United States of America v. Account Number XXXX4539

UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
EASTERN DISTRJCT OF NEW YORl(
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
V.
ALL ASSETS HELD IN RAYMOND JAMES
& ASSOCIATES, INC. ACCOUNT NUMBER
XXXX4539 IN THE NAME OF DELTORA
ENTERPRJSES GROUP CO. LTD., AND ALL
FUNDS TRACEABLE THERETO,
Defendant in rem.
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WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, United States District Judge:
DECISION & ORDER
19-CV-377 (WFK) (CHK)
The United States of America brings this civil action in rem, seeking forfeiture of the assets held
in a brokerage account at Raymond James & Associates, Inc. ("Raymond James") in the name of
Deltora Enterprises Group Co. Ltd. ("Deltora"). Deltora, Gonzalo Eduardo Monteverde Bussalleu
("Monteverde"), and Maria Isabel Carmona Bernasconi ("Carmona," and together with Deltora
and Monteverde, the "Claimants") claim rights to the assets. The Claimants now move to dismiss
this action for due process violations, failure to state a claim, improper venue, and failure to
prosecute. Raymond James moves to transfer custody of the assets to the Government. For the
reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Claimants' motions and RESERVES on Raymond
James's motion.
BACKGROUND
From 2001 to 2015, a Brazilian holding company named Odebrecht S.A. ("Odebrecht")1
paid approximately $800 million in bribes to, and for the benefit of, foreign officials, political
parties, and candidates in multiple countries for the purpose of obtaining and retaining business.
Am. Comp!. ,i,i 18(a), 19, ECF No. 69. Odebrecht laundered these payments through various
bank accounts associated with offshore entities. Id ,i,i 24, 26.
On June 8, 2017, the United States Government obtained a pre-forfeiture seizure warrant
in the Middle District of Florida pertaining to assets allegedly constituting or derived from
proceeds traceable to Odebrecht's bribery funds (the "Defendant Assets"). See Raymond James
1 Odebrecht is now named "Novonor." Am. Comp!. ,i 18(a) n.l .
1
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Mot. for Release of Funds, Ex. I, ECF No. 62-1; see, e.g., Am. Comp!. 'if 60 (alleging forfeiture
under 18 U.S.C. § 98l(a)(l)(C)). The Defendant Assets, including secmities and cash, are
currently held in a brokerage account at Raymond James & Associates, Inc. ("Raymond James")
in the name of Deltora Enterprises Group Co. Ltd. ("Deltora"). Am. Comp!. 'if I. Deltora is a
company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. Id ,r l8(f). Deltora is owned
by two Peruvian citizens: Gonzalo Eduardo Monteverde Bussalleu ("Monteverde") and Maria
Isabel Carmona Bernasconi ("Carmona"). Id. ,r l8(g), (h). The Government alleges Monteverde
and Carmona controlled the Deltora account at Raymond James (the "Deltora Account") and
helped to launder at least $ I 4 million of bribery payments for Odebrecht tln·ough entities under
their control. Id 'if 24. The Government further contends Monteverde and Carmona controlled
other accounts under Deltora's name and the names of other entities. Id. ,r 37.
Upon obtaining the seizure warrant, the Government initially directed Raymond James to
liquidate the Deltora Account and to provide the Government with a check for its value.
Raymond James Mot. for Release of Funds, Ex. 2, ECF No. 62-2. Shortly thereafter, former
counsel for Deltora, Monteverde, and Carmona (together, the "Claimants") entered into an
agreement with the Government permitting Raymond James to restrain the Deltora Account
instead of liquidating it.2 See First Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 39-5 (June 28, 2017 letter from the
Government memorializing the agreement). Under this agreement, the Defendant Assets
remained in the Deltora Account with trading allowed but distributions prohibited. See id. The
parties continued to communicate until September 2017, after which they were not in contact for
2 Although the Court dismisses Monteverde's and Carmona's individual claims for lack of
standing, infi·a Discussion Section I, the Court refers to Deltora, Monteverde, and Carmona,
collectively, as "Claimants."
2
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approximately nine months. Levy Deel. ,r,r 3-5, ECF No. 45; Ex. A to Levy Deel., ECF No. 45-
3.
Claimants retained their current counsel in late May of 2018. First Mot. to Dismiss at 11,
ECF No. 39. On August 30, 2018, Claimants filed a motion in the Middle District of Florida
seeking return of the property or, in the alternative, that the Government file a forfeiture action
within 90 days. Id. at 10. On November 3, 2018, Claimants also filed a civil action in the
Middle District ofFlorida. Id. at 11; see Deltora Enters. Grp. et al., v. United States, 18-CV-
2713 (M.D. Fla.).
On January 18, 2019, the Government filed a civil forfeiture action in rem against the
Deltora Account in the Eastern District ofNew York. Comp!., ECF No. 1. The Government
argues the Defendant Assets are property constituting or deriving from proceeds traceable to
unlawful activities; namely, bribery ofa foreign official, violations ofthe Foreign Co1rupt
Practices Act ("FCP A"), violations of Panamanian law, and money laundering transactions. See
generally Am. Comp!.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) (stating it is unlawful to conduct
financial transactions designed to conceal the source, ownership, or control ofproceeds of
specified unlawful activities); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (defining specified unlawful activity). On
February 5, 2019, the Court issued another warrant authorizing seizure ofthe Defendant Assets
and the "use [of! discretion and whatever means appropriate to protect and maintain the
Defendant [A]ssets." ECF No. 4. On February 20, 2019, Deltora, Monteverde, and Carmona
each filed claims to the Defendant Assets. ECF Nos. 6-8. On February 25, 2019, the
Government moved to dismiss Claimants' action in the Middle District of Florida for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Deltora Enters. Grp. et al., v. United States, 18-CV-2713 (M.D.
Fla.), ECF No. I I.
3
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On March 29, 2019, the Government moved to stay this action. Mot. to Stay, ECF No.
