Holman v. Grey et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SERRICE HOLMAN, Attorney-in-Fact for
KEVIN WILLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE LISA GREY; MICHAEL
McMAHON; WENDY STEIN; KIRSTIN
(LAST NAME UNKNOWN); GREGORY
ESPOSITO; MICHAEL CIRIGLIANO;
RICHARD KOPACZ; JOSEPH LICITRA;
MAQUITA MOODY; BIJU KOSHY;
DANIEL CICERO; JONAH HUGHEY; and
RUSSELL SATIN,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-CV-1591 (HG)
HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Serrice Holman, proceeding pro se and identifying herself as attorney-in-fact for
her son Kevin Willis, commenced this action on March 17, 2026, against several Defendants
associated with her own state criminal proceedings and Willis’s separate state criminal
proceedings. The Defendants named in the Complaint are Judges Lisa Grey and Biju Koshy (the
“Judicial Defendants”); District Attorney Michael McMahon and Assistant District Attorneys
Jonah Hughey and Russell Satin (the “Prosecutor Defendants”); court employees Wendy Stein,
Daniel Cicero, and Kirstin (last name unknown) (the “Court Employee Defendants”); and
attorneys Gregory Esposito, Michael Cirigliano, Richard Kopacz, Joseph Licitra, and Maquita
Moody (the “Defense Attorney Defendants”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).1 Plaintiff invokes the
1 	Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases and Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court
omits all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations. The
Court refers to the pages assigned by the Electronic Case Files system (“ECF”).
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Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and seeks monetary damages and other relief arising
from (i) Willis’s arrest, prosecution, and detention, (ii) the alleged unreasonable seizure of
$80,000 from Plaintiff, and (iii) alleged physical mistreatment of Plaintiff. See Compl. at 4–6,
12–16. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is GRANTED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff purports to assert claims belonging to Willis. Those claims are DISMISSED
without prejudice for the reasons set forth below. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary relief
against Defendants entitled to absolute immunity, those claims are DISMISSED with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Plaintiff’s remaining claims based on alleged
violations of her own constitutional rights are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with leave to amend by November 9, 2026.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff identifies herself as “Attorney-in-Fact” for her son Kevin Willis and claims that
she is the sole proprietor of a business. Compl. at 2, 12, 14. The Complaint alleges that, on
March 17, 2025, government officials seized $80,000 in “business capital” from Plaintiff without
a warrant and without providing a “Property Clerk Invoice,” and that they failed to disclose the
seizure during Plaintiff’s arraignment in state court. Id. at 5, 12, 14–16. After she demanded
return of the $80,000, Plaintiff was allegedly threatened and later subjected to physical
mistreatment, including what she described as “mechanical asphyxiation,” being stomped while
prone, and having hair forcibly removed from her scalp. Id. at 12–13, 16. She characterized this
2 	The Court “recite[s] the substance of the allegations as if they represented true facts, with
the understanding that these are not findings of the [C]ourt, as [I] have no way of knowing at this
stage what are the true facts.” In re Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 20 F.4th 131, 133 (2d
Cir. 2021).
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alleged mistreatment as an attempted murder. Id. at 16. But the Complaint does not identify
(i) which named Defendant(s) personally committed the alleged acts, (ii) when each named
Defendant participated in the alleged acts, or (iii) facts connecting any particular Defendant to
the alleged injuries. Plaintiff also alleges that the Defense Attorney Defendants and the
Prosecutor Defendants conspired to suppress evidence concerning the seized funds. Id. at 12–13.
Separately, the Complaint alleges that her son Willis has been unlawfully detained for an
extended period, that state officials improperly used competency proceedings under Article 730
of the New York Criminal Procedure Law to keep him detained, and that Willis has been denied
a speedy trial. Id. at 5, 12–13. She characterizes Willis’s detention as a kidnapping. Id. at 12.
According to Exhibit A of the Complaint, Willis is detained on Rikers Island. Id. at 29.
Plaintiff claims these events constitute violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 4–5, 13. She seeks damages, including damages for Willis’s alleged
disappearance and kidnapping, and appears also to request federal intervention in the ongoing
state proceedings. Id. at 6, 9, 12–13.
