Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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FARIZ ABASOV,
Plaintiff,
- against -
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS), et al.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-1793 (PKC)
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Fariz Abasov (“Plaintiff”) brings the instant action against USCIS,
Attorney General of the United States Pamela Bondi, Director of USCIS Kika Scott, Secretary of
Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York
John H. Durham (“Defendants”). 	Plaintiff argues that Defendants have unreasonably delayed
adjudication of his application for asylum in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1), and seeks a writ of mandamus to compel Defendants to act
on his application, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 19, 25; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss (“Opp’n”), Dkt. 8, at 2.) Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b) to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), Dkt. 7.)
For the reasons set herein, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is a native of Azerbaijan, (Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF2 21) who is seeking asylum in,
and withholding of removal from, the United States, (Compl., Dkt. 1, at ECF 3). In June 2021,
Plaintiff was approved for an F2 visa and, shortly thereafter, arrived in the United States. 	(Id.
¶ 11.) On September 15, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an Application for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, known as a Form I-589 (“I-589”), with USCIS. (Id.; Ex. A, Dkt. 1, at ECF 9.)
On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff requested that USCIS expedite his I-589 application. (Compl.,
Dkt. 1, ¶ 13; Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF 17–18.) 	Plaintiff explained to USCIS that expediting his
application was warranted due to several hardships he and his family faced. (Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF
17–18.) 	Although he and his wife had acquired work authorization, (see Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 15;
Ex. D, Dkt. 1, at ECF 14–15), Plaintiff explained that his spouse “faced constant rejection from
employers due to the restrictions associated” with her authorization, (Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF 17–
18). As a result, Plaintiff’s daughter, who “did not qualify for any financial aid as an international
student,” left her college and the country, which Plaintiff claimed “caus[ed] immense emotional
distress” to his spouse. 	(Id. at ECF 17, 25.) 	Moreover, Plaintiff’s “pending asylum status”
hindered his “ability to travel” and “support” ailing relatives abroad, as well as have family visit
him. (Id. at ECF 17–18.) This family separation, he shared, “further compounded [his] family’s
emotional distress.” (Id.)
1 For purposes of this Memorandum & Order, the Court assumes the truth of Plaintiff’s
non-conclusory, factual allegations in the Complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
2 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing
system and not the document’s internal pagination.
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On June 11, 2024, USCIS rejected Plaintiff’s request because the reasons stated in his letter
“d[id] not meet the extreme emergent need required for an expedite.” (Id. at ECF 19.)
Plaintiff filed suit in the Eastern District of New York on April 1, 2025, seeking to compel
Defendants to adjudicate his application. 	(Dkt. 1.) 	Plaintiff claims the four years he has been
waiting for a decision constitutes “an unreasonable delay” under the APA. (See Compl., Dkt. 1,
¶¶ 10, 19–20.) Plaintiff alternatively requests that the Court issue a writ of mandamus “compelling
Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiff’s I-589” application, pursuant to the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361. (Id., ¶ 25.) On June 6, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b). (MTD,
Dkt. 7.)
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)3, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face where it “pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	In reviewing a complaint for failure to state a claim, the
Court accepts as true all factual allegations and draws from them all reasonable inferences, while
disregarding “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.”
Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Dane v. UnitedHealthcare
Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2020)). 	Furthermore, “[i]t is well established that the
submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
3 Although Defendants’ motion does not set forth the subsection of Rule 12(b) pursuant to
which they seek to dismiss the Complaint, (see MTD, Dkt. 7), it is apparent that their arguments
seek dismissal for failure to state a claim, Rule 12(b)(6).
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470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted), and read to “raise the strongest
arguments they suggest,” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Plaintiff’s APA Claim
The APA provides that “[w]ith due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties
or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a
matter presented to it.” 	5 U.S.C. § 555(b). 	Courts may, however, “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Id. § 706(1). To determine whether agency action
has been unreasonably delayed, courts look to the “source of delay—e.g., the complexity of the
investigation as well as the extent to which the defendant participated in delaying the proceeding.”
Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 191 F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Pub.
Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Comm’r, 740 F.2d 21, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Where, as here, Plaintiff
seeks “to compel action by immigration authorities, courts utilize the six-factor test articulated in
Telecommunications Research & Action v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (‘TRAC’) to
determine whether relief under the APA is warranted.” Yueliang Zhang v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-5370
(DLI), 2020 WL 5878255, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2020) (quoting Hoo Loo v. Ridge, 2007 WL
813000 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007)); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
710 F.3d 71, 84 (2d Cir. 2013), as amended (Mar. 21, 2013) (adopting TRAC factors as the “test
for determining if agency action is unreasonably delayed”).4 These so-called “TRAC” factors are:
4 Some out-of-Circuit district courts have declined to analyze the TRAC factors on a motion
to dismiss due to their fact-intensive nature. 	See Saharia v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
No. 21-CV-3688 (NSR), 2022 WL 3141958, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2022) (applying TRAC
factors to a plaintiff’s APA claim, while noting that some courts have found the factors too fact-
intensive for analysis on a motion to dismiss). But courts within this Circuit have regularly held
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(1) [T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of
reason;
(2) [W]here Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme
may supply context for this rule of reason;
(3) [D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less
tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;
(4) [T]he court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority;
(5) [T]he court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests
prejudiced by delay; and
(6) [T]he court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in
order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.
TRAC, 750 F.3d at 80 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 	A plaintiff need not
“demonstrat[e] that all of these factors weigh in that party’s favor” to prevail on an unreasonable
delay claim. Mu v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 23-CV-2067 (HG), 2023 WL 4687077,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2023). At the same time, a court may “refuse[] to grant relief, even though
all the other factors considered in TRAC favor[ ] it, where a judicial order putting the petitioner at
the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.”
L.M. v. Johnson, 150 F. Supp. 3d 202, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal
Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
that unreasonable delay claims may be decided at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Khan v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 722 F. Supp. 3d 92, 99 n.6 (D. Conn. 2024); Sheiner v. Mayorkas, No. 21-CV-5272
(ER), 	2023 	WL 	2691580, 	at 	*5 	n.12 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	29, 	2023); 	Aydemir 	v. 	Garland,
No. 22-CV-100 (PAC), 2022 WL 4085846, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 6, 2022); Wara v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-CV-3535 (OEM), 2025 WL 2208255, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 2025).
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For the following reasons, the Court holds that the balance of the TRAC factors weigh
against finding Defendants’ four-year delay unreasonable under the APA.5
A. 	First TRAC Factor: Rule of Reason
The first, “most important” TRAC factor—whether a rule of reason governs the time it
takes the agency to make the decision at issue—weighs in favor of Defendants. 	In re Core
Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Kaur v. Mayorkas, No. 22-CV-4514 (PAE),
2023 WL 4899083, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2023) (citations omitted). The parties dispute whether
USCIS’s approach to processing I-589 applications—“last-in-first-out,” or “LIFO”—is a rule of
reason. (MTD, Dkt. 7, at 3; Opp’n, Dkt. 8, at 3.) The LIFO approach, adopted in 2018, prioritizes
review of the newest applications to “discourage individuals from potentially filing meritless
asylum applications to take advantage of the backlog to obtain employment authorization” while
their case is pending. 	U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Backlog Reduction of Pending
Affirmative Asylum Cases: Fiscal Year 2021 Report to Congress 2 (2021); see U.S. Citizenship
and Immigr. Servs., Asylum Application Processing: Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress 4
(2022) (providing a similar explanation).6 Plaintiff asserts that LIFO is not a rule of reason because
it has “systematically marginalized older cases” and failed to reduce the backlog of applications.
(Opp’n, Dkt. 8, at 3.) The Court disagrees, for two reasons.
First, the fact that LIFO has a backlog does not undermine its validity as a rule of reason.