18. On April 3, 2019, the Court granted the stay based on the Government's representations
"that the continuing prosecution of this civil forfeiture case would adversely affect the
prosecution of the related criminal investigation." Minute Entry dated April 3, 2019. The Court
subsequently denied Claimants' motions for reconsideration, and the Second Circuit dismissed
Claimants' appeal of the same for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Minute Entries dated April 4,
2019, and April 8, 2019; USCA Mandate, ECF No. 25. On January 13, 2020, the Court granted
the parties' joint stipulation agreeing to maintain the Defendant Assets in the Deltora Account at
Raymond James pending the resolution of this action. Order, ECF No. 27.
On March 24, 2020, Claimants moved to lift the stay. ECF No. 28. Later, on August 14,
2020, Claimants moved for a hearing on the status of the stay. ECF No. 36. On August 20,
2020, the Court denied these motions. Minute Entty dated August 20, 2020.
In May 2022, the Government advised Claimants' counsel it was prepared to lift the stay.
Levy Deel. ,i 12. Acting upon the request of Claimants' counsel, the Govermnent refrained from
moving to lift the stay until September 9, 2022. Levy Deel., Ex. C, ECF No. 45-3 (emails from
Claimants' counsel asking the Government to delay its filing until September 2, 2022, at the
earliest); see Mot. to Lift Stay, ECF No. 37. Thereafter, on September 19, 2022, the Court
granted the Govermnent' s motion to lift the stay and ordered a briefing schedule as to Claimants'
anticipated dispositive motions. Order, ECF No. 38.
On October 31, 2022, Claimants moved to dismiss the action based on violations of due
process. See generally First Mot. to Dismiss. On November 9, 2022, Claimants also moved to
dismiss the action for failure to state a claim and improper venue. Second Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 40. On December 9, 2022, the Government cross-moved to strike the claims to the
4
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Defendant Assets filed by the individual claimants-Monteverde and Carmona-based on lack
of standing. Gov't Opp'n to First Mot. to Dismiss and Cross-Motion to Strike, ECF No. 43. On
February 21, 2023, the parties completed briefing on Claimants' motions to dismiss and the
Government's cross-motion to strike.3 See ECF No. 56.
On November 26, 2024, Raymond James moved to transfer custody of the Defendant
Assets to the Government. Mot. for Release of Funds, ECF No. 62. On January 6, 2025,
Claimants moved to dismiss the action for lack of prosecution (their third motion to dismiss).
Third Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 67. On January 14, 2025, the Government filed an Amended
Complaint.4 See generally Am. Comp!. On August 1, 2025, the Court held a status conference,
after which it directed the parties to file proposed briefing and discovery schedules. Minute
Entry dated August 1, 2025. On August 19, 2025, the Court adopted the Government's proposed
discovery schedule and the parties' joint proposed supplemental briefing schedule. Order, ECF
No. 76. The Court also scheduled a two-week trial to commence on April 6, 2026. Id.
I. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
LEGAL STANDARD
"Motions to dismiss in rem forfeiture actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) and Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and
Asset Forfeiture Actions." In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 777 F. Supp. 2d 529, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Holwell, J.). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain
3 Claimants also moved to unseal two ex parte affidavits filed by the Government in support of
the Government's motions for a stay and for a search and seizure warrant. ECF No. 47. On
September 30, 2025, the Court referred to Magistrate Judge Clay H. Kaminsky all current and
future discovery disputes, including Claimants' aforementioned motion to unseal. ECF No. 80.
4 The Amended Complaint unseals the names of individuals and companies mentioned in the
Complaint. Gov't Ltr. to the Court, ECF No. 69-1. Claimants' counsel "consented to the filing
of the deanonymized Amended Complaint." Id.
5
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face."'
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). Under the Supplemental Rules, a complaint for civil asset forfeiture must "state
sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet
its burden ofproofat trial." Supp. Rules for Ce11ain Admiralty and Maritime Claims and Asset
Forfeiture Actions ("Supp. R.") G(2)(f). "No complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the
Govemment did not have adequate evidence at the time the complaint was filed to establish
forfeitability of the property." 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(D).
In considering Claimants' motions to dismiss, the Comi accepts as true all factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the Govemment's
favor. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court is not, however, "bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements ofa cause ofaction, supp011ed by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
II. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)
District courts may dismiss an action because ofthe plaintiffs failure to prosecute. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4l(b); Linkv. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) ("The authority ofa
federal trial comi to dismiss a plaintiffs action with prejudice because ofhis failure to prosecute
cannot seriously be doubted."). Dismissals under Rule 41(b) are with prejudice unless otherwise
stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
6
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DISCUSSION
I. Monteverde and Carmona Lack Standing to Challenge the Government's in rem
Forfeiture Action Against the Defendant Assets.
As a threshold matter, the Court must first decide the Government's motion to strike
Monteverde's and Carmona's claims to the Defendant Assets for lack ofstanding.5 Supp. R.
G(8)(c)(i)-(ii) ("The [Government's] motion [to strike a claim] must be decided before any
motion by the claimant to dismiss the action."); United States v. $557,993.89, More or Less, in
U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Gov't Cross-Mot. to Strike at 27, ECF No.
43 (arguing Monteverde and Cannona, as shareholders of Deltora, lack Article III standing to
contest forfeiture of the Defendant Assets).
"In order to contest a governmental forfeiture action, claimants must have both standing
under the statute or statutes governing their claims and standing under Article III of the
Constitution as required for any action brought in federal court." In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related
Props., 08-CV-10934, 2021 WL 1226594,at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) (Preska, J.).
Monteverde and Carmona bear the burden of establishing standing. Mercado v. U.S. Customs
Serv., 873 F.2d 641,644 (2d Cir. 1989). To establish standing, Monteverde and Carmona must
show they have "actual possession, dominion, control, title or financial stake" in the Defendant
Assets. United States v. Contents ofAcct. Nos. 208-06070 & 208-06068-1-2, 847 F. Supp. 329,
5 While the Court was drafting the instant Decision & Order, Claimants' counsel filed a letter to
the Court stating an intent to withdraw Monteverde's and Carmona's individual claims and to
pursue this action solely through Deltora. See ECF No. 92 (quoting United States v. Wallach,
935 F.2d 445,462 (2d Cir. 1991)). The individual claimants' concession of the unviability of
their claims, and the support cited in their letter, mirrors the instant opinion and therefore has no
effect on the outcome of the instant Decision & Order. As the Court has already determined, see
Discussion Section I, Deltora is the only claimant that has standing to pursue its claim. The
Court thus evaluates the motions to dismiss with respect to Deltora's interest in the Defendant
Assets.
