Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
NETZAHAULCOYOTL LOMELI LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-01445-KG-GBW
TODD BLANCHE, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Netazahualcoyotl Lopez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. 1, the Government’s Response, Doc. 7, and Petiitoner’s Reply, Doc. 8. Because
Petitioner’s challenge presents a purely legal question, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28
U.S.C. § 2243, and grants his petition for the reasons below.
I. Background
Petitioner, a 31-year-old Mexican citizen, entered the United States in 2021 with a work
visa. Doc. 1 at 2. He is married and has two United States citizen children. Id.
On August 20, 2025, Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested
Petitioner in Florida. Doc. 1 at 2. Petitioner remains detained at the Otero County Detention Center
in New Mexico. Doc. 1 at 2. Petitioner has not been afforded a bond hearing.
Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 3. He seeks immediate release or,
alternatively, a bond hearing in front of a neutral adjudicator. Id. at 4.
Petitioner filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) on May 6, 2026,
seeking immediate release and enjoinment of transfer during the pendency of these proceedings.
Doc. 3.
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II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical confinement.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is available if a noncitizen is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. Analysis
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention violates the INA and the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and that release is warranted.
A. Petitioner’s detention violates the INA.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018).
First, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs noncitizens detained at a port of entry or shortly after entry, who are
treated as “[noncitizens] seeking admission into the country.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Absent exceptions not relevant here, § 1225 “mandates
detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1
(D.N.M.).
By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) sets forth “the default rule” for detaining noncitizens
“already in the country.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Section § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and
detention of noncitizens, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General...pending a decision on
whether [they are] to be removed.” Under federal regulations, noncitizens detained under § 1226(a)
are entitled to individualized bond hearings at the “outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306.
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Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue, the Court
concludes that § 1226 governs here.1 See Barco Mercado v. Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13
(S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide and noting that challengers prevailed
in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across fifty courts). ICE arrested Petitioner
4 years after his initial entry into the United States and did not apprehend him at or near the border.
Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply because Petitioner effected an
entry into the United States by living here for four years. Doc. 1 at 2. Therefore, Petitioner’s
continued detention without a bond hearing violates the INA.
Moreover, this Court’s prior decisions control. The Government concedes that the material
facts here are materially indistinguishable from those in Patel v. Noem, 2026 WL 103163 (D.N.M.),
where the Court held that § 1226 governs. See Doc. 7 at 2. The Court has reached the same
conclusion in numerous similar cases. See, e.g., Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432,
at *3 (D.N.M.); Arroyo Lopez v. Noem, 2026 WL 776332, at *3 (D.N.M.); Aguilar v. Lyons, 2026
WL 851237, at *2 (D.N.M.). The Government acknowledges that these decisions control the
outcome here if followed. Doc. 7 at 2. Because the Government offers no new basis for
Petitioner’s continued detention, Petitioner is entitled to relief.
B. Petitioner’s detention violates the Due Process Clause.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from depriving any
person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
1 There is currently a circuit split on this issue. The Second Circuit has held that individuals
like Petitioner are entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Cunha v. Freden, ---
F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. 2026). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have reached the
opposite conclusion. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v.
Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). The Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue.
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U.S. at 690. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of
law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693. The Government’s power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the
ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”). Given that §
1226(a) is controlling here, Petitioner “is entitled—as a right—to an individualized bond hearing.”
Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, 2025 WL 3485771, at *5 (D.N.M.). Petitioner’s continued detention
without such review “constitutes an ongoing violation of [his] right to due process.” Id.
C. The proper remedy is release.
The Court next turns to the appropriate remedy. Federal courts are authorized under § 2243
to “dispose of [a habeas petition] as law and justice require” and thus possess broad discretion to
fashion appropriate relief. Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435, 443 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Burton v.
Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that a federal court “possesses power to grant
any form of relief necessary to satisfy the requirement of justice”) (emphasis in original). Given the
Government’s conduct here, release is warranted. See Singh v. Carnes, 2026 WL 446579, at *1
(D.N.M.) (ordering release where the Government “failed to articulate a legitimate interest in
Petitioner’s continued detention”); Palomeque-Carrion v. Bondi, 2026 WL 895567, at *2 (D.N.M.)
(same); Alfaro Herrera v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 91470, at *1 (D. Colo.) (same).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court orders that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, is granted. The Government shall release
Petitioner within 24 hours of this Order. The Government shall not impose any new
conditions of release beyond those in place prior to Petitioner’s detention.
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2. Before Petitioner’s removal order becomes final, the Government is enjoined from
redetaining Petitioner absent a predetention hearing before a neutral immigration judge at
which the Government must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner
poses a danger or flight risk. This Order does not affect the Government’s ability to detain
Petitioner once his removal order becomes final—at that point, his detention is governed by
the mandatory detention provision of § 1231.
3. The Government shall file a status report within ten (10) business days of this Order
certifying compliance.
4. Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Doc. 3, is denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the
NEF (Notice of Electronic Filing)
accompanying this document. Electronically
filed documents can be found on the Court’s
PACER public access system.
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