“[R]ules of reason are not judged on whether they provide the best solution to a problem, but
5 The Court will address the TRAC factors from most to least important.
6 “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may take ‘judicial notice of documents in
the [public] record, including of the records and reports of administrative bodies.’” 	Yueliang
Zhang, 2020 WL 5878255, at *1 n.2 (quoting Volpe v. Nassau Cty., 915 F. Supp. 2d 284, 291
(E.D.N.Y. 2013)); see Mu, 2023 WL 4687077, at *2 (taking judicial notice of the fact that USCIS
adjudicates asylum applications “on a LIFO basis”).
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whether they constitute a reasoned attempt to address mounting issues within a system.” Jan v.
Mayorkas, No. 24-CV-1686 (LDH), 2025 WL 964092, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (quoting
He v. Garland, No. 23-CV-5386 (EK), 2024 WL 3708146, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2024)). LIFO,
which presents an agency’s “establishment of a logical system to prioritize and process
applications,” is one such attempt. Lin v. Mayorkas, No. 24-CV-01403 (RER), 2025 WL 1884304,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2025). Numerous courts have accordingly recognized that although LIFO
“forces asylum applicants who filed earlier to bear the brunt of those delays,” it does so as part of
an “attempt to address mounting issues with the asylum application process.” See, e.g., Fangfang
Xu v. Cissna, 434 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); He, 2024 WL 3708146 at *3 (making the
same observation and concluding that the “LIFO model, despite any shortcomings, meets [the rule
of reason] standard”). 	“[T]he fact that the system includes various forms of prioritization and
delay . . . does [not] entitle Plaintiff[] to relief under the APA.” L.M., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 214 n.4.
And Plaintiff does not allege that the delay in adjudicating his application is attributable to a lack
of diligence by Defendants or anything other than the effects of LIFO. Ying Yu Liu v. Wolf, No.
19-CV-0410 (PGG), 2020 WL 2836426, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2020) (concluding that “the
delay was the result of the LIFO rule, which was itself a reasoned response to a systemic crisis”
(quoting Fangfang Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 53)).
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that LIFO’s backlog undermines its
validity as a “rule of reason,” (see Opp’n, Dkt. 8, at 3), USCIS has recently implemented reforms
to address that concern. 	In 2024, USCIS introduced “a second track, in which other asylum
officers are assigned to I-589s in the backlog, starting with the oldest applications and working
forward.” (MTD, Dkt. 7, at 2); see also Affirmative Asylum Interview Scheduling, U.S. Citizenship
and 	Immigr. 	Servs., 	https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/affirm
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ative-asylum-interview-scheduling (last updated Mar. 29, 2024) (explaining that the second track
“permits some of the oldest pending applications to be completed in chronological order”).7 This
second track bolsters the conclusion that LIFO provides a rule of reason. See Chang v. Jaddou,
No. 24-CV-6565 (JPC) (SLC), 2025 WL 2015143, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2025) (concluding the
“two-track system” constitutes a rule of reason); Cheng v. Garland, No. 24-CV-3465 (JLR), 2024
WL 5009146, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2024) (observing that “USCIS also recently adjusted its
system for scheduling affirmative asylum interviews ‘to adjudicate backlogged applications in
chronological order’” and concluding that LIFO is a rule of reason).
The Court thus joins the courts in this Circuit that have concluded that LIFO provides a
rule of reason. See Yueliang Zhang, 2020 WL 5878255, at *4 (“Numerous courts have found that
the USCIS’s use of LIFO in the asylum context is a rule of reason.”); Wara, 2025 WL 2208255,
at *5 (joining “other courts in this Circuit by holding that Defendants’ adjudication of asylum
applications on a LIFO scheduling system is . . . an appropriate rule of reason”); Konde v. Raufer,
No. 23-CV-4265, 2024 WL 2221227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2024) (joining the “chorus of
judges in this Circuit finding that the time USCIS takes to adjudicate asylum applications through
its LIFO policy is governed by a rule of reason”).