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible ‘when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all factual
allegations are assumed to be true, that rule is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
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Pro se complaints “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,
72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se
complaint liberally”). Nonetheless, where a plaintiff proceeds IFP, the Court must dismiss the
action if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for vindicating federal constitutional and statutory rights
against persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that
the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States;
and (2) that they did so under color of state law.” Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740,
750 (2d Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must also allege each defendant’s personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation. See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Claims Asserted on Behalf of Kevin Willis
As an initial matter, Plaintiff may not prosecute claims belonging to Willis. Although
Plaintiff describes herself as Willis’s attorney-in-fact, that designation does not permit her, as a
non-attorney, to prosecute claims belonging to Willis pro se. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Berrios v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 132–34 (2d Cir. 2009); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558
(2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on
another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.”). A non-attorney may represent only her own
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interests and may not appear on behalf of another person in federal court. See Berrios, 564 F.3d
at 132–34.
The Complaint asserts numerous claims concerning rights belonging to Willis, including
claims arising from his detention, competency proceedings, asserted speedy-trial rights, and
criminal defense. Compl. at 5, 9, 12–16. Plaintiff may not litigate Willis’s constitutional claims
merely by virtue of her designation as his attorney-in-fact. See Berrios, 564 F.3d at 132–34.
The Court therefore does not reach the merits of claims belonging to Willis. Those claims are
dismissed without prejudice to Willis asserting them on his own behalf or through licensed
counsel, subject to any applicable procedural requirements or defenses. The Court considers
separately below whether the Complaint states any claim based on an alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s own federal rights.
II. 	Claims Against Judicial Defendants and Prosecutor Defendants
Even if the Court construed the Complaint as asserting claims belonging personally to
Plaintiff, the claims against the Judicial Defendants and the Prosecutor Defendants are not
viable. Judges are immune from suits for damages arising from acts performed in their judicial
capacities, unless they act in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11–12 (1991); Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 2020). The Complaint challenges
judicial acts taken in connection with state criminal proceedings, including rulings concerning
warrants, competency, representation, and orders of protection. Compl. at 5, 9–10, 22–39.
Nothing alleged plausibly suggests that Judge Grey or Judge Koshy acted outside a judicial
capacity or in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages against the Judicial Defendants for those acts, those claims must be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
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Prosecutors likewise enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for conduct
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” including initiating and
pursuing a prosecution and presenting the State’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–
31 (1976); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342–43 (2009). The allegations against
District Attorney McMahon and Assistant District Attorneys Hughey and Satin concern their
conduct in connection with Willis’s prosecution. Compl. at 2–3, 7–8, 12, 22–39. The Complaint
alleges no investigative or administrative conduct by those Defendants outside their role as
advocates that plausibly deprived Plaintiff of a federal right. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages against the Prosecutor Defendants for such conduct, those claims must
likewise be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
III. 	Claims Against Court Employee Defendants
The Complaint names Deputy Clerk Wendy Stein, Court Officer Daniel Cicero, and a
Brooklyn court clerk identified simply as “Kirstin” as Defendants. Compl. at 3. Court
employees may be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity when performing functions that
are judicial in nature and integral to the judicial process. See Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62,
66–67 (1997). The Court need not determine whether such immunity applies here, however,
because the Complaint does not allege facts showing that either Stein, Cicero, or Kirstin, through
their own individual actions, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at
618 (“[A] plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Stein, Cicero, or Kirstin,
and the claims against them are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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IV. 	Claims Against Defense Attorney Defendants
The Complaint also names Gregory Esposito, Michael Cirigliano, Richard Kopacz,
Joseph Licitra, and Maquita Moody as being attorneys who allegedly represented Willis or were
associated with Legal Aid. Compl. at 7. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants
violated Willis’s constitutional rights in connection with his criminal representation, Plaintiff
may not prosecute those claims for the reasons explained above, and the Court does not reach
their merits. And to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert that these Defendants violated her own
constitutional rights, the Complaint fails to state such a claim. An attorney, whether privately
retained or court appointed, does not act under color of state law merely by representing a
defendant in a criminal proceeding. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981);
Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).
A private party may nevertheless act under color of state law where the private party
conspires with a state actor to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ciambriello v.
