State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al v. Emuna, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, etal.,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
EMUNA INC., d/b/a Navar Pharmacy,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-3076 (NGG) (LKE)
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
State Farm Indemnity Company, State Farm Guaranty Insurance
Company, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (collec-
tively, "State Farm") 	bring this declaratory judgment action
challenging unpaid claims submitted by Defendant Emuna, Inc.
d/b/a Navar Pharmacy ("Emuna") under New York State's No-
Fault Laws. 1 (Am. Compl. (Dkt. 6) 'I'I 1-6.) State Farm alleges
that Emuna failed to comply with verification requests that it is-
sued pursuant to those No-Fault Laws, including requests for
documents and examinations under oath ("EUOs"). (Id.) It also
seeks a judicial determination that such noncompliance renders
the claims non-compensable for failing to meet a condition prec-
edent to coverage. (Id. at 'I'I 41-48.) In response, Emuna moves
to compel arbitration pursuant to New York Insurance Law §
5106(b) 	("Section 	5106") 	and 	the 	Federal Arbitration Act
("FM") 9 U.S.C. § 4, and to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
(Emuna's Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Arbitration and
Dismiss ("Emuna's Mot.") (Dkt. 15-1) at 1.) State Farm opposes
by arguing that Emuna waived its right to arbitrate by previously
filing several state court collection actions concerning certain re-
imbursement claims. (State Farm's Mem. of L. in Opp'n ("State
1 N.Y. Ins. Law§§ 5101, et seq.; 11 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 65, et seq.
1
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Farm's Opp'n") (Dkt. 16-1) at 7-10.) For the reasons set forth be-
low, the court GRANTS Emuna's motion to compel arbitration
and DISMISSES the action WITH PREJUDICE.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
State Farm brought this action on June 3, 2025, (Compl. (Dkt.
1)), and filed its Amended Complaint on June 10, 2025, seeking
declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201, 2202, and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3001. (Am. Compl. at 2.)
On July 18, 2025, Emuna moved to compel arbitration and to
dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), (3), and (6), the FM, and Section
5106(b). (Emuna's Mot. at 1.) Emuna argued that disputes con-
cerning alleged noncompliance with verification procedures fall
within the mandatory arbitration provision of Section 5106(b),
and that arbitration was mandatory under either New York con-
tract law, the state No-Fault Law, or the FM. (Id. at 4.)
State Farm opposed the motion on August 1, 2025. It asserted
that Emuna waived arbitration by filing state court collection ac-
tions to seek payment of individual invoices that arose from the
same No-Fault claims. Under Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S.
411 (2022), Emuna allegedly waived its right to arbitrate be-
cause its litigation conduct was inconsistent with its existing right
to arbitrate. (State Farm's Opp'n at 7-10.)
Emuna replied on August 8, 2025. It countered that its prior civil
court actions were limited to seeking payment of individual in-
voices, and that it did not litigate the verification or eligibility
issues presented in State Farm's motion. Consequently, its ac-
tions purportedly are not "inconsistent with" arbitration under
2
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Morgan or Second Circuit precedent. (Emuna's Reply Mem. of L.
("Emuna's Reply") (Dkt. 17) at 2-5.) 2
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint, mo-
tion papers, and other documents properly considered on a
motion to compel arbitration. Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834
F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[A] court [must] consider all rel-
evant 	admissible 	evidence 	submitted 	by 	the 	parties 	and
contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with affidavits."). 3
Emuna, a health care provider, submitted first-party No-Fault
claims to State Farm seeking reimbursement for medical services
provided to individuals injured in covered automobile accidents.
(Emuna's Mot. at 2-3.) State Farm thereafter issued verification
requests pursuant to 11 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 65-1.1, 3.5(b)-(c), includ-
ing 	requests 	for 	supporting 	documentation 	and 	notices
scheduling EUOs. (Am. Compl. 'l'l 19-23.) State Farm alleges that
Emuna failed to comply with these requests and that, under the
No-Fault regulations, such noncompliance renders the claims
non-compensable. (Id. 'l'l 1-6.)
