USA v. Reid et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
WILLIAM REID,
Petitioner,
-against-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
20-cv-6228-LDH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
-against-
WILLIAM REID,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
16-cr-00212-LDH
LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:
William Reid (“Petitioner”) filed the instant petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
vacate his conviction and reduce his sentence with respect to Count Three of the Superseding
Indictment. (See USA v. Reid, No. 16-CR-212, Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 81.)
BACKGROUND
On June 14, 2016, Petitioner, together with others, was charged in a seven-count
Superseding Indictment. (See Reid, Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 28.) Specifically,
Petitioner was charged on Count One with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to
Distribute Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(i); Count Three with Use of
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Firearms In Connection with a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924/(c)(1)(A)(i); Count Four with Hobbs Act Extortion Conspiracy of John Doe #1, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Count Five with Attempted Hobbs Act Extortion of John Doe #1, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Count Six with Committing and Threatening Physical Violence
in Furtherance of a Plan to Extort John Doe #1, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and Count
Seven with Possessing, Brandishing and Discharging a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i-iii), 924(c)(1)(C)(i). (See Reid, Superseding Indictment
at 1–4.)
On January 13, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress a gun recovered in connection
with a Pennsylvania state case. (See Reid, ECF Nos. 41 at 1, 41-1 at 1–4.) Petitioner’s motion
was denied. (See Reid, Mar. 22, 2017 Order.) On April 11, 2017, Petitioner pleaded guilty,
pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government (the “Plea Agreement”), to Counts One and
Three of the Superseding Indictment. (See Reid, Apr. 11, 2017 Min. Entry.) On March 6, 2018,
Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the firearm, which supported his
conviction on Count Three, should not have been considered in his federal case because it was
recovered in connection with an unrelated Pennsylvania state case in which the charge relating to
the firearm was dismissed. (See Reid, ECF No. 59.) On November 1, 2018, Petitioner was
sentenced to a total of 145 months’ imprisonment consisting of 85 months on Count One and 60
months on Count Three, followed by four years of supervised release. (See Reid, Nov. 1, 2018
Min. Entry.) On November 6, 2018, this Court denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, (Reid, ECF No. 66), and entered the final judgment as to his sentence (Reid, ECF No. 67).
Thereafter, on November 13, 2018, Petitioner filed an appeal of his conviction and
sentence to the Second Circuit. (See Reid, ECF No. 69.) The Government moved to dismiss
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Petitioner’s appeal, (USA v. Reid, No. 18-3409, Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 27), which the Second
Circuit construed “as also seeking summary affirmance of Appellant’s term of supervised
release, special conditions of supervised release, and special assessment, which were not covered
by [Petitioner’s] appeal waiver.” (Id., ECF No. 89.) On May 4, 2020, the Second Circuit
granted the Government’s motion to dismiss and its motion for summary affirmance. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a court may “vacate, set aside or correct” a conviction or
the sentence “imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a). In a Section 2255 proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Triana v. United States, 205 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2000). To
obtain relief under Section 2255, a petitioner must show “that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Further, a
collateral attack on a conviction or sentence imposed is only available for “an error of law or fact
that constitutes ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.’” United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). However, where it “plainly appears from the motion, any attached
exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the
judge must dismiss the motion.” Fed. R. Governing § 2255 Proceedings in the U.S.D.C. 4(b).
Such is the case here.
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On April 11, 2017, pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty as
to Counts One and Three of the Superseding Indictment. (See Reid, Apr. 11, 2017 Min. Entry.)
Of particular relevance, under the Plea Agreement, Petitioner waived his right to appeal or
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence if the custodial sentence imposed was 195 months
or below. (Resp’t’s Opp’n at 4.) Certainly, any appellate waiver must be made knowingly,
voluntarily, and competently. United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 2000).
Here, it was. Indeed, Petitioner does not argue otherwise nor could he credibly. At Petitioner’s
sentencing, the Court inquired into the sufficiency of the plea and ultimately found that it was
made with the requisite competency. As such, the Court must enforce the appellate waiver so
long the sentence imposed fell within or below the stipulated range set forth in the Plea
Agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
petitioner’s appeal under Section 2255 of a sentence within the range stipulated by the plea
agreement was foreclosed by such agreement). It did.
This Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 145 months, (see Judgment
at 2, ECF No. 67), which is fifty months below the waiver. (Resp’t’s Opp’n at 4.) Therefore,
Petitioner was sentenced within the range to which he stipulated to in the Plea Agreement and his
right to appeal was waived. This is the only appropriate conclusion. The law is clear: “In no
circumstance . . . may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of
a sentence conforming to the agreement.” United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53
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(2d. Cir. 1993). Petitioner’s motion to vacate his conviction as to Count Three and reduce his
sentence is barred by the Plea Agreement.1
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH
December 4, 2025 LASHANN DEARCY HALL
United States District Judge
1 Even in the absence of the appellate waiver, the Petitioner’s argument would still fail. Petitioner’s
primary claim is that he is entitled to relief because the gun recovered in connection with a Pennsylvania state case
should not have provided a basis for the federal conviction on Count Three. (Mot. to Vacate at 13-14.) However, as
the Government notes, this is the same argument that Petitioner advanced in connection with his motion to suppress
evidence of the gun before the trial, which this Court rejected. (See Reid, Mar. 22, 2017 Order) (denying, inter alia,
Petitioner’s motion to suppress). Furthermore, both this Court and the Second Circuit considered and rejected this
argument post-trial in connection with Petitioner’s post-trial appeals. (See Reid, Memorandum and Order, ECF No.
66) (where this Court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and finding Petitioner’s “2011
Pennsylvania conduct was relevant conduct and would be considered by the Court in determining his sentence”);
(see also Reid, Mandate of USCA, ECF No. 78) (where the Second Circuit granted the government’s motion to
dismiss with respect to, inter alia, Petitioner’s appeal of his conviction and term of imprisonment). Petitioner
provides no basis for the Court to disturb these findings.
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