Moyle v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————x
DANIEL MOYLE, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	REPORT AND
: 	RECOMMENDATION
-versus- 	:
: 	24-CV-3874 (CBA) (CHK)
UNITED PARCELS SERVICE, INC., 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
—————————————————————x
CLAY H. KAMINSKY, United States Magistrate Judge:
Defendant United Parcel Service (“UPS”)1 moves for Rule 11 sanctions against
Plaintiff Daniel Moyle and his attorney, Tyrone A. Blackburn, for pursuing time-
barred 	claims 	in 	this 	matter. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	I 	recommend 	that
Defendant’s motion for sanctions be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is one of several lawsuits brought against UPS by a group of former UPS
employees represented by counselor Blackburn. Plaintiff Daniel Moyle, along with
Fari Murray, Carlos Palaguachi, Robert Santiago, Ahmed Radwan, Tyler Lilly, Roy
Welsh, Travis Steele, and Warren Payne (together, the “Initial Plaintiffs”), first filed
suit in this District in 2020. See Murray et al. v. UPS et al., No. 20-cv-01427 (MKB)
(LB) (the “Initial Action”). The Initial Plaintiffs had alleged violations of the federal
1 UPS’s name is misspelled in the caption of this case, Moyle v. United Parcels Service, Inc.
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Fair Labor Standards Act, among other claims, but ultimately filed a Fifth Amended
Complaint 	that 	contained 	only 	state 	law 	claims. 	The 	district 	court 	therefore
dismissed the Initial Action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
on October 26, 2023.
After the Initial Action was dismissed, several of the Initial Plaintiffs brought
new suits against UPS in state court based on the allegations underlying the Initial
Action. Some of those actions, including this one, were removed to this District.
Moyle filed this action in New York state court on January 28, 2024, after the
statute of limitations had run on his claims. See ECF No. 28 at 3–4 (Memorandum
and Order). He therefore relied on the tolling provision of New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (“CPLR”) § 205(a), which renders timely certain otherwise time-
barred actions when a prior action based on the same transactions or occurrences has
been dismissed for any reason other than voluntary discontinuance, failure to obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, failure to prosecute, or a final judgment on
the merits. See ECF No. 30-5 ¶ 4 (Complaint). Among the criteria for tolling under
CPLR § 205(a) is that the new action be filed and served within six months of the
prior lawsuit’s termination. See CPLR § 205(a); ECF No. 28 at 4.
After filing this action in state court—well within the six-month window—
Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Defendant’s counsel by email to inquire whether UPS
would waive service of process; Defendant’s counsel responded, on February 21, 2024,
that UPS refused to do so. See ECF No. 10-1 ¶¶ 9–13 (Blackburn Aff.). On April 5,
2024, Plaintiff’s counsel retained the services of “We Serve Law,” a process server, to
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serve Defendant in connection with several separate cases the Initial Plaintiffs were
bringing against UPS, including Moyle’s. Id. ¶ 17. He paid an additional $100 to
ensure priority service by April 7, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Nevertheless, service in this
case and others was not effected until May 2, 2024, six months and six days after the
dismissal of the Initial Action. See ECF No. 28 at 4.
In the months that followed, UPS moved to dismiss the claims in each of these
cases as untimely. Counselor Blackburn opposed these motions on behalf of his
clients, arguing primarily that the Court should excuse the short delay and extend
the time for service in the interest of justice under CPLR § 306-b or Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(m) because he was misled by his process server and UPS had actual knowledge
of the claims. He filed Moyle’s Opposition to UPS’s Motion to Dismiss this action on
October 11, 2024. See ECF No. 22 (Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss).
The courts consistently granted UPS’s motions to dismiss these late-served
actions as time barred. On September 12, 2024, the Kings County Supreme Court
dismissed Murray v. UPS et al., Index No. 502791/2024. See ECF No. 30-2 ¶ 9
(Lajewski Decl.); ECF No. 27-2 (Murray order). On March 10, 2025, Judge Donnelly
in this District dismissed Welsh v. UPS et al., No. 24-cv-3876 (AMD) (PK). On May
19, 2025, Judge DeArcy Hall in this District granted UPS’s motion to dismiss Moyle
et al. v. UPS, No. 24-cv-3880 (LDH) (LKE), from the bench during a premotion
conference. Finally, this Court dismissed the present action by Memorandum and
Order dated July 16, 2025. ECF No. 28.
