Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
OLEKSII TIUTIUNNYK,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00594-KG-GJF
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Oleksii Tiutiunnyk’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Doc. 1, and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Doc. 6. For the reasons below, the Court grants Respondents’
motion and dismisses the petition without prejudice.
I. Background
Petitioner arrived in the United States from Ukraine on April 15, 2023. Doc. 6 at 2. The
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) arrested Petitioner at a checkpoint in New Mexico on
August 30, 2025. Id. On November 25, 2025, after a hearing, an immigration judge ordered
Petitioner’s removal. Id. The order became administratively final on December 26, 2025, when the
deadline for Petitioner to appeal the removal order expired. Doc. 6 at 2. Petitioner is currently
detained at the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico, pending removal
proceedings. Id.
Petitioner appears to challenge his arrest and continued detention as unlawful. Doc. 1.
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention pending removal is constitutionally permissible under
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2011), and that Petitioner has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Doc. 6 at 1.
II. Standard of Review
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A habeas petition seeks “release from unlawful physical confinement.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas review is proper where an immigration detainee is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded
factual allegations in a complaint and view[s] these allegations in the light most favorable to the”
petitioner. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). A habeas petition
withstands dismissal only if it alleges “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241
F.3d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition may “be dismissed...under
Rule 12(b)(6)”).
III. Analysis
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), when a noncitizen is ordered removed,
the Government must execute the removal within a 90-day “removal period.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
§ 1231(a)(2). The “removal period begins” when the removal order “becomes administratively
final.” § 1231(a)(1)(B). An order of removal becomes administratively final upon either (1) “a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of
the period” in which the noncitizen may appeal the order. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see also Riley
v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 267 (2025).
Although the Government may continue to detain an “inadmissible” noncitizen beyond the
90-day removal period, see § 1231(a)(6), it may not detain them “indefinitely.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 699. A six-month detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. This presumptively
reasonable period does not begin until the noncitizen is detained. See Callender v. Shanahan, 281
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F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating that the presumptively reasonable period under
Zadvydas “could not have begun until [the petitioner] was detained by ICE”). After six months, if
the noncitizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut
that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 US. at 701.
Here, the presumptively reasonable period has not yet elapsed. The removal period began
on December 26, 2025, when the deadline for Petitioner to file an appeal expired. See
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). Petitioner’s approximately three-month confinement remains well within the
six-month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas. Because Petitioner’s detention
remains within the presumptively reasonable period, we decline to address Respondents’ contention
that Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Doc. 6 at 2. See United
States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 315 F.R.D. 56, 60–61 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting that “it is
regular and proper to leave alternative arguments unresolved after a court finds a dispositive basis
for resolving an issue” even if jurisdictional deficiencies may exist). Thus, the Court denies the
petition and grants Respondents’ motion to dismiss.
III. Conclusion
The Court grants Respondents’ motion to dismiss and dismisses the petition without
prejudice. Petitioner may refile his petition should the facts of his detention change.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the
NEF (Notice of Electronic Filing)
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