USA v. Forney

United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
-----------------------------------X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
- against -
JOEL DAVID FORNEY,
also known as “Sirbar,”
Defendant.
-----------------------------------X
Memorandum and Order
No. 24-CR-146 (KAM)
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
On August 15, 2025, after a five-day trial, a jury found Joel
David Forney (“Defendant” or “Forney”) guilty of five counts of a
superseding 	indictment 	charging 	him 	with 	two 	counts 	of 	sex
trafficking 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1591(a) 	(Counts 	One 	and
Four), one count of Mann Act Transportation (Count Two), one count
of 	Mann 	Act 	Interstate 	Prostitution 	(Count 	Three), 	and 	one 	count
of Mann Act Coercion and Enticement (Count Five). 	Presently before
the 	Court 	is 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	motion 	pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of
Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 29 for a judgment of acquittal or, in
the 	alternative, 	his 	Rule 	33 	motion 	for 	a 	new 	trial. 	(ECF 	No.
147, 	“Def. 	Mot.”) 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	Mr. 	Forney’s
motions are respectfully DENIED.
BACKGROUND
I. 	The Charges
On 	July 	15, 	2025, 	Mr. 	Forney 	was 	charged 	in 	a 	five-count
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superseding 	indictment. 	(ECF 	No. 	77.) 	On 	August 	1, 	2025, 	the
Court 	granted 	the 	Government’s 	motion 	to 	correct 	a 	typographical
error 	and 	to 	proceed 	via 	a 	corrected 	trial 	indictment. 	(ECF 	No.
101 	at 	3.) 	Trial 	proceeded 	based 	on 	the 	corrected 	trial
indictment. 	(ECF No. 104, the “Indictment.”)1
The Indictment charges Mr. Forney with five counts: Count One
charges Mr. Forney with Sex Trafficking of Jane Doe-1 (referred to
at 	trial 	as 	“Jonnica 	C.”) 	in 	or 	about 	and 	between 	April 	2016 	and
February 2017 in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 1591(a)(1), 1591(a)(2),
and 	1591(b); 	Count 	Two 	charges 	Mr. 	Forney 	with 	Mann 	Act
Transportation 	of 	Jane 	Doe-1 	(referred 	to 	at 	trial 	as 	“Jonnica
C.”) in or about and between April 2016 and July 2016 in violation
of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 2421(a); 	Count 	Three 	charges 	Mr. 	Forney 	with 	Mann
Act Interstate Prostitution of Jane Doe-1 (referred to at trial as
“Jonnica C.”) in or about and between April 2016 and July 2016 in
violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2422(a); 	Count 	Four 	charges 	Mr. 	Forney
with Sex Trafficking of Jane Doe-2 (referred to at trial as Shyya
H.) 	in 	or 	about 	and 	between 	May 	2017 	and 	September 	2017 	in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), 1591(a)(2), and 1591(b)(1);
and 	Count 	Five 	charges 	Mr. 	Forney 	with 	Mann 	Act 	Coercion 	and
Enticement of Jane Doe-3 (referred to at trial as “Melissa N.”) in
1 References to the Indictment hereafter refer to the corrected Superseding
Indictment available at ECF No. 104.
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or 	about 	and 	between 	June 	2014 	and 	December 	2014 	in 	violation 	of
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).2
II. 	Mr. Forney’s Trial and Jury Verdict
Jury selection for Mr. Forney’s trial commenced on August 11,
2025. 	(Tr.3 	2.) 	After 	preliminary 	instructions 	by 	the 	Court 	and
opening 	statements 	by 	both 	parties, 	the 	government 	presented 	its
case-in-chief over the course of the next three days and rested on
August 13, 2025. (Id. 2–45, 53-162, 164-333, 346-553.)
After the government rested, Mr. Forney moved for a judgment
of 	acquittal 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	29. 	(Id. 	555-56.) 	The 	Court 	ruled
that there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury.
(Id. 	556-57.) 	After 	his 	initial 	Rule 	29 	motion, 	Mr. 	Forney
presented 	a 	defense 	case 	over 	two 	days, 	testified 	on 	his 	own
behalf, and rested on August 14,2025. (Id. 555-652, 681-751.) The
Court 	held 	a 	charging 	conference 	with 	the 	parties 	outside 	the
presence 	of 	the 	jury 	and 	Mr. 	Forney.(Id. 	784-831.) 	Mr. 	Forney
was offered the right to be present at his charging conference but
declined to be present. 	(Tr. 784-85.)
O 	August 	15, 	2025, 	both 	parties 	presented 	their 	closing
arguments to the jury, the Court charged the jury, and, following
2 The remainder of this Memorandum and Order will refer to each Jane Doe by the
first name and initial used to refer to that Jane Doe at trial.
3 	Citations 	to 	“Tr.” 	refer 	to 	the 	transcript 	of 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	trial 	in 	this
action, which commenced on August 11, 2025 and concluded on August 15, 2025,
when the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
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its 	deliberations, 	the 	jury 	convicted 	Mr. 	Forney 	of 	Counts 	One
through Five. 	(Id. at 846–1057.)
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Rule 29 Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal
In deciding a Rule 29 motion, a court should “avoid usurping
the role of the jury,” and cannot “substitute its own determination
of the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn for that of the jury.” 	United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d
122, 	129 	(2d 	Cir. 	1999) 	(alterations 	adopted) 	(quoting 	United
States 	v. 	Mariani, 	725 	F.2d 	862, 	865 	(2d 	Cir. 	1984)). 	A 	court
must 	consider 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	evidence 	“in 	the 	light 	most
favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could
have 	been 	drawn 	in 	the 	government’s 	favor, 	and 	deferring 	to 	the
jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the
weight 	of 	the 	evidence.” 	United 	States 	v. 	White, 	7 	F.4th 	90, 	98
(2d 	Cir. 	2021) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Aquart, 	912 	F.3d 	1, 	17
(2d 	Cir. 	2018)); 	see 	United 	States 	v. 	Archer, 	977 	F.3d 	181, 	188-
89 (2d Cir. 2020) (A court must “defer to the jury’s resolution of
conflicting evidence[.]”). 	A court must also evaluate the evidence
in 	a 	sufficiency 	challenge 	“in 	conjunction,” 	rather 	than
“piecemeal or in isolation.” 	United States v. Klein, 913 F.3d 73,
78 (2d Cir. 2019).
Ultimately, 	a 	court 	may 	enter 	a 	judgment 	of 	acquittal 	“only
if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is
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‘nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt
beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt.’” 	Guadagna, 	183 	F.3d 	at 	130 	(quoting
United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1982)). 	Thus,
a 	defendant 	challenging 	his 	conviction 	on 	sufficiency 	grounds
“faces 	a 	heavy 	burden, 	as 	the 	standard 	of 	review 	is 	exceedingly
deferential to the jury’s apparent determinations.” United States
v. 	Davis, 	No. 	21-1486, 	2023 	WL 	4582002, 	at 	*1 	(2d 	Cir. 	July 	18,
2023) (summary order) (alteration adopted) (quoting United States
v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 710 (2d Cir. 2019)).
II. 	Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial
Rule 	33(a) 	states 	that 	“[u]pon 	the 	defendant’s 	motion, 	the
court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest
of 	justice 	so 	requires.” 	“The 	defendant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of
proving 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	new 	trial 	under 	Rule 	33, 	and
before ordering a new trial pursuant to Rule 33, a district court
must 	find 	that 	there 	is 	‘a 	real 	concern 	that 	an 	innocent 	person
may 	have 	been 	convicted.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	McCourty, 	562 	F.3d
458, 	475 	(2d 	Cir. 	2009) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Ferguson, 	246
F.3d 	129, 	134 	(2d 	Cir. 	2001)); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Walker,
974 F.3d 193, 208 (2d Cir. 2020) (“In determining whether to grant
a 	Rule 	33 	motion, 	the 	ultimate 	test 	is 	whether 	letting 	a 	guilty
verdict stand would be a manifest injustice.” (alteration adopted)
(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Canova, 	412 	F.3d 	331, 	349 	(2d 	Cir.
2005))); 	United 	States 	v. 	Triumph 	Cap. 	Grp., 	Inc., 	544 	F.3d 	149,
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159 	(2d 	Cir. 	2008) 	(“Generally, 	a 	motion 	for 	a 	new 	trial 	‘should
not 	be 	granted 	unless 	the 	trial 	court 	is 	convinced 	that 	the 	jury
has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a
miscarriage 	of 	justice.’” 	(quoting 	Smith 	v. 	Carpenter, 	316 	F.3d
178, 183 (2d Cir. 2003))).
Although 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	“generally 	allow[s] 	district
courts 	greater 	deference 	to 	grant 	a 	new 	trial 	under 	Rule 	33 	than
to 	grant 	a 	motion 	for 	acquittal 	under 	Rule 	29, 	courts 	must
nonetheless 	exercise 	Rule 	33 	authority 	‘sparingly’ 	and 	in 	‘the
most 	extraordinary 	circumstances.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Coté, 	544
F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 969
F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992)).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Rule 29: Count Three – Mann Act Interstate Prostitution of
Jonnica C.
