Abeth Hashimi v. Baklajian et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ABETH HASHIMI,
Plaintiff,
v.
HAIG BAKLAJIAN AND EMMA BAKLAJIAN,
AS TRUSTEES OF THE HAIG BAKLAJIAN AND
EMMA BAKLAJIAN REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST, DATED AUGUST 1, 2001, and CAFÉ
TRISKEL LTD.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-2152 (MKB)
MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Abeth Hashimi commenced the above-captioned action on April 17, 2025,
against Defendants Haig Baklajian1 and Emma Baklajian, as Trustees of the Haig Baklajian and
Emma Baklajian Revocable Living Trust (“Baklajian”), Dated August 1, 2001 (the “Trust”), and
Café Triskel LTD (“Café Triskel”),2 seeking injunctive relief for alleged violations of Title III of
1 Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Defendant Haig Baklajian on May
15, 2025, (Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Docket Entry No. 7), and the Court subsequently
dismissed him as a party, (Order dated May 22, 2025).
2 The Court notes that Defendant Café Triskel is in default, having failed to appear
despite being served on April 24, 2025. (Café Triskel Summons, Docket Entry No. 10.)
Following the initial conference in which Café Triskel did not appear, Magistrate Judge Vera M.
Scanlon ordered Baklajian to “provide Plaintiff’s counsel with any alternative contact
information, aside from the corporate address already on file,” and ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to
personally serve Café Triskel “at the place of business on or before 9/26/2025” as “the parties
must make a concerted effort to facilitate the appearance of [Café Triskel].” (Order dated Aug.
15, 2025; see Min. Order dated Aug. 14, 2025.) Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service on August
27, 2025, affirming that the summons and Complaint were personally served on Café Triskel at
33-04 36th Avenue, Queens, NY 11106, on August 22, 2025. (Aff. of Service, Docket Entry No.
19.) Although the August 22, 2025 affidavit of service was initially filed unsigned and undated,
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the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (“ADA”) and the ADA’s
Accessibility Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. Part 36 (“ADDAG”). (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.)
On October 10, 2025, Baklajian moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Plaintiff opposed the motion.3 For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses the
Complaint and grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.4
I. 	Background
Plaintiff currently resides in Flushing, New York in Queens County.5 (Compl. ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff is a qualified individual with disabilities under the ADA, suffering from a congenital
Plaintiff filed a signed and dated version on February 6, 2026. (Revised Aff. of Service, Docket
Entry No. 26; see Order dated Feb. 3, 2026.)
3 (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), Docket Entry No. 23; Decl. of B. Pollina, Esq. in
Supp. of Def.’s Mot. (“Pollina Decl.”), appended to Def.’s Mot., Docket Entry No. 23-1; Def.’s
Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Mem.”), appended to Def.’s Mot., Docket Entry No. 21-6;
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Docket Entry No. 22; Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.’s
Mot. (“Def.’s Reply”), Docket Entry No. 24.)
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition brief refers to a plaintiff by the name of Samuel
Lopez, not Abeth Hashimi, includes an erroneous caption, and makes references to Brooklyn, while
the subject property and Plaintiff are both located in Queens, N.Y. (Pl.’s Opp’n 1–3; see also Def.’s
Reply 6 n.1.) In addition, the erroneous caption also fails to identify Haig and Emma Baklajian as
defendants in their capacities as trustees. (Pl.’s Opp’n 1–3; see also Def.’s Reply 6 n.1.) Counsel
must read any amended complaint prior to filing it in order to avoid these types of errors.
4 Café Triskel has not appeared in this action. However, for the reasons explained
below, the Court dismisses the claims against Café Triskel for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Lovell v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 758 F. App’x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Because
the standing issue goes to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it can be raised sua sponte.”
(quoting Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care,
L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005))); Guggenheim Cap., LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444,
449 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that a court may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte).
5 The Court relies “solely on the pleadings — that is, the allegations of the Complaint
and any exhibits attached to it” in deciding Baklajian’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing
under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lugo v. City of Troy, 114 F.4th 80,
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neuromuscular disorder, known as central nuclear myopathy, “which is characterized as a default
in the cell structure of voluntary muscles and as a result is bound to ambulate in a wheelchair.”
(Id.) The Trust, of which Haig and Emma Baklajian are trustees, transacts business in the State
of New York and within this judicial district as the owner of the property located at 33-04 36 th
Avenue, Queens, NY 11106 (the “Subject Property”). (Id. ¶ 3.) Café Triskel is a corporation
that transacts business in the State of New York and within this judicial district as the lessee and
owner/operator of the business located at the Subject Property, named “Café Triskell.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
The Subject Property is in a neighborhood where Plaintiff “dines out two to three times
per month” and which Plaintiff passes “at least once per week when he is doing errands, visiting
family and friends throughout the borough, and looking to drink and eat out.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
“has partaken at, and in, nearly all of the neighboring restaurants surrounding the [Subject
Property] that are all without obstructions about twice per month, including but not limited to
Escola Corp’s Restaurant, Psari, Mad Donkey Bar & Grill and Arepas Grill.” (Id.) Plaintiff
lives “only several miles” from the Subject Property.6 (Id.)
87 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Carter v. HealthPort Techs., Inc., 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016)); New
York v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 454 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“When a Rule
12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint
and exhibits attached to it (collectively the ‘[p]leading’), the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden.
The task of the district court is to determine whether the [p]leading ‘allege[s] facts that
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [the plaintiff] has standing to sue.’” (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Carter, 822 F.3d at 56–57)); see Kelsey v. Kessel, No. 24-1105,
2025 WL 1324213, at *1 (2d Cir. May 7, 2025) (summary order) (“A facial challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction ‘is based solely on the pleadings – that is, the allegations of the complaint and
any exhibits attached to it.’” (quoting Lugo, 114 F.4th at 87)).
6 Baklajian argues that “Google Maps reports that the distance between Flushing, New
York [(where Plaintiff lives)] and the [Subject Property] by car is approximately 6.6 miles.”
(Def.’s Mem. 3; see Distance Depiction, annexed to Poll. Decl. as Ex. D, Docket Entry No. 23-
5.) “[A]ccording to the travel time estimates supplied by Google Maps, a morning car trip from
Flushing to the [Subject Property] is expected to take between [nineteen] and [twenty-one]
minutes, while a morning trip by public transportation is expected to take between [thirty-nine]
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Plaintiff has visited the Subject Property twice: first, around the middle of October of
2024, and second, on December 20, 2024. (Id. ¶ 5.) During these occasions, Plaintiff
encountered “a set of concrete steps directly within the entrance, interpolating between the
outward swinging entrance door and the hallway of the restaurant, and that which was
impassable for wheeled ambulation.” (Id.) This “architectural barrier” “constrained, hindered
and thwarted” “Plaintiff’s ability to ambulate through the entrance of the Subject Property” and
“caused Plaintiff to turn back.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10.) Plaintiff “affirms that he would eat at [Café
Triskell] and avail himself of the goods and services offered to the public, were it not for the
structural barriers inhibiting his ability to enter the subject facility.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff “plans to
return to the Subject Property to avail himself of the goods and services offered to the public at
the Subject Property in the coming months, and thereby determine whether the Subject Property
is ADA compliant or if the Defendant’s discriminatory policy of wanton indifference to
Plaintiff’s civil rights continues to be promulgated by [sic] these Defendants” and “will continue
to dine out in the neighborhood,” with specific plans “to visit [the] [S]ubject [P]roperty this
summer and autumn with family and friends for nights out, and holidays and events.” (Id. ¶¶ 6,
10.)
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against him by failing to
comply with the ADA, listing twenty-nine different “unlawful physical barriers, dangerous
conditions and ADA violations which preclude and/or limit Plaintiff’s ability to access the
[Subject Property] and full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services offered at the [Subject
Property].” (Id. ¶ 16.) These alleged barriers include: inaccessible entrances, a missing ramp at
the entrance, inaccessible exterior dining tables, inaccessible interior dining tables, noncompliant
and [fifty-one] minutes.” (Def.’s Mem. 3; see Distance Depiction.) Plaintiff does not dispute
this in his briefing. (See generally Pl.’s Opp’n.)