7
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333 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Cedarbaum, J.) (internal citation omitted); Bacchus v. United States, 12-
CV-5104, 2014 WL 2558800, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2014) (Irizarry, J.).
Monteverde and Carmona fail to cany their burden of establishing standing to contest
forfeiture of the Defendant Assets. The Defendant Assets are held by Deltora in a Raymond
James account opened in Deltora's name. See Am. Compl. ,r 18(f) (stating Deltora is the holder
of the Raymond James account); Stipulation, ECF No. 27 (stipulation governing the Defendant
Assets' management during this action and indicating the same). "A basic tenet of American
corporate law is that the corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities." Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,474 (2003). "An individual shareholder, by virtue of his ownership of
shares, does not own the corporation's assets." Id. at 475. Monteverde and Carmona may own
stock in Deltora, hold a directorship in Deltora, and open and manage accounts in Deltora's
name; nevetiheless, they do not directly own Deltora's assets, nor are they corporate claimants
with title to the Raymond James account. See Carmona Resp. to Inten-og. at 8, ECF No. 45-14
(stating Carmona owns five percent of the shares in Deltora); Monteverde Resp. to Interrog. at 2,
ECF No. 45-14 (stating Monteverde's and Carmona's interests in the Defendant Assets are
"reflected as stocks, bonds and cash"). In short, because "the shareholder claimants [i.e.,
Monteverde and Carmona] are neither owners nor lienholders with respect to corporate assets,
they have no standing" to contest the forfeihire of such corporate assets. United States v. Ne·w
Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 440, 442---43 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Glasser, J.) (striking
individual shareholder claims to seized property where corporation filed a notice of claim to the
in rem defendants); United States v. 479 Tamarind Drive, Hallendale, Fla., 98-CV-2279, 2011
WL 1045095, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011) (Cote, J.) (striking claim for lack of standing
where claimant "present[ed] no basis for a claim in the propetiy other than as a shareholder, and
8
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no other potential ownership or possessory interest [was] evident from the record available"); see
also United States v. All Assets Held in Account Number XXXXXXXX in name ofDoraville
Props. Co,p., 299 F. Supp. 3d 121, 137 (D.D.C. 2018) (striking claims to seized property where
individual claimants were only beneficiaries of the trust holding the assets, but allowing a
different individual claim to proceed where claimant had an annuity in the trust).6
The Court rejects Monteverde's and Catmona's argument that the Government conceded
their standing by alleging Monteverde and Catmona exercised control over the Defendant
Assets. See Claimants' Opp'n to Gov't Cross-Mot. to Strike at 14, ECF No. 48. This argument
is belied by Monteverde's and Carmona's own caselaw. See United States v. Real Prop.
Associated with First Beneficial Mortgage Corp. ("First Beneficial"), 08-CV-285, 2009 WL
1035233 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2009); Claimants' Opp'n to Gov't Cross-Mot. to Strike at 16
(citing First Beneficial). In First Beneficial, the court held the President and sole shareholder of
a corporation lacked standing to challenge a civil forfeiture action against six properties titled in
the corporation's nmne. Id. at* 1. Had the First Beneficial court found standing, it would have
allowed the shareholder "to disregard the corporate entity when it suits him and allow the benefit
of the corporate entity when he desires." Id at*4. First Beneficial therefore supports the
finding of this Court: despite Carmona's service as a Deltora director and Monteverde's and
Carmona'sjoint control ofDeltora's investment accounts, permitting these interests to confer
standing would enable Monteverde and Catmona to cloak themselves in the corporate form when
it suits them and to discard the corporate form when it does not.
6 Monteverde and Carmona cite United States v. All Funds ofPerusa, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1996), rev 'din part sub. nom., 166 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1999), as supporting their claim
to standing. For the reasons identified by the Government, Perusa is plainly inapplicable to the
matter at hand. See Gov't Reply for Cross-Motion to Strike at 2-3, ECF No. 54.
9
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Finally, the Court dispenses with Monteverde's and Cannona's incorrect argument that
the Government's standing challenge is barred by !aches. See Claimants' Opp'n to Gov't Cross
Mot to Strike at I 6. "[L]aches is not available against the federal government where, as here, it
undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest." S.E.C. v. Durante, 641
F. App'x 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); New Silver
Palace Rest. Inc., 810 F. Supp. at 444 (rejecting !aches argument in civil forfeiture action). The
Government, moreover, may move to strike a claim in a civil forfeiture action "at any time
before trial." Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(B).
Because Monteverde and Carmona lack Article III standing to contest the forfeiture
proceeding, the Court grants the Government's motion to strike Monteverde's and Carmona's
claims to the Defendant Assets. The Court evaluates the remaining motions with respect to
Deltora, the proper claimant, and its interest in the Defendant Assets.
II. The Government Did Not Violate Deltora's Due Process Rights.
Deltora first moves the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the grounds ofdue
process violations. 7 Due process oflaw entitles an owner of property seized by the Government
to a post-seizure hearing within a reasonable time. United States v. $8,850,461 U.S. 555,564
(I 983). Courts consider four factors when determining whether there has been a due process
violation following an asset seizure: (I) the length ofthe delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3)
the claimants' assertions of their rights to the propetiy; and (4) prejudice to the claimants. See
generally $8,850. The Supreme Comi has deemed the length of the delay as the "overarching
factor" in the due process analysis, but "none of these factors is a necessary or sufficient
7 Although Deltora filed its motions to dismiss before the Government filed the Amended
Complaint, the Comi evaluates Deltora's motions to dismiss with respect to the Amended
Complaint because it only deanonymized cetiain names.
10
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condition for finding unreasonable delay." Id. at 565. "Rather, these elements are guides in
balancing the interests of the claimant and the Governrnent to assess whether the basic due
process requirement offairness has been satisfied in a particular case." Id
Despite the delays in this case, there has not been a due process violation.