Before this action was filed, Emuna filed several civil court col-
lection actions seeking payment of specific unpaid No-Fault bills
from State Farm. (State Farm's Opp'n at 4.) State Farm states
that these are "at issue in this declaratory judgm,ent action,"
which Emuna does not contest. 4 While those actions sought re-
imbursement of individual invoices, State Farm does not allege
2 Neither party requested a stay pending arbitration.
3 When quoting cases, unless otherwise noted, all citations and internal
quotation marks are omitted, and all alterations are adopted.
4 State Farm cites to an alleged affidavit not contained in its briefing. (Id.;
see also Deel. of Louis D'Onofrio (Dkt. 16-2) 'l'l 3-4.) However, Emuna does
3
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that verification issues were raised or adjudicated in those pro-
ceedings. (Id.; Emuna's Reply at 5.)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Motion to Compel Arbitration Under the FAA
A motion to compel arbitration is evaluated under "a standard
similar to that applicable for summary judgment." Bensadoun v.
Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the
court considers pleadings, affidavits, and other admissible evi-
dence 	submitted 	by 	the 	parties 	and 	draws 	all 	reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-movant (here, State Farm). See
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,
282 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2002) and Wachovia Bank, Nat'lAss'n
v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164,
171-72 (2d Cir. 2011)).
A district court's role in determining the arbitrability of claims is
limited to deciding (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate
exists and (2) whether the dispute at issue falls within the scope
of that agreement. In re Am. Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig.
(''American Express"), 672 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2011); see
Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir.
2002). "Upon finding that such an agreement exists, a federal
court must compel arbitration of any dispute falling within the
scope of the agreement pursuant to the terms of the agreement."
U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d
135, 146 (2d Cir. 2001).
1. 	Mandatory Arbitration Under New York Insurance
Law Section 5106(b)
New York's No-Fault regime is designed to ensure the prompt
and 	fair 	resolution 	of 	first-party 	benefit 	disputes. 	Section
not dispute this assertion and appears to concede these invoices are re-
lated. (See Emuna's Reply at 5.)
4
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5106(a), for example, requires insurers to pay claims within 30
days of receipt of proof of a claim and imposes interest for over-
due payments. And 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.2(a)-(b) directs insurers
to process claims promptly, fairly, and without treating appli-
cants as adversaries. Section 5106(b) fits within this framework.
It requires insurers to provide claimants with the option to sub-
mit "any dispute involving the insurer's liability to pay first party
benefits" to arbitration under simplified procedures approved by
the Superintendent of Financial Services.
The New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit have held
that arbitration of first-party benefit disputes is mandatory under
the No-Fault statute. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Maiorano, 44
N.Y.2d 364, 369 (1978) ("Every insurer shall provide a claimant
with the option of submitting any dispute involving the insurer's
liability to pay first party benefits to binding arbitration.") (citing
an earlier but nearly identical version of Section 5106(b)) 5; see
also Am. Indep. Ins. Co. v. Nova Acupuncture, P.C., 28 N.Y.S.3d
704, 707 (2d Dep't 2016) ("Insurance Law§ 5106(b) mandates
every insurer to provide a claimant with the option to arbitrate
disputes concerning first-party benefits."); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 88 (2d
Cir. 2024) ("The No-Fault Act's implementing regulations further
require that insurers include a '[m]andatory personal injury pro-
tection endorsement' in their liability policies providing that '[i]n
the event any person making a claim for first-party benefits and
the [insurer] do not agree regarding any matter relating to the
5 Compare N.Y. Ins. L. § 675(2), L.1981, c. 340 (section renumbered by
L.1984, c. 36 7) ("Every insurer shall provide a claimant with the option of
submitting any dispute involving the insurer's liability to pay first party
benefits ... to arbitration."), with Section 5106(b) ("Every insurer shall
provide a claimant with the option of submitting any dispute involving the
insurer's liability to pay first party benefits ... to arbitration.").