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signage identifying restrooms, inaccessible restrooms, a noncompliant door knob at the restroom
door, a noncompliant door lock at the restroom door, an inaccessible water closet in the
restroom, the lack of required grab bars on the rear and side walls of the water closet in the
restroom, an inaccessible flush control in the water closet, an inaccessible lavatory in the
restroom, an inaccessible hand dryer in the restroom, a noncompliant mounted hand dryer in the
restroom, an inaccessible mirror in the restroom, and a noncompliant mounted mirror in the
restroom. (Id.)
II. 	Discussion
a. 	Standards of review
i. 	12(b)(1)
A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the court “lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it.” AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC v. CohnReznick LLP, 136
F.4th 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000)); Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Vill. of Chestnut Ridge, N.Y., 98 F.4th
386, 391 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d
Cir. 2021)); Brokamp v. James, 66 F.4th 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Cortlandt St. Recovery
Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms.,S.à.r.l., 790 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2015)), cert. denied, 144 S.
Ct. 1095 (2024); Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 16 F.4th 1070, 1075 (2d Cir.
2021) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113). Courts must “accept the complaint’s material
allegations as true, and . . . draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor,” Sunvestment
Energy Grp. NY 64 LLC v. Nat’l Grid USA Servs. Co., 116 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2024)
(quoting Raymond Loubier Irrevocable Tr. v. Loubier, 858 F.3d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 2017)), but
“[w]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to
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decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings,” Talarico Bros. Bldg. Corp.
v. Union Carbide Corp., 73 F.4th 126, 136 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d
619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003)); Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc. (Harty), 28 F.4th 435, 441 (2d Cir. 2022)
(“It is only where ‘jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute’ that the court has the ‘obligation to
decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits.’” (first
quoting Tandon v. Captain
’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014);
and then citing LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1999))); see Iacovo v.
Magguilli, No. 24-CV-4372, 2025 WL 1135471, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) (“In resolving a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the
complaint . . . as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting
jurisdiction.” (quoting Tandon, 752 F.3d at 243)). Ultimately, “the party asserting subject matter
jurisdiction ‘has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.’”
Tandon, 752 F.3d at 243 (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113); AMTAX Holdings, 136 F.4th at
37 (“A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113)).
ii. 	Article III standing
“The Constitution limits federal courts to deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Bost v.
Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. ---, ---, 146 S. Ct. 513, 523 (2026) (Barrett, J.,
concurring) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2); FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289, 295
(2022) (quoting same). “‘Standing to sue is a doctrine’ that ‘limits the category of litigants
empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.’” Liberian
Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Lamont, 970 F.3d 174, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)); see also Packer ex rel. 1-800-Flowers.Com, Inc. v. Raging
Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 105 F.4th 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Article III of the Constitution requires that
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plaintiffs establish standing to sue in federal court.”). “To establish constitutional standing, ‘a
plaintiff must show (i) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury
would likely be redressed by judicial relief.’” DirecTV, LLC v. Nexstar Media Grp., Inc., 162
F.4th 295, 306 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021);
Cudjoe v. Building Industry Elec. Contractors Ass’n, No. 24-921, 2025 WL 655580, at *1 (2d
Cir. Feb. 28, 2025) (summary order) (quoting Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 590 U.S. 538, 540
(2020)) (same); Packer, 105 F.4th at 51 (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 423) (same);
Saba Cap. Cef Opportunities 1, Ltd. Nuveen Floating Rate Income Fund, 88 F.4th 103, 110 (2d
Cir. 2023) (quoting Thole, 590 U.S. at 540) (same); Liu v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 21-
3021, 2022 WL 4372587, at *1 (2d Cir. Sep. 22, 2022) (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at
423) (same); Calcano v. Swarovski N.A. Ltd., 36 F.4th 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting
TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 423) (same); Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 19
F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2016))
(same). “An injury in fact must be ‘particularized,’ and it must be ‘concrete.’” Harty, 28 F.4th
at 442 (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 340).
“[S]tanding is required for subject matter jurisdiction.” James v. Willis, No. 21-501,
2022 WL 481812, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 2022) (summary order) (citing Strubel, 842 F.3d at
187). “If plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no subject[-]matter jurisdiction to hear
their claim.” Karkare on behalf of JN v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental &
Reinforcing Iron Workers Local 580, 140 F.4th 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration in original)
(quoting Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care,
L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005)); Bohnak v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 79 F.4th 276,
282–83 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting same); Otrompke v. First Dep’t Comm. on Character & Fitness,
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No. 20-4107, 2021 WL 5764221, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2021) (summary order) (“A district court
lacks jurisdiction ‘when . . . the plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to bring the action.’”
(quoting Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp., 790 F.3d at 417)); see also Citizens United to Protect
Our Neighborhoods, 98 F.4th at 391 (“A district court properly dismisses an action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) ‘if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate it, such as when the plaintiff[s] lack[] constitutional standing to bring the
action.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167,
172 (2d Cir. 2021))). “Before deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine
that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Therefore, for a case to proceed, the party
invoking federal jurisdiction must plausibly plead that it has standing to sue.” Humphrey v.
Syracuse Police Dep’t, 758 F. App’x 205, 205–06 (2d. Cir. 2019) (first citing United States v.
Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014); and then citing Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822
F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2016)); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (Assessing
plausibility is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”); Calcano, 36 F.4th at 74 (“Although we generally accept the
truth of a plaintiff’s allegations at the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff still ‘bears the burden
of alleging facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [the plaintiff] has standing to sue.”
(alternation in original) (quoting Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp., 790 F.3d at 417)); Pan v.
Whitaker, 351 F. Supp. 3d 246, 249–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[F]ederal courts have a continuing
and independent duty to ensure that they possess subject matter jurisdiction, and must dismiss a
case when they find subject matter jurisdiction lacking.”). The court “need not credit ‘a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation’ or a ‘naked assertion devoid of further factual
enhancement,’” but must instead “refer to a complaint’s ‘factual context’ to discern whether to
accept ‘a complaint’s conclusory statements.’” Calcano, 36 F.4th at 75 (first quoting Ashcroft,
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556 U.S. at 678; and then quoting Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 146
(2d Cir. 2011)).
“[A] plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy
the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.”
Choi’s Beer Shop, LLC v. PNC Merch. Servs. Co., L.P., 855 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998)); see Ct. Citizens
Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439, 448 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting same). To seek injunctive
and declaratory relief, a plaintiff’s standing “depend[s] on whether [that plaintiff] [is] likely to
suffer future injury” based on the alleged conduct. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
105 (1983); Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 136 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting id.). The
risk of future harm must be “real and immediate,” although it need not be certain. Shain v.
Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
b. 	Plaintiff lacks standing under the ADA
Baklajian argues the Complaint “is of the cut-and-paste variety that relies on conclusory
allegations of injury that fall far short of establishing standing” as Plaintiff “fails to allege both
past injury and a plausible intention to return to the [Subject Property].” (Def.’s Mem. 1–2.)
Plaintiff argues Baklajian’s motion is “premised on extrinsic exhibits that are at most
tangential, and a fallacious series of arguments based on preclusions of facts and
misrepresentations of [sic] stare decisis that in no way diminish Plaintiff’s standing —
nevermind surmount the Court’s inherent subject matter jurisdiction.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 4.) In
support, Plaintiff argues that Second Circuit case law supports: (1) that he suffered a “concrete
and particularized injury” when he encountered a wheelchair-inaccessible entrance at the Subject
Property which deterred him from entering, (id. at 9–13); and (2) that the Complaint “clearly
establishe[s]” “a concrete intent to return” having plead two past visits, a “probable plan to visit
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the restaurant” in the future, and previous dining experiences in the surrounding area which he
“travels through . . . regularly,” (id. at 14–15).
A plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief for disability discrimination where “(1)
the plaintiff alleged past injury under the ADA; (2) it was reasonable to infer that the
discriminatory treatment would continue; and (3) it was reasonable to infer, based on the past
frequency of plaintiff’s visits and the proximity of defendants’ [businesses] to plaintiff’s home,
that plaintiff intended to return to the subject location.” Calcano, 36 F.4th at 74 (alteration in
original) (quoting Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2013));
Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 F. App’x 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting same). 7
“These considerations may assist courts in determining whether an alleged prospective injury is
sufficiently ‘concrete and particularized.’” Calcano, 36 F.4th at 74 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). A plaintiff must make a “substantial showing before
determining that future encounters are likely.” Constance v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr.
at Syracuse, 166 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting cases).
i. 	Plaintiff sufficiently pleads past injury as to the Subject Property’s
inaccessible entrance, and may seek removal of all other
noncompliant conditions at the Subject Property
Baklajian argues Plaintiff fails to plead “past injury” because the “allegations in the
Complaint are vague, conclusory, and insufficient to raise a reasonable inference of ‘past
injury.’” (Def.’s Mem. 5.) She argues that “[t]he Complaint presents a list of 29 alleged ADA
7 Baklajian challenges Plaintiff’s standing only as to the first and third factors —
“alleged injury under the ADA” and “intention to return to the subject location.” (See generally
Def.’s Mem.; Def.’s Reply.) As Baklajian does not contest the second factor — “discriminatory
treatment would continue” — the Court does not include an analysis of that standing
requirement. See Hirsch v. Campaniello Soho, Inc., No. 14-CV-5097, 2015 WL 678662, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (not addressing whether “[p]laintif has adequately established that any
discriminatory treatment [would] continue” as defendants did not contest it).
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violations (not including sub-parts) devoid of any factual assertions connecting each purported
violation to Plaintiff’s alleged personal experience at the [Subject Property].” (Id. at 3, 5–7; see
Def.’s Reply 3–6.) In support, Baklajian argues that “the Complaint [ ] makes allegations about
alleged characteristics of the [Subject Property] that [Plaintiff] indisputably did not encounter . . .
identif[ying] [ ] a host of alleged violations affecting the interior of the [Subject Property],
including the dining counter and restrooms, even though Plaintiff acknowledges he never entered
the premises.” (Def.’s Mem. 3, 5–7 (emphasis omitted); see Def.’s Reply 3–6.) Baklajian
acknowledges that “the only alleged ADA violation that Plaintiff claims to have personally
encountered is the set of concrete steps at the entrance to the [Subject Property].” (Def.’s Reply
3–6.) In response to Plaintiff’s “deterrence theory,” Baklajian argues that “Kreisler did not hold,
as a blanket rule, that a plaintiff who alleges encountering one ADA violation may then shoehorn
in countless other unfounded alleged ADA violations that he neither encountered nor for which
he pleaded the basis of his knowledge.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff contends that accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, he has alleged
“multiple past injuries” to his rights having visited the Subject Property twice, which are “actual
and particularized injuries.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 10.) Further, having pled an inability to enter the
Subject Property after encountering an inaccessible entrance, Plaintiff argues Second Circuit case
law has established that “Plaintiff need not even attempt to overcome the architectural barrier, as
deterrence alone can constitute concrete injury.” (Id. at 11 (citing to Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 187–
89).)
“A plaintiff can demonstrate past injury under the ADA by showing (1) ‘the direct injury
from personally encountering disability-based discrimination at [d]efendant’s property’ and (2)
‘deterrence from using [d]efendant’s property because it is not ADA compliant.’” Valdez v.
Singlee Lau, Inc., No. 24-CV-9150, 2025 WL 3074254, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting
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Access 4 All, Inc. v. Trump Int’l Hotel & Tower Condo., 458 F. Supp. 2d 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)); Feltzin v. Triangle Props. #1, LLC (Feltzin), No. 14-CV-5131, 2016 WL 11599264, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2016) (quoting same). “Courts both in this Circuit and elsewhere have
held that, as a bare minimum, a plaintiff can establish a direct injury sufficient to support
standing only if she ‘personally encounters the barrier to access’ that caused her injury.” Feltzin,
2016 WL 11599264, at *4 (quoting Panzica v. Mas-Maz, Inc., No. 05-CV-2595, 2007 WL
1732123, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2007)) (collecting cases). “In lieu of a direct injury, an
allegation that a physical access barrier deters a plaintiff from frequenting a restaurant is
sufficient to show a past ADA injury.” Valdez, 2025 WL 3074254, at *2 (citing Kreisler, 731
F.3d at 188); see Calcano, 36 F.4th at 74 n.4 (“A plaintiff ‘need not attempt to overcome an
obvious barrier’ to allege an injury in fact.’ (quoting Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188)); Kreisler, 731
F.2d at 188 (“[D]eterrence constitutes an injury under the ADA . . . .”).
“[O]nce a plaintiff establishes standing with respect to one barrier in a place of public
accommodation, that plaintiff may bring ADA challenges with respect to all other barriers on the
premises that affect the plaintiff’s particular disability.” Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188; see Brown v.
Mermaid Plaza Assocs. LLC, No. 13-CV-760, 2018 WL 2722454, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018)
(quoting id.); Hurley v. Tozzer, Ltd., No. 15-CV-2785, 2018 WL 1872194, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
2, 2018) (“It is well established [in the Second Circuit] that an ADA plaintiff has standing to
challenge every single architectural barrier inside a premises, so long as he or she has suffered an
actual injury from at least one barrier.”); Rosa v. 600 Broadway Partners, LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d
191, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Having alleged that she encountered a barrier at [the d]efendants’
store, [the p]laintiff ‘may bring ADA challenges with respect to all other barriers on the premises
that affect [her] particular disability.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188)).
“Once a plaintiff has established standing to sue for at least one barrier under the ADA, he has
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standing to challenge a list of alleged barriers regardless of whether he has personally
encountered them.” Harty v. Spring Valley Marketplace LLC (Spring Valley Marketplace LLC),
No. 15-CV-8190, 2017 WL 108062, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017) (emphasis added) (finding
that “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that [the p]laintiff only personally experienced one of these
aforementioned barriers, he still maintains standing to pursue injunctive relief because under the
ADA deterrence may constitute an injury”); see Pierre v. Smith St. Bagels Inc., No. 23-CV-7901,
2025 WL 2371077, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2025) (quoting id.), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 2371020 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2025); see also Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 189
(holding the plaintiff “need not personally encounter each ADA violation within the [subject
property] in order to seek its removal” (emphasis added)). “Some courts have anchored this
same test in the text of the ADA, which states that a person with a disability does not need ‘to
engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization covered
by this subchapter does not intend to comply with its provisions.’” Castillo v. John Gore Org.,
Inc., No. 19-CV-388, 2019 WL 6033088, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12188(a)(1)) (collecting cases); see Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 189 (“This rule is also consistent with
the ADA’s mandate that disabled individuals need not ‘engage in a futile gesture if such a person
has actual notice that [the private entity] does not intend to comply with [ADA] provisions.”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1))).
As Baklajian acknowledges, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that he directly
encountered and personally observed an inaccessible entrance, i.e., “a set of concrete steps
directly within the entrance . . . which was impassable for wheeled ambulation,” which deterred
him from entering the Subject Property. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 16(1)–(7); see Pl.’s Opp’n 10–11; Def.’s
Reply 4–5.) This constitutes a “concrete and particularized” injury to establish Article III
standing. See Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188 (“[T]he fact that the wheelchair-inaccessible entrance
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deterred [plaintiff] from accessing the [subject property] established a concrete and
particularized injury.”); Rouse v. Broadway & Cooper LLC, 753 F. Supp. 3d 153, 164–65
(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (finding plaintiff satisfied standing by alleging he visited the subject property
but was unable to enter because of structural barriers, including, an inaccessible entrance);
Woods v. Kaztle Walsh, LLC, No. 22-CV-525, 2023 WL 6442064, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2023)
(finding the plaintiff sufficiently alleged past injury by identifying “mobility-related barriers at
the [p]roperty” that caused the plaintiff difficulty in accessing the property); Gannon v. 31 Essex
St. LLC (Gannon), No. 22-CV-1134, 2023 WL 199287, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2023) (the
plaintiff established past injury under the ADA “by asserting that he was denied full and equal
access to the property when he was unable to enter the bakeshop as a result of structural
barriers”); Shalto v. SFL Pizza Crp., No. 19-CV-1687, 2020 WL 3960506, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July
13, 2020) (affirming on reconsideration that allegations of the plaintiff having been deterred
from eating at the restaurant by the step at the entrance was sufficient to establish past injury).