A. Length of the Delay
The parties disagree on what the actual length of the delay was in this case. But
regardless ofhow it is calculated, the length of the delay was extensive. Accordingly, this factor
favors Deltora.
Deltora argues the length of the delay exceeds five years, calculated from the date
Magistrate Judge Sansone authorized the seizure warrant in the Middle District of Florida (June
20 I 7) to the lifting ofthe stay (September 2022). First Mot. to Dismiss at 4. The Government
contends the length of the delay is much less-approximately eighteen months--calculated from
the date ofthe asset seizure to the filing ofthe initial Complaint. Gov't Opp'n to First Mot. to
Dismiss at I 7. The Governrnent urges the Court to exclude the stay period from the calculation
regarding the length ofthe delay. Id.
The Court accounts for the stay period when calculating the length of the delay, as the
Government's obligation to proceed expeditiously extends beyond the filing ofthe forfeiture
action to the commencement oftrial. 8 United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154,
8 The Government also argues Deltora's motion to dismiss-as applied to the stay period-is
"duplicative ofprior challenges" raised before this Court and the Second Circuit. See Gov't
Opp'n to First Mot. to Dismiss at 12. Although the Court previously denied Deltora's motions to
lift the stay, such prior orders do not require the Court to conclude now that Claimants suffered
no due process violation. To be sure, the Court's granting ofa stay-and its subsequent denials
ofmotions to lift the stay-do not support Deltora's contention that there was a five-year-long,
Government-induced delay. See also Levy Deel., Ex. C (stating Claimants asked the
Governrnent to delay lifting the stay for several months). But the Court's prior orders, without a
written opinion, do not serve as a decision on Deltora's legitimate due process challenges.
11
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1163 (2d Cir. 1986) ("To require prompt filing ofa forfeiture action but allow indefinite
postponement ofthe trial would reduce the filing requirement to a nullity."); accord United
States v. $307,970.00, in US. Currency, 156 F. Supp. 3d 708, 716 (E.D.N.C. 2016) ("[I]fthe
most due process required was the filing ofa complaint, after the government fulfilled that task,
its attorneys could sit idly by without ever taking meaningful steps to move the case forward.").
At the same time, the Court recognizes the difference-both conceptually and mathematically
between the pre-litigation delay (approximately eighteen months) and the post-commencement
of-litigation delay (approximately f01iy-one months). The Comi considers the reasons for these
delays when evaluating the second factor in the due process analysis. See Banco Cafetero
Panama, 797 F.2d at 1163 ("We leave to the District Comi the task ofconducting a forfeiture
trial within a reasonable time ... to provide appellants with due process oflaw.").
After accounting for the period during which this action was stayed, the length ofthe
delay in this case totals over five years, but by any measure, the delay has been significant. See
$8,850 at 565 (holding a delay ofeighteen months between asset seizure and filing of forfeiture
action was "quite significant"); accord United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527
F.2d 1112, 1114 (1st Cir. 1975) (affirming dismissal offorfeiture proceeding on due process
grounds and noting it was bound by the district court's finding that "the twelve and one-half
month delay [was] 'inexcusable'"). The Court finds this factor weighs in favor ofDeltora.
B. Reason for the Delay
The Government provides several justifications for the significant delay in this case. One
reason-related international criminal investigations and prosecutions----explains the slow nature
ofthe instant proceedings. Therefore, this factor favors the Government.
12
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First, the Government contends Deltora was, in part, responsible for the delay by
repeatedly asking the Government to wait before filing the forfeiture complaint. See Levy Deel.
,i 7; id., Ex. B, ECF No. 45-2.9 And later in the litigation-after the Government notified
Deltora it was prepared to lift the stay-Deltora requested an extension of the stay for several
months. See Levy Deel., Ex. C, ECF No. 45-3. In support of its blame-shifting, the Government
cites $307,970.00, another civil forfeiture case involving claimant-induced delays. Gov't Opp'n
to First Mot. to Dismiss at 21; see Deltora's Reply at 6 (responding that $307,970.00 is factually
distinguishable from this case). In $307,970.00, four years had passed since the Government
seized the funds at issue. 156 F. Supp. 3d at 720. When evaluating the reasons for the delay, the
$307,970.00 court noted both pmiies had sought and obtained stays. See $307,970.00 at 714-16,
720. Finding claimants patiially responsible for the length of the delay, the $307,970.00 court
concluded the delay did not violate claimants' due process rights. Id. Although the Government
is the only party who moved for a stay in this case, Deltora asked the Government to delay filing
the initial Complaint and to delay filing the motion to lift the stay. While Deltora undoubtedly
contributed to the length of the delay, such contributions represented mere months out of the
five-year-long delay. The Court proceeds to the Government's next justification for the delay.
The Government's second justification for the delay-which addresses the stay period
itself from April 2019 to September 2022-is better supported. Most imp01iantly, the stay
period was approved by this Comi in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 98l(g). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(g) ("Upon the motion of the United States, the court shall stay the forfeiture proceeding if
9 Fourteen months after the seizure, the Government informed Claimants it was prepared to file
the Complaint within ninety days. Gov't Opp'n to First Mot. to Dismiss at 21 ("In September of
2018, the Government ... represented to the comi that they would file a forfeiture action within
90 days.").
