Pridgen v. Warden Solomon Chester, NYC DEPT. of Correction

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
N o 25-CV-5935 (RER) (MMH)
_____________________
ANDREW PRIDGEN
VERSUS
W ARDEN SOLOMON CHESTER, NYC DEPT. OF C ORRECTION
___________________
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
___________________
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., District Judge:
On October 21, 2025, pro se petitioner Andrew Pridgen, detained at Otis Bantum
Correctional Center on Rikers Island,1 filed this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 challenging—what appears to be—his ongoing criminal action in Queens
County on speedy trial grounds, and an impending (at the time) involuntary commitment
to a mental health facility.
After carefully reviewing the record, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
dismisses Pridgen’s petition.
BACKGROUND
The petition is difficult to follow, but Pridgen appears to allege that he would be
(and subsequently was) transferred to a mental health facility without due process, and
1 During the pendency of this petition, Pridgen filed a notice of change of address for Kirby Manhattan
Psychiatric 	Center, 	a 	maximum 	security 	psychiatric 	center 	on 	Randalls 	Island. 	(ECF 	No. 	6);
https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/krpc/.
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that his speedy trial rights had been violated during his confinement on Rikers Island on
2022 criminal charges in Queens County. (ECF No. 1 (“Pet”) at 6–7, 14–15, 18–20). It is
not clear from the record whether Pridgen’s criminal case is ongoing or has been resolved
by a conviction or a dismissal.
On November 18, 2025, Pridgen filed a letter requesting new counsel in his
criminal matter, raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his current
appointed attorney. (ECF No. 4). Pridgen explained that he was waiting for a bed at Kirby
Psychiatric Center and that “[s]ince approximately November or May 28, 2025 which i
was 	found 	‘dismissed 	due 	to 	incompetence’ 	which 	on 	nycourt.gov 	means 	not
pending/terminated which is violating my speedy trial rights.” (Id. ¶ 2). Pridgen paid the
filing fee. (ECF No. 8).
LEGAL STANDARD
Courts may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing section 2254 Cases, the court has the
authority to review and deny a section 2254 petition without ordering a responsive
pleading from the State “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing § 2254
Cases, Rule 4; see Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing section
2254 Habeas Rule 4).
Alternatively, pretrial habeas relief is available to a person “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and
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“a court may consider an improperly characterized pretrial habeas petition as having been
filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” Johnson v. New York, No. 12–CV–03213 (RRM), 2012 WL
2861004, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012). See also Nieves v. Farber, No. 20 Civ. 0990
(LJL), 2020 WL 1529454, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (“A prisoner in state custody
generally must challenge his confinement in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, but such relief is available under § 2241 to a state pretrial detainee challenging
his custody as unlawful under the Constitution or federal law.”).
Courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the
strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Williams v.
Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant “is not
exempt from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” McCrary
v. Cty. of Nassau, 493 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Court cannot consider Pridgen’s petition under section 2241 or section 2254.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Pridgen was a pretrial detainee when he filed this proceeding. Since he was not
“in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” at the time he filed his petition, he
cannot seek habeas corpus relief under section 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Johnson,
2012 WL 2861004, at *1. Even if Pridgen could be considered in custody pursuant to a
state court judgment, there is no evidence on the record that he exhausted his state court
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remedies related to a state court judgment prior to filing this petition.2 See O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a
state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court.”). Once Pridgen has
contested his involuntary commitment in state court and exhausted all his available state
remedies, he may file a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Buthy v.
Commissioner of Office of Mental Health of New York State, 818 F.2d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir.
1987) (the trial judge “correctly held that [petitioner] could challenge the fact of his pre-
hearing confinement in the forensic unit, as opposed to the conditions of that confinement,
only by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus and after exhausting state remedies as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)”).
To the extent that Pridgen argues that the New York state court violated his speedy
trial or due process rights in an ongoing criminal proceeding, the Court cannot consider
the petition because, as above, Pridgen has not exhausted available state court
remedies. Although not a statutory requirement, section 2241 requires a petitioner to
exhaust available court or administrative remedies.3 See United States ex rel. Scranton
2 Pridgen fails to demonstrate that either exception to the exhaustion requirement applies under section
2254. See Johnson v. Schneider, 20-CV-888 (JLS), 2020 WL 4905361, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020)
(“Section 2254 provides two narrow exceptions to its exhaustion requirement. A federal court may grant a
petitioner's unexhausted petition for habeas relief if: (1) ‘there is an absence of available State corrective
process’; or (2) ‘circumstances exist that render [the State corrective process] ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)).
3 Pridgen fails to demonstrate that either exception to the exhaustion requirement applies under section
2241. See Robinson, 2012 WL 1965631, at *2 (“A petitioner who has not exhausted available state court
or administrative remedies may only seek a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241 if: (1) he establishes
cause for his failure to exhaust and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, see id., or
(2) he demonstrates that the failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
(citing omitted).
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v. State of New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir.1976) (“While 28 U.S.C., Section 2241
does not by its own terms require the exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to
the grant of federal habeas relief, decisional law has superimposed such a requirement
in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”); see also Allen v. Maribal, No. 11–
CV–2638 (KAM), 2011 WL 3162675, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (“While 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 does not on its face require the exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to
the grant of federal habeas relief, the Second Circuit has superimposed such a
requirement to accommodate principles of federalism.”). Because Pridgen has not
presented his federal constitutional speedy trial or due process claims before the trial
court or the highest state court, he has not exhausted his available state court remedies.4
Allen, 2011 WL 3162675, at *3 (“Because the state proceedings are pending before the
trial court, petitioner's claims have yet to be presented to the highest state court, and
petitioner therefore has not exhausted his available state remedies”).
“Even if [Pridgen] could show cause for his failure to exhaust and prejudice
resulting to him from the alleged violation of federal law, the petition is denied pursuant
to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).” Robinson v. Sposato, No. CV–11–0191
(SJF), 2012 WL 1965631, at *3 (May 29, 2012). At the time Pridgen filed his petition, the
criminal proceeding against him was still pending in state court and “there is ample
4 Pridgen attaches an affidavit in support of a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds to
his petition. (Pet. at 58–60). Without more, this is not enough for Pridgen to have exhausted his state court
remedies. Ramirez v. Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 280 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2001) (“State remedies are
deemed exhausted when a petitioner has: (i) presented the federal constitutional claim asserted in the
petition to the highest state court . . . and (ii) informed that court (and lower courts) about both the factual
and legal bases for the federal claim.”).
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opportunity for review of petitioner's constitutional claim in state court, i.e., by way of direct
appeal from, or other collateral attack of, his judgment of conviction in state court.” Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Pridgen’s application for a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2254 without
prejudice.
As Pridgen has not made a substantial showing of the denial of constitutional right,
a certificate of appealability will not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The Court certifies pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore
in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this order to Pridgen
and to note mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: February 23, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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