Having established standing with respect to one barrier at the Subject Property, Plaintiff
may bring ADA challenges, under a deterrence theory of injury, with respect to all other barriers
on or in the Subject Property that impact his disability.8 See Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188
8 As Baklajian argues, except as to the barriers at the entrance of the Subject Property for
which Plaintiff has established past injury, the Complaint does not contain any information
regarding the other alleged non-compliant conditions at the Subject Property and Plaintiff’s
papers are silent as to how Plaintiff came to know of the alleged interior violations. (See Def.’s
Mem. 3, 5–6; Def.’s Reply 1, 3–5; see generally Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n.) Specifically, Plaintiff
does not explain how he learned of the exterior dining tables or any of the interior conditions,
especially considering Plaintiff admittedly did not enter the Subject Property. (See Compl. ¶ 10
(Plaintiff encountered the steps which “the wheelchair could not safely traverse” forcing Plaintiff
“to turn back.”).) In Kreisler v. Second Avenue Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013), the
Second Circuit held that the plaintiff established past injury as to the inaccessible entrance and
thus had standing to seek removal of all barriers inside the subject property related to his
disability. Id. at 188. The court’s holding was supported by Kreisler’s testimony that, “prior to
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(establishing that “deterrence constitutes an injury under the ADA” and “because [the plaintiff]
ha[d] standing to pursue injunctive relief as to the [d]iner’s entrance, he ha[d] standing to seek
removal of all barriers inside the [d]iner related to his disability that he would likely encounter
were he able to access the [d]iner”); id. at 189 (holding that the plaintiff “need not personally
encounter each ADA violation within the [d]iner in order to seek its removal”); Jiminez v. GWB
Acquisitions, LLC, No. 24-CV-7385, 2026 WL 252527, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026) (finding
standing where the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of at least one barrier at the subject premises
because “a plaintiff with standing ‘need not personally encounter each ADA violation . . . to seek
its removal’” (first quoting Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); and
then quoting Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188–89)); Dunston v. Babushka LLC, No. 24-CV-2969, 2024
WL 5164694, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2024) (holding that where the plaintiff encountered an
inaccessible entrance twice, she had standing to bring claims to the other structural barriers,
including inaccessible exterior dining tables and benches, interior dining tables and dining
counter, and restroom), report and recommendation adopted, Order adopting Report and
Recommendation (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2025); Brown, 2018 WL 2722454, at *6 (holding that
standing was satisfied where the “plaintiff personally encountered at least some of the current
commencing the lawsuit, his attorney informed him of the [d]iner’s interior architectural
barriers” in addition to the inaccessible entrance. Id. at 188 n.5.
For the other reasons explained below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims and grants
leave to amend. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must specify his knowledge of the other
alleged noncompliant conditions that he does not allege to have directly encountered —
explaining whether he personally observed or learned from a third party about these alleged
noncompliant conditions — including the violations relating to the exterior dining tables, the
interior dining tables, the interior restrooms, and more.
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architectural barriers” and thus could bring “[additional] ADA challenges with respect to all
other barriers on the premises that affect [her] particular disability”).9
ii. 	Plaintiff fails to plead a reasonable inference of intent to return to the
Subject Property
Baklajian argues that Plaintiff “fails to plausibly allege an intention to return to the
Subject Property.” (Def.’s Mem. 7.) First, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint only a “naked
9 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s briefing fails to cite to any case other than Kreisler v.
Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013) to support his deterrence theory of past
injury. (See Pl.’s Opp’n 10–11.) In addition, Plaintiff argues that Baklajian’s cited cases,
Hashimi v. Court Diner Inc., No. 23-CV-5811, 2024 WL 4225781 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 18, 2024) and
Feltzin v. Triangle Props. #1 (Feltzin), LLC, No. 14-CV-5131, 2016 WL 11599264 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2016), have “holdings antithetical to Second Circuit holdings, and thus [are] entirely
discordant.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 12–13.) This argument is plainly unpersuasive and unsupported.
The Court notes the persuasiveness of Court Diner which involves the same Plaintiff and
a virtually identical complaint, as pointed out by Baklajian. (Def.’s Mem. 2, 7.) Comparing the
Complaint in this case to the complaint in Court Diner, (see Hashimi v. Court Diner Inc. Compl.
(“Court Diner Compl.”), annexed to Poll. Decl. as Ex. B, Docket Entry No. 23-3), Plaintiff’s
allegations are seemingly uniform, and Plaintiff similarly lists a long list of alleged non-
compliant conditions without providing more information to prove actual knowledge of such
conditions. (Compare Compl. ¶ 16 with Court Diner Compl. ¶ 14.)
The Court finds, however, a distinguishing aspect in the complaints which warrant a
slightly differing conclusion: Plaintiff did not plead any structural barrier he personally
encountered in Court Diner while he did in this case. The Court Diner Compl. only states
“[P]laintiff’s ability to ambulate through the entrance of the [s]ubject [p]roperty was constrained,
hindered, and thwarted by the structural barriers, that which prevented access to the public
accommodation.” (Compare Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10 with Court Diner Compl. ¶¶ 4, 11.) Thus, the
court in Court Diner found Plaintiff failed to establish standing as to the diner’s entrance,
“offer[ing] no description about the structural barriers or the [d]iner’s entrance and exit,” and all
other alleged violations, as it was “not clear which, if any, of the thirty-six alleged violations . . .
Plaintiff personally encountered.” Court Diner, 2024 WL 4225781 at *2–3. In the Complaint in
this case, Plaintiff alleges specific details and direct injury regarding the Subject Property’s
unnavigable entrance. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Therefore, while the court in Court Diner dismissed the
entire complaint for failure to plead past injury, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately pled past
injury by alleging a direct encounter with the inaccessible entrance, with supporting factual
details. For that reason, Court Diner does not impact the Court’s analysis of past injury and is
not “antithetical” as Plaintiff claims because it does not address a deterrence theory of injury.
Feltzin, on the other hand, specifically dealt with “whether plaintiff ha[d] alleged a direct
injury” as “plaintiff’s brief [did] not argue that his pleadings and affidavit should be construed as
advancing a deterrence-based theory of injury.” Feltzin, 2016 WL 11599264, at *5. This case
also has no impact on the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s deterrence theory.
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assertion that ‘Plaintiff intends to visit the [Subject Property] again in the near future to utilize all
of the goods and services offered therein,’” (Def.’s Mem. 8 (quoting Comp. ¶ 14)), which is
deficient as “vague, some day intentions do not support a finding of actual or imminent injury
required by Article III,” (id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Second, Baklajian
contends that Plaintiff “fails to explain what is distinctive about [Café Triskell] . . . or why
[Plaintiff] wants to visit the place so urgently . . . .” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Gannon v. Hua Da Inc. (Hua Da Inc.), No. 22-CV-1650, 2023 WL 2664012, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2023)).) Lastly, Baklajian argues that “Plaintiff’s ‘assertions of proximity
and prior visits are vague, lacking in support, and do not plausibly establish that Plaintiff[ ]
intended to return to the [S]ubject [Property].’” (Id. at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Calcano, 36 F.4th at 75).) In support, Baklajian argues that (1) “Plaintiff’s alleged
patronage of other restaurants in the neighborhood” fails to “establish his reasons for desiring to
patronize [Café Triskell] uniquely,” (2) Plaintiff’s past two visits to the Subject Property does
not “support the inference that he intend[s] to return to the [Subject Property],” and (3) Plaintiff’s
failure to identify “what he means by the neighborhood or how broadly such a term is construed”
provides the Court with “no metric at all by which to gauge the proximity of other restaurants
Plaintiff alleged visited to Plaintiff’s home or to the café.” (Def.’s Reply 8 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).) Baklajian asserts that the Second Circuit in Calcano and Kreisler
“instructed courts to scrutinize the plaintiff’s proximity to the subject location in assessing
whether a complaint plausibly establishes that the plaintiff intended to return.” (Def.’s Mem. 8.)
Lastly, Baklajian contends that while the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff lives “only several
miles” from the Subject Property, travel time estimates report a morning trip from Flushing
would take between nineteen and twenty-one minutes by car, and between thirty-nine and fifty-
one minutes by public transportation. (Id. at 3, 8–9; see Distance Depiction.)