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the court determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the ability of the Government to
conduct a related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal case.");
$307,970.00, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 718 ("As the court's grant of the government's [§ 98l(g)]
motion demonstrates, the delay was the result of the government satisfying those statutory
criteria."). Section 98l(g) authorizes the Government to request a stay in order to protect related
criminal investigations. See $8,850,461 U.S. at 567 ("Pending criminal proceedings present
similar justifications for delay in instituting civil forfeiture proceedings."); accord United States
v. $131,551.03 Plus Accrued Int. ji-om Sale of JO Table Bluff Rd., Loleta, CA, O6-CV-5256, 2010
WL 1135743, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss where case was
stayed for over three years, in pmi because Government declarations "set fmih a legitimate law
enforcement-related justification for the delay"); $307,970.00, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 718 ("[T]he
court does not weigh [a I O-month] delay harshly against the government" because it is "mindful
of the tension between criminal investigation and a forfeiture proceeding" and "views the delay
as a necessary and permissible attempt to accommodate the criminal matter."). Here, the
Government believed, and this Court agreed, that the forfeitt1re proceeding would impair the
integrity of the Government's complex, related criminal investigation, pmiicularly considering
the extensive international cooperation involved therein.10 Mot. to Stay, ECF No. 18; Sealed
Graham Deel., ECF No. 19. The related prosecutions have been widespread-as of December
10 The first motion to dismiss also argues the Government's reason for the stay is insufficient
because the Government has not brought criminal prosecutions against Monteverde and
Carmona. First Mot. to Dismiss at 23. In light of the Court's threshold detennination that
Monteverde and Carmona lack standing to challenge this civil forfeiture action, this argument is
unpersuasive, if not inelevant. It is also wrong. There is a well-settled understanding that "in
civil forfeiture, the government may take property connected to criminality, even if the
prope1iy's current owner or possessor is not guilty of any crime." United States v. Elias, 23-
6626 at 11 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2025).
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2022, the Government had initiated four criminal prosecutions and the forfeiture ofassets
belonging to the former Peruvian president. Gov't Opp'n to First Mot. to Dismiss at 19.
Furthermore, the Government dealt with unforeseen difficulties resulting from the COVID-19
pandemic, which "hampered [its] ability to empanel and present to the grand jury, ... [and] to
pursue evidence and travel to witness interviews overseas." Gov't Opp'n to First Mot. to
Dismiss at 19. The extensive and complicated international nature ofthe related criminal
proceedings supp01is the Government's reason for the delay.
Accordingly, the Government has provided valid reasoning to explain the life ofthis
case. Despite the relatively long period between the asset seizure and filing ofthe initial
Complaint, most of the delay in this case can be attributed to the lengthy stay coupled with
Claimants' contributory setbacks. Outside ofthe reasons identified by the Government, any
other delays have been attributable to the Court's schedule. See $307,970.00 at 718 (recognizing
the same). Therefore, this factor weighs in the Government's favor.
C. Deltora's Assertions of Its Rights
The third factor-Deltora's asse1iions of its rights-favors neither pmiy. "A claimant is
able to trigger rapid filing ofa forfeiture action ifhe desires it." $8,850,461 U.S. at 569.
Therefore, "failure to use these remedies can be taken as some indication that [claimants] did not
desire an early judicial hearing." Id
After a few months' communication with the Government, Deltora did not challenge the
asset seizure for about a year. Levy Deel. ,r 5. Specifically, in July 2017, the parties agreed to
maintain the Defendant Assets at Raymond James, rather than to liquidate the account. Levy
Deel. ,r,r 3-5. Then, from September 2017 to approximately June 2018, neither Deltora's prior
counsel nor Monteverde or Carmona contacted the Government about the seized assets. Id.
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Deltora argues it failed to assert its rights because Monteverde and Carmona were unfamiliar
with the U.S. legal system, an explanation which appears reasonable on its face given their
foreign citizenship, but which is belied by the fact that all parties were represented by counsel.
Reply at 7. Ultimately, Deltora did not challenge the seizure for a year and does not provide a
compelling reason explaining why.
Shortly after obtaining new counsel, Deltora vigorously asserted its rights by:(!) filing
motions to unseal and for the return of property in the Middle District of Florida; (2) filing a civil
action in the Middle District of Florida; and (3) moving to dismiss this case, opposing the stay,
filing appeals, and requesting updates on the status of the stay. First Mot. to Dismiss at 25;
Reply at 10.
Deltora's decision not to challenge the asset seizure until 2018 favors the Government,
but Deltora's vigorous assertion of its rights since then weighs in its favor. All things
considered, this factor nets neutral.
D. Prejudice From the Delay
The fourth factor-prejudice from the delay-weighs in favor of the Government
because Deltora does not offer specific, compelling reasons establishing such prejudice. First,
Deltora contends it has been prejudiced by the restraint on its brokerage account, which prevents
it from "freely deposit[ing] money in the account" and "tak[ing] distributions from the account"
when necessary for business purposes. First Mot. to Dismiss at 27. While this may be trne,
Deltora's argument does not address the type of prejudice contemplated by this factor. "The
primary inquiry here is whether the delay has hampered the claimant in presenting a defense on
the merits, through, for example, the loss of witnesses or other important evidence." $8,850,461
U.S. at 569. In this regard, Deltora argues its ability to present a meritorious defense has been
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prejudiced by the delay because a key witness, Mr. Jorge Salinas, has died. First Mot. to Dismiss
at 26. If Mr. Salinas planned to offer favorable testimony at trial (which Deltora does not
explicitly say), Deltora could have sought to temporarily lift the stay to obtain such testimony.
Other than this vague assertion, Deltora has not shown any other reason why Mr. Salinas's death
has prejudiced its case. Furthe,more, Deltora has failed to explain how the delay has otherwise
hampered its ability to maintain and collect evidence necessary to presenting a meritorious
defense. Just as the passage of time makes it more difficult for Deltora to obtain evidence, it also
negatively impacts the Government's case. See $307,970.00 at 720. Because Deltora only offers
vague concerns-instead of specific reasons-as to why the death of one allegedly favorable
witness was crucial to its defense, Deltora has not established prejudice from the delay.
Considering all four factors, the delay in this litigation does not compel dismissal for due
process violations. Although they were long, the delays stemmed primarily from the
Government's related criminal investigations and prosecutions. Such related proceedings have
justified significant delays in other civil forfeiture actions, and they do in this case. Therefore,
Claimants' motion to dismiss for due process violations is DENIED.
III. The Amended Complaint Adequately Specifies Violations of the FCPA and
Panamanian Law and Asserts Proper Venue in the Eastern District of New York.
Next, Deltora moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to allege a specified
unlawful activity and for improper venue. See generally Second Mot. to Dismiss. The Court
rejects both arguments.