5
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claim, such person shall have the option of submitting such disa-
greement to arbitration."' (citing 11 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 65-1.1)).
Consequently, courts in this district have determined that dis-
putes concerning a provider's alleged failure to comply with
verification procedures, including document requests and EUOs,
fall squarely within Section 5106(b). See State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Eclipse Med. Imaging, P.C., 744 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215-
16 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding that disputes concerning compli-
ance 	with 	verification 	obligations 	fall 	"under 	the 	No-Fault
scheme's broad arbitration provision").
2. 	Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate
Waiver of the right to arbitrate is not to be lightly inferred, and
any doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration. Leadertex,
Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 25 (2d
Cir. 1995). A party waives arbitration when it acts inconsistently
with an existing right to arbitrate. Morgan, 596 U.S. at 415. The
factors to consider whether a party has waived its right are: "(1)
the time elapsed from when litigation was commenced until the
request for arbitration; (2) the amount of litigation to date, in-
cluding motion practice and discovery." La. Stadium & Expo. Dist.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 626 F.3d 156, 159
(2d Cir. 2010); Doyle v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 144 F.4th 122, 131-
32 (2d Cir. 2025) (stating the same). Eschewing a "rigid formula
or bright-line rule for identifying when a party has waived its
right to arbitration," the Second Circuit applies these factors "to
the specific context of each particular case." La. Stadium, 626
F.3d at 159.
For the first Doyle factor, delays of a year or greater can evince a
desire to litigate rather than arbitrate. 6 Contrast La. Stadium, 626
6 The parties fail to discuss the first Doyle factor altogether. (See State
Farm's Opp'n at 7-10; Def.'s Reply at 2-5.) But because the court "must
6
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F.3d at 159-160 (holding that an 11-month interval weighs to-
wards waiving the right to arbitrate), and Doyle, 144 F.4th at
130-31 (also emphasizing an 11-month period from the filing of
the complaint to the first discussion of arbitration in any of de-
fendant's filings); and Nokia Corp. v. InterDigital, Inc., No. 08-
1642, 2008 WL 2951912, at *1-2 (2d Cir. July 31, 2008) (sum-
mary order) 	(finding an almost three year litigation history
evincing "efforts to litigate, rather than arbitrate" claims), with
PPG Indus. v. Webster Auto Parts, 128 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.
1997) (''This five-month delay, by itself, is not enough to infer
waiver of arbitration.").
For the second Doyle factor, courts consider pursuing merits liti-
gation as constituting a significant amount of litigation. See 144
F.4th at 131-32. This includes, for example, moving to dismiss
on the merits, seeking dispositive relief, or pursuing resolution of
arbitrable issues in federal court, before invoking arbitration. See
id. Indeed, "only the prior litigation of the same legal and factual
issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver
of the right to arbitrate." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d
126, 133 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d
176, 178 (2d Cir. 1991) as an example where waiver was based
in part on a party's prior litigation in an "identical suit"). Partici-
pation in limited or ministerial proceedings that do not address
the substance of the 	arbitrable 	dispute 	does not constitute
waiver. Distajo, 107 F.3d at 133. This includes mere collection
efforts or procedural filings. Id.
3. 	Disposition When All Claims Are Arbitrable
When an issue must be referred to arbitration, the court "shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
consider delay in conjunction with" the amount oflitigation to date, it con-
ducts its own analysis. See PPG Indus. v. Webster Auto Parts, 128 F.3d 103,
108 (2d Cir. 1997).
