Codio v. Bailey House Inc. and Housing Works Inc. (Merged Programs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SHYMEL CODIO,
Plaintiff,
- against -
BAILEY HOUSE INC. and HOUSING
WORKS INC.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-7027 (PKC) (TAM)
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Shymel Codio filed this action against Bailey House Inc. (“Bailey House”)
and Housing Works Inc. (“Housing Works”) (together, “Defendants”1), alleging a violation of his
civil rights. 	(See Compl., Dkt. 1.) 	Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is
granted. 	(See IFP Motion, Dkt. 2.) 	For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Although Plaintiff’s allegations are somewhat unclear, he appears to assert that on
March 152, he was “locked out” and that Bailey House failed to help him. (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 5.)
Plaintiff then appears to have brought an action against Defendants in Kings County Supreme
1 Housing Works and Bailey House are non-profit organizations that provide supportive
housing, healthcare and advocacy for individuals. See Press Release, Hous. Works (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.housingworks.org/press/housing-works-and-bailey-house-complete-merger-
creating-one-of-the-largest-providers-of-hiv-aids-housing-primary-care-and-comprehensive-
services-in-new-york-city [https://perma.cc/PF2G-M6KG]. The two entities merged in 2019. Id.
2 Plaintiff does not provide a year.
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Court (“state case”). 	(See Exhibit, Dkt. 1-2 (New York Supreme Court Judgment)3.) On
December 17, 2025, upon Defendants’ default in the state case, Defendants were directed by the
Kings County Supreme Court to reinstate Plaintiff’s benefits under his “contractual program
agreement.” (Id.) For relief in the instant action, Plaintiff seeks housing and monetary damages.
(Compl., Dkt. 1, at 6.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 	Although courts assume all allegations in the
complaint to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In
reviewing a pro se complaint, courts must be mindful that a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings should be
held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)
(noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint
liberally”).
“Regardless of whether a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court has the inherent
power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous or the court lacks
jurisdiction over the matter.” Jean-Baptiste v. Montway LLC, No. 22-CV-5579 (PKC) (LB), 2022
3 Plaintiff only provides the judgment, which includes the index number 177/2025.
(Exhibit, Dkt. 1-2.) From this index number, the Court determines that Plaintiff appears to have
filed his pleadings in the state case on September 3, 2025. See Pl.’s Pleadings, Codio v. Bailey
House/Housing Works, No. 177/2025, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sep. 3, 2025), Dkt. 3.
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WL 11213581, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2022) (citing Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants
Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–364 (2d Cir. 2000)). 	“[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not
waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” 	Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2000); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
DISCUSSION
Even under a liberal reading, the Complaint fails to state facts to support either federal
question or diversity jurisdiction.
I. 	Federal Question Jurisdiction
Section 1331 provides the Court “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A plaintiff properly invokes
Section 1331 jurisdiction when they plead a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or
laws of the United States, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006), i.e., when plaintiff’s
claim “necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” Bracey v. Bd of
Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim for the denial of a federal constitutional right to
housing. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 6.) However, there is no constitutional right to housing. Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“We are unable to perceive in [the Constitution] any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . . . . Absent constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are
legislative, not judicial, functions”); Sexton v. Dept. of Homeless Servs., No. 24-CV-8895, 2025
WL 1334605, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2025) (“[T]here is no right under the United States
Constitution to housing generally (or, for that matter, to safe and sanitary housing specifically).”);
Johnson v. Fudge, No. 21-CV-9648, 2022 WL 311551, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (“[C]ourts
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have long held that there is no constitutional right to adequate housing.”). 	Plaintiff does not
otherwise allege any plausible facts to suggest he was denied a benefit to which he is entitled
“under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff thus
fails to properly invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.
II. 	Diversity Jurisdiction
To invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff must allege that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 and is non-speculative. 	Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat.
Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 93 F.3d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1996) (“A party invoking the jurisdiction
of the federal court has the burden of proving that it appears to a ‘reasonable probability’ that the
claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount.” (quoting Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton
Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994))); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (requiring for diversity
jurisdiction that, inter alia, “the matter in controversy exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs”). 	Plaintiff must also adequately allege that “all of the adverse
parties in a suit . . . be completely diverse with regard to citizenship.” See Handelsman v. Bedford
Vill. Assocs., 213 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here,
Plaintiff has failed to allege any amount in controversy, let alone a non-speculative amount that is
above $75,000. Additionally, Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of New York and thus not
diverse. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff thus fails to properly invoke the Court’s diversity
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and grants Plaintiff’s IFP motion. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment
and close this case. The Court would normally not enable electronic notifications without a party’s
consent, but given the circumstances (Plaintiff's failure to provide a street address, and the
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likelihood that Plaintiff lacks a current physical address), the Court adds the email he provided on
his Complaint to the docket for the sole purpose of communicating this dismissal order, and
relevant appeal information, to him.4 Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to include a copy
of the appeals packet as attachment to its judgment.
Ordinarily, the Court might grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint.
However, the Court does not do so here because, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, amendment
would be futile. See Wimberly v. Atl. Dialysis Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 24-CV-9269 (JPO), 2025
WL 1237546, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2025) (“[A] court need not grant leave to amend when
amendment would be futile.” (quoting Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2011)), recon.
denied, 2025 WL 1677757 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2025), appeal dismissed (Sep. 2, 2025); Lehrman
v. Lovo, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 348, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (same).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore denies IFP status for the purpose of any appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: February 3, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
4 Normally, the Court would mail Plaintiff all unreported cases cited in this Order.
However, this is not possible given Plaintiff has not provided the Court with an address.
Accordingly, should he wish to review the unreported cases cited herein, Plaintiff may come to
the courthouse and communicate through the Clerk of Court to Chambers, where the cases will be
provided to him free of charge.
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