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Plaintiff argues that accepting the allegations included in the Complaint as true is
sufficient to establish standing. (Pl.’s Opp’n 15–17.) First, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint
that “Plaintiff: a) dines out in this neighborhood multiple times per month; b) has dined at and
accessed nearly all adjacent restaurants that are compliant with the ADA; and c) avers that he
would visit and eat at the public accommodation were it not for barriers to access.” (Id. at 15
(citing Compl. ¶ 7).) Plaintiff also alleges that the Complaint “set[s] forth a plausible, credible,
and even probable plan to visit the restaurant for ‘specific events’ and ‘with certain friends and
family,’ as well as a factual claim that he will continue to dine at the neighboring restaurant[s].”
(Id. (quoting Compl. ¶ 10).) Lastly, Plaintiff argues that in the Complaint, he asserts that he
“travels through this neighborhood regularly, has partaken of the services offered in nearly all of
the surrounding public accommodations, and thereon intends to visit the facility again.” (Id.
(quoting Compl. ¶ 14).)
“[T]he focus of the third factor — i.e., intent to return based on past visits and proximity
— is to ensure that ‘the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial’ to establish
standing.” Calcano, 36 F.4th at 74–75 (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 415).
“[C]onclusory allegations of intent to return and proximity are not enough — in order to ‘satisfy
the concrete-harm requirement’ and to ‘pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief,’ [p]laintiff[]
must establish a ‘material risk of future harm’ that is ‘sufficiently imminent and substantial.’”
Id. at 72 (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 435)); see Woods, 2023 WL 6442064, at 3 (“In
particular, focus on the plaintiff’s ‘intent to return based on past visits and proximity’ ‘ensure[s]
that “the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial” to establish standing.’” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 74)); Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., No. 17-
CV-6251, 2023 WL 2622925, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023) (“Courts in this Circuit have
linked the third element — intent to return — to the constitutional requirement that an injury in
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fact be imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical.” (citing Castillo, 2019 WL 6033088, at
*4)). A plaintiff can satisfy this requirement “if they show a plausible intention or desire to
return to the place but for the barriers to access.’” Feltzin v. Stone Equities, LLC (Stone
Equities), No. 16-CV-6457, 2018 WL 1115135, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2018) (quoting Shariff
v. Shannel Realty of Queens, LLC, No. 11-CV-1499, 2013 WL 5519978, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep.
30, 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1114682 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018).
“[T]he central inquiry is not whether a complaint pleads the magic words that a plaintiff ‘intends
to return,’ but if, ‘examined under the totality of all relevant facts,’ the plaintiff plausibly alleges
‘a real and immediate threat of future injury.’” Calcano, 36 F.4th at 65 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1233 (11th Cir. 2021)
(finding professing only “an intent to return to the places previously visited is not enough to
establish standing for prospective relief” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))).
“Intent to return to the place of injury ‘some day’ is insufficient.” Small v. Gen Nutrition Cos.,
Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).
“While there is no precise degree of likelihood of return that is necessary to show
imminence, the following factors are relevant: ‘(1) the proximity of the place of public
accommodation to plaintiff’s residence, (2) plaintiff’s past patronage of defendant’s business, (3)
the definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near
defendant.” Castillo, 2019 WL 6033088, at *4 (quoting Stone Equities, 2018 WL 1115135, at
*11); see Calcano, 36 F.4th at 65 (considering factors of “definiteness of the plaintiff’s plan to
return” and “frequency of the plaintiff’s travel near the defendant’s business” in determining
whether plaintiff “faces a real and immediate threat of future injury” (quoting Kennedy, 998 F.3d
at 1233)); Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering “past
frequency of [plaintiff’s] visits and the proximity of defendants’ restaurants to [plaintiff’s]
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home” when determining intent to return). Intent to return is a “highly fact-sensitive inquiry.”
Bernstein, 621 F. App’x at 59 (first citing Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 187–88; and then citing
Camarillo, 518 F.3d at 158); see Valdez, 2025 WL 3074254, at *4 (“Kreisler and Calcano set a
case-by-case standard for determining what constitutes a reasonable likely intent to return based
largely on past visits and proximity.”); Wahab v. White’s Boots, Inc., No. 23-CV-9018, 2024 WL
3909083, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024) (“Post-Calcano, courts in this [d]istrict have engaged
in fact-intensive inquiries to determine whether allegations like the ones in the instant
[c]omplaint clear the intent-to-return bar impose by the Second Circuit.”). “[T]he Second
Circuit’s opinions in Kreisler and Calcano are helpful in distinguishing between plausible and
implausible assertions of an intent to return to a particular location.” Gannon, 2023 WL 199287,
at *3.
Plaintiff emphasizes the Court’s obligation to accept the allegations in the Complaint as
true. (Pl.’s Opp’n 5, 9, 15–17.) While correct, the Court “need not credit ‘a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation’ or a ‘naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement,’”
Calcano, 36 F.4th at 75 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678), nor can the Court ignore that the
Complaint’s allegations “parrot the court’s language in Kreisler,” id. at 76 (“Plaintiffs’
conclusory invocations of the factors we found relevant in Kreisler are insufficient to establish
standing.”).
1. 	Proximity to Plaintiff’s residence
Plaintiff alleges that he “resides in Flushing” and “lives only several miles from [the
Subject Property].” (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7.) According to Baklajian, “Google Maps reports that the
distance between Flushing, New York [where Plaintiff lives] and the [Subject Property] by car is
approximately 6.6 miles.” (Def.’s Mem. 3; see Distance Depiction.) “[A]ccording to the travel
time estimates supplied by Google Maps, a morning car trip from Flushing to the [Subject
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Property] is expected to take between [nineteen] and [twenty-one] minutes, while a morning trip
by public transportation is expected to take between [thirty-nine] and [fifty-one] minutes.”
(Def.’s Mem. 3; see Distance Depiction.)
“Vaguely asserting that one lives in close proximity to a defendant’s business and intends
to be a customer in the future is not enough; the plaintiff’s assertions must be accompanied by
specific and individualized details.” Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *3 (citing Calcano, 36 F.4th
at 76–77); see Calcano, 36 F.4th at 76 (“Standing on its own, this bare allegation of so-called
‘proximity’ hardly supports an inference that [the plaintiff], who is blind, would ‘immediately’
make this inter-borough trip just to purchase braille gift cards from [the defendant’s business].”).
Plaintiff’s assertion that he lives in the same borough as the Subject Property, the largest
New York City borough by land area, is insufficient to support an inference of intent to return
without more specific and individualized details connecting him to that neighborhood, especially
when it could take him up to nearly an hour to travel to Astoria. See Calcano, 36 F.4th at 76
(finding lack of standing where one plaintiff stated he lived in Bronx, N.Y., “close to
[d]efendant’s retail store locate at 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y.,” but “depending on
where [plaintiff] lives in the Bronx, which the complaint does not say, that address could be up
to an hour away from [defendant’s business]”); Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *4 (The plaintiff
“does not provide sufficient evidence that he resides in close proximity to the property, merely
asserting that he lives in the same county, i.e., the island of Manhattan.”); Hennesssy by and
through Hennessy v. Poetica Coffee Inc., No. 21-CV-5063, 2022 WL 4095557, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Sep. 7, 2022) (“Plaintiff’s bare allegation that he resides in Kings County is insufficient to
support a plausible inference that [the p]laintiff would return to [the d]efendants’ business on
Atlantic Avenue in Boerum Hill several times a year after it becomes fully accessible.” (internal
quotation marks and citation mitted)); Dominguez v. Pizza Hut of Am., LLC, No. 19-CV-10175,
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2020 WL 3639977, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2020) (finding the plaintiff’s allegation that he
“resides within close proximity to at least one of [the d]efendant’s physical locations” was
conclusory); cf. Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188 (holding that the plaintiff’s residence “within several
blocks of the [d]iner” supported an inference of intent to return).
Plaintiff’s proffered connection to the neighborhood does not support his assertion that he
“passes by [the Subject Property] at least once per week when he is doing errands, visiting
family and friends throughout the borough, and looking to drink and eat out,” and the Subject
Property “is in a neighborhood that Plaintiff dines out two to three times per month.” (Compl. ¶
7.) These reasons do not connect Plaintiff to Astoria, Queens specifically, where the Subject
Property is located, that would help explain why Plaintiff frequents such an area so far away
from where he resides. Plaintiff does not allege anything distinctive about why he patronizes the
neighborhood, alleging only that he visits “family and friends throughout the borough” and
without discussing what routine errands he runs nearby. (Id.) This is insufficient to support
standing. Cf. Volfman v. Miss Du’s Tea Shop, Inc., No. 24-CV-2973, 2025 WL 1852302, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2025) (finding standing where plaintiff conceded that he lived approximately
thirty-five minutes away from defendant’s business but “explain[ed] that he is frequently in
downtown Manhattan for work (approximately 3-5 times per month), and on other occasions
(such as for family outings, shopping, and dinners),” described “what attracted him to
[defendant’s property]” in detail, and listed specific reasons he would return (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1621628
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2025).
