
Daly purports to satisfy the second element of an abuse of process claim (an intent to do
harm), based solely on a lack of probable cause. (Pl.’s Mot. at 18–19). Therefore, a
finding of probable cause to initiate the cases is sufficient to defeat Daly’s abuse of
process claim. See Tuccillo v. County of Nassau, 723 F. App’x 81, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (“New
York state courts have subsequently held that probable cause will defeat an abuse of
process claim under at least some circumstances.”)); Mangino v. Inc. Village of Patchogue,
814 F. Supp. 2d 242, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[W]here plaintiff’s only argument to support
such elements is a purported lack of probable cause, such claims must fail if probable
cause is found to exist.”); e.g., Rivera v. Jahmi, 801 F. Supp. 3d 129, 161–62 (E.D.N.Y.
2025) (granting defendant summary judgment as to plaintiff’s abuse of process claim
given probable cause to effectuate arrest) (collecting cases).
Probable cause is found in “such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty.” Boyd, 336 F.3d at 76. In the
context of malicious prosecution, “probable cause is assessed in light of the facts known
or reasonably believed by the officers at the initiation of the prosecution, not the arrest.”
Keyes v. City of New York., No. 21-2406, 2023 WL 176956, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2023). The
existence of probable cause turns on “the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong
enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for
prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of.” Bernshtein v. City of New York,
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496 F. App’x 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted)); see also Thomas v. Genova, No.
23-7452, 2025 WL 583182, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (“Probable cause exists when an
officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the
person to be arrested.” (quotation omitted)).
Probable cause “does not require absolute certainty, and [courts] instead look to
the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted). To that end, “the fact that an
innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged does not negate probable
cause.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants had probable cause to
initiate the Justice Court Cases against Daly. The Justice Court Cases were based on the
twelve accusatory instruments prepared by Village Ordinance Inspectors between 2017
and 2018. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 84). They contained detailed information about the
relevant officer’s observations, and the factual bases for the alleged violations, which
included searches of databases for evidence of permits allowing the work that was
being done on Daly’s property. Such accusatory instruments—with similar levels of
evidentiary support—are often found sufficient to demonstrate the existence of
probable cause. E.g., Norton v. Town of Islip, 97 F. Supp. 3d 241, 258–59, 261 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (finding probable cause for appearance tickets issued against homeowner in
connection with alleged violations of town’s rental permit law, based on facts from
town investigator’s site visit and observations, and absence of rental permit with
housing bureau); Rodriguez v. Village of Sleepy Hollow, No. 13-CV-8465, 2015 WL 4597446,
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at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2015) (finding probable cause based on appearance tickets for
construction infractions based in part on officer’s observations); Lepper v. Village of
Babylon, No. 18-CV-7011, 2022 WL 939719, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022) (granting
summary judgment where defendants had probable cause to issue tickets and
commence an action over failure to obtain necessary land-use permits based on
investigator’s observations).
The tickets that formed the basis of Daly’s prosecution reflect the Inspectors’
observations and simultaneous documentation of the violations on Daly’s property on
specific days: improper clearing of vegetation, (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 18–19, 30–32, 34–37,
86–87); a noncompliant flagpole without the required variance, (id. ¶¶ 60–61);
prohibited signs, (id. ¶¶ 55–56); the improper storing of multiple unregistered vehicles,
(id. ¶¶ 40–42); improper construction work on a retaining wall, (id. ¶¶ 92–93); and
permit-less grading work, (id. ¶¶ 65–68, 86–87, 90, 96). The Inspectors’ personal
observations were also documented and sworn under penalty of perjury. (Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt. ¶¶ 13–14). Therefore, with no facts to the contrary, the Court finds that there was
probable cause, based on these accusatory instruments, to prosecute Daly.
Daly’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. For example, Daly contends
that the violations are not based on probable cause because they “contain nothing but
conclusory statements that are not based upon personal observations,” and Defendants
had “no reason to suspect [Daly] of having violated any law.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 8). The
record belies this argument. The violation tickets recount the Inspectors’ observations,
interviews, and actions taken to inspect and verify the alleged violations. (See, e.g.,
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Ticket 1861, attached to Defs.’ Mot. as Ex. 24, Dkt. No. 70-10 (describing that Bailey
“observed that work consisting of clearing and grading . . . was being done by a
commercial contractor . . . while the stop work order was still in effect” and that he
“searched the records maintained by the building department and determined that the
stop work order ha[d] not been rescinded and that no permit for such work ha[d] been
issued”); Ticket 1833, attached to Defs.’ Mot. as Ex. 13, Dkt. No. 70-10 (describing that
Smith “observed: [t]hat [Daly] had a large area located on top of a slope on the eastern
portion of his property cleared of vegetation and trees” and that “[a] search of Building
Department records indicate[d] no such permit or approval ha[d] been issued”)). Their
contents establish probable cause. See, e.g., Carminucci v. Pennelle, No. 18-CV-2936, 2020
WL 4735172, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (“[Building Inspector’s] observation,
however brief, is enough to establish probable cause in this instance because it explains
that he observed a broken fence on Plaintiffs’ property in violation of the Town
Code.”).4
4 Daly also makes various assertions, without citations to caselaw, about the
admissibility of the violations and the Inspectors’ observations. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 8–16).
But it is quite plain that the statements contained in the violation tickets and the tickets
themselves are both admissible and sufficient to demonstrate the existence of probable
cause. See Smith v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-9069, 2016 WL 5793410, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 30, 2016) (“The statements of the [witness] contained in the police reports are not
inadmissible hearsay where, as here, they are not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted but for purposes of establishing whether the arresting officers had information
giving them probable cause.”). Nor is there any merit to Daly’s contention that the
evidence in the tickets was not direct evidence, like video of violations, but merely the
Inspectors’ own observations. An officer’s personal observations are sufficient to
establish probable cause; he need not provide testimony from others or video or
forensic evidence to prosecute. See Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2015)
(concluding “that the defendants . . . had, from their personal observations, sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause.”).
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Ultimately, Defendants have shown that there was probable cause to initiate the
Justice Court Cases against Daly, and Daly has provided no evidence to the contrary.5
See Thomas v. Genova, 698 F. Supp. 3d 493, 511–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (granting summary
judgment where there was probable cause to commence a code enforcement given the
undisputed fact that the property was being operated as a two-family home in a one-
family zone and plaintiff had no permit to do so), aff’d, No. 23-7452, 2025 WL 583182 (2d
Cir. Feb. 24, 2025). As such, the Court grants Defendants’ summary judgment on Daly’s
malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. Granting Defendants’ motion
necessarily means that Daly’s motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Daly’s motion for summary judgment is denied
and Defendants’ motion is granted. Daly’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. The
Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara
SANKET J. BULSARA
United States District Judge
Date: 	March 6, 2026
Central Islip, New York
5 Because the Court finds that Daly’s claims are dismissed, it need not address
the parties’ arguments as to the other elements of the claims nor the Village’s liability
under Monell.
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