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A. Failure to Allege a Specified Unlawful Activity
Under 18 U.S.C. § 981, any property involved in, derived from, or traceable to a
"specified unlawful activity" is subject to forfeiture to the United States. 11 In this case, the
Government asserts five bases under 18 U.S.C. § 981 to justify forfeiture of the Defendaot
Assets; these bases can be broken down into two categories. First, the Government alleges the
Defendant Assets were involved in, derived from, or traceable to foreign offenses involving
bribery of a public official and violations of the PCPA and Paoamaniao criminal law (i.e., the
"specified unlawful activity"). Arn. Comp!. ,r 60. Second and relatedly, the Government
contends the Defendant Assets were involved in or traceable to money laundering transactions
and a conspiracy to commit money laundering. Arn. Comp!. ,r,r 63-74. These allegations of
money laundering also require the Government to show the Defendant Assets are traceable to the
specified unlawful activity. See, e.g. Am. Comp!. ,r 73 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i)); see
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) ("Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts ... such a
financial transaction ... knowing the transaction is designed in whole or in pati to conceal or
disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity.").
With respect to the predicate offenses (bribery of a public official, and violations of the
FCPA and Panamanian law), the Government alleges Odebrecht's subsidiary, Klienfeld Services
Ltd. ("Klienfeld"), sent money to Claimants' bank accounts as payment to foreign publicists for
"campaign services" benefitting then-Panamanian president Ricm·do Alberto Mmiinelli Berrocal.
11 The specified unlawful activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(a), (c)(7)(b)(iv), and
(c)(7)(D). See Am. Comp!. ,r,r 59-74; see also Second Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (chart defining
forfeiture authority and specified unlawful activity).
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Am. Comp!. ,r,r 1 S(b), 28-29. Odebrecht allegedly sent those payments "to influence Martinelli
in connection with contracts Odebrecht had obtained and sought to obtain in Panama." Id. ,r 29.
For several reasons, Deltora contends the Government has not sufficiently alleged conduct
constituting bribery of a public official and, as a result, has not sufficiently alleged a money
laundering offense. Second Mot. to Dismiss at 10-11.
The Government has satisfied the heightened pleading standard for in rem civil forfeiture
actions. Under Supplemental Rule G(2)(f), complaints in civil forfeiture actions must "state
sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet
its burden of proof at trial." As outlined in the Government's opposition to the instant motion to
dismiss, the Amended Complaint alleges extensive details related to Odebrecht' s bribery
scheme, the benefits Odebrecht expected to receive from the bribery funds, the relationship
between the Defendant Assets and the bribery scheme, and Claimants' alleged involvement in
the money laundering operation. Gov'! Opp'n to Second Mot. to Dismiss at 6-7, 19; see Am.
Comp!. ,r,r 21-34. For example, the Amended Complaint lists several money transfers from
Klienfeld into Deltora's account at St. Georges Bank & Trust in the Cayman Islands (the
"Deltora Cayman Account"), including the amount and date of each transfer, and alleges
Klienfeld "was used by Odebrecht for illicit purposes" and "did not engage in any legitimate
business activity" that may explain the transfers. Am. Comp!. ,r,r 37, 40. The Amended
Complaint then explains how Claimants allegedly: (1) presented fake documents to facilitate the
transfers; (2) laundered the illicit proceeds through other entities they controlled; and (3)
eventually wired that money into Deltora's account at Raymond James. See Am. Comp!. ,r,r 41-
58. The Government's allegations regarding Claimants' participation in a complex bribery and
money laundering operation involving the former president of Panama support a reasonable
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belief the Government will be able to establish violations of the FCP A or Panamanian criminal
law at trial.
On a more granular level, Deltora also takes issue with the lack of allegations about
specific wire transfers into the Deltora Account that the Government alleges constitute bribery
payments. Those wire transfers originated from two other accounts controlled by Monteverde
and Carmona, which were under the names of two offshore companies: (1) Isagon SAC
("Isagon") and (2) Inversiones El Sanctuario SAC ("Inversiones El Sanctuario"). See Am.
Comp!. ,r 18 (g), (h). Deltora contends the Government fails to specify how those transfers in
particular were derived from, involved in, or traceable to the predicate offenses. Second Mot. to
Dismiss at 11-12 (noting the Government fails to allege when and from whom Monteverde and
Carmona's Isagon account received a $4.4 million payment); but see Am. Comp!. ,r,r 29, 31, 51
(discussing the Isagon account and identifying wire transfers from entities controlled by
Monteverde and Carmona into the Deltora Account). Deltora's arguments are misguided. At the
pleading stage, the Government need not trace every allegedly improper transaction to specific
illegal activity. See United States v. Mondragon, 313 F.3d 862, 866-67 (4th Cir. 2002)
(affinning denial of motion to strike the complaint where complaint lacked information about the
drug transactions giving rise to the seized cash); Advisory Comm. Note Supp. Rule G (stating
Supp. Rule G(2)(f) should be read consistent with Mondragon); United States v. Dime Sav. Bank
of Williamsburg Acct. No. 58-400738-1, 255 F. Supp. 2d 56, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (Levy,
Mag.) (denying motion to dismiss where claimant argued "the government is required to allege
facts showing that each transfer can be traced to specific deposits of criminally deposited
monies"). The standard articulated in Supplemental Rule G(2)(f) does not require the
Government to provide a detailed accounting of this money laundering scheme at the pleading
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stage, especially where many of the transactions were conducted using offshore entities and
international bank accounts. See Gov't Opp'n to Second Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9. Although the
Government will need to provide more information to prove its claims at trial, the Amended
Complaint offers more than enough information to allow Claimants to investigate the allegations.
See Mondragon, 313 F.3d at 866-67 (stating the purpose of a civil forfeiture complaint is to
allow claimants to "commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a responsive pleading");
see also Advisory Comm. Note Supp. Rule G (stating the standard in Supp. Rule E(2)(a), which
is discussed in Mondragon, now applies to civil forfeiture actions in accordance with Supp. Rule
G(2)(f)). Because the allegations clearly outline the Government's theory of the underlying
crimes and the money laundering operation, the Amended Complaint is sufficient "to support a
reasonable belief that the [G]overnment will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial." Supp.
R. G(2)(f); see Dime Sav. Bank, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 68 ("[T]he issue before the court is pleading,
not proof at trial. Thus, the court need not pass on the government's ultimate burden of proof
regarding traceability."); Mondragon, 313 F.3d 862 at 866.