Mr. Forney argues that this Court should overturn the jury’s
verdict 	as 	to 	Count 	Three, 	Mann 	Act 	Interstate 	Prostitution 	of
Jonnica C. in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) because the evidence
does not establish that Jonnica C. traveled “under her own steam,”
without transportation assistance from Mr. Forney. 	(Def. Mot. at
4-7 (quoting United States v. Purcell, 967 F.3d 159 analysis on §
2421(a))). 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	Court 	finds
abundant 	evidence 	supporting 	the 	jury’s 	conviction 	of 	Mr. 	Forney
as to Count Three.
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A. 	Legal Standard
Following 	a 	charging 	conference 	at 	which 	the 	parties 	were
fully 	heard, 	the 	Court 	charged 	the 	jury 	that 	to 	find 	Mr. 	Forney
guilty 	of 	Mann 	Act 	interstate 	prostitution 	of 	Jonnica 	C. 	in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), the government must prove beyond
a 	reasonable 	doubt: 	(1) 	that 	the 	defendant 	knowingly 	persuaded,
induced, 	enticed, 	or 	coerced 	Jonnica 	C. 	to 	travel 	in 	interstate
commerce; (2) that Jonnica C. traveled in interstate commerce; and
(3) that the defendant acted with the intent that Jonnica C. would
engage 	in 	prostitution. 	(Tr. 	1004-1007); 	Sand, 	Modern 	Federal
Jury 	Instructions—Criminal, 	Instructions 	(“Sand 	Criminal
Instructions”) 64.02. 	The Court instructed the jury that it must
unanimously 	decide 	whether 	the 	Government 	has 	proven 	beyond 	a
reasonable 	doubt 	each 	element 	with 	respect 	to 	Jonnica’s 	travel:
(1) 	from 	Wisconsin 	to 	New 	York, 	and, 	(2)from 	New 	York 	to
Connecticut.4 	(Tr. 1006.)
B. 	Section 2422(a) Does Not Require a Victim to Travel
Without Any Assistance From the Defendant
Mr. 	Forney 	argues 	that 	he 	cannot 	be 	convicted 	under 	Count
Three, Mann Act Interstate Prostitution of Jonnica C. in violation
of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2422(a), 	because 	he 	was 	convicted 	of 	Count 	Two,
Mann 	Act 	Transportation 	of 	Jonnica 	C. 	in 	violation 	of 	§ 	2421(a)
4 The verdict form included a special verdict from the jury with respect to each
of the two trips.
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regarding the same two trips, one from Wisconsin to New York, and
one from New York to Connecticut. 	(Def. Mot. at 4-7.) 	Mr. Forney
asserts 	that 	Section 	2421(a) 	applies 	to 	circumstances 	where 	the
defendant 	personally 	or 	through 	an 	agent 	performed 	the 	act 	of
transporting, but Section 2422(a), requires that the victim travel
“under 	her 	own 	steam” 	without 	any 	transportation 	assistance 	from
the 	defendant. 	(Id.) 	In 	support 	of 	his 	assertion, 	Mr. 	Forney
cites 	and 	quotes 	Purcell. 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at 	5 	(quoting 	Purcell, 	967
F.3d 	at 	190) 	(“A 	defendant 	will 	be 	deemed 	to 	have 	‘transport[ed]
an individual under Section 2421 where the evidence shows that the
defendant personally or through an agent performed the proscribed
act 	of 	transporting, 	as 	opposed 	to 	situations 	where 	the 	victim
travels under her own steam, without need of anyone to ‘transport’
her.”)). 	Mr. Forney argues that because the evidence established
that Mr. Forney transported Jonnica C. to New York and Connecticut
in 	violation 	of 	Section 	2421(a) 	as 	charged 	in 	Count 	Two, 	the
evidence 	does 	not 	establish 	that 	Jonnica 	C. 	traveled 	“under 	her
own steam” to support a guilty verdict under § 2422(a) as charged
in Count Three. 	(Id.)
Mr. 	Forney 	is 	incorrect. 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	conviction 	under 	§
2421(a) 	does 	not 	preclude 	his 	conviction 	under 	§ 	2422(a) 	because
Section 	2421(a) 	and 	Section 	2422(a) 	are 	separate 	and 	distinct
offenses 	and 	penalize 	different 	conduct. 	Section 	2421(a) 	states
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in relevant part:
Whoever 	knowingly 	transports 	any 	individual 	in
interstate or foreign commerce, . . . 	with intent that
such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual
activity 	for 	which 	any 	person 	can 	be 	charged 	with 	a
criminal 	offense, 	or 	attempts 	to 	do 	so, 	shall 	be 	fined
. . . 	or imprisoned . . . or both. (emphasis added).
A 	conviction 	under 	§2422 	does 	not 	require 	that 	the 	victim
travel on his or her own as Mr. Forney contends. Instead, Section
2422(a) states in relevant part:
Whoever 	knowingly 	persuades, 	induces, 	entices, 	or
coerces 	any 	individual 	to 	travel 	in 	interstate 	or
foreign 	commerce, 	. 	. 	. 	to 	engage 	in 	prostitution, 	or
in 	any 	sexual 	activity 	for 	which 	any 	person 	can 	be
charged 	with 	a 	criminal 	offense, 	or 	attempts 	to 	do 	so,
shall 	be 	fined 	. 	. 	. 	or 	imprisoned 	. 	. 	. 	or 	both.
(emphasis added).
As 	this 	Court 	has 	previously 	explained, 	transportation 	of 	a
person 	interstate 	and 	inducing 	a 	person 	to 	travel 	interstate 	are
two separate actions and crimes that can be attributed to the same
person. 	See United States v. Forney, No. 24-cr-146 (KAM), 2025 WL
2208298, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025). 	“One person may be guilty
of 	both 	offenses 	although 	they 	may 	arise 	out 	of 	the 	same
transaction” 	because 	“it 	would 	not 	require 	the 	same 	evidence 	to
establish that one knowingly transported a woman, or caused her to
be transported, and to prove that he induced the same woman to go
in such commerce.” 	United States v. Saledonis, 93 F.2d 302, 303-
04 (2d Cir. 1937) (analyzing and interpreting the two predecessor
statutes 	to 	§ 	2421(a) 	and 	§ 	2422(a)); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v.
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Taitano, 442 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852
(1971) 	(finding 	§ 	2421 	and 	§ 	2422 	are 	“separate 	and 	distinct”);
Batsell v. United States, 403 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 	393 	U.S. 	1094 	(1969) 	(same); 	Nunnally 	v. 	United 	States,
291 	F.2d 	205, 	206 	(5th 	Cir. 	1961) 	(“The 	offense 	of 	causing
transportation of a woman under § 2421 and the offense of inducing
a 	woman 	to 	go 	in 	interstate 	commerce 	for 	immoral 	purposes 	under
§ 2422 constitute separate crimes.”).
Accordingly, 	a 	conviction 	under 	Section 	2422(a) 	does 	not
require the government to have presented evidence that Jonnica C.
traveled “under her own steam” to New York or Connecticut. Section
2422(a) 	does 	not 	state 	“whoever 	knowingly 	persuades 	. 	. 	. 	any
individual to travel” alone or by their own steam “shall be fined
. . . or imprisoned.” 	To read such a requirement into the statute
violates the well-established principle that courts do not read in
a requirement that Congress omitted. 	See e.g., Olivieri v. Stifel,
Nicolaus 	& 	Co., 	Inc., 	112 	F.4th 	74, 	89 	(2d 	Cir. 	2024) 	(quoting
Jama 	v. 	Immigr. 	& 	Customs 	Enf’t, 	543 	U.S. 	335, 	341 	(2005) 	(“[W]e
‘do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted
text 	requirements 	that 	it 	nonetheless 	intends 	to 	apply.’”)).
Because 	“persuasion 	is 	distinct 	from 	the 	actual 	transportation,”
“convincing 	someone 	to 	transport 	himself 	or 	herself 	across 	state
lines 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	prostitution 	completes 	the 	crime 	under
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§ 2422(a),” 	no 	matter 	if 	a 	defendant 	travels 	with 	the 	person 	or
not. 	United 	States 	v. 	Williams, 	291 	F.3d 	1180, 	1187 	(9th 	Cir.
2002), 	overruled 	on 	other 	grounds 	by 	United 	States 	v. 	Gonzales,
506 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007).
Courts also agree that § 2422(a) does not require a victim to
travel 	alone 	or 	on 	her 	“own 	steam” 	without 	any 	assistance 	from 	a
defendant. 	Courts 	have 	upheld 	§ 2422(a) 	jury 	convictions 	even
when the underlying 2422(a) conduct included actual transportation
by the defendant. 	See United States v. Kelly, 609 F. Supp. 3d 85,
136 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), aff'd, 128 F.4th 387 (2d Cir. 2025) (upholding
a 	2422(a) 	jury 	conviction 	when 	Defendant 	paid 	for 	the 	victim’s
plane 	ticket); 	United 	States 	v. 	Townsend, 	521 	F. 	App'x 	904, 	907
(11th Cir. 2013) (upholding a § 2422(a) conviction where defendant
traveled with the victim to another state in denying Rule 29 motion
based on insufficiency of evidence).
