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2:26-cv-02309Nmd13 ott 2026

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
EUDYS ANTONIO BECERRA HURTADO,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 2:26-cv-02309-SMD-JHR
WARDEN OF THE OTERO COUNTY
PROCESSING CENTER, 	et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, and for the
reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Venezuela, was encountered at the border of the United States on 	or
about September 28, 2023. Petitioner was thereafter paroled into the country. On or about January
29 or January 30, 2026, Petitioner was detained by immigration officials and remains detained at
Otero County Processing Center in New Mexico. 	See 	Docs. 1, 7. The record does not demonstrate
that Petitioner has any criminal history nor that he violated any conditions of release. 	See id.
Petitioner asserts that this ongoing detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Doc. 1 at 6.
Petitioner filed a prior petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Texas.
See Becerra Hurtado v. Warden, No. 3:26-cv-01765-DCG (W.D. Tex.). The petition was dismissed
without prejudice on August 10, 2026, after Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the petition. 	See
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Becerra Hurtado v. Warden, Doc. 10.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that they are in “custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
I. 	Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). 	Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Id. 	at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. 	See id. 	at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. 	E.g., 	Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
Mass. 2025); 	see also Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); 	Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Court’s understanding of §§ 1225 and 1226 in 	Santillan
Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F. 4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026). The court held that noncitizens “who entered
the United States without admission and who have lived here since” cannot be subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. 	Id. 	at 1239. 	These individuals are “categorically unable to
seek admission while they remain in the country.” 	Id. 	“The Government’s interpretation disrupts
§ 	1226(a)’s 	coverage 	of 	inadmissible 	noncitizens. 	If 	the 	Government 	is 	correct 	that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of all applicants for admission, then there are no
inadmissible noncitizens left for § 1226(a) to cover.” 	Id. 	at 1247.
Because it is undisputed that Petitioner entered the United States approximately three years
ago and was arrested in the interior of the country, § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.
II. 	The Government’s Ongoing Detention Violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Rights
The Court finds that ongoing detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. 	Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025) (citing 	Ky. Dep’t of Corr.
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). 	“Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
“Due process requires that, whenever the Government detains somebody, it must have a
good reason for doing so. If the detention is civil and nonpunitive, like the immigration detention
here, that reason must rise to the level of a ‘strong special justification.’” 	Santillan Quiroz, 180
F.4th at 1249 (citation omitted).
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Respondents have offered neither a justification nor a formal process for the deprivation of
Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. Respondents’ response does not contest any of the assertions
in the Petition and does not set forth any criminal history nor any failure to comply with conditions
of release. 	See 	Doc. 7. 	Petitioner’s time within the country following release creates a
constitutionally protected interest that cannot be revoked without providing due process of law.
The United States’ power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” 	See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence [the alien’s] constitutional status changes
accordingly.”). Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention
and was deprived of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
Respondents indicate that they are not submitting an opposition and cite to 	Santillan Quiroz
in noting that the Court may then grant relief. 	See 	Doc. 7 at 3. Because Respondents have offered
no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to § 2241.
See Ramirez v. Noem, 829 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D.N.M. 2026).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby 	ORDERED:
1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is 	GRANTED;
2) 	Respondents 	SHALL 	release Petitioner within 48 hours without any additional
conditions 	or 	restraints 	beyond 	those 	that 	existed 	before 	Petitioner’s 	unlawful
detainment;
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3) 	Respondents 	SHALL 	provide Petitioner with all personal 	belongings, facilitate
Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility, and provide all identity and travel
documents required to allow return to Petitioner’s primary address;
4) 	Respondents 	SHALL 	file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. 	This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location, or
other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or copies
of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of release;
5) 	Respondents 	SHALL NOT 	re-detain Petitioner without adequate notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing before a neutral immigration judge, at which the Government must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or
a flight risk;
6) 	The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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