Deltora's remaining arguments regarding the depth--or lack thereof--of the factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint fall flat. The informational gaps identified by Deltora are
relatively minor and concern details to be borne out at trial. See, e.g., Second Mot. to Dismiss at
14 (arguing the Complaint lacks allegations about who received the campaign services and how
Odebrecht sought to benefit from those services); id. (contending the Complaint did "nothing
more than illustrate th[at] Odebrecht privately donated to campaign financing"). Deltora seeks a
complaint so comprehensive as to vitiate the need for trial or further fact-finding.
Deltora's critiques about the legal viability of the Government's case similarly lack merit.
Deltora asserts the Hoskins cases, which imposed territorial requirements for establishing
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criminal liability under the FCPA, preclude forfeiture ofthe Defendant Assets. See generally
United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Hoskins, 44 F.4th 140 (2d
Cir. 2022). This argument is misplaced. Deltora incorrectly conflates criminal liability under
the FCPA and civil forfeiture ofmonies traceable to FCPA violations. See Second Mot. to
Dismiss at 15-18; Gov't Opp'n to Second Mot. to Dismiss at 13-16. But ifthere was any doubt
about the applicability of the Hoskins cases, the Amended Complaint resolves it. The Amended
Complaint alleges conduct occurring in the United States and related to the bribery scheme:
"[M]any ofthe funds deposited into Klienfeld's Antigua and Barbuda account were caused by an
agent ofOdebrecht while in the United States." Am. Comp!. ,r 18(b). Therefore, Deltora's
argument under Hoskins fails.
Deltora also contends "the allegation that Deltora' s Cayman Islands Account received
money from Klienfeld is insufficient to state a violation ofPanamanian articles 345, 347, 351,
and 354 as a specified unlawful activity ... which is necessary to state a cause ofaction for
forfeiture." Second Mot. to Dismiss at 19. With respect to financial transactions, a "specified
unlawful activity" means "an offense against a foreign nation involving bribery ofa public
official, or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement ofpublic funds by or for the benefit ofa
public official." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv). Deltora states the Panamanian Articles do not
involve either type ofoffense. Second Mot. to Dismiss at 20. This argument is, at best, wrong
and at worst, intentionally misleading. Article 351 ofthe Panamanian Criminal Code
(Unjustified Enrichment) criminalizes the receipt ofincome "whose licit origin cannot be
justified" by "public servant[s], personally or through an intermediary." Am. Comp!., Attach. A.
Articles 345,347, and 354 clearly criminalize "bribery ofa public official" using similar
language. See id.; see also United States v. Real Prop. Known as Unit 5B of Onyx Chelsea
22
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Condo, 10-CV-5390, 2012 WL 1883371, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2012) (Forrest, J.) (holding
the violation of a foreign offense under Section 1956( c)(7)(B)(iv) is "defined by the relevant
foreign nation"); Am. Comp!. ,r 18(i) (alleging Martinelli was a "public official" under Section
1956(c)(7)(B)(iv) and a "public servant" within the meaning of Panamanian law). The Court
therefore swiftly rejects this argument. Deltora's remaining contention-that the Govermnent
must identify which Article of the Panamanian Criminal Code applies to the alleged
misconduct-misses the mark. See Second Mot. to Dismiss at 21. All four provisions could
apply to the alleged misconduct, and the Govermnent bears the burden of proving those
violations of Panamanian law at trial. The Court rejects Deltora's myriad arguments and denies
the motion to dismiss for failure to allege a specified unlawful activity.
B. Failure to Allege Improper Venue
Deltora also argues the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because venue is not
proper in the Eastern District of New York. Second Mot. to Dismiss at 22. On a motion to
dismiss for improper venue, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of
appropriate venue. Study Logic, LLC v. Farmer Bros. Co., l 8-CV-1645, 2019 WL 3412114, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019) (Dearie, J.); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). The district court views
all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378,
384 (2d Cir. 2007).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1355, forfeiture actions may be brought in the district in which any of
the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(l). Deltora
contends the alleged acts occurred in the Cayman Islands, Antigua, Brazil, and Panama-not in
the United States. Second Mot. to Dismiss at 22. The Govermnent counters that the "acts giving
23
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rise to the forfeiture, specifically, wire transfers, occurred in this district." Gov't Opp'n to
Second Mot. to Dismiss at 20. 12
The Government adequately alleges venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York
because wire transfers in furtherance of the bribery and money laundering scheme passed
through the district. "[V]enue lies where a wire in furtherance of a scheme begins its course,
continues, or ends." United States v. Rutigliano, 790 F.3d 389,397 (2d Cir. 2015). The
Government contends two wire transfers passed through U.S. correspondent accounts 13 in New
York City on September 25, 2014, and December 22, 2014, respectively. Gov't Opp'n to
Second Mot. to Dismiss at 22. While the Court did not locate such dates in the Complaint or
Amended Complaint, the Amended Complaint does allege nine wire transfers from Klienfeld's
account at Mein! Bank in Antigua (the "Klienfeld Account") were sent to the Deltora Cayman
Account through Standard Chattered Bank in New York. Am. Comp!. ,r 32, 39. The Comt
considers these allegations sufficient to establish that at least one wire transfer involved in the
bribery and money laundering scheme was routed through New York City and was processed by
a Manhattan-based payment processing center. See Pepitone Deel. ,r,r 8-11, ECF No. 51; Gov't
Opp'n to Second Mot. to Dismiss at 22. In order to be processed by the Manhattan-based center,
those wire transfers must have traversed the waters over the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of
New York. 14 Because "acts" giving rise to the forfeiture-/. e., wire transfers-occurred in the
12 Venue is also proper in: (I) the district where a forfeiture action accrues or the defendant is
found; (2) the district where such prope1ty is found; or (3) the district into which the prope1ty is
brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1395; see id. § 1355 (stating venue is proper in any other district where
specifically provided for in section 1395 of this title).
13 A "correspondent account" is "an account established to receive deposits from, make
payments on behalf of a foreign financial institution, or handle other financial transactions
related to such institution." 31 U.S.C. § 5318(A)(e )(I )(B).