Mr. 	Forney 	relies 	heavily 	on 	United 	States 	v. 	Purcell, 	967
F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2020) and United States v. Holland, 381 F.3d 80
(2d 	Cir. 	2004). 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at 	5-7.) 	But 	both 	cases 	fail 	to
support 	his 	argument 	that 	a 	violation 	of 	§ 2422(a) 	requires
evidence 	that 	Jonnica 	C. 	traveled 	anywhere 	under 	her 	own 	steam.
The 	Second 	Circuit 	in 	Purcell 	reversed 	the 	conviction 	on 	the
§ 2422(a) 	Count 	due 	to 	insufficient 	evidence 	of 	venue. 	Purcell,
967 	F.3d 	at 	185-91. 	The 	Second 	Circuit 	in 	Purcell 	only 	drew 	a
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distinction between a “proscribed act of transporting” and “where
the 	victim 	travels 	under 	her 	own 	steam” 	in 	explaining 	when 	a
“defendant 	will 	be 	deemed 	to 	have 	‘transport[ed]’ 	an 	individual
under Section 2421.” 	Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Holland,
381 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2004)). 	Likewise, the Second Circuit in
Holland, 	drew 	the 	same 	distinction 	in 	its 	§ 	2421(a) 	analysis 	but
also 	did 	not 	comment 	on 	the 	required 	elements 	of 	§ 2422(a). 	See
Holland, 	381 	F.3d 	at 	86. 	Neither 	case 	held 	that 	§ 	2422(a)
requires, 	and 	is 	only 	limited 	to, 	when 	a 	victim 	travels 	without
any transportation assistance from a defendant.
United 	States 	v. 	Jones 	also 	provides 	no 	basis 	to 	grant 	a
judgment of acquittal on Count Three. 	See 909 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.
1990); (Def. Mot. at 5.) 	In Jones, the D.C. Circuit held that an
escort 	service’s 	advertisements 	and 	support 	services 	could 	not
fulfill 	the 	“transport” 	element 	under 	§ 	2121(a) 	when 	the 	escorts
made 	their 	own 	travel 	arrangements 	and 	transported 	themselves
interstate. 	909 	F.2d 	at 	540. 	Although 	the 	D.C. 	Circuit, 	in
dictum, 	then 	drew 	a 	distinction 	between 	Ҥ 	2421 	cases 	where 	a
defendant performs the proscribed act of transporting” and § 2422
“cases 	in 	which 	the 	defendant 	provides 	the 	motivation, 	ranging
from 	persuasion 	to 	coercion, 	but 	the 	person 	then 	‘travels’ 	under
her 	own 	steam,” 	the 	D.C. 	Circuit 	did 	not 	state 	that 	§ 	2422
violations 	are 	only 	limited 	to 	cases 	where 	a 	defendant 	provides
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the 	motivation 	but 	the 	person 	then 	travels 	under 	her 	own 	steam.
See 	id. 	Moreover, 	contrary 	to 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	assertion 	(Def. 	Mot.
at 5-6), the Second Circuit in Purcell did not “adopt[]” any Jones
interpretation of § 2422(a). See 967 F.3d at 191-192. 	The Second
Circuit 	in 	Purcell 	and 	Holland 	only 	cited 	to 	the 	relevant 	Jones’
language in its § 2421(a) analysis. 	See 967 F.3d at 191-192; 381
F.3d at 86. 	Neither adopted any Jones interpretation of § 2422(a).
See id.5
Mr. Forney’s reliance on Jones is misplaced. 	Although drawing
a distinction between cases where a victim is actually transported
by 	a 	defendant 	versus 	cases 	where 	a 	victim 	travels 	under 	her 	own
steam may “together comprise a set that captures all instances in
which 	a 	person 	crosses 	a 	state 	line,” 	Jones, 	909 	F.2d 	at 	540, 	it
does not capture all instances of defendant misconduct related to
a victim’s crossing of state lines under § 2421(a) and § 2422(a).
The 	plain 	language 	of 	§ 	2421(a) 	and 	§ 2422(a) 	does 	not 	preclude
the 	possibility 	that 	a 	defendant 	violates 	both 	§ 	2421(a) 	and
§ 2422(a). 	If 	a 	defendant 	knowingly 	drives 	or 	purchases 	a
transportation 	ticket 	for 	a 	victim 	to 	fulfill 	the 	“transport”
element 	of 	2421(a) 	but 	does 	not 	“persuade, 	induce, 	entice 	and
5 The Second Circuit in Purcell explicitly rejected Jones’ reasoning and holding
on the scope of § 2421(a) because another Second Circuit case, United States v.
Mi Sun Cho, held otherwise. See 967 F.3d at 190-192, 191 n. 17 (explaining the
Second Circuit’s contrary holding on § 2421(a) in United States v. Mi Sun Cho,
713 F.3d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 2013)).
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coerce 	an 	individual,” 	that 	is 	a 	violation 	of 	§ 	2421(a) 	but 	not
2422(a). If a defendant does “persuade, induce, entice and coerce
an 	individual” 	but 	fails 	to 	directly 	drive 	or 	purchase 	a 	ticket
that 	transports 	an 	individual, 	such 	conduct 	does 	not 	violate
2421(a) but does violate 2422(a). 	But if a defendant both drives
or 	purchases 	a 	transportation 	ticket 	for 	a 	victim 	and 	also
“persuade[s], 	induce[s], 	entice[s] 	and 	coerce[s] 	an 	individual,”
such conduct is a violation of both § 2421(a) and § 2422(a) because
“[t]he offense of causing transportation of a woman under § 2421”
and 	the 	offense 	of 	inducing 	a 	woman 	to 	[travel] 	in 	interstate
commerce 	. 	. 	. 	under 	§ 	2422” 	are 	two 	separate 	acts 	both 	of 	which
“constitute separate crimes.” 	Nunnally v. United States, 291 F.2d
205, 206 (5th Cir. 1961). 	A violation of § 2422(a) thus does not
require 	that 	a 	victim 	travel 	“under 	her 	own 	steam” 	to 	find 	a
defendant guilty of providing the motivation for someone to engage
in interstate prostitution.
C. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence
The 	Court 	finds 	abundant 	evidence 	supporting 	the 	jury’s
conviction of Mr. Forney as to Count Three, which charges him with
Mann Act Interstate Prostitution of Jonnica C. 	in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2422(a) in or about and between April 2016 and July 2016.
First, 	the 	evidence 	showed 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	persuaded,
induced, 	and 	enticed 	Jonnica 	C. 	to 	travel 	from 	Wisconsin 	to 	New
York 	and 	New 	York 	to 	Connecticut. 	Jonnica 	C. 	testified 	that 	Mr.
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Forney 	told 	her 	that 	as 	an 	escort, 	she 	could 	make 	a 	“substantial
amount of money” and that she could keep the money she earned and
live a “very luxurious” and “fancy” life working in New York. 	(Tr.
41, 	119.) 	Based 	on 	her 	conversations 	with 	Mr. 	Forney, 	Jonnica 	C.
thought she would live in a “really nice house or nice apartment”
(Id. 237), “sit down on a yacht somewhere drinking martinis” (Id.
237), 	and 	make 	enough 	money 	to 	“pay 	for 	a 	lawyer” 	to 	“get 	her
daughter 	back” 	and 	“support 	[her] 	kid, 	(Id. 	42-43.) 	Jonnica 	C.
also testified that Mr. Forney wanted her to travel from New York
to Connecticut because the casino there was “big for” prostitution
and 	it 	was 	where 	“people 	have 	money.” 	(Id. 	130.) 	Mr. 	Forney
himself testified that he would travel with Jonnica C. to different
states 	to 	enhance 	his 	prostitution 	business. 	(Id. 	594.) 	These
kind 	of 	“financial 	rewards” 	or 	“incentives” 	are 	sufficient
evidence that a defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, or enticed
a victim under Section 2422. 	See United States v. Waqar, 997 F.3d
481, 	487-88 	(2d 	Cir. 	2021); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Kelly, 	128
F.4th 387, 414 (2d Cir. 2025) (defendant’s promises of free travel
and 	trips 	with 	defendant 	were 	sufficient 	evidence 	of 	inducement
under § 2422(a)).
The evidence also showed that Mr. Forney coerced and induced
Jonnica 	C. 	to 	travel 	from 	New 	York 	to 	Connecticut 	to 	engage 	in
prostitution. 	Jonnica 	C. 	testified 	that 	she 	was 	subject 	to 	Mr.
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Forney’s 	coercive 	scheme 	from 	the 	day 	Jonnica 	C. 	arrived 	in 	New
York 	City. 	(Tr. 	54-56.) 	The 	day 	she 	arrived 	in 	New 	York, 	Mr.