7
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such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 3. Where all claims are arbitrable and
a stay is requested, the statute leaves no room for judicial discre-
tion; the court must stay the action. Katz v. Cellco P's hip, 794 F.3d
341, 345-46 (2d Cir. 2015). However, when no stay is requested,
the Second Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a case referred
to arbitration. Benzemann v. Citibank N.A., 622 F. App'x 16, 18
(2d Cir. 2015) (summary order), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 618
(2017).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. 	Application of the FAA
The court concludes, as the parties agree, that the FAA applies to
the arbitration agreement. See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404
F.3d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court has
an independent obligation to determine whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate). First, the FAA applies to the dispute at hand
because an agreement to arbitrate exists. American Express, 672
F.3d at 128. Emuna's claims are first party claims within the
meaning of Section 5106(b), giving them standing to request re-
imbursement from State Farm. 7 Emuna also retained the right to
arbitrate through the assignment of the claims for reimburse-
ment. See Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertex Steamship Corp., 352
F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1965) C'[A]bsent contrary expression, as-
signment of a contract carries with it a right to arbitration therein
provided."). The parties agree that the relevant claims derive
from policies that contain such clauses, including one appended
7 "First party benefits" are defined as "payments to reimburse a person for
basic economic loss on account of personal injury arising out of the use or
operation of a motor vehide."Ins. L. § 5102(b). Emuna is seeking direct
payment from State Farm after covered persons assigned Emuna their no-
fault benefits. See 11 N.Y.C.C.R.R § 65-3.ll(a).
8
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to Plaintiffs opposition as "Exhibit l."8 Accordingly, the court
finds that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement.
Second, the court finds that the dispute falls within the scope of
the agreement. American Express, 672 F.3d at 128. State Farm
seeks declaratory relief solely on the basis that Emuna failed to
comply with verification requests, including document produc-
tion 	and 	EUO 	attendance. 	"[T]he 	scope 	of the 	arbitration
agreement must be resolved" by using the contract's choice of
law clause. Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 223-24 (2d
Cir. 2014). As the parties have chosen New York law, 9 the court
follows established interpretations of New York law under its No-
Fault scheme. Disputes concerning compliance with verification
obligations fall squarely within the scope of Section 5106(b) be-
cause they concern liability for first-party benefits. Eclipse, 744 F.
Supp. 3d at 215-16. ("[T]he No-Fault scheme's broad arbitration
8 (State Farm's Opp'n at 9 & n.8 ("As Emuna correctly notes, there is "[a]
clause included in every relevant automobile insurance policy provides, in
accordance with the No-Fault Law, that in any dispute over first party ben-
efits the insurer shall afford the claimant an opportunity to arbitrate its
claims in a New York State approved arbitral forum.")) A contract, in-
cluded but not cited in Plaintiffs Opposition as Exhibit 1, appears to
contain such a clause on its page 11, that "if there is a disagreement as to
whether incurred charges are medical expenses, then the disagreement will
be resolved by arbitration upon written request of the insured or us." (State
Farm Car Pol. Booklet ("Exh. 1") (Dkt 16-3) at ECF p. 12.) The policy is
submitted to the court by declaration of Louis D'Onofrio, who swears that
this policy is "in force and applicable to the claims at issue." (D'Onofrio
Deel.'! 5.) Thus, this clause to arbitrate medical expenses suffices to com-
mit the parties by contract to arbitration for the disputes of verification of
medical expenses. And, even if the clause did not, the court would be
forced to read in such a clause by operation of the Insurance Law. (See
Emuna's Mot. at 4 (''The Insurance Law further provides that if any insurer
fails to offer an arbitration option in its policies, one will be supplied by
default. (Ins. Law§ 5103(h)).")
9 (See Exh. 1 at ECF p. 32.)
9
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provision, which allows a party to elect arbitration for issues re-
garding both 'liability' and 'any other matter' related to 'first party
benefits' [] necessarily encompasses verification."); Ryder Truck
Lines, 44 N.Y.2d at 369 (explaining that an earlier and substan-
tially similar version of Section 5106 should be read as "a broad
arbitration clause embracing all disputes with respect to entitle-
ment to first-party benefits arising under the [no-fault] statute");
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mun, 751 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2014) (ruling
that Section 5106(b) "makes arbitration available for disputes
stemming from reimbursement claims," and that the consensus
view in the Eastern District is that "medical providers have a right
to arbitrate as-yet unpaid claims").