14 The Eastern District of New York includes "the waters within the counties of Bronx and New
York." 28 U.S.C. § 112(c).
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Eastern District of New York, the Government adequately alleges venue in this district. See
Rutigliano, 790 F.3d at 397; United States v. $198,573.85 in US. Currency, 13-CV-1180, 2014
WL 859137, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2014) (Hurd, J.) (denying motion to dismiss for
improper venue where members of a conspiracy agreed to a drug sale and one member of the
conspiracy executed a wire transfer originating from the district); see also United States v. Ho,
984 F.3d 191, 205 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding the money laundering statute applies to wire transfers
passing through United States accounts, even if the United States is "neither the point of
origination nor the end destination for the money"); United States v. Obaid, 971 F.3d 1095, 1106
(9th Cir. 2020) (holding claimants' personal involvement in the conspiracy was immaterial to the
venue analysis because the forfeiture "action is predicated on whether the [company] shares, i.e.,
the res, are traceable to the proceeds of the crime").
The Government has can-ied its burden to make a prima facie showing of venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1355. The Court does not consider the Government's alternative arguments under 28
U.S.C. § 1395 and 18 U.S.C. § 981(h). The Court denies Deltora's motion to dismiss for
improper venue.
IV. In the Context of This Action, the Government Has Moved with Appropriate
Diligence.
As evidenced by the Government's regular participation in this action, Deltora's motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute is without merit. Courts in the Second Circuit consider five
factors when determining whether to dismiss for failure to prosecute:"(!) whether the plaintiffs
failure to prosecute caused a delay of significant duration; (2) whether the plaintiff was notified
that further delay would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendant was likely to be prejudiced
by further delay; (4) whether the need to alleviate court calendar congestion outweighs the
plaintiffs right to have his day in court; and (5) whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate."
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Leya v. Mayorkas, 24-CV-3980, 2025 WL 35942, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2025) (Donnelly, J.)
(quoting US. ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248,254 (2d Cir.2004)).
Deltora's motion fails on the first factor alone: the Government has prosecuted this case
with sufficient speed, and any failure to proceed diligently on the Government's part has not
caused a serious delay. In support ofthe first factor, Deltora notes this case has been on the
docket for more than six years, with their motions to dismiss pending for more than two years.
Third Mot. to Dismiss at 5. But Deltora's attempt to blame the Government for the slow pace of
this litigation is misguided. As explained above, the delays are largely attributable to the stay
period and the Court's docket management. See Discussion Section II.B (evaluating the reasons
behind the length of the delay). And although the Government itself moved for the stay, the
Court declines to characterize this action as a "failure to prosecute." Indeed, a "failure to
prosecute" involves inaction on the pmt of the plaintiff. That is not the case here, especially
where the Comt granted the stay and subsequently denied motions to lift the stay.
Deltora also argues "the [G]overnment has done vittually nothing [to move discovery
forward] ... [b]eyond the limited request for records at the end of2023." Third Mot. to Dismiss
at 3. This is incorrect. The Government has produced over 35,000 pages of material and sought
contact information for Deltora's witnesses. See Gov't Opp'n to Third Mot. to Dismiss at 3.
Deltora's version of events is further disproven by a February 2024 email from the Government
asking to discuss "the status ofdiscovery, Claimants' inte1rngato1y responses, and deposition
scheduling." Id., Ex. B, ECF No. 70-2. Notably, Deltora's counsel replied that "a deposition
scheduling conference is premature as [he has] not propounded any discovery regarding [the
Government's] possible witnesses ... [and the parties] have not received a ruling on either
26
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motion to dismiss." Id Following the August 2025 status conference, the parties have also
engaged in briefing about discovery issues. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 83-85.
The Government has been actively pursuing this case, and the Court has fulfilled
Deltora's request for discove1y deadlines and a trial date. See Order, ECF No. 76. Deltora's
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is denied.
V. Custody of the Defendant Assets
Finally, the Court addresses non-party Raymond James's motion to transfer custody of
the Defendant Assets to the Government. See generally Mot. for Release of Funds. Raymond
James argues it "has been the forced custodian of the Defendant Assets for more than seven
years" and, during that time, it has been burdened with: (I) providing a monthly accounting of
the Deltora Account to the U.S. Marshals service; (2) meeting anti-money laundering ("AML")
requirements for the Deltora Account; and (3) paying legal fees in connection with this action.
Id at 6. The Government is willing to assume custody of the Defendant Assets. See Gov't
Response to Mot. for Release of Funds at 3 ("[The Government] does not oppose the Motion and
notes that the cash, which currently comprises the vast majority of the Defendant Assets, would
earn interest at a significantly higher rate if moved to [the Government's Seized Asset Deposit
Fund]."), ECF No. 66. Claimants oppose the proposed transfer. See generally Claimants'
Response to Mot. for Release of Funds, ECF No. 64.
Raymond James argues 18 U.S.C. § 983G)(l) authorizes the Court to "order the
Defendant Assets to be transferred to and held by the Government instead." Mot. for Release of
Funds at 6-7. But 18 U.S.C. § 9830)(1) appears to limit the Court's ability to restrain seized
assets "[u]pon application of the United States." Indeed, when the Court so-ordered the
Stipulation maintaining the Defendant Assets in the Deltora Account at Raymond James, ECF
No. 27, it did so upon a joint application submitted by the Government, ECF No. 26. Raymond
27
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James has not provided the Court with any case law supporting its position that 18 U.S.C.
§ 983G)(l) authorizes the Court to modify the Stipulation upon the motion of a non-party. The
Court therefore directs Raymond James, Deltora, and the Government to file supplemental briefs
as to: (1) the Court's authority to order the transfer of the Defendant Assets upon the motion of a
non-party; and (2) the standard by which the Court should review any such motion to modify the
Stipulation. These supplemental briefs shall be simultaneously filed on ECF on or by Friday,
February 13, 2026, at 5:00 P.M.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Deltora's motions to dismiss at ECF Nos. 39, 40, 67. The Comt
RESERVES on Raymond James's motion at ECF No. 62.
Dated: December 18, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
-1fON. WILLIA¥"f.
UNITED STijfES D
28
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