Forney picked her up, took her to a hotel, made her feel like she
could 	not 	reject 	his 	sexual 	advances, 	had 	sex 	with 	her, 	and 	took
sexually explicit photos of her. (See id. 54-65; Government Exhibit
(“GX”) 205-1S) Jonnica C. testified that Mr. Forney then instructed
her to have sex with two men for his financial benefit, taking all
of Jonnica C’s earnings after each man left. 	(Id. 67-70.) 	On her
second day with Mr. Forney, Jonnica C. testified that she woke up
to 	Mr. 	Forney 	staring 	at 	her 	and 	warning 	her 	that 	“there’s 	going
to 	be 	consequences 	for 	you 	falling 	asleep” 	after 	she 	fell 	asleep
after 	engaging 	in 	prostitution 	at 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	direction. 	(Id.
70-71, 	74, 	76-78). 	Mr. 	Forney 	required 	Jonnica 	C. 	to 	make 	close
to 	$2,000 	a 	day 	in 	prostitution, 	even 	if 	she 	was 	sick 	or 	was 	on
her period. (Id. 93-95.) 	Jonnica C. testified that Mr. Forney was
“intimidating,” 	that 	“she 	felt 	trapped” 	those 	first 	few 	weeks 	in
New 	York, 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	verbally 	threatened 	her 	with 	physical
violence, and that Mr. Forney showed her a picture of a dismembered
body 	while 	saying 	“this 	is 	what 	happens 	if 	you 	don’t 	obey 	your
pimp.” 	(Id. 87-88, 97-98.)
Second, 	the 	evidence 	showed 	that 	Jonnica 	C. 	traveled 	in
interstate 	commerce 	to 	New 	York 	and 	Connecticut. 	Jonnica 	C.
testified that she traveled from Wisconsin to New York to meet Mr.
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Forney 	where 	he 	directed 	her 	to 	engage 	in 	prostitution 	upon 	her
arrival. 	(Id. 	44.) 	Mr. 	Forney 	also 	purchased 	Jonnica 	C. 	a 	train
ticket to travel from Wisconsin to New York. (GX 904; Tr. 507-09,
683.) 	Jonnica 	C. 	also 	testified 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	drove 	her 	from
New York to Connecticut where she engaged in prostitution and that
she stayed in a Ramada Inn in Connecticut. (Tr. 124-126, 133-134.)
Mr. 	Forney 	admitted 	that 	he 	took 	Jonnica 	C. 	from 	New 	York 	to
Connecticut where Jonnica C. engaged in prostitution with men for
Mr. Forney’s financial benefit. (Id. 624.)
Third, 	the 	Defendant 	acted 	with 	the 	intent 	that 	Jonnica 	C.
would engage in commercial prostitution. 	Backpage records showed
that 	Mr. 	Forney 	posted 	prostitution 	advertisements 	featuring
Jonnica C. in New York and Connecticut. 	(GX 400-499.) 	Mr. Forney
admitted at trial that he spoke with Jonnica C. before she arrived
in 	New 	York 	to 	ensure 	that 	Jonnica 	C. 	understood 	that 	“[s]he 	was
coming 	to 	New 	York 	to 	become 	a 	prostitute.” 	(Tr. 	575.) 	Jonnica
C. 	also 	testified 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	set 	the 	prices 	charged 	for
Jonnica C.’s prostitution services. (Id. 93-94.) 	Mr. Forney also
admitted 	that 	he 	transported 	Jonnica 	C. 	to 	Connecticut 	where
Jonnica 	C. 	had 	sex 	with 	men 	for 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	financial 	benefit.
(Id. 624.)
The 	jury 	was 	permitted 	to 	credit 	all 	the 	aforementioned
evidence 	in 	finding 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	was 	guilty 	of 	Mann 	Act
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Interstate Prostitution of Jonnica C. See United States v. Elias,
619 F. Supp. 3d 296, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing United States v.
Rea, 	958 	F.2d 	1206, 	1222 	(E.D.N.Y. 	1992)) 	(noting 	the 	“jury 	was
entitled to credit each piece of [the aforementioned] evidence in
reaching 	its 	verdict 	. 	. 	. 	[and 	t]his 	court 	will 	not 	now 	second-
guess the jury’s assessments.”) 	Thus, this Court will not disturb
the jury’s verdict that Mr. Forney is guilty of Mann Act Interstate
Prostitution 	of 	Jonnica 	C. 	in 	violation 	of 	§ 	2422(a), 	as 	charged
in Count Three.
II. 	Rule 29: Count Four – Sex Trafficking of Shyya H.
Mr. Forney argues that this Court should overturn the jury’s
verdict as to Count Four, Sex Trafficking of Shyya H., in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), because “the evidence failed to establish
that any force used against Shyya H. was for the purpose of causing
her 	to 	engage 	in 	or 	continue 	to 	engage 	in 	commercial 	sex 	work.”
(Def. Mot. at 9.) 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds
abundant 	evidence 	supporting 	the 	jury’s 	conviction 	of 	Mr. 	Forney
as to Count Four.
A. 	Legal Standard
Count 	Four 	charges 	Mr. 	Forney 	with 	Sex 	Trafficking 	of 	Shyya
H. in or about and between May 2017 and September 2017 in violation
of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1591(a). 	(Indictment 	¶ 	4.) 	The 	Court 	instructed
the jury to apply the Court’s instructions in Count One regarding
the elements of sex trafficking, the definitions of force, threats
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of force, fraud and coercion, the meaning of interstate commerce,
and what it means to act knowingly and intentionally to Count Four.
(Tr. 1008.) 	Accordingly, the Court charged the jury that, to find
Mr. 	Forney 	guilty 	of 	sex 	trafficking 	of 	Shyya 	H. 	in 	violation 	of
§ 1591(a), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
elements of sex trafficking: (1) that (a) the defendant knowingly
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or
maintained 	a 	person 	by 	any 	means; 	OR 	(b) 	the 	defendant 	knowingly
benefitted, 	financially 	or 	by 	receiving 	something 	of 	value, 	from
participating 	in 	a 	venture 	that 	recruited, 	enticed, 	transported,
provided, obtained, or maintained a person; (2) that the defendant
knew, 	or 	acted 	in 	reckless 	disregard 	of 	the 	fact, 	that 	force,
threats of force, fraud or coercion would be used with respect to
such 	person; 	(3) 	that 	the 	defendant 	knew 	or 	acted 	in 	reckless
disregard of the fact that means of force, threats of force, fraud
or coercion, or any combination, would be used to cause such person
to 	engage 	in 	a 	commercial 	sex 	act; 	and 	(4) 	that 	the 	defendant’s
conduct 	was 	in 	or 	affecting 	interstate 	commerce. 	(Tr. 	990-98,
1008); Sand Criminal Instructions 47A-17, 47A-18.
As 	to 	the 	first 	element, 	the 	Court 	instructed 	the 	jury 	that
“recruit” means to “employ or find a person to join.” 	(Tr. 992.)
To 	“entice” 	means 	to 	“attract, 	tempt, 	or 	persuade 	a 	person 	by
offering something.” 	(Id.) 	To “harbor a person” means “to provide
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shelter 	for 	that 	person.” 	(Id.) 	To 	“transport 	a 	person” 	means
“to move a person from one place to another.” 	(Id.) 	To “provide
a 	person” 	means 	“to 	make 	someone 	available 	for 	use.” 	(Id.) 	To
“obtain a person” refers “to acquiring, controlling, or possessing
that 	person 	even 	if 	only 	for 	a 	short 	period 	of 	time.” 	(Id.) 	To
“maintain 	a 	person” 	means 	“to 	upkeep 	someone 	or 	to 	put 	care 	or
work into them. 	(Id.)
As to the second element, the Court instructed the jury that
a 	person 	acts 	"knowingly" 	when 	he 	“acts 	intentionally 	and
voluntarily, 	and 	not 	because 	of 	ignorance, 	mistake, 	accident, 	or
carelessness.” 	(Tr. 980.) 	A person acts “intentionally” when he
“acts 	deliberately 	and 	purposefully.” 	(Id. 	981.) 	That 	is, 	a
defendant’s 	acts 	“must 	have 	been 	the 	product 	of 	his 	conscious,
objective 	decision 	rather 	than 	the 	product 	of 	a 	mistake 	or 	an
accident.” 	(Id.) 	To 	act 	“knowingly” 	or 	“intentionally,” 	the
person 	need 	not 	“be 	aware 	of 	the 	specific 	law 	or 	rule 	that 	his
conduct 	may 	violate, 	but 	he 	must 	act 	with 	the 	specific 	intent 	to
do whatever it is the law forbids.” (Id.)
The 	Court 	also 	instructed 	the 	jury 	that 	“force” 	means 	“any
form 	of 	power, 	violence 	or 	physical 	pressure 	directed 	against
another person.” (Id. 994.) 	The jury was further instructed that
“fraud,” 	means 	“the 	defendant 	knowingly 	made 	a 	misstatement,
misrepresentation 	or 	omission 	of 	a 	material 	fact 	to 	entice 	the
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victim.” (Id.) 	A “material fact” is “one that a reasonable person
would 	expect 	to 	rely 	on 	when 	making 	a 	decision.” 	(Id. 	994-95.)