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On March 11, 2025, while this matter was still pending, Defendant’s counsel
emailed Plaintiff’s counsel a copy of the decision dismissing the Welsh companion case
and asked to arrange a call to discuss whether the remaining Initial Plaintiffs would
voluntarily dismiss their claims. ECF No. 30-11 (Mar. 11, 2025 email). During the
ensuing call, which took place on March 17, 2025, Defendant’s counsel reportedly told
Plaintiff’s counsel that Plaintiff had no good faith basis to continue pursuing his
claims after the decisions in Murray and Welsh and informed him “that continuing
such claims would give UPS no other choice but to seek sanctions under Rule 11.”
ECF No. 30-2 ¶ 12. Plaintiff’s counsel refused to withdraw the remaining actions,
including this action, reportedly on the grounds that doing so would negatively
impact a case that Plaintiff’s counsel had apparently brought against his process
server. Id. ¶ 13.
In a follow-up email on May 29, 2025, after the oral ruling dismissing the other
Moyle case (a putative class action), Defendant’s counsel wrote Plaintiff’s counsel “to
request, again, that you agree to voluntarily dismiss the Moyle single plaintiff case
and the Steele single plaintiff case.” ECF No. 30-13 (May 29, 2025 email). She wrote:
We both know that Moyle and Steele’s claims are completely barred
under CPLR 205(a), and the plaintiffs’ insistence on opposing UPS’s
motions to dismiss is frivolous and without any legal or factual basis.
Please speak with Messrs Moyle and Steele and explain to them that if
they do not withdraw their complaints, UPS will seek sanctions against
them and your law firm for all attorneys’ fees and costs associated with
having to file the motions to dismiss.
Id. It is unclear from the record whether Plaintiff’s counsel responded; what is clear
is that the claims were not withdrawn.
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UPS subsequently submitted a letter motion on June 12, 2025, seeking leave
to file the decisions of dismissal in the companion cases as supplemental authority in
support of its then-pending motion to dismiss this action. ECF No. 27. In the same
letter motion, UPS also requested leave of Court to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions,
arguing briefly:
In light of the dismissals of [four companion cases], Plaintiff’s insistence
in opposing UPS’s Motion to Dismiss constitutes frivolous conduct under
FRCP 11(b)(1). Plaintiff’s continuing opposition to UPS’s Motion to
Dismiss is being presented for the improper purpose of harassing UPS,
causing unnecessary delay in the inevitable dismissal of Plaintiff’s case,
and to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Plaintiff’s insistence in
opposing UPS’s Motion to Dismiss also constitutes frivolous conduct
under FRCP 11(b)(2) in that the prosecution of Plaintiff’s time-barred
case 	is 	neither 	warranted 	by 	existing 	law 	nor 	warranted 	by 	a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law. Based on these facts, UPS respectfully
requests leave from the Court to file a motion for sanctions.
ECF No. 27 at 3. 	The request to file a sanctions motion was not, however, noted in
the ECF description of this letter on the Court’s docket, which reads simply “Letter
MOTION for Leave to File Document in further Support of Defendant United Parcel
Service, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss.”
This Court, the Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, granted UPS’s motion to
dismiss this action by Memorandum and Order dated July 16, 2025. ECF No. 28. The
Court also noted that UPS had indicated that it wished to move for sanctions
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and stated that “UPS may file such a motion.” ECF
No. 28 at 9.
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UPS filed the instant motion for sanctions on July 28, 2025, and it was referred
to me for a report and recommendation the same day. Oral argument was heard on
September 4, 2025.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides, in relevant part:2
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—
whether 	by 	signing, 	filing, 	submitting, 	or 	later 	advocating 	it—an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(2) 	the 	claims, 	defenses, 	and 	other 	legal 	contentions 	are
warranted 	by 	existing 	law 	or 	by 	a 	nonfrivolous 	argument 	for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing
new law.
Rule 11 thus imposes an “affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.” Gutierrez v.
Fox, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, “the court may impose an appropriate
sanction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
The standard for finding a Rule 11 violation “is purposefully high, so as not to
stifle legal creativity and zealous advocacy.” Galin v. Hamada, 283 F. Supp. 3d 189,
201 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). It is met where “it should have been patently obvious to any
attorney who had familiarized himself [or herself] with the law” that the action was
2 As discussed below, UPS seeks sanctions only under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), not, as suggested in its
June 12, 2025 letter, also under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), which addresses filings made “for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.”
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frivolous, Four Keys Leasing & Maint. Corp. v. Simithis, 849 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir.