County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2002). To state such a claim, however, a
plaintiff must allege facts plausibly supporting an agreement between the private and state actors
to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury. Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are
insufficient.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Cirigliano and Esposito “conspired with District Attorney
McMahon and Judge Koshy to suppress the theft of the capital.” Compl. at 12. But the
Complaint alleges no facts from which the Court could plausibly infer an agreement or concerted
action among Cirigliano, Esposito, and any state actor to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion of a conspiracy therefore does not plausibly allege that Cirigliano
or Esposito acted under color of state law with respect to any claim belonging to Plaintiff. As to
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Kopacz, Licitra, and Moody, the Complaint does not allege that they participated in the alleged
conspiracy or otherwise acted jointly with a state actor to violate Plaintiff’s rights. Accordingly,
to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims based on alleged violations of her own rights, she fails to
state a Section 1983 claim against the Defense Attorney Defendants.
V. 	Claims Based on Alleged Seizure of $80,000
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the $80,000 in “business capital” was her property and
seeks to assert a Fourth Amendment claim based on its seizure, the Complaint does not identify
which named Defendant seized the funds or otherwise allege facts showing the personal
involvement of any named Defendant in the alleged seizure. Compl. at 5, 12, 14–16. Pursuant
to Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618. Accordingly, any claim by Plaintiff
based on the alleged seizure of her property fails to state a claim under Section 1983.
VI. 	Remaining Constitutional Allegations
Plaintiff also alleges that she was subjected to serious physical mistreatment after
demanding the return of the allegedly seized $80,000. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
unnamed “state actors” subjected her to “mechanical asphyxiation (strangulation),” stomped her
in the face while she was prone, and forcibly ripped hair from her scalp. Compl. at 12–13, 16.
Plaintiff characterizes this conduct as an attempted murder and a violation of her federal
constitutional rights. Id. at 13.
These allegations, although serious, do not state a Section 1983 claim against any named
Defendant. To state a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must plead and prove that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618. Here, Plaintiff does not identify any named Defendant
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as having used force against her or allege facts showing that any named Defendant personally
participated in, directed, or was otherwise personally involved in the alleged use of force.
Plaintiff’s reference to unidentified “state actors” is therefore insufficient to state a Section 1983
claim against any of the named Defendants.
The Court is required to construe a pro se complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the
strongest claims it suggests. See Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). But
even liberally construed, the Complaint does not allege facts connecting the alleged physical
mistreatment of Plaintiff to any named Defendant. Accordingly, these allegations fail to state a
claim against any named Defendant under Section 1983 and must be dismissed.
VII. 	Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend before dismissal
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Leave to amend is not required, however, where amendment would be futile. Cuoco, 222 F.3d at
112.
Here, amendment would be futile as to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief against the
Judicial Defendants and Prosecutor Defendants for conduct protected by absolute immunity.
Leave to amend those claims is therefore denied. But Plaintiff’s remaining claims based on
alleged violations of her own rights are dismissed for pleading deficiencies that may potentially
be cured. In particular, the Complaint does not identify the individuals allegedly responsible for
the seizure of Plaintiff’s property or the alleged physical mistreatment, does not allege the
personal involvement of the Court Employee Defendants, and does not plausibly allege that the
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Defense Attorney Defendants acted under color of state law to violate Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff
is therefore granted leave to file an amended complaint by November 9, 2026.3
In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must identify the individual or individuals she
believes were responsible for the alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights. For each
named Defendant, Plaintiff must include a brief description of what they did or failed to do and
how each Defendant’s act or omission caused her injury. If Plaintiff does not know the name of
an individual Defendant, she may identify that individual as John or Jane Doe and, to the best of
her ability, provide identifying information and the date and location of the alleged incident.
Plaintiff may not assert claims belonging to Willis unless Willis proceeds on his own behalf or
through licensed counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint, filed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), is
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Claims belonging to
Kevin Willis are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1654 because Plaintiff, a
non-attorney proceeding pro se, may not prosecute them on his behalf. See Berrios, 564 F.3d at
132–34. Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief against the Judicial Defendants and the Prosecutor
Defendants are barred by absolute immunity and are therefore dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Finally, Plaintiff’s remaining claims based on alleged
violations of her own constitutional rights are dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because leave to amend should be freely given when justice so
3 	Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint does not simply add to the first
complaint. Once an amended complaint is filed, it completely replaces the original. Therefore,
Plaintiff must include in the amended complaint all the necessary information contained in the
original complaint. Moreover, any amended complaint Plaintiff chooses to file must be
captioned “Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Order.
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requires, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint as to
her own Section 1983 claims only, consistent with this decision. If Plaintiff does not file an
amended complaint on or before November 9, 2026, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to
issue judgment and close this case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and
note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Hector Gonzalez
HECTOR GONZALEZ
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 9, 2026
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