Onfroy v. The Law Offices of Geoffrey T. Mott, P.C. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LOVERN ONFROY,
Plaintiff,
-against-
THE LAW OFFICES OF GEOFFREY T. MOTT,
P.C., GEOFFREY T. MOTT, and SAMUEL
MILLER,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
22-CV-2314(EK)(SDE)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Lovern Onfroy’s landlord brought several state court
lawsuits against her after she allegedly failed to pay rent.
Two of those lawsuits sought unpaid rent for the same period —
October 2020 through March 2021. 	She sued, alleging violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).
At this stage, the remaining defendants are the law
firm that represented the landlord — The Law Offices of Geoffrey
T. Mott, P.C. — and two of its attorneys, Mr. Mott (the firm’s
principal) and Samuel Miller. 	In May, Onfroy agreed to a
settlement with Mott P.C. and Mr. Mott (the “Mott defendants”),
on the record in open court.
Since then, Onfroy contends that the Mott defendants
have violated the agreement’s terms. 	Onfroy has now moved to
enforce the settlement. 	Onfroy also now seeks to hold defendant
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Miller jointly and severally liable for the contemplated
settlement, though the agreement did not contemplate his
personal liability.
Background
The parties explained the settlement terms in detail
on the record. 	The Mott defendants agreed to pay a total of
$70,000, split across five installments between July and
November 2025. 	Tr. of Proceedings on May 30, 2025, at 23:1-12
(“Settlement Tr.”), ECF No. 92. 	They also agreed to provide
Onfroy a confession of judgment by June 13, consistent with an
agreed-upon precedent, for the full settlement amount less any
payments made up to that point. 	Id. at 23:13-24.
In New York, a confession of judgment allows a party
(typically a creditor) to “file a judgment voluntarily
confessed,” avoiding the need for a separate action. 	Siegel,
N.Y. Prac. § 299 (6th ed.). 	Once filed and entered in state
court, it “may then be enforced as if duly rendered by that
court.” 	Id. § 301. 	Confessions of judgment are “closely
scrutinized and will be valid only if [they conform] to the
strict requirements” of C.P.L.R. § 3218. 	Id. § 299. 	Onfroy
agreed to provide a release and dismiss the remaining defendant,
Miller, within thirty days of payment. 	Settlement Tr. 24:21-
25:3, 26:1-6.
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Since then, the Mott defendants and their counsel have
tried, unsuccessfully, to provide an enforceable confession of
judgment. 	In one attempt, they failed to include Mott’s correct
county of residence, a requirement under Section 3218. 	See ECF
No. 88-3 (confession of judgment indicating Nassau County); ECF
No. 88, at 2 (describing Mott’s county of residence as Suffolk
County). 	At a subsequent conference, defense counsel reported
that they had sent Mott a confession of judgment “several times
to sign,” but to no avail. 	Tr. of Proceedings on Sept. 5, 2025,
at 4:1-4, ECF No. 91. 	In response, the Court explained that it
was considering simply entering judgment, obviating the need for
a confession of judgment. Id. at 4-6.
Discussion
The Second Circuit has endorsed the use of “settlement
judgments,” whereby district courts enter judgment on terms
agreed to by the parties on the record. 	Such judgments avoid
“an additional lawsuit for breach of a settlement agreement” and
provide “[d]ue regard for the proper use of judicial resources.”
Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 1986).1
Judgment is also appropriate when a party agrees in a
settlement to provide a signed confession of judgment and does
not do so. 	In Febus v. Guardian First Funding Group, LLC, the
1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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court entered judgment after a party agreed “to enter into the
confession of judgment and then simply refus[ed] to sign the
document.” 	90 F. Supp. 3d 240, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 	Otherwise,
a party could evade “the very purpose of a confession of
judgment — to avoid motion practice between the parties.” 	Id.
When entering a settlement judgment, “the judge is
obliged to determine the detailed terms of the relief and the
wording of the judgment,” as “the parties have agreed only upon
the basic aspect of relief.” 	Janus Films, 801 F.2d at 582.
Here, a determination of the relief is not necessary, as the
parties extensively “detailed terms” of the settlement. 	Id.
The Court will simply need to determine the judgment’s wording.
Given the foregoing, the Court will enter judgment
requiring the Mott defendants to pay $70,000.2 	We also add
prejudgment interest at nine percent, accruing from June 13, the
day on which the Mott defendants were to have provided the
confession of judgment.3 	The Court will not enter judgment
against Miller. 	A settlement judgment may only award “those
precise forms of relief that are either agreed to by the parties
or fairly implied by their agreement.” 	Id. 	The settlement did
2 The Mott defendants have filed records indicating that some settlement
payments have already been made. 	ECF No. 85.
3 In New York, interest “shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because
of a breach of performance of a contract,” and the computation runs “from the
earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed.” 	C.P.L.R.
§§ 5001(a)-(b); id. § 5004(a) (setting the applicable rate at nine percent);
see also Febus, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 249-50 (awarding prejudgment interest).
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not contemplate Miller paying any money, and contemplated his
dismissal within thirty days of payment.
Finally, though this judgment does not resolve claims
as to Miller, a partial final judgment is appropriate. 	Such a
judgment may be entered “[w]hen an action presents more than one
claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are
involved . . . if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 	In making
this latter determination, “a district court must take into
account judicial administrative interests as well as the
equities involved.” 	Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446
U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
Both factors weigh in favor of a partial final
judgment and there is no just reason for delay. 	Onfroy “is
legally entitled to a judgment” on the settlement and “should be
able to execute upon it now.” 	Ginett v. Computer Task Grp.,
Inc., 962 F.2d 1085, 1097 (2d Cir. 1992). 	Further delay would
continue to frustrate the purpose of the confession of judgment.
Additionally, any remaining proceedings as to Miller have not
yet been scheduled and may not be for months. 	See Cromer Fin.
Ltd. v. Berger, No. 00-CV-2284, 2002 WL 31388721, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2002) (weighing this fact in favor of
entering partial final judgment).
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Consideration of the Second Circuit’s administrative
interests do not counsel otherwise. 	Appellate courts endeavor
to avoid piecemeal appeals, Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, 642 F.3d
304, 310 (2d Cir. 2011), and appeals that may be rendered
advisory or moot by disposition of remaining claims. 	Ginett,
962 F.2d at 1095. 	There is no such risk here. 	Any appeal by
the Mott defendants would challenge the Court’s enforcement of
the settlement. 	Any appeal filed by Miller would concern the
merits of the FDCPA case.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement, ECF No.
88, is granted in part. 	The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to enter judgment against defendants The Law Offices of
Geoffrey T. Mott, P.C. and Geoffrey T. Mott for (a) $70,000 and
(b) prejudgment interest of nine percent on this amount,
accruing from June 13, 2025 to the entry of judgment. 	The Court
will not retain jurisdiction over these defendants, and the
Clerk of Court is directed to terminate them from this case.
Plaintiff is directed to dismiss Miller by January 30 or show
cause why such dismissal should not occur. 	Defendants’ motion
to extend the time to complete discovery, ECF No. 82, is denied
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without prejudice to renew, and Plaintiff’s prior motion for
settlement, ECF No. 81, is terminated as moot.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	December 9, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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