“Coercion” 	means 	either 	“a 	threat 	of 	serious 	harm 	or 	physical
restraint 	against 	a 	person,” 	or 	“any 	scheme, 	plan 	or 	pattern
intended 	to 	cause 	a 	person 	to 	believe 	that 	failure 	to 	perform 	an
act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against
a 	person,” 	or 	the 	“abuse 	or 	threatened 	abuse 	of 	law 	or 	legal
process.” 	(Tr. 995-996); § 1591(e)(2). 	A “threat” is defined as
“a 	serious 	statement 	expressing 	an 	intention 	to 	inflict 	harm 	at
once or in the future . . . A statement is a threat if it was made
under 	such 	circumstances 	that 	a 	reasonable 	person 	hearing 	the
statement would understand it as a serious expression of intent to
cause 	harm.” 	(Tr. 	995.) 	The 	term 	“serious 	harm” 	includes
“physical and nonphysical types of harm, including psychological,
financial 	or 	reputational 	harm 	that 	is 	sufficient 	under 	all
surrounding 	circumstances 	to 	compel 	a 	reasonable 	person 	in 	the
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial
sexual 	activity 	in 	order 	to 	avoid 	such 	harm.” 	(Tr. 	995);
§ 1591(e)(5). 	In considering whether Mr. Forney made a threat of
serious harm, the Court charged the jury to consider “the victim’s
station 	in 	life, 	physical 	and 	mental 	condition, 	age, 	educational
level, experiences, and intelligence.” 	(Tr. 995.)
As 	to 	the 	third 	element, 	the 	Court 	instructed 	the 	jury 	that
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a ”commercial sex act” is “any sex act on account of which anything
of 	value 	is 	given 	to 	or 	received 	by 	a 	person.” 	(Tr. 	997.) 	The
element 	does 	“not 	require[] 	that 	the 	victim 	actually 	performed 	a
commercial 	sex 	act 	as 	long 	as 	the 	government 	has 	proved 	that 	the
defendant 	recruited, 	enticed, 	harbored, 	transported, 	provided,
obtained, 	or 	maintained 	the 	victim 	for 	purposes 	of 	engaging 	in
commercial sex acts.” 	(Id.)
As to the fourth element that the defendant’s conduct was in
or 	affecting 	interstate 	commerce, 	the 	Court 	instructed 	the 	jury
that 	“interstate 	commerce” 	means the 	“movement 	of 	money, 	goods,
services, 	and 	individuals 	between 	any 	two 	or 	more 	states.” 	(Id.
998.)
B. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. 	Forney’s 	sole 	argument 	challenging 	his 	conviction 	on
Count Four is that there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Forney
knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that force, threats
of 	force, 	coercion 	or 	any 	combination 	thereof 	would 	be 	used 	to
cause 	Shyya 	H. 	to 	engage 	in 	a 	commercial 	sex 	act. 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at
8-10.) 	But 	there 	was 	ample 	evidence 	before 	the 	jury 	that 	Mr.
Forney 	himself 	knowingly 	or 	recklessly 	used 	force, 	threats 	of
force, 	a 	coercive 	scheme, 	or 	any 	combination 	thereof, 	to 	cause
Shyya H. to engage in commercial sex acts for his benefit.
First, even though Mr. Forney failed to address the evidence
establishing 	his 	use 	of 	coercion 	in 	his 	Rule 	29 	motion 	on 	Count
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Four, the 	evidence 	showed 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	engaged 	in 	a 	coercive
scheme 	and 	made 	“threats 	of 	serious 	harm.” 	See 	§ 	1591(e)(2)(A),
(B) (defining “coercion”); (Def. Mot. at 8-10.)
Shyya 	H. 	testified 	to 	how 	Mr. 	Forney 	exercised 	a 	pattern 	of
coercive 	control 	in 	connection 	with 	her 	prostitution 	activities.
Mr. Forney required Shyya H. to abide by certain rules. 	(Tr. 292-
93, 	304-06.) 	Shyya 	H. 	was 	not 	allowed 	to 	walk 	on 	the 	sidewalk
while 	looking 	for 	dates 	but 	was 	required 	to 	walk 	on 	the 	street.
(Id. 292.) 	She was also required to keep her head down if she was
approached 	by 	a 	pimp. 	(Id.) 	Shyya 	H. 	was 	required 	to 	make 	at
least 	$600 	a 	night 	and 	give 	Mr. 	Forney 	every 	dollar 	she 	earned
from commercial sex work. (Id. 293, 304.) 	Shyya H. could not leave
the 	street 	or 	stop 	prostituting 	for 	the 	night 	until 	she 	had 	met
her 	quota. 	(Tr. 	304.) 	Shyya 	H. 	never 	withheld 	money 	from 	Mr.
Forney 	because 	she 	“was 	scared 	to” 	and 	didn’t 	have 	anywhere 	to
hide the money. (Id. 305-06.) 	Shyya H. worked the Penn Track seven
days 	a 	week 	from 	9:00 	P.M. 	to 	7:00 	or 	8:00 	A.M 	in 	the 	morning.
(Id. 302.) Mr. Forney dictated how long Shyya H. worked and forced
Shyya 	H. 	to 	work 	even 	if 	she 	was 	tired, 	sick, 	or 	on 	her 	period.
(Id. 305-06.) 	Mr. Forney made clear it “wasn’t an option” to not
work as a prostitute and follow his rules. (Id.)
Shyya H. did not have any of her own money but relied on Mr.
Forney to provide necessities. 	(Id. 308-309.) 	Mr. Forney provided
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only $20 a day for food and no money for clothes. 	(Id. 308.) 	To
the extent Mr. Forney provided any clothes, they exposed her body.
(Id. 	308-09.) 	Shyya 	H. 	also 	testified 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	took 	away
her smartphone, replaced it with a flip phone and told her that he
didn’t want her to speak with her family members because Mr. Forney
“was now [her] only family.” 	(Id. 	310-11.)
There was also abundant evidence that Mr. Forney used threats
of 	force 	and 	serious 	harm 	so 	Shyya 	H. 	would 	continue 	engaging 	in
commercial sex acts for his benefit. 	Shyya H. testified that she
never 	asked 	to 	leave 	because 	she 	did 	not 	want 	to 	“ask 	anything
that 	could 	cause 	[her] 	to 	get 	smacked.” 	(Id. 	at 	306.) 	She 	felt
it 	was 	“crazy” 	to 	ask 	to 	leave 	because 	it 	would 	“[p]robably 	get
[her] 	smacked.” 	(Id. 	319.) 	She 	followed 	the 	rules 	because 	she
thought 	Mr. 	Forney 	would 	“beat 	[her] 	ass” 	if 	she 	did 	not. 	(Id.
293.) 	Shyya 	H. 	also 	testified 	that 	she 	did 	not 	contact 	the
authorities 	while 	she 	worked 	for 	Mr. 	Forney 	because 	it 	was
“dangerous” 	and 	“would 	put 	[her] 	life 	in 	jeopardy.” 	(Id. 	329).
Shyya H. also witnessed Mr. Forney beating another prostitute who
worked 	for 	Mr. 	Forney, 	Foxy, 	and 	testified 	that 	after 	she 	was
“terrified” and thought that if she did “something wrong” she would
“get 	[her] 	ass 	beat 	like 	that.” 	(Id. 	312-14.) 	The 	jury 	was
entitled 	to 	infer 	that 	“the 	logical 	objective 	of 	[defendant]'s
intimidating 	pattern 	of 	behavior 	was 	to 	cause 	[the 	victim] 	to
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believe that she could not refuse to work as a prostitute for him
without incurring harm.” 	Purcell, 967 F.3d at 193.
The 	jury 	was 	also 	entitled 	to 	credit 	evidence 	of 	Shyya 	H.’s
“particular 	vulnerabilities” 	to 	assess 	if 	“reasonable 	people 	of
the 	same 	background 	and 	in 	the 	same 	circumstances” 	would 	feel
coerced. 	Id. at 192-93 (citation modified). 	Shyya H.’s testimony
that 	she 	had 	experienced 	homelessness, 	struggled 	with 	drug
addiction, was a teen mom, and spent her “whole life” in the foster
care system where she suffered abused showed that it was reasonable
for 	her 	to 	feel 	coerced 	through 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	conduct. 	(Tr. 	277-
78); see also United States v. Shine, No. 20-314, 2022 WL 761520,
at 	*2 	(2d 	Cir. 	Mar. 	14, 	2022) 	(summary 	order) 	(holding 	that
evidence 	that 	defendant 	exploited 	victim’s 	fear 	of 	homelessness
and 	violence 	supported 	the 	conclusion 	that 	the 	defendant 	coerced
his victims).