2. 	Past patronage of the Subject Property
Plaintiff alleges he visited the Subject Property twice: once in the middle of October of
2024 and once on December 20, 2024. (Compl. ¶ 5.) While this factor is typically not analyzed
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alone, instead considered in the general context of Plaintiff’s relationship to the Subject Property,
the Complaint’s details of Plaintiff’s past two attempts to visit the Subject Property support
finding Plaintiff’s plausible intention to return. See Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 186 (the complaint
described the plaintiff’s encounter with the defendant’s diner in 2008 in detail). Most of the
cases in this Circuit that do not find standing involve a complaint that lacks details and
specificity regarding when a plaintiff visited the defendant’s business — but Plaintiff does
provide sufficient information regarding his visits. See Calcano, 36 F.4th at 76–77 (holding that
the plaintiffs “cannot possibly show that they have suffered an injury that is ‘concrete and
particularized’” because they failed to “provide any details about their past visits or the
frequency of such visits”); Hennesssy, 2022 WL 4095557, at *3 (the plaintiff failed “to provide
any details about [the p]laintiff’s previous attempt to access [the d]efendants’ business” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Stone Equities, 2018 WL 1115135, at *11 (the plaintiff only alleged
that he “visited the property which forms the basis of this lawsuit” but nothing more); cf. Valdez,
2025 WL 3074254, at *4 (finding standing as supported by a complaint that detailed the
plaintiff’s “long[] history of visiting the restaurant”). Thus, Plaintiff’s past two visits attempting
to visit the Subject Property, in addition to Plaintiff’s stated “intent to return,” does slightly
weigh in favor of finding Plaintiff plausibly likely to return. See Davis v. Wild Friends Foods,
Inc., No. 22-CV-4244, 2023 WL 4364465, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2023) (the plaintiff’s
previous five visits supported finding intent to return); cf. Stone Equities, LLC, 2018 WL
1115135, at *11 (“[A] lack of specificity with regard to past patronage, or an interest in
patronage, weighs against an inference that [the p]laintiff plausibly possesses an intent to return
to the [p]roperty in the imminent future but for the alleged violations.”).
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3. 	Definitiveness of Plaintiff’s plans to return to the Subject
Property
Plaintiff asserts that he “[p]lans to return to the Subject Property to avail himself of the
goods and services offered to the public at the Subject Property in the coming months,” (Compl.
¶ 6), with “specific[] plans to visit this [Subject Property] this summer and autumn with family
and friends for nights out, and holidays and events.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Without more, these assertions
are insufficient to establish a plausible intent to return to the Subject Property. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 564 (A plaintiff’s “profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before
— where they will presumably, this time, be deprived . . . — is simply not enough” to establish
standing.”); Calcano, 36 F.4th at 76 (the plaintiffs alleged that they “intend[ed] to immediately
purchase at least one store gift card” without providing support as to “why they want to purchase
braille gift cards . . . so urgently”). It is not enough that Plaintiff has visited the Subject Property
before and that he alleges that he “plans to return.” See Calcano, 36 F.4th at 76 (“Plaintiffs’
vague assertions that they have been customers at defendant’s businesses on prior occasions . . .
[do not] nudge their claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680)); Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *4
(the plaintiff failed to “explain why he wanted to access the property in the first place or why he
would want to access it in the future,” only “imply[ing] that he may want to patronize [the
defendant’s business] at some point in the future”); Hennesssy, 2022 WL 4095557, at *3 (finding
the plaintiff’s alleged “inten[t] to patronize [the d]efendants’ business several times a year after it
becomes fully accessible” was insufficient to plead standing (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
Plaintiff does not explain in the Complaint why he intends to visit or what is distinctive
about the business located at the Subject Property. See Hua Da Inc., 2023 WL 2664012, at *3
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(finding that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to explain what is distinctive about [the d]efendants’
delicatessen and grocery — one of literally thousands on the island of Manhattan” and therefore
did not plead a plausible intent to return (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gannon
v. JBJ Holdings LLC (JBJ Holdings LLC), No. 22-CV-1674, 2022 WL 6698222, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 11, 2022) (standing lacking where the plaintiff failed to “allege what is distinctive about
[the d]efendants’ donut shop” where “[t]here are many donut shops on the island”); Stone
Equities, 2018 WL 1115135, at *11 (finding insufficient pleading where the plaintiff stated that
he “plans to return to the [p]roperty once the barriers to access are corrected and the facility
becomes fully accessible” and “desires to visit [the defendant’s business] not only to avail
himself of the goods and services offered to the public at the [p]operty, but to assure himself that
this [p]roperty is in compliance with the ADA”); cf. Brown v. Lay Win Herbal, Inc., No. 24-CV-
8114, 2025 WL 3274560, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2025) (finding the plaintiff’s “interest in
patronizing [the defendant’s business] in particular: it is a ‘unique Chinese medicine clinic’ that
offers acupuncture services and herbal remedies” supported a reasonable inference that he
intends to return), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3633500 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
2025); Valdez, 2025 WL 3074254, at *4 (finding the plaintiff’s “claims [that] she is fond of and
has cravings for [defendant’s] ‘Boneless Fried Chicken Crackling’ and ‘French Fries’”
demonstrate plausible intent to return); Volfman, 2025 WL 1852302, at *6 (finding sufficient
allegations where the plaintiff “describe[d] in detail what attracted him to [the defendant’s
business] (the healthy, low calorie fruit drinks and teas, described in online reviews as
refreshing, an absolute delight, and just perfect) and why he wants to return (to try the well-
reviewed Purple Taro Bubble Milk Tea)” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));
Davis, 2023 WL 4364465, at *6–7 (finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged intent to return by
explaining that he “enjoys honeyed butter,” “is generally interested in organic food as part of his
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diet,” “was interested in trying a new brand to enjoy a healthy and tasty new food,” and was
particularly interested in “[the d]efendant’s honey sunflower butter” because it was “a distinctive
product”).
Moreover, Plaintiff unsatisfactorily asserts that he has “set forth a plausible, credible, and
even probable plan to visit the restaurant” in the future, with “plans to return . . . in the coming
months,” specifically “this summer and autumn with family and friends for nights out, and
holidays and events.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 15; Compl. ¶¶ 6, 10.) “Such ‘some day’ intentions —
without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day
will be — do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury’ that Article III requires.”
Harty, 28 F.4th at 443 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564) (finding lack of “sufficiently imminent”
injury where the plaintiff alleged that he intended to utilize the defendant’s website in “the near
future”); Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *4 (finding the plaintiff’s assertion that he wanted to
patronize the defendant’s business “at some point in the future, but that he ‘[did] not know when’
. . . [was] insufficient to establish injury absent a description of concrete plans”); cf. Spring
Valley Marketplace LLC, 2017 WL 108062, at *8 (finding the plaintiff’s allegation to return in
June or July of 2016, supported by his alleged professional and family connections, constituted
“more than a vague ‘some day’ intention to return.”). Nor can the Court assume Plaintiff intends
to return based on his past two attempted visits to the Subject Property. See Lopez v. Peapod,
LLC, No. 19-CV-9906, 2021 WL 1108559, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021) (“Courts . . . have
declined to find an intent to return even when a plaintiff pleads that they had visited a
defendant’s store before and will do so again in the future.”); see also Bernstein, 621 F. App’x at
58–59 (finding the plaintiff’s intent to return to Central Park could not solely be based on the fact
that he visited the park thirty times a year for the past ten years); Ortiz v. Westchester Med. Ctr.
Health Care Corp., No. 15-CV-5432, 2016 WL 6901314, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016)
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(holding the plaintiff’s identification of a single past visit to the accused premises “d[id] not,
without engaging in impermissible ‘indefinite speculation,’ plausibly bridge the gap between a
mere possibility and a real and imminent threat of harm as required to support the inference that
it is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ instead of simply conceivable” that plaintiff would return).