1988), or “where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success,”
Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 626 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks
omitted). “When divining the point at which an argument turns from merely losing
to losing and sanctionable,” the Second Circuit has instructed district courts “to
resolve all doubts in favor of the signer.” Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341,
1350 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
If the Court concludes that a Rule 11 violation has occurred, it must then
determine, in its discretion, whether sanctions should be imposed. Perez v. Posse
Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Even if the district court concludes that
the assertion of a given claim violates Rule 11, however, the decision whether or not
to impose sanctions is a matter for the court’s discretion.”); see also Ipcon Collections
LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 698 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In short, sanctions
under Rule 11 are discretionary, not mandatory.”) Sanctions, if imposed, “must be
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
DISCUSSION
After careful consideration, I conclude that the instant motion should be denied
on the merits because Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate in these circumstances.
Before reaching the merits, however, I address Plaintiff’s procedural objections to the
motion.
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I. 	Procedural Issues
A. 	Rule 11’s Safe-Harbor Provision
Plaintiff argues first that Defendant’s motion may not be heard because UPS
did not comply with the “safe harbor” requirements of Rule 11(c)(2). That subsection
provides in relevant part:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion
and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).
The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be
presented 	to 	the 	court 	if 	the 	challenged 	paper, 	claim, 	defense,
contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21
days after service or within another time the court sets.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
The parties agree that Defendant did not serve a separate motion for sanctions
on Plaintiff at least 21 days in advance of its filing. See ECF No. 31 at 4 (Pl.’s Opp’n);
ECF No. 33 at 2 (Def.’s Reply). Plaintiff argues that this failure to comply with Rule
11(c)(2) is dispositive, noting that the Second Circuit has described the safe-harbor
provision as “a strict procedural requirement” that informal warnings do not satisfy.
Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d
170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012); ECF No. 31 at 4. Defendant counters that it substantially
complied with the safe harbor provision by providing Plaintiff’s counsel with notice of
the basis for sanctions and an opportunity to withdraw the untimely complaint and
that service of a formal motion would not have caused him to withdraw it. ECF No.
33 at 3–4.
I assume without deciding that the Court may reach the merits of this motion.
Although Defendant did not comply with the letter of Rule 11(c)(2), Plaintiff received
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written notice more than 21 days before Defendant filed this motion of both the
factual and legal bases for the motion for sanctions and of Defendant’s intent to file
a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. “The purpose of the [safe harbor] provision is not to
cause a party opposing a frivolous filing to incur costs merely to have the filing
withdrawn, 	but 	to 	give 	the 	opponent 	notice 	and 	an 	opportunity 	to 	consider
withdrawing the filing without the court’s involvement.” Star Mark Mgmt., 682 F.3d
at 177 (finding service of a brief “notice of motion” that identified the bases of an
anticipated sanctions motion without any affidavits or memorandum of law to comply
with the rule). The purpose is rather “to reduce the number of motions for sanctions
and to provide opportunities for parties to avoid sanctions altogether.” Perpetual Sec.,
Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2002). The provision therefore requires “that
the subject of a sanctions motion be informed (1) the source of authority for the
sanctions being considered; and (2) the specific conduct or omission for which the
sanction is being considered so that the subject of the sanctions motion can prepare
a defense.” Star Mark Mgmt., 682 F.3d at 175 (quotation marks omitted). District
courts in this Circuit have reached the merits of Rule 11 sanctions motions even
where no formal motion was served if counsel was provided with written notice of the
anticipated sanctions motion and its bases more than 21 days before filing. See
Montanez v. D&D Auto, LLC, Case No. 3:15-cv-397 (VAB), 2016 WL 1254199, at *18
(D. Conn., Mar. 29, 2016); Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463, 480 n.27 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, No. 03 Civ. 7841 (NRB), 2006 WL
2872566, at *6 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 5, 2006).
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Plaintiff certainly received notice of the bases for possible sanctions in this
matter and had the opportunity to withdraw the untimely complaint. Defendant’s
counsel repeatedly advised Plaintiff’s counsel that this lawsuit was time-barred and
that UPS would move for sanctions if he did not withdraw it. At the same time,
Plaintiff’s counsel received decision after decision finding the companion actions
time-barred for the reasons articulated by Defendant’s counsel. Finally, UPS sought
leave to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions—albeit as a secondary point in a letter
addressed primarily to the then-pending motion to dismiss—and identified the
specific conduct that allegedly violated Rule 11(b). That application was made on
June 12, 2025. The Court did not dismiss this action and give Defendant leave to file
the instant motion until July 16, 2026, i.e., more than 21 days later.
For all these reasons, and because the Court specifically authorized this
motion, Defendant is “entitled to a decision on the merits.” Jeffreys, 275 F. Supp. 2d
at 480 n.27 (“Defendants should not be penalized for complying with the Court’s
order.”). But Defendant’s failure to comply with the letter of Rule 11’s safe harbor
provision weighs against imposing sanctions as a discretionary matter, as discussed
below.