A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Forney coerced Shyya H. to engage in commercial sex
acts 	for 	his 	benefit. 	There 	is 	sufficient 	evidence 	of 	coercion
where, as here, a victim “testified repeatedly that a defendant’s
behavior 	inspired 	fear” 	that 	she 	was 	subject 	to 	“a 	pattern 	of
behavior designed to intimidate and exert control[,]” which caused
her 	to 	continue 	to 	engage 	in 	commercial 	sex 	for 	the 	defendant’s
benefit, 	See 	Purcell, 	967 	F.3d 	at 	193-94. 	In 	Purcell, 	this 	was
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sufficient 	evidence 	of 	coercion 	even 	without 	any 	evidence 	of 	the
defendant’s use of force or threats of force. 	Id. at 193.
But 	here, 	there 	is 	also 	additional 	evidence 	that 	Mr. 	Forney
used 	force 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	compelling 	Shyya 	H. 	to 	perform
commercial sex acts for Mr. Forney’s benefit. 	Shyya H. testified
that 	Mr. 	Forney 	used 	force 	against 	her 	“three 	different 	times.”
(Tr. 	311). 	Shyya 	H. 	testified 	that 	the 	first 	time 	Mr. 	Forney
“smacked” 	her 	“[a]cross 	her 	face[,]” 	she 	was 	“scared.” 	(Id. 	311-
12.) 	Shyya 	H. 	testified 	that 	the 	second 	time 	that 	Mr. 	Forney
exerted 	force 	in 	connection 	with 	causing 	Shyya H. 	to 	engage 	in
commercial 	sex 	acts 	was 	when 	she 	wanted 	to 	overnight 	with 	a 	man
for “700” but Mr. Forney did not want Shyya H. to “stay there all
night” 	and 	“came 	and 	beat 	[her] 	ass.” 	(Id. 	315.) 	Shyya 	H.
testified that Mr. Forney took off all his clothes before beating
her 	on 	her 	head 	while 	she 	was 	“balled 	up 	protecting 	[her] 	face.”
(Id. 	315-16.) 	She 	felt 	“scared,” 	“just 	wanted 	it 	to 	be 	over” 	and
had 	“a 	headache 	for 	. 	. 	. 	two 	weeks 	straight 	after 	that.” 	(Id.
316.) 	Shyya 	H. 	testified 	that 	the 	third 	time 	Mr. 	Forney 	used
physical force against her was when he “smacked [her] on the track”
on her mouth. 	(Id. 317.)
It 	was 	reasonable 	for 	the 	jury 	to 	find 	that 	Mr. 	Forney’s
actions 	were 	not 	“merely 	incidental” 	but 	were 	directly 	meant 	to
compel Shyya H. to engage in commercial sex acts for Mr. Forney’s
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benefit, especially viewed in light of Mr. Forney’s coercive scheme
of 	control. 	(Contra 	Def. 	Mot. 	at 	9-10 	(citing 	United 	States 	v.
Chen, No. 22-CR-158 (ENV) (MMH), 2025 WL 2271484, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
July 7, 2025)).6 	Chen held that evidence that defendant beat his
organization’s 	prostitutes 	to 	keep 	them 	from 	working 	for 	rival
organizations 	but 	“not 	to 	force 	them 	to 	keep 	working 	for 	the
organization” 	was 	insufficient 	to 	show 	that 	such 	force 	was 	meant
to compel the prostitutes to engage in commercial sex acts because
the prostitutes were free to leave. 	2025 WL 2271484, at *4. 	But
here, there is no evidence that Mr. Forney was beating Shyya H. to
keep 	her 	from 	working 	freelance 	or 	for 	rival 	organizations. 	See
id. 	Although Mr. Forney asserts that the first instance of force
is 	insufficient 	because 	Shyya 	H. 	did 	not 	provide 	more 	details 	on
the first time Mr. Forney hit her,(Def. Mot. at 10), the jury could
have reasonably inferred from the evidence of Mr. Forney’s larger
coercive 	scheme 	that 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	first 	use 	of 	violence 	against
Shyya 	H. 	was 	intended 	to 	cause 	Shyya 	H. 	to 	continue 	to 	engage 	in
commercial sex acts for his benefit.
Mr. 	Forney 	asserts 	that 	the 	second 	and 	third 	instances 	of
force 	did 	not 	“cause 	Shyya 	to 	engage 	in 	commercial 	sex 	work”
because she decided to leave Mr. Forney and continued to engage in
sex work, however, § 1591(a) does not require that Shyya H. cease
6 Case is on appeal. 	See United States v. Chen, No. 25-1916 (2d Cir. 2025).
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engaging 	in 	commercial 	sex 	work. 	The 	relevant 	element 	requires
only that the Mr. Forney knew or acted in reckless disregard that
his 	use 	of 	force 	was 	meant 	to 	cause 	Shyya 	H. 	to 	engage 	in 	a
commercial sex act because “[t]he result itself is not an element
of 	the 	offense.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Alvarez, 	601 	F. 	App'x 	16, 	18
(2d 	Cir. 	Feb. 	5, 	2015)(summary 	order). 	Section 	1591(a) 	does 	not
impose a requirement of a “necessary result” but only “criminalizes
certain 	means 	when 	they 	are 	‘used 	to 	cause’ 	an 	act, 	and 	thus 	is
concerned with the means and not with the result.” 	Id.; see also
United 	States 	v. 	McIntyre, 	612 	F. 	App'x 	77, 	80 	(3d 	Cir. 	2015)
(“Section 	1591(a) 	does 	not 	require 	the 	direct 	cause-and-effect
connection [defendant] posits”).
Shyya 	H’s 	“participation 	in 	prostitution 	either 	before 	or
after 	the 	time 	period 	in 	the 	indictment” 	moreover, 	“has 	no
relevance to whether [the defendant] beat her, threatened her, and
took the money she made from prostitution in order to cause her to
engage 	in 	commercial 	sex.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Roy, 	781 	F.3d 	416,
420 	(8th 	Cir. 	2015); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Palms, 	21 	F.4th
689, 	703 	(10th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(collecting 	cases). 	Mr. 	Forney’s
position 	is 	untenable. 	It 	essentially 	excuses 	a 	person’s 	use 	of
force, threats of force, fraud and coercion to compel a victim to
engage 	in 	commercial 	sex 	acts 	for 	the 	person’s 	economic 	and
personal 	benefit 	if 	the 	victim 	continues 	to 	engage 	in 	commercial
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sex work in the future.
The 	jury 	was 	permitted 	to 	credit 	all 	the 	aforementioned
evidence in finding that Mr. Forney forced, threatened, and coerced
Shyya 	H. 	into 	working 	for 	Mr. 	Forney 	as 	his 	prostitute 	for 	his
financial 	benefit. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Elias, 	619 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
296, 	304 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2022) 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Rea, 	958 	F.2d
1206, 1222 (2d Cir. 1992)) (noting the “jury was entitled to credit
each piece of [the aforementioned] evidence in reaching its verdict
. 	. 	. 	[and] 	this 	court 	will 	not 	now 	second-guess 	the 	jury’s
assessments”). 	The 	evidence 	of 	sex 	trafficking 	presented 	to 	the
jury was “not incredible on its face,” United States v. Diaz, 176
F.3d 	52, 	92 	(2d 	Cir. 	1999) 	(citation 	modified). 	It 	was 	thus
reasonable for the jury to infer that the victim was coerced into
engaging in commercial sex acts. 	See United States v. McDermott,
245 	F.3d 	133, 	137 	(2d 	Cir. 	2001) 	(“[T]he 	task 	of 	choosing 	among
competing, 	permissible 	inferences 	is 	for 	the 	[jury], 	not 	for 	the
reviewing court.”).
Thus, this Court will not disturb the jury’s finding that Mr.
Forney 	is 	guilty 	of 	committing 	sex 	trafficking 	of 	Shyya 	H. 	in
violation of § 1591(a), as charged in Count Four.
III. Rule 33: Count One – Sex Trafficking of Jonnica C.
In the alternative to his Rule 29 motion, Mr. Forney moves to
vacate 	his 	conviction 	on 	Count 	One 	and 	remand 	for 	a 	new 	trial
pursuant 	to 	Rule 	33. 	(Def. 	Mot. 	16.) 	In 	deciding 	a 	Rule 	33
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motion, a court must determine if manifest injustice would result
from 	allowing 	the 	guilty 	verdict 	to 	stand. 	See 	United 	States 	v.
James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation modified); United
States 	v. 	Stewart, 	433 	F.3d 	273, 	296 	(2d 	Cir. 	2006) 	(motions 	for
new 	trial 	“should 	be 	granted 	only 	with 	great 	caution 	and 	in 	the
most extraordinary circumstances”).
Mr. Forney asserts that a new trial on Count One is warranted
based 	upon 	the 	Court’s 	decision 	to 	exclude 	emails7 	between 	Mr.