Plaintiff’s self-described “probable plans” do not establish “concrete” injury and plausible intent
to return.
4. 	Frequency of travel in the area of the Subject Property
Plaintiff states he “passes by the [Subject Property] at least once per week when he is
doing errands, visiting family and friends throughout the borough, and looking to drink and eat
out,” and the Subject Property “is in a neighborhood that Plaintiff dines out two to three times
per month.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) In support, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that he has “partaken at,
and in, nearly all of the neighboring restaurants surrounding the [Subject Property] that are
without obstructions about twice per month, including but not limited to Escola Corp’s
Restaurant, Psari, Mad Donkey Bar & Grill and Arepas Grill.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s connection to the
“neighborhood” is still unclear given he does not reside in close proximity to the Subject
Property, he “visit[s] family and friends throughout the borough,” and he “passes by [the Subject
Property] . . . when he is doing errands.”10 (Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).)
However, in the Complaint, Plaintiff specifies his frequent visits near the Subject
Property, noting that he “passes by [the Subject Property] at least once per week” and dines in
the neighborhood “two to three times per month,” including at several neighboring restaurants all
notably less than two blocks away from the Subject Property. (Id.) Plaintiff’s allegations just
barely cross the threshold to support a plausible intention to return. See Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188
10 See supra Section II.b.ii.1.
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(finding the plaintiff’s allegation that he passed by the diner three to four times per week and
“frequent[ed] diners in his neighborhood often” supported standing); Valdez, 2025 WL 3074254,
at *4 (finding a totality of factors supported finding intent to return where the plaintiff pleaded
“she lives 35 minutes away from the restaurant” and “she visits the Upper West Side at least
once a month to visit her friends and family who live there”); Woods, 2023 WL 6442064, at *4
(reasonably inferred plausible intent to return where the defendant’s apartment building housed
several of the plaintiff’s friends and family members and have “asked him to come visit their
apartments several times”); cf. Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *4 (noting that the plaintiff’s lack
of assertion that he “frequent[ed] other bakeshops in the neighborhood” supported the court
finding the plaintiff lacked standing); Hennesssy, 2022 WL 4095557, at *3 (finding the
plaintiff’s allegation that he “frequent[ly] travels to the area where [the] defendant’s business
was located,” without more, did not allow the court to conclude that the plaintiff had standing
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)); Stone Equities, 2018 WL 1115135, at
*12 (holding the plaintiff’s allegations that he “regularly visits the area near [the d]efendant’s
shopping center to visit friends, enjoy restaurants and other retail establishments” and he “travels
to New Yok to visit with friends and family who reside in New York” insufficient to support a
plausible inference). Plaintiff’s “demonstrated specific and geographic and habitual reasons why
he would return to the [Subject Property] support standing.” See Gannon v. Yan Ping Ass’n (Yan
Ping Ass’n), No. 22-CV-1675, 2023 WL 6292533, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2023) (describing
the plaintiff and the court’s holding in Kreisler).
5. 	Complaint’s boilerplate nature
The Court’s analysis is also impacted by the boilerplate nature of the Complaint because
the Court “cannot ignore the broader context of Plaintiff[’s] transparent cut-and-paste and fill-in-
the-blank pleadings.” Calcano, 36 F.4th 68; see Sookul v. Fresh Clean Threads, Inc., 754 F.
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Supp. 3d 395, 402–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (summarizing that “Calcano and its progeny . . . are
concerned with uncareful ADA plaintiffs who fail, in their haste to file more lawsuits, to submit
a complaint with allegations that are coherent and detailed enough to ‘nudge their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Calcano, 36
F.4th at 76)); Dominguez, 2020 WL 3639977, at *4 (“‘There is nothing inherently wrong with
filing duplicative lawsuits against multiple defendants if the harms to be remedied do [in fact]
exist and are indeed identical. But those who live by the photocopier shall die by the
photocopier’ if they ‘fail[] specifically to assert any concrete injury.’” (alterations in original)
(quoting Mendez v. Apple Inc., No. 18-CV-7550, 2019 WL 2611168, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
2019))). While the Court does not factor Plaintiff’s status as an ADA tester into its analysis,11
nearly all of the complaints Plaintiff has filed in his seventy-nine cases are carbon-copy
complaints using identical language to state the same conclusory contentions against dining
establishments all across this District and the Southern District and allege an indistinguishable
laundry list of ADA violations. (See Party Search.) See Yan Ping Ass’n, 2023 WL 6292533, at
*3 (finding the plaintiff “undermines his own standing claims by alleging that he has an
11 Plaintiff dedicates several paragraphs of his briefing to “Defendant’s attack on [the]
veracity of initial pleadings based on a purported ‘ADA tester’ label.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 16–17.)
While Plaintiff could accurately be described as an ADA tester, (see Party Search, annexed to
Poll. Decl. as Ex. A, Docket Entry No. 23-2 (consisting of a non-exhaustive list of cases where
Plaintiff brought an ADA suit, totaling seventy-nine cases)), the argument and term “ADA
tester” is notably absent from Baklajian’s brief in support of her motion to dismiss. (See
generally Def.’s Mem.) As noted above, the Court’s analysis is not impacted by Plaintiff’s status
as an ADA tester, nor does the Court take issue with the sheer volume of lawsuits he has filed.
“The law is clear that testers can have standing, but even testers have to show that they have
suffered an Article III injury in fact.” Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc. (Harty), 28 F.4th 435, 444
n.3 (2d Cir. 2022).
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immediate intent to return to disparate and seemingly unremarkable establishments all across
Manhattan”).12
The Complaint in this case almost exactly mirrors the Court Diner Compl. but
incorporates a few changes — notably adding specific details about the Subject Property’s
inaccessible entrance, which Plaintiff alleged to directly have encountered, and about Plaintiff’s
plans to return. (Compare Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 10 to Court Diner Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 14.)13 See
Hashimi v. Court Diner Inc., No. 23-CV-5811, 2024 WL 4225781 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 18, 2024).
While those changes result in a slightly different outcome —Court Diner found Plaintiff failed to
allege past injury, but here the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded past injury — the
12 Analyzing the complaints in those other cases, there appear to be three “templates” —
the first was used primarily in 2018 and 2019 cases, which contain minimal factual allegations,
including no specific dates of visits, no specific allegations regarding his interaction with the
ADA violations, little or no discussion of proximity of the subject property, and no concrete
plans to return. See, e.g., Compl., Hashimi v. Yumi Delite, Inc., No. 19-CV-547 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2019); Compl., Hashimi v. Muscle Maker Corp., LLC, No. 18-CV-10474 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12,
2018). Later versions track the Court Diner Compl., which adds slightly more detail including
Plaintiff’s visiting date, plans to return, details about the subject property, and restaurants in the
surrounding area Plaintiff has patronized. See, e.g., Compl., Hashimi v. Mumford, No. 24-CV-
2769 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2024); Compl., Hashimi v. Dada Bada Realty, No. 23-CV-7196
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2023). Following the court’s decision in Court Diner on September 18,
2024 dismissing the case for failure to plead past injury, it appears that Plaintiff once more
revised his template to include more details about the inaccessible entrances he encountered at
the subject properties. Compare Court Diner Compl. to Compl. ¶ 2, Hashimi v. Pancyprian
Ass’n Inc., No. 24-CV-8381, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2024) (same). In some other recent complaints,
Plaintiff even includes more detail than he does in this case (such as including specific details
about the defendant’s business), while mentioning that he has plans to return in the “summer and
fall” and frequents restaurants within a one block radius. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 4, 7, 10 to Compl.
¶¶ 9, 12, 15, Hashimi v. Hoxha, No. 25-CV-2682 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2025) (detailing that the
subject property “is a Colombian restaurant offering a variety of traditional dishes, including
bandeja paisa and parrilladas” and “Plaintiff appreciates the quality of the cuisine and the
ambiance”).