B. 	Fourth TRAC Factor: Effect of Expediting Delayed Action
The fourth TRAC factor—the effect of expediting the delayed action—which is also one of
the “most relevant” considerations, weighs strongly in favor of Defendants. N-N v. Mayorkas, 540
F. Supp. 3d 240, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation omitted). 	An agency “is in a unique—and
7 A court may also take judicial notice of documents retrieved from official government
websites. 	See Singh v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-CV-3003 (LDH), 2025 WL
964145, at *1 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (citing Rynasko v. New York Univ., 63 F.4th 186, 191
n.4 (2d Cir. 2023)).
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authoritative—position to view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects for each, and allocate
its resources in the optimal way.” Kaur, 2023 WL 4899083, at *11 (quoting In re Barr Lab’ys,
Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 	For the Court “to demand an accelerated protocol, [it]
would have to intrude into a quintessentially administrative function, and in the process
reconfigure the agency’s priorities” by ordering it to expedite an application merely because a suit
has been filed. N-N, 540 F. Supp. 3d at 261; see Xiaobin Xu v. Nielsen, No. 18-CV-2048 (BMC),
2018 WL 2451202, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2018) (dismissing an unreasonable delay claim in
part because “[t]here are many other applicants who have waited even longer than plaintiff; to
grant him priority is to push them further back in line when the only difference between them is
that plaintiff has brought a federal lawsuit”); Gong v. Duke, 282 F. Supp. 3d 566, 569 (E.D.N.Y.
2017) (same).
Here, 	Defendants 	contend—and 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	dispute—that 	“immediately
adjudicating his application would unjustifiably benefit Plaintiff over others simply because he
filed suit.” (MTD, Dkt. 7, at 3.) 	Rather, Plaintiff takes issue with what he charges is USCIS’s
“neglect of longstanding filings.” (Opp’n, Dkt. 8, at 3.) But “[a]s frustrating as the USCIS backlog
may be, it is not apparent that allowing line jumping” would encourage the agency “to change its
ways.” Poz v. Mayorkas, No. 23-CV-7902 (DLI), 2024 WL 4309234, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 26,
2024) (citation omitted); see Qi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 23-CV-8843 (JLR), 2024
WL 2262661, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2024) (“[L]eapfrogging Plaintiff’s application to the front
of the line would do nothing to cure the deficiencies of the asylum application process . . . .”
(quoting Baisheng Chen v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-9951 (AJN), 2020 WL 6825681, at*6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
20, 2020)). Rather, moving Plaintiff’s application to the front of the line would “simply move all
other[] [applicants] back one space.” FangFang Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 54 (quoting L.M., 150 F.
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Supp. 3d at 213); see Sunny v. Biden, No. 21-CV-4662 (BMC), 2023 WL 5613433, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2023) (same); Konde, 2024 WL 2221227, at *4 (same). 	Thus, the Court
concludes that expediting Plaintiff’s application would disrupt “agency activities of a higher or
competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.3d at 80.
C. 	Second TRAC Factor: Statutory Scheme
The second TRAC factor—whether “Congress has provided a timetable” for the agency to
act—similarly does not support finding USCIS’s delay unreasonable. 	Id. at 80. 	Congress has
directed USCIS to adjudicate an asylum application “within 180 days after the date an application
is filed.” 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii). 	However, in the very same subsection, Congress
divests applicants of “any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable”
against the “United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.” 	Id. § 1158(d)(7).
Because applicants may not enforce the 180-day adjudication timeline, the Court does not accord
significant weight to this timetable. 	See Ujka v. Mayorkas, No. 24-CV-4801 (KPF), 2025
WL 2419545, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2025) (compiling cases giving the second TRAC factor
little weight in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7)); Ying Yu Liu, 2020 WL 2836426, at *9 (“Given
Congress’s decision that the schedule it set forth [in § 1158(d)] would not be binding, this Court
cannot give that schedule binding effect here.” (citation omitted)); Fangfang Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d
at 53 (reaching a similar conclusion).