Forney and Jonnica C. because the evidence was offered to impeach
Jonnica’s 	credibility. 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at 	11-15.) 	As 	an 	initial
matter, 	Mr. 	Forney 	fails 	to 	cite 	to 	where 	in 	the 	trial 	record
defense 	counsel 	attempted 	to 	admit 	into 	evidence 	three 	defense
exhibits, 	designated 	in 	his 	Rule 	33 	motion 	as 	DX-B, 	DX-C, 	or 	DX-
D, and where in the trial record the Court ruled that such exhibits
were 	inadmissible. 	Upon 	review 	of 	the 	transcript, 	the 	Court 	has
been 	unable 	to 	identify 	when 	defense 	counsel 	attempted 	to 	admit
into the record and where the Court ruled on the admissibility of
7 Before trial, Mr. Forney represented that the defense had no proposed exhibits
for trial in response to the Court’s Pre-Trial Scheduling Order, (ECF No. 63,
85.)
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the defense exhibits DX-B8, DX-C9 or DX-D10, so identified for the
first 	time 	in 	this 	Rule 	33 	motion. 	In 	a 	sidebar 	during 	Mr.
Forney’s direct regarding DX-A, defense counsel mentioned that he
had 	“four 	separate 	emails” 	that 	he 	sought 	to 	admit 	through 	Mr.
Forney 	but 	other 	than 	defense 	exhibit 	DX-A, 	failed 	to 	label 	or
identify 	what 	those 	emails 	were 	or 	formally 	move 	to 	admit 	them
into 	evidence. 	(Tr. 	579.) 	The 	Court 	thus 	does 	not 	consider 	any
Rule 33 arguments regarding DX-B, DX-C, or DX-D.
Defense counsel only attempted to admit DX-A, into the record.
(Tr. 578-79.) 	DX-A is a May 11, 2016 email chain between Jonnica
C. and Mr. Forney where Jonnica C. writes “[a]ll I ask is for you
to 	keep 	these 	private 	and 	confidential. 	Thank 	you[,]” 	and 	six
8 DX-B is an email dated November 3, 2016 with an attached letter to Jonnica
C’s 	parents. 	During 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	cross 	examination, 	Defense 	counsel 	asked
Jonnica C. if she recalled a letter to her parents who had guardianship over
Jonnica C.’s child. 	Jonnica C. testified that she did not recall whether she
contacted Mr. Forney and asked him for a copy of the letter but did recall that
Mr. 	Forney 	“composed 	a 	letter” 	(Tr. 	231.) 	Defense 	counsel 	did 	not 	mark,
identify, designate, or formally attempt to move DX-B into evidence at trial.
(See Tr. 230-34 (The Court: “Are you trying to put this into evidence.” Defense
counsel: “Not right now.”))
9 DX-C is an email dated January 20, 2019 with the body text “Hello sir, how
are you?” During Jonnica C.’s cross examination, defense counsel asked Jonnica
C. if she recalled sending an email to Mr. Forney in January 2019 that simply
said “Hello, sir. How are you?” (Tr. 234-35). 	Jonnica C. responded that she
“d[id]n’t recall either doing it or not.” 	(Tr. 235.) 	Defense counsel did not
mark, identify, designate, or formally attempt to move DX-C into evidence at
trial.
10 DX-D is an email dated June 7, 2019 with the body text “Do you have any of
my older photos? I really liked some of them and would hate to make some new
ones.” 	During 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	cross 	examination, 	defense 	counsel 	asked 	“Do 	you
recall sending an e-mail to Mr. Forney in June of 2019 in which you asked him
whether he had any of your older photos?” to which Jonnica C. testified that
she 	could 	not 	recall. 	(Tr. 	235.) 	Defense 	counsel 	did 	not 	mark, 	identify,
designate, or formally attempt to move DX-D into evidence at trial.
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attached photographic images including four nude images of a woman
from the shoulders down and two photos of Jonnica C’s face. 	(Def.
Mot. at 12.) 	At trial, the Government objected to DX-A on hearsay
grounds. (Tr. 578-88.) 	Mr. Forney argued that DX-A was admissible
because 	it 	was 	not 	offered 	for 	the 	truth 	of 	the 	matter 	asserted
but 	to 	impeach 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	purported 	testimony 	denying 	that 	she
sent 	the 	email 	and 	photos 	to 	Mr. 	Forney. 	(Id. 	580.) 	The 	Court
noted 	that 	Jonnica 	C. 	had 	not 	denied 	that 	she 	sent 	the 	email 	or
the 	photographs 	but 	testified 	that 	she 	could 	not 	remember. 	(Id.
580-82.) 	The Court subsequently ruled that DX-A was hearsay, not
proper impeachment as an inconsistent statement, and inadmissible
given 	that, 	on 	cross, 	Jonnica 	C. 	did 	not 	recall 	whether 	she 	sent
the 	email 	or 	attached 	photos, 	her 	recollection 	had 	not 	been
refreshed when she was shown DX-A, and she could not identify the
four photos of a nude body. 	(Id. 579-88.)
Mr. 	Forney 	now 	argues 	that 	DX-A 	should 	have 	been 	admitted
because DX-A was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted
but 	to 	(i) 	show 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	email 	had 	been 	sent; 	(ii) 	show
the 	images 	attached 	to 	the 	emails 	which 	as 	images 	were 	non-
statements, 	and 	(iii) 	impeach 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	claims 	on 	direct
examination 	that 	she 	was 	unaware 	that 	she 	was 	coming 	to 	New 	York
for 	the 	purpose 	of 	engaging 	in 	prostitution. 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at 	14.)
During 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	direct, 	defense 	counsel 	argued 	that 	DX-A 	was
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to impeach Jonnica C. and undercut Jonnica C.’s credibility. 	(See
Tr. 	586-87) 	(Defense 	counsel: 	“the 	fact[] 	that 	[the 	email 	and
attached 	photos] 	were 	sent 	. 	. 	. 	undercuts 	her 	claim 	that 	she
didn’t 	or 	she 	doesn’t 	remember.”). 	Although 	Mr. 	Forney 	fails 	to
carry 	his 	burden 	on 	a 	Rule 	33 	motion 	and 	cite 	to 	any 	evidentiary
rule governing his claims, Mr. Forney essentially argues that DX-
A should have been admitted as extrinsic impeachment evidence.
But hearsay is also not automatically admissible just because
it 	is 	offered 	for 	impeachment 	purposes. 	There 	are 	two 	avenues 	to
admit 	out 	of 	court 	statements 	for 	impeachment 	purposes: 	Fed. 	R.
Evid. 	(“FRE”) 	613(b) 	and 	FRE 	801(d)(1)(A). 	“Prior 	inconsistent
statements are generally admissible for impeachment purposes only,
see 	[FRE] 	613, 	and 	are 	inadmissible 	hearsay 	for 	substantive
purposes 	unless 	they 	were 	made 	at 	‘a 	trial, 	hearing, 	or 	other
proceeding, or in a deposition.’” Santos v. Murdock, 243 F.3d 681,
684 	(2d 	Cir. 	2001) 	(quoting 	FRE 	801(d)(1)(A)). 	Here, 	DX-A 	is
inadmissible 	under 	FRE 	801(d)(1)(A) 	because 	the 	email 	statement
was 	not 	made 	under 	penalty 	of 	perjury 	in 	a 	deposition 	or 	at 	a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding.
The 	Court 	properly 	excluded 	DX-A 	because 	DX-A 	is 	also
inadmissible under FRE 613(b). 	The general rule is that “extrinsic
evidence 	is 	not 	admissible 	to 	prove 	specific 	instances 	of 	a
witness's 	conduct 	in 	order 	to 	attack 	or 	support 	the 	witness's
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character 	for 	truthfulness.” 	FRE 	608. 	DX-A 	is 	thus 	inadmissible
as 	extrinsic 	evidence 	to 	attack 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	credibility 	and 	her
lack 	of 	memory 	and 	to 	prove 	that 	Jonnica 	C. 	did 	send 	the 	email.
The 	exception 	under 	FRE 	613(b) 	allows 	“extrinsic 	evidence 	of 	a
witness’s prior statement” to be “offered to impeach that witness’s
credibility 	only 	if, 	inter 	alia, 	the 	statement 	is 	inconsistent
with 	[the 	witness’s] 	trial 	testimony.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Arena,
180 	F.3d 	380, 	400 	(2d 	Cir. 	1999), 	abrogated 	on 	other 	grounds 	by
Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003); see
also 	United 	States 	v. 	Hale, 	422 	U.S. 	171, 	176 	(1975) 	(Although
“prior 	inconsistent 	statements 	may 	be 	used 	to 	impeach 	the
credibility 	of 	a 	witness 	. 	. 	. 	the 	court 	must 	be 	persuaded 	that
the statements are indeed inconsistent.”) “The extrinsic evidence
of 	the 	prior 	inconsistent 	statement 	must” 	also 	“be 	competent 	and
otherwise admissible.” 	United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d
114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
As discussed at trial, the Court was not persuaded that DX-A
was 	inconsistent 	with 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	testimony 	that 	she 	could 	not
recall sending DX-A and that her recollection was not refreshed by
DX-A. 	(Tr. 	578-88.) 	The 	Court 	sees 	no 	reason 	to 	revisit 	that
decision. 	Contrary to Mr. Forney’s assertions at trial (Id. 579-
80, 586-87), Jonnica C. did not testify that she did not send DX-
A, 	nor 	did 	she 	deny 	ever 	taking 	or 	sending 	the 	attached
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photographs. 	Jonnica C. instead testified that she did not recall
sending 	the 	email 	or 	the 	attached 	photographs, 	and 	could 	not
identify the nude, headless photos as herself. 	(Id. 175, 182-83,
190-91.) 	Jonnica 	C. 	confirmed 	that 	the 	two 	attached 	photos 	with
a 	face 	were 	of 	her 	face. 	(Tr. 	190.) 	Mr. 	Forney 	now 	advances 	a
new basis for inconsistency in asserting that DX-A was offered to
impeach 	Jonnica 	C. 	on 	her 	purported 	claim 	that 	“she 	was 	unaware
that 	she 	was 	coming 	to 	New 	York 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	engaging 	in
prostitution.” 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at 	14.) 	At 	trial, 	Jonnica 	C. 	did 	not
testify that she was unaware that she was traveling to New York to
engage 	in 	prostitution. 	Instead, 	Jonnica 	C. 	testified 	that 	she
was 	aware 	there 	was 	a 	possibility 	she 	would 	be 	engaging 	in
prostitution. 	(Tr. 41-42, 236-37.) 	The email statement in DX-A,
“[a]ll I ask is for you to keep these private and confidential[,]”
thus 	does 	not 	conflict 	with 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	testimony 	and 	is 	not
proper extrinsic impeachment evidence admissible under FRE 613(b).