B. 	State Court Filings
Plaintiff also argues that “Rule 11 does not apply to filings or conduct that
occurred in state court prior to removal.” ECF No. 31 at 5–6. On this understanding,
because this action was originally filed in New York State court, the rules of that
court system and not Rule 11 provide the proper mechanisms to police potentially
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sanctionable filings or conduct that occurred in that system and a motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 is improper under the circumstances.
This argument misses the mark, for the reasons articulated by Defendant. See
ECF No. 33 at 5–6. Rule 11 expressly encompasses “later advocating” a previously
presented filing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Thus “a litigant’s obligations with respect to
the contents of these papers . . . include reaffirming to the court and advocating
positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning they cease to have
any merit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment. By
opposing Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s counsel necessarily reaffirmed
and advocated for the timeliness of the complaint in this Court.
II. 	Sanctions Against Plaintiff and his Counsel Are Not Warranted.
On the merits, I conclude that Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed on
Plaintiff or his counsel.
A. 	The Court is not empowered to impose sanctions on Plaintiff.
Plaintiff himself may not be sanctioned because he is represented by counsel
and no monetary sanction may be imposed “against a represented party for violating
Rule 11(b)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(A). Although Defendant’s June 12, 2025 letter
also cited Rule 11(b)(1), which prohibits presenting papers to the Court for an
improper 	purpose, 	Defendant’s 	motion 	papers 	did 	not 	specify 	a 	subsection 	of
Rule 11(b). Asked to specify at oral argument, Defendant’s counsel logically identified
only 	Rule 11(b)(2), 	which 	requires 	that 	“the 	claims, 	defenses 	and 	other 	legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
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extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” ECF
No. 38 (Sept. 4, 2025 Transcript), Tr. 12:13–16. Accordingly, no sanctions may be
imposed on Moyle.
B. 	Plaintiff’s counsel made a losing argument, not a frivolous one.
We turn to counselor Blackburn. Plaintiff’s counsel has consistently found
himself on the losing side of motions to dismiss as a result of the late service he
obtained in this set of related cases against UPS. His decision to pursue each of these
cases has provoked understandable frustration on the part of UPS, ultimately leading
to 	the 	filing 	of 	this 	motion 	for sanctions. 	Yet 	losing, 	even 	repeatedly, 	is 	not
sanctionable. Our adversarial system requires lawyers to advocate zealously. Every
adjudication produces a loser, so sanctions “must be imposed carefully, lest they chill
the creativity essential to the evolution of the law.” Abra Const. Corp. v. Greco, 230
F.R.D. 385, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The question
is whether, resolving all doubts in favor of the signer, it was obvious that there was
zero chance of success. Rodick, 1 F.3d at 1350.
Under this generous standard, I conclude that Mr. Blackburn’s attempts to
salvage this case “were not so quixotic as to warrant sanctions.” Id. at 1351. He
pressed creative and equitable arguments asking the Court to excuse a short delay in
service. His primary argument—that the time for service under CPLR § 205(a) could
be extended—was not foreclosed by any precedent of the New York Court of Appeals.
See ECF 28 at 6. UPS does not contend that this argument was frivolous when first
made; it argues, rather, that “after the first dismissal in state court and after the
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second dismissal in federal court, it became clear that what they were maybe
thinking, or hoping to argue, was not going to save the cases.” ECF No. 38, Tr. 12:1–
4; see also id. Tr. 12:17–20 (“[C]ertainly after receipt of the Welsh decision by Judge
Donnelly, plaintiffs and plaintiff’s counsel should have known that there was no non-
frivolous argument to make to modify or reverse the existing law.”). Yet because these
trial-level decisions were not binding on this Court, I do not find they made it
“patently clear” that he had “absolutely no chance of success” in this case. Rodick,
1 F.3d at 1350.
C. 	Discretion
Finally, I conclude that sanctions are inappropriate as a discretionary matter.
As discussed above, Defendant did not serve Plaintiff with a separate motion for
sanctions as required by the text of Rule 11(c)(2). Although counselor Blackburn was
certainly on notice that UPS had threatened sanctions, he plausibly claimed during
oral argument that he did not take the threats seriously and that service of a formal
Rule 11 motion would have captured his attention and forced him to speak with his
client about withdrawing the complaint. See ECF No. 38, Tr. 20–22. Under these
circumstances, even if I were to find a violation of Rule 11(b)(2), I could not conclude
that sanctions are necessary for deterrence.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Defendant’s motion for sanctions
be DENIED.
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OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen (14) days. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s
order. Caidor v. Onondaga Cty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008).
SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
Clay H. Kaminsky
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: 	Brooklyn, New York
February 18, 2026
/s/ Clay H. Kaminsky
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