D. 	Third and Fifth TRAC Factors: Prejudice to Health and Welfare
Plaintiff’s Complaint focuses almost entirely on the third and fifth TRAC factors, which
concern the nature and extent to which Defendants’ delay prejudices his human health and welfare.
Plaintiff’s Complaint details how the four years he has waited for a decision has caused “significant
emotional distress, financial instability, and uncertainty.” 	(Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 15.) 	Although
Plaintiff and his wife both obtained employment authorization, he claims that renewing his
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employment authorization documents “took fifteen months,” (id.), and that even when his wife
had employment authorization, employers were reluctant to hire her “due to the restrictions
associated” with her authorization, (Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF 17–18). Plaintiff further states that his
spouse’s application to renew her employment authorization was “denied [in February 2025] due
to an erroneous fee-related issue,” (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 15), and he is now “the sole provider for [his]
family,” (Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF 25).
While the Court is sympathetic to the difficulties Plaintiff and his family have experienced
and are continuing to experience, such hardships are lamentably commonplace among asylum-
seekers. 	Many asylum seekers spend years without seeing family members as they await a
decision. See, e.g., Zheng v. Garland, No. 22-CV-6039 (AMD), 2024 WL 333090, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 29, 2024) (observing that delay, which kept plaintiff from visiting elderly parents abroad,
“could just as easily be true for every other noncitizen whose asylum application has been delayed”
(quoting De Oliveira v. Barr, No. 19-CV-1508 (ENV), 2020 WL 1941231, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
22, 2020))); Singh v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-CV-3562 (RPK), 2025 WL
1489804, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2025) (concluding that delay, which prevented plaintiff “from
seeing his immediate family in India . . . would not differentiate” his application from that of other
asylum-seekers). 	And although asylum-seekers may obtain work authorization, delays in
obtaining renewed authorizations, as well as employers’ reluctance to hire individuals with such
authorization, is well-documented. See Ujka, 2025 WL 2419545, at *7 (concluding that the third
and fifth TRAC factors did not favor a plaintiff even where the plaintiff alleged that employers
were reluctant to hire employees “in her position”); Cohen v. Jaddou, No. 21-CV-5025 (PAC),
2023 WL 2526105, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023) (finding a plaintiff’s allegations that his work
authorization “restricted [] his ability to obtain employment” to be insufficient to justify APA relief
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(citation omitted)); Chang, 2025 WL 2015143, at *7 (dismissing unreasonable delay claim despite
plaintiff’s allegations of delays in processing work authorization). In this regard, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated why his application should be placed in front of “longer-pending applications that
present comparable interests.” Singh, 2025 WL 1489804, at *3; see also Plesha v. Garland, No.
24-CV-7234 (BMC), 2024 WL 5221202, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2024) (declining to grant relief
because doing so would push the plaintiff “ahead of other applicants waiting for the adjudication”
who may be facing “the same or worse harms and threats to their welfare”).
That said, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged financial harm arising out of USCIS’s denial of
his spouse’s application to renew her employment authorization. (See Ex. D, Dkt. 1, at ECF 14–
15 (USCIS letter denying employment authorization renewal); Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF 25 (alleging
it has become “increasingly difficult to sustain ourselves”).) Defendants admit—in a footnote—
that “Plaintiff’s spouse’s [employment authorization document] is pending with USCIS.” (Reply,
Dkt. 9, at 3 n.4.) Nonetheless, Defendants insist that this fact “is not the basis of any claim in this
action.” (Id.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s Complaint ties his spouse’s inability to renew her
employment authorization to his worsening financial situation. 	(See Ex. E, Dkt. 1, at ECF 25.)
The inability to work is a kind of harm contemplated by the third and fifth TRAC factors—and a
harm that distinguishes Plaintiff’s application from others in the queue. See Ray v. Cuccinelli, No.