Finally, even if DX-A was erroneously excluded, the exclusion
of DX-A does not amount to a manifest injustice. 	See United States
v. 	Ragano, 	759 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	363, 	369 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2024) 	(“A 	Rule 	33
motion 	is 	generally 	an 	improper 	vehicle 	by 	which 	a 	defendant 	may
challenge 	evidentiary 	rulings, 	absent 	‘manifest 	injustice.’”)
(citation modified).
Citing 	only 	United 	States 	v. 	Mergen, 	764 	F.3d 	199 	(2d 	Cir.
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2014), 	Mr. 	Forney 	argues 	that 	the 	Court’s 	exclusion 	of 	DX-A’s
amounts 	to 	a 	manifest 	injustice 	because 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	has
held that erroneously excluded impeachment evidence warrants a new
trial if the case hinges on whether the jury believes the defendant
or 	another 	witness. 	(Def. 	Mot. 	at 	15-16.) 	But 	United 	States 	v.
Mergen 	is 	inapposite. 	In 	Mergen, 	the 	district 	court 	incorrectly
excluded, based on hearsay and lack of authentication, a recorded
conversation on the night of an alleged arson between the defendant
and an FBI agent where the FBI agent stated that defendant had not
done 	“anything 	wrong.” 	764 	F.3d 	at 	206. 	The 	FBI 	agent 	then
testified that on the night of the arson, he had already taken the
view 	that 	the 	defendant 	“should 	be 	criminally 	prosecuted.” 	The
Second Circuit ruled that the recording should have been admitted
because 	it 	contained 	prior 	inconsistent 	statements 	of 	the 	agent
and was offered for impeachment. 	Id. at 206-07. 	A new trial was
granted because the exclusion of the recording meant the jury did
not 	have 	any 	evidence 	of 	defendant’s 	version 	of 	the 	facts. 	See
id. at 207. 	But that is not the case here. 	First, the FBI agent’s
testimony 	in 	Mergen 	was 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	agent’s 	prior
statement. 	See 	id. 	Here, 	Jonnica 	C.’s 	trial 	testimony 	that 	she
could 	not 	recall 	the 	email 	or 	identify 	the 	nude 	photos 	was 	not
inconsistent 	with 	her 	email. 	Her 	recollection 	was 	not 	refreshed
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by DX-A. 	(Tr. 175, 182-83, 191.)11 	Second, the Court allowed Mr.
Forney to testify that he received an email from Jonnica C. in May
2016 with photo attachments, that he now knew that the photographs
of 	a 	woman’s 	face 	were 	of 	Jonnica 	C., 	and 	that 	he 	believed 	the
attached 	nude 	photos 	were 	of 	Jonnica 	C. 	(Tr. 	590.) 	Defense
counsel 	included 	such 	testimony 	in 	defense 	counsel’s 	summation.
(Id. 902-04.) 	The images were also admitted into evidence in DX-
E, 	a 	Cellebrite 	extraction 	from 	a 	phone 	that 	was 	admitted 	into
evidence. (Id. 551-53, 581.)
Accordingly, 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	argument 	that 	any 	erroneous
exclusion 	impeded 	on 	Mr. 	Forney’s 	right 	to 	present 	a 	defense 	and
his due process rights also provides no basis for a new trial. 	A
defendant’s 	due 	process 	right 	to 	present 	a 	defense, 	“is 	not
absolute” because a defendant “must comply with established rules
of 	procedure 	and 	evidence 	designed 	to 	assure 	both 	fairness 	and
reliability.” 	Washington 	v. 	Schriver, 	255 	F.3d 	45, 	56 	(2d
Cir.2001) 	(citation 	modified). 	Here, 	Mr. 	Forney 	was 	given 	the
opportunity to cross examine Jonnica C. and to present his version
of events on the relevant emails through his testimony and admitted
exhibits.
11 The Court advises that although defense counsel only sought to refresh Jonnica
C’s recollection with DX-A during Jonnica C.’s cross, and did not formally seek
to admit it into evidence, had defense counsel moved to admit DX-A into evidence
DX-A would have been inadmissible through Jonnica C. because she did not recall
sending the email. 	(See Tr. 180-83, 190-91.)
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There is, moreover, “satisfactory and sufficient evidence in
the record” to “support[] the jury's finding that the defendant is
guilty 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt,” 	so 	“a 	new 	trial 	is 	not
warranted” even if “a trial court errs in its evidentiary rulings.”
Ragano, 	759 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	369 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Parnas,
No. 19-cr-725, 2022 WL 669869, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Kukushkin, 61 F.4th 327 (2d Cir. 2023)).
Jonnica C. testified that Mr. Forney recruited and enticed her to
come 	to 	New 	York 	and 	go 	to 	Connecticut 	to 	perform 	commercial 	sex
acts 	with 	men. 	(Tr. 	40-41, 	119.) 	She 	also 	testified 	that 	Mr.
Forney 	benefited 	financially 	in 	doing 	so 	by 	taking 	all 	her
earnings. 	(Id. 	28, 	94-95; 	see 	also 	id. 	624-25 	(Mr. 	Forney’s 	own
testimony.)) 	She 	further 	testified 	that 	Mr. 	Forney 	used 	force,
threats of force and coercion to compel her to engage in commercial
sex acts. (Id. 94-100.)
The 	Government 	introduced 	into 	evidence 	Amtrak 	records
showing that Mr. Forney purchased a train ticket for Jonnica C.’s
travel 	from 	Wisconsin 	to 	New 	York 	(GX 	904); 	Backpage 	records
showing Mr. Forney posted prostitution advertisements for Jonnica
C. 	(GX 	400-499); 	hotel 	records 	with 	dates 	corresponding 	to 	when
Mr. Forney posted Backpage advertisements of Jonnica C. to solicit
clients 	in 	locations 	consistent 	with 	the 	hotel 	records 	(GX 	402,
907); text messages with and photographs of Jonnica C. relating to
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prostitution, and online searches of prostitution related websites
(GX 200-216). 	The Government elicited testimony from a detective
who 	arrested 	and 	observed 	Jonnica 	C. 	in 	Connecticut 	during 	an
undercover 	operation, 	(Tr. 	259-70). 	Mr. 	Forney 	himself 	also
testified 	that 	he 	recruited 	Jonnica 	C. 	to 	work 	as 	a 	prostitute,
bought 	her 	train 	ticket 	to 	New 	York, 	and 	transported 	her 	between
states 	to 	engage 	in 	commercial 	sex 	acts. 	(Id. 	572-73, 	572-75,
593-94, 682-83.)
Based 	on 	the 	trial 	record, 	and 	for 	the 	same 	reason 	that 	Mr.
Mr. Forney’s Rule 29 motion fails, the Court finds Mr. Forney has
not 	demonstrated 	extraordinary 	circumstances 	or 	that 	a 	manifest
injustice would result from allowing the guilty verdict to stand.
Accordingly, Mr. Forney is not entitled to vacatur on Count One or
a 	new 	trial 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	33 	and 	his 	Rule 	33 	motion 	is
respectfully denied. 	See United States v. Curry, 542 F. Supp. 3d
197, 	206-07 	(W.D.N.Y. 	2021) 	(denying 	defendant’s 	Rule 	33 	motion
for the same reasons that warranted denial of defendant’s Rule 29
motion), aff’d, No. 22-50, 2023 WL 8073057 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2023).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully DENIES Mr.
Forney’s Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts,
and 	in 	the 	alternative, 	his 	Rule 	33 	motion 	for 	a 	new 	trial. 	All
parties shall appear for Mr. Forney’s sentencing on April 3, 2026
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at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 6B South.
So ordered.
Dated: 	December 18, 2025
Brooklyn, New York 	_______________________________
Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
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