Further, the FM applies to the present dispute because it con-
cerns a transaction involving interstate commerce. See generally
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, (1995) (dis-
cussing 	the 	broad 	reach 	of the 	FM to 	regulate 	interstate
commerce 	under 	the 	Commerce Clause); 	see also David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245,
249 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing the FM at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2). Automo-
bile insurance policies like the one now at issue "undoubtedly
affect[] interstate commerce." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elzanaty, 929 F.
Supp. 2d 199,208 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Gov'tEmps. Ins. Co. v. Grand
Med. Supply, Inc., No. ll-CV-5339 (BMC), 2012 WL 2577577, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. July 4, 2012) (same); Tri-Borough NY Med., 120
F.4th at 88 (foreclosing the reasoning employed by some courts
in this district that the No-Fault Laws were removed from the
ambit of the FM). 10
10 The Second Circuit rejected the argument that the arbitration clauses
were not "privately negotiated" within the meaning of the FM, finding
instead that the crux of the argument was whether the parties were "co-
erced or defrauded into agreeing to arbitrate" and because "State Farm
chose to do business in New York, [] that choice requires it to comply with
New York law (including the No-Fault Act.)." 120 F.4th at 88.
10
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Because the FM applies to the parties' contract, the court must
compel arbitration. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213,218 (1985) ("By its terms, the [FM] leaves no place forthe
exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates
that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitra-
tion on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been
signed."); see also Gabay v. Roadway Movers, Inc., 671 F. Supp.
3d 371, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), appeal withdrawn, No. 23-757,
2023 WL 7298749 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2023).
B. 	Waiver Argument
State Farm contends that even though the FM governs Emuna's
reimbursement claims, the court should not compel arbitration
because Emuna waived that right by filing several state court col-
lection actions. The court disagrees.
State Farm claims that a series of state court collection actions
instituted by Emuna, both before and after State Farm com-
menced this action, waived Emuna's right to arbitrate by "acting
inconsistently with that right." (State Farm's Opp'n at 4, 8-9. (cit-
ing Morgan, 596 U.S. at 412 and Doyle, 144 F.4th at 130).) While
the court agrees with State Farm that Morgan and Doyle control
this dispute, the court determines that Emuna has not waived its
right to arbitrate.
First, Emuna did not wait to request arbitration. Second, the liti-
gations before 	this 	court and in state court did 	not reach
advanced stages, nor do they constitute "prior litigation of the
same legal and factual issues" that would lead a court to find that
Emuna "act[ed] inconsistently'' with its right to arbitrate. Doyle,
144 F.4th at 127; Distajo, 107 F.3d at 133. Based on the limited
record before this court, the claims in state court appear to be
simple collection actions at the early stages of litigation. They
also appear to litigate different factual and legal issues than the
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verification claim that lies at the base of this federal lawsuit. Ac-
cordingly, bringing those distinct claims does not constitute
waiver of Emuna's right to arbitrate.
1. 	The first Doyle factor
The timing ofEmuna's motion to compel arbitration in the
federal case evinces a desire to arbitrate. State Farm filed its com-
plaint on June 3, 2025, and in response, Emuna first notified the
court of its intention to compel arbitration on July 2, 2025.
(Compl.; Emuna's Letter to the Court dated 7/2/2025 (Dkt. 14).)
This one-month period is significantly shorter than the 11-month
delays in La. Stadium, 626 F.3d at 159-160 and Doyle v. UBS Fin.
Servs.J Inc., 144 F.4th at 130-31. And it is even shorter still than
the five-month period which was not enough to infer an intent to
waive arbitration in PPG Indus., 128 F.3d at 108. Thus, the first
Doyle factor weighs against waiver.
2. 	The second Doyle factor
Emuna does not allege that the state court actions are substantive
litigation. Under Doyle, courts still consider the amount of litiga-
tion conduct to date, including pursuing merits litigation, the
amount of discovery undertaken, and making dispositive mo-
tions before invoking arbitration. 144 F.4th at 126, 129-30.
