Mazzei v. New York City Dept. of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Ettore Mazzei, who is currently detained on Rikers Island, filed this
pro se civil rights action on August 12, 2025. ECF No. 1. For the reasons that
follow, the complaint is dismissed, with leave to file an amended complaint within
30 days of the date of this Order.
BACKGROUND
In the space on the form complaint to identify the legal basis for the claim,
Plaintiff checks the box for “Violation of my federal constitutional rights.” ECF No.
1 at 2.1 The complaint alleges a litany of problems Plaintiff has faced during his
detention at Rikers Island, including “medical malpractice,” “medical records
1 The complaint is filed on a form complaint and includes additional pages.
For ease of reference, the Court refers to the page numbers assigned by the
Electronic Case Filing System (“ECF”).
ETTORE MAZZEI,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTION, OFFICER
HOGAN, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE,
and NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF
THE CAPITOL, and NEW YORK
CITY CORPORATION COUNSEL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
No. 25-cv-4541 (NRM) (CLP)
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forged,” failure to provide adequate recreational opportunities, inadequate access to
the law library, limitations on mail service, and various other conditions that he
believes to be “environmental hazard[s].” Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiff does not identify any individuals who may be responsible for these
alleged harms. He claims that he was assaulted on August 28, 2024 because
“Officer Hogan NYC DOC officer on duty in NIC 6B allowed assault to happen and
continue due to discrimination and prejudice against plaintiff.” Id. at 5. He does
not describe any specific acts or omissions of Officer Hogan. Plaintiff states that he
was assaulted by another inmate on August 1, 2025. Id. at 5. He alleges that a
“strategic response team” searched his person and his belongings on November 21,
2024 and took his mail, including “privileged mail to his attorney,” and
subsequently contacted his attorney about “mail I send to him.” Id. at 5. He claims
that his phone calls are monitored and that the Richmond County District Attorney,
the New York Police Department, and the New York City Department of Correction
“use plaintiff’s conversation against him in violation of the law.” Id. at 6. He states
that New York State’s courts’ “procedure and actions are arbitrary and capricious at
best and have discriminated against plaintiff being a prisoner.” Id. at 6. He claims
that “all defendants” have discriminated against him on the basis of “his age 62,
color (white) race and national origin (Italian, American).” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff requests $8 million in damages and injunctive relief, including
access to recreation, law library, mail service, a proper mattress, smoke-free living
spaces, and “proper staff and supervision in housing area and dorms.” Id. at 6.
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Plaintiff states that he previously filed a notice of claim with the New York
City controller and filed claims in a New York State court, but planned to abandon
that action after the Bronx County Supreme Court denied his request to proceed in
forma pauperis. Id. at 4.
DISCUSSION
Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1915A requires this Court to review the
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or from officers or employees thereof, and to “identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint — (1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). Moreover,
pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, a district court must dismiss a case if the
court determines that the complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). If a liberal
reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,”
this Court must grant leave to amend the complaint. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
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99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795
(2d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In order to maintain a civil rights action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
two essential elements. First, “the conduct complained of must have been
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d
545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). Second, “the conduct complained of must have deprived a
person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” Id. Further, a plaintiff seeking to recover money damages under
Section 1983 must establish that the named defendants were personally involved in
the wrongdoing or misconduct complained of. See Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470,
484 (2d Cir. 2006). A municipality can be liable under Section 1983 only if a
plaintiff can show that a municipal policy or custom caused the deprivation of his or
her constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91
(1978); Cash v. County. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]o establish
municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that ‘action pursuant to
official municipal policy’ caused the alleged constitutional injury.” (quoting Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional
activity is not sufficient to impose liability on a municipality without showing that
it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy that can be
attributed to a municipal policymaker. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 823 (1985).
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This complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1983. Plaintiff mentions
multiple components of his detention that he does not like, but he has not alleged
that any individual state actor was responsible for any act or omission that violated
his constitutional rights. He does not allege that the City of New York or the New
York City Department of Correction operated under some municipal policy or
custom that caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. The only individual
defendant he names, Officer Hogan, is vaguely alleged to have “allowed assault to
happen and continue due to discrimination and prejudice,” but Plaintiff has not
described any specific acts or omissions by this Defendant that violated Plaintiff’s
rights. ECF No. 1 at 5.
Prisoners and detainees do have constitutionally protected rights to be held
under humane conditions of confinement, including access to adequate food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and security. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994). Humane conditions of confinement are guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of convicted
prisoners, while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
pretrial detainees held in state custody. See Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69
(2d Cir. 2009). A claim for inhumane conditions of confinement may assert a
constitutional deprivation where it alleges “unquestioned and serious deprivation of
basic human needs” or denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Inadequate medical treatment may
also give rise to a constitutional deprivation where a prisoner alleges “acts or
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omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d
845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying the same standard to pretrial detainees under the
Fourteenth Amendment). A plaintiff must show that he was “actually deprived of
adequate medical care,” and that “the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently
serious.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2006). He must also
show that the official “knows that inmates [or detainees] face a substantial risk of
serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Merely negligent conduct causing unintended
loss or injury to life, liberty or property is not sufficient to state a claim under the
Due Process Clause or any other provision of federal law. See Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 332–33 (1986) (finding that due process protections are not triggered
by lack of due care by state officials); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347–48
(1986) (finding that although official’s negligence led to serious injury, the
Constitution requires no procedure to compensate injury arising from negligence).
Claims for negligence may arise under state law, but not in federal court.
In light of the Court’s duty to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se
litigants, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint. In order to establish a
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, he must provide details that show that
individual officials were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. He must describe the
specific incidents which he believes may have violated his constitutional rights,
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including dates, locations, and the individuals who were involved. He must explain
what each official did or failed to do in violation of his civil rights. Even if Plaintiff
does not know the names of these individuals, he may identify each of them as John
Doe Correctional Officer or Jane Doe Medical Staffer, or the like, and provide any
known identifying information.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state
a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light
of plaintiff’s pro se status, he is granted leave to file an amended complaint within
30 days as directed by this Order. Any amended complaint must be captioned,
“Amended Complaint,” and shall bear the same docket number as this order.
Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint completely replaces all prior
pleadings. No further summons shall issue at this time, and all further proceedings
shall be stayed for 30 days. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30
days, the complaint will be dismissed, and judgment shall enter. The Court certifies
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be
taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of
an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to mail a copy of this order to
Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
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/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: 	November 23, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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