13 See supra n.9 for a discussion comparing the Compl. with the Court Diner Compl.
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Court finds these boilerplate complaints undermine Plaintiff’s alleged intention to return.14 See
Dominguez v. Athleta, No. 19-CV-10198, 2021 WL 918314, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021)
(“Plaintiff has filed at least [twenty-four] nearly identical complaints against other retailers in
this district, which undermines the sincerity of [the p]laintiff’s alleged intent to return to the
[d]efendant’s business.”); Calcano v. Cole Haan LLC (Cole Haan), No. 19-CV-10440, 2021 WL
849434, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021) (the plaintiff’s “other ADA litigation may ‘undercut the
sincerity’ of his intent to return”).
“Although [the court] might excuse a stray technical error or even credit an odd
allegation standing alone as an idiosyncratic preference — to do so here in light of the
cumulative implausibility of [the] plaintiffs’ allegations would be burying our heads in the sand.”
Calcano, 36 F.4th at 77. “‘[J]udicial experience and common sense’ suggest that the errors,
oddities, and omissions in the complaints are a result of their mass production, and they render
[the plaintiff’s] cookie-cutter assertion of standing implausible.” Id. (first alteration in original)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679). There are numerous grammar errors, erratically defined terms
(including the use of some that are never defined), inconsistent allegations, and incongruent
pleadings in the Complaint and Plaintiff’s briefing.15 (Compl. ¶¶ 5–10, 14; see generally Pl.’s
14 The court in Court Diner did not reach the issue of Plaintiff’s intent to return having
held he failed to plead past injury. Court Diner, 2024 WL 4225781, at *3.
15 In addition to the large errors explained infra, some other substantive examples
include: (1) Plaintiff’s discussion of “Defendant’s attack on veracity of initial pleadings based on
a purported ‘ADA tester’ label . . .” but that term never appears in Baklajian’s memorandum in
support, (see Pl.’s Opp’n 16; see generally Def.’s Mem.); (2) asserting that the Complaint
explains Plaintiff’s reasoning for his visits but it is never mentioned, (see Pl.’s Opp’n 8); (3)
asking the Court to credit Plaintiff’s “testimony at trial” while this memorandum and order deals
with Baklajian’s motion to dismiss, (see Pl.’s Opp’n 18); and (4) arguing that there are “material
facts in genuine dispute,” a standard for summary judgment and not a motion to dismiss, (see
Pl.’s Opp’n 9).
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Opp’n.) While more passable than the Court Diner Compl., which alleges unrelated ADA
violations such as those related to the women’s bathroom, the Complaint similarly lists a
countless number of interior ADA violations without pleading how Plaintiff came to learn of
those violations. (Compare Compl. ¶ 16 with Court Diner Compl. ¶ 14.) Similarly, Plaintiff
alleges exterior seating ADA violations without mentioning that he observed those when he was
at the Subject Property’s entrance or resolving the discrepancy that it likely was too cold to eat
outside “in the middle of October” and unquestionably too cold on December 20, 2024. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 10, 16.)
Most notable is the fact that Plaintiff’s opposition briefing (1) identifies the Plaintiff is as
“Samuel Lopez,” not Abeth Hashimi, in both the caption and throughout the body of the brief,
(2) discusses the “greater Brooklyn area” while the allegations in the Complaint relate to
Plaintiff’s residence and the Subject Property’s location in Queens, and (3) incorrectly names the
Defendants Haig and Emma Baklajian individually, not in their capacity as trustees of the Haig
Baklajian and Emma Baklajian Revocable Living Trust, dated August 1, 2021.16 (See generally
Pl.’s Opp’n; see Def.’s Reply at 6 n.1.) These inconsistencies and mistakes serve to undermine
the plausibility of Plaintiff’s allegations. See Calcano, 36 F.4th at 77 (finding “[the p]laintiff’s
cookie-cutter assertion of standing implausible” given the numerous incongruencies and
impossible assertions in the complaint); Rendon v. Berry Global Inc., No. 22-CV-10420, 2023
Some non-substantive examples include: (1) punctuation errors, such as continuing
sentences after periods, (see Compl. ¶ 6 (“ . . . which exist within the Facility.including but not
limited to . . . ”)); (2) varying term use to reference the Subject Property, as it is defined in the
Complaint as the Subject Property or “the Facility,” but also called the “subject location,” the
“subject premises,” or plainly calling it Café Triskell; and (3) the misuse of singular and plural
versions of plaintiff and defendant, while there only exists one Plaintiff and three Defendants in
this case.
16 See supra n.3.
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WL 3724795, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023) (finding the complaints filed in over three hundred
ADA actions across the country, including over forty in New York, contained the same “cut-and-
paste and fill-in-the-blank” allegations “served to underscore the implausibility of [the
p]laintiffs’ claims”); Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *4 (considering that the plaintiff had “filed
twenty-six cases, including this one, in this [d]istrict since January 14, 2022, each filed by the
same attorney” and “[t]he complaint in the instant case contain[ed] general and conclusory
assertions that are almost identical to the language in the other twenty-five cases filed by
[plaintiff] and his attorney” in its standing analysis); Hennesssy, 2022 WL 4095557, at *3
(noting that the plaintiff’s seventy-nine other ADA actions in this District which “exhibit the
same ‘cut-and-paste and fill-in-the-blank’ approach that existed in Calcano, using the same
language, to state the same conclusory allegations, and with the same typographical errors”
(citations omitted)); Dominguez, 2020 WL 3639977, at *4 (finding lack of a particularized and
concrete injury where the plaintiff “filed dozens of substantially identical [generic] complaints in
this district against various retail and dining establishments”).
For these reasons, the Court finds the totality of the circumstances fails to indicate that
Plaintiff has a plausible likelihood of intent or desire to return to the Subject Property. See
Gomez v. W. Shore Inn Rest., Inc., No. 22-CV-277, 2023 WL 5337864, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. June
30, 2023) (finding the plaintiff “failed to plausibly allege that he intends to return to the [s]ubject
[p]roperty” under a “highly fact-sensitive inquiry” where the factors weighed against finding
standing); JBJ Holdings LLC, 2022 WL 6698222, at *3 (“[U]nable to draw an inference that [the
plaintiff] would return to the [p]remises in the future,” the court found the plaintiff “failed to
sufficiently allege standing under the ADA.”); Access 4 All, Inc. v. G & T Consulting Co., LLC,
No. 06-CV-13736, 2008 WL 851918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2008) (“[C]ourts have found that
plaintiffs do not have standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA when they fail to show a
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plausible intent or desire to return to the place where they had previously encountered an ADA
violation . . . .”). Thus, the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead an “actual or imminent” threat of
injury to Plaintiff and ultimately Plaintiff does not have standing to seek injunctive relief. See
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–64.
c. 	The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint under Rule 15
While Baklajian’s briefing is silent as to the issue, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the
Complaint “should the Court desire further factual enhancement.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n 17–18; see
generally Def.’s Reply.) Plaintiff argues Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“emphasizes the importance of having the action resolved on the merits” and thus “motions to
amend typically are ‘accorded a broad and liberal treatment . . . [that] serves the integrity and
fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search for the truth.’” (Pl.’s Opp’n 17 (quoting
Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993).)
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[l]eave to amend should
be ‘freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires,’ but ‘should generally be denied in instances of
futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party.’” United States ex
rel. Ladas v. Exelis, Inc., 824 F.3d 16, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (second and third alterations in original)
(first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); and then quoting Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc.,
551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hereford Ins.
Co., 66 F.4th 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2023) (“A court should freely give leave when justice so requires,
but it may, in its discretion, deny leave to amend for good reason, including futility, bad faith,
undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Dalewitz v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 22-CV-7323, 2025 WL 764023, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
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11, 2025) (“[A]bsent a showing of prejudice or bad faith, practice in this Circuit is to grant a
motion to amend.” (citing Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993))).
Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint and is therefore granted an
opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Gannon, 2023 WL 199287, at *4–5 (granting leave to amend to
pleadings in an effort to establish standing under the ADA); Dominguez, 2020 WL 3639977, at
*4 (same). Because leave to amend should be freely given under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and no showing of prejudice or bad faith has been made, the Court grants
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. See Normal v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 23-
CV-9245, 2024 WL 3890103, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2024) (“In this Circuit, ‘[i]t is the usual
practice upon granting a motion to dismiss to allow leave to replead.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991))).
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint and grants Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint. Any amended complaint must be filed on or before March
18, 2026.
Dated: March 4, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
SO ORDERED:
/s/MKB
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge
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