Courts can only find waiver after a party "has rais [ed] a number
of substantive issues ... [and] exhausted [its] pretrial maneu-
vers" and "retreat[ed] to [the] contractual right to arbitration."
Kramer, 943 F.2d at 180. Similarly, inLeadertex, the Second Cir-
cuit explained that a party had waived its right to arbitration by
submitting and amending several pleadings, engaging in an "en-
ergetic pursuit of discovery," and waiting seven months-until
"the eleventh hour, with trial imminent"-to seek enforcement
of an arbitration agreement. 67 F.3d at 26.
For similar reasons State Farm's heavy reliance on Doyle works
to its detriment here. In Doyle, the Second Circuit ruled that
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UBS's "decision to first seek full and final resolution of the claims
against [it] in federal court is inconsistent with the right to arbi-
trate those same claims." 144 F.4th. at 132. UBS "moved to
dismiss all claims against [it] - without any mention of the pos-
sible availability of arbitration. By doing so, [it] intentionally
availed [itself] of the District Court's authority and sought affirm-
ative, dispositive relief." Additionally, UBS "sought to proceed in
another venue - arbitration - only after their motion to dismiss
was denied." Id. at 131.
Here, there has been no significant motion practice in ei-
ther the federal or state cases. Unlike UBS in Doyle, the parties
here do not allege that the state court actions include any mo-
tions to dismiss or summary judgment, substantial discovery, or
trial. See id. at 131. Accordingly, the conduct undertaken here is
not substantial enough under Doyle, Kramer, or Leadertex to find
that arbitration has been waived. See id.; Kramer, 943 F.2d at
180; Leadertex, 67 F.3d at 26.
3. 	Further litigation would also not waive arbitration.
Even if there had been substantial litigation of the collection
suits, "only prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as
those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver." Weiss
v. American Express National Bank, No. 19-CV-4720 (JPO), 2020
WL 6807628, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2020) (quoting Distajo,
107 F.3d at 132).
Although the parties did not submit the state court pleadings, the
scope of No-Fault collection actions is limited. Gov't Emps. Ins.
Co. v. Tolmasov, 602 F. Supp. 3d 380, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (de-
scribing a plaintiff's summary judgment burden in a no-fault
collection action as requiring a showing that plaintiff sent statu-
tory billing forms of overdue benefits); Viviane Etienne Med. Care,
P.C. v. Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 N.Y.3d 498, 511 (2015) (ruling
a plaintiff can win summary judgment with ((proof of billing and
the absence of a timely denial or payment" as sufficient (to obtain
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reimbursement''). Several courts have found that parallel collec-
tion suits do not waive the right to arbitration. See Distajo, 107
F.3d at 133 (characterizing eviction actions that did not waive
arbitration as "simple collection proceedings" where the only is-
sues "pertained to whether (and how much) [was owed]"); see
also Weiss, 2020 WL 6807628, at *1-2 (distinguishing simple col-
lection claims from later litigation involving different statutory
and factual issues and declining to find waiver); cf Gov't Emps.
Ins. Co. v. Elmwood Park Med. Grp., P.C., No. 21-CV-617 (FB)
(RER), 2022 WL 772737, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-00617 (FB) (RER),
2022 WL 768360 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) (finding proceedings
not parallel when "relief requested in federal court" was "suffi-
ciently distinct from relief sought ... in state proceedings" when
"the state court proceedings are suits for collection, and would
not dispose of GEICO's common law fraud and unjust enrichment
claims").
Even "some factual overlap between the actions" does not estab-
lish that the "factual and legal issues" are identical. Hyman v.