20-CV-06279-JSC, 2020 WL 6462398, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020) (concluding that the Third
and Fifth TRAC factors favored plaintiffs because their “inability to maintain continuous, lawful
employment and associated benefits” was a prejudice that “exists not only for [them], but for their
families”); cf. Qi, 2024 WL 2262661, at *6 (concluding that the third and fifth TRAC factors did
not favor a plaintiff in part because he “d[id] not allege that he has been unable to work during the
pendency of his application”); Cohen, 2023 WL 2526105, at *5 (finding allegations as to prejudice
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insufficient because “Plaintiff essentially admits that he is not prevented from obtaining
employment”). 	However, Plaintiff does not dispute that he currently is able to work, which
somewhat mitigates the prejudice that he claims. (Reply, Dkt. 8, at 3 n.4.) The Court thus finds
that the delay “tips the third and fifth factors in [Plaintiff’s] favor, albeit to only a slight degree.”
See Kaur, 2023 WL 4899083, at *10–11 (reasoning that at least some of the harms a plaintiff
alleged were not “inherent to the application process” (quoting Sheiner, 2023 WL 2691580, at
*9)).
E. 	Sixth TRAC Factor: Agency Impropriety
Plaintiff does not allege any agency “impropriety” is contributing to the delay at issue.
TRAC, 750 F.3d at 80. 	Thus, this factor is neutral. 	Kaur, 2023 WL 4899083, at *12; Waris v.
Bitter, No. 23-CV-9487 (JGLC), 2024 WL 3237914, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024).
* 	* 	*
In sum, although the third and fifth TRAC factors slightly favor Plaintiff’s APA claim for
expedited consideration of his asylum petition, the first, fourth, and second factors lead the Court
to find that Defendants’ delay is not unreasonable. The Court does not wish to minimize the harm
that Plaintiff and his family are experiencing due to the uncertainty inherent to the asylum process.
But in light of our overtaxed immigration system, many courts have found delays longer than
Plaintiff’s not to be unreasonable under the APA. See Abdiev v. Garland, No. 23-CV-8091 (DEH),
2024 WL 3742545, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2024) (concluding a delay of more than four years for
asylum adjudication was not unreasonable); Ahmed v. Bitter, No. 23-CV-189 (NGG) (RJL), 2024
WL 22763, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024) (“[D]istrict courts have generally found that immigration
delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years
are often not unreasonable.” (citation omitted)). 	Plaintiff’s APA claim must therefore be
dismissed.
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II. 	Plaintiff’s Mandamus Claim
Plaintiff’s Mandamus Act claim similarly must be dismissed. The Mandamus Act permits
a district court to “compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to
perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy,”
Escaler v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 582 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2009), and is only
available where the plaintiff establishes that “(1) there is a clear right to the relief sought; (2) the
Government has a plainly defined and peremptory duty to perform the act in question; and (3)
there is no other adequate remedy available,” Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 133 (2d
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Because Plaintiff can—and does—bring an undue delay claim under the APA, “[t]he Court
need not . . . consider whether Plaintiff has satisfied the first two requirements” for mandamus
relief. Mu, 2023 WL 4687077, at *3. The ability to bring a cause of action under the APA—even
where, as here, Plaintiff has “failed to adequately plead that alternative remedy”—means that
Plaintiff has an “adequate alternative remedy,” and therefore cannot state a mandamus claim.
Cohen, 2023 WL 2526105, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023) (citation omitted); Zhuo v. Mayorkas,
No. 23-CV-5416 (DLI), 2024 WL 4309232, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2024); Luo v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 23-CV-1104 (HG), 2023 WL 5672041, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 1,
2023).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint for failure to state a claim. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	“At some point,” however,
“Defendants’ continued failure to act on Plaintiff[’s] asylum application, if it continues, may be so
severe as to give rise to an APA violation.” Abdiev, 2024 WL 3742545, at *5. The Court therefore
dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, so Plaintiff may refile “should [his] application
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for asylum remain pending without decision to an unreasonable degree.” Konde, 2024 WL
2221227, at *5.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: December 22, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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