Cummings-Ramone, No. 24-CV-5920 (MKB), 2025 WL 2549981,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2025) (collecting cases and finding lack
of waiver when different suits concerned different conduct and
implicated different legal frameworks); see also Desarrolladora La
Ribera v. 	Anderson, 	No. 	24-CV-67 	(IAK) 	(BCM), 	2024 WL
5186600, at *17 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 20, 	2024) 	(concluding that
''[w]hile there is considerable factual overlap between [the plain-
tiff]'s 	defamation 	claims 	and 	[the 	defendant]'s 	fraud
counterclaims, they are not identical either legally or factually,
and thus the fact that [the plaintiff] seeks to litigate its own
claims does not constitute a waiver of its right to arbitrate the
counterclaims").
Here, the state court actions do not constitute waiver. As de-
scribed, 	they do 	not appear to 	ask for 	an 	adjudication 	of
14
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compliance with verification procedures, 11 the 	propriety of
EUOs, or whether a provider satisfied No-Fault regulatory obli-
gations-issues that lie at the heart of State Farm's declaratory
judgment action. State Farm makes no representation to the con-
trary and only characterizes these lawsuits as "seeking payment
of No-Fault bills." (State Farm's Opp'n at 4.) They are like the
eviction proceedings in Distajo and the collection claims in Weiss.
Any overlap in the facts between the claims does not compel oth-
erwise, given that they are not identical factual and legal issues.
See Hyman, 2025 WL 2549981, at *8; Desarrolladora La Ribera,
2024 WL 5186600, at *17.
Arbitration here is not a "second bite at the apple" after the fail-
ure of other avenues of litigation. Doyle, 144 F. 4th at 131.
Because State Farm has not shown that Emuna engaged in liti-
gation conduct inconsistent with an existing right to arbitrate, it
has not established waiver. See Morgan, 596 U.S. at 415. There-
fore, Emuna's motion to compel arbitration is granted.
C. 	Dismissal is Appropriate
Because Emuna's claims are arbitrable, all that remains is for the
court to determine the proper procedural disposition. Emuna
seeks dismissal, State Farm opposes it, and neither party has re-
quested a stay. The FM instructs that the court "shall" stay the
action when arbitration is required and a party has requested a
stay. 9 U.S.C. § 3; Katz, 794 F.3d at 345-46.
"A court may dismiss a case in favor of arbitration, however, if
no party has requested a stay." Boustead Sec., LLC v. Leaping Grp.
Co., 656 F. Supp. 3d 447, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Benze-
mann, 622 F. App'x at 18 (concluding that the district court did
not err by dismissing an action in favor of arbitration because no
party requested a stay); Aleksanian v. Uber Techs. Inc., 524 F.
11 (Emuna's Reply at 5 "Emuna has not opted to litigate State Farm's veri-
fication claim as part of its collection actions.")
15
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s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
Supp. 3d 251, 264
(S.D.N.Y.
2021), vacated and remanded on
other grounds,
No.
22-CV-0098, 2023
WL
7537627 (2d
Cir.
Nov.
14, 2023) (same); DeLisle
Sales
Grp.)
LLC
v.
House
of
Wu) LLC,
No.
20-CV-819 (MPS), 2020
WL
7699852, at *7
(D.
Conn.
Dec.
28, 2020) (same).
As
neither party requested a stay, the court dismisses the action.
V. 	CONCLUSION
State Farm initiated this action seeking a judicial determination
that Emuna's claims are non-compensable based on alleged non-
compliance with verification requests. But that question
is
one
the legislature has assigned to arbitration under Section 5106(b).
Thus, the court may not substitute its judgment to determine the
arbitral forum mandated by statute. Emuna's prior state court
suits do not alter that conclusion. Those actions were limited in
their actual litigation,
as
well as cabined to routine collection
matters that failed to address the verification issues at the center
of this dispute.
Because the claims presented here fall squarely within the
No-
Fault arbitration framework, and because waiver has not been
established, this action must proceed to arbitration. Emuna's mo-
tion to compel arbitration
is
therefore
GRANTED
and this action
is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	Brooklyn, New York
Janua~ 	7, 2026
16
N CHOIAS
G.
GARAUFIS
nited States District Judge
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