Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ANDRES EDUARDO CHACIN ACURERO,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 2:26-cv-00565-MIS-JFR
DORA CASTRO, Warden, Otero County
Processing Center; MARY DE ANDA-
YBARRA, Director of the El Paso Field
Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal
Operations; TODD M. LYONS, Acting
Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; and TODD BLANCHE, Acting
U.S. Attorney General,
Respondents.
ORDER DENYING VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 2241
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Andres Eduardo Chacin Acurero’s
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), ECF No. 1, filed
February 26, 2026. The Federal Respondents (“Respondents”) filed a Response on March 10,
2026 (“Response”),1 ECF No. 9, to which Petitioner filed a Reply on March 20, 2026 (“Reply”),
ECF No. 10. Upon review of the Parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, the Court
will DENY the Petition.
1 The Clerk’s Office served all Respondents with the Petition pursuant to this District’s Standing
Order Regarding Service of Process in Immigration Habeas Petitions filed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Case 1:26-
mc-00004, ECF No. 3 (D.N.M. Jan. 28, 2026). ECF No. 2. However, as has become customary in these cases, the
Warden did not respond to the Petition.
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I. Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who entered the United States without inspection or
parole near Eagle Pass, Texas on September 14, 2021. Pet. ¶ 12; Resp. ¶¶ 1-2. Shortly thereafter,
U.S. Border Patrol Agents apprehended Petitioner, determined that he was an inadmissible alien
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and detained him. See Pet. ¶ 36; Resp. ¶ 3.
After Petitioner claimed fear of returning to Venezuela, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) issued him a Notice to Appear, placed him in removal proceedings, and released him on
his own recognizance. See Pet. ¶ 36; Resp. ¶ 4-5. Petitioner moved to Orlando, Florida and is the
father to a two-year-old daughter who is a U.S. citizen. Id. ¶ 37. According to Respondents, “[t]he
presently available records indicate that Petitioner did not report [for his immigration proceedings]
as instructed.” Resp. at 6.
On November 22, 2025, U.S. Border Patrol Agents encountered Petitioner at an airport in
El Paso, Texas, asked him about his immigration status, and arrested him. Pet. ¶ 42; Resp. ¶ 7.
Petitioner was transported to the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico where
he has been detained ever since. Pet. ¶ 42; Resp. ¶ 8. The same day, DHS issued Petitioner a
Notice to Appear, placing him in removal proceedings and charging him with being inadmissible
under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA as a noncitizen who “entered the United States without
being admitted or paroled.” Notice to Appear (Nov. 22, 2025), ECF No. 1-2. Petitioner has since
filed an application for asylum, which remains pending. Pet. ¶ 41; Resp. ¶ 9.
On December 12, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner bond, finding that pursuant
to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N.
Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), “the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a bond.” Pet. ¶ 44; Resp. ¶ 10.
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On January 2, 2026, the Immigration Judge held a custody redetermination hearing at
Petitioner’s request. Resp. ¶ 11. On that date, the Immigration Judge again denied bond because
“[t]he Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a bond under Matter of YAJURE HURTADO, 29 I&N Dec.
216 (BIA 2025).” Id. The Immigration Judge additionally found, “[i]n the alternative, [Petitioner]
has not met his burden of showing that he is not a flight risk.” Id.
On February 20, 2026, the Immigration Judge revisited the matter upon Petitioner’s
request, again denying relief on the following grounds:
[Petitioner] received a prior bond hearing. Despite the Court’s finding that it lacked
jurisdiction under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the
Court also fully evaluated the Respondent’s claim on the merits and ruled that
[Petitioner] did not meet his burden of showing that he is not a flight risk.
[Petitioner] has not shown substantially changed circumstances to justify a second
bond hearing.
Order of the Immigration Judge (Feb. 20, 2026), ECF No. 9-1.
On February 25, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. On February 26, 2026, the Court issued an Order to
Show Cause instructing Respondents to answer the Petition and show cause why it should not be
granted. ECF No. 6. On March 10, 2026, Respondents filed a Response, ECF No. 9, to which
Petitioner filed a Reply, ECF No. 11.
II. Legal Standard
Federal courts possess authority to review the legality of executive detention through the
writ of habeas corpus. Title 28, United States Code, section 2241 expressly authorizes courts to
issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Tenth Circuit has recognized that
“[c]hallenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes
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v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-
88 (2001)). “The fundamental purpose of a § 2241 habeas proceeding is to allow a person in
custody to attack the legality of that custody, and the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir.
1997)).
III. Discussion
Petitioner argues that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and his re-detention
without notice or individualized assessment as to his dangerousness or flight risk violates the INA
and its implementing regulations, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶¶ 46-71.
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). Resp. at 5-7. They further argue that Petitioner’s due process claim is foreclosed by
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 7-11 (citations omitted). Finally, Respondents argue that even if
the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is governed by Section 1226(a), his claim fails because
he has received an individualized detention hearing, and the Court lacks authority to review the
Immigration Judge’s factual determination regarding Petitioner’s flight risk. Id. at 13-14.
In his Reply, Petitioner maintains that his detention is governed by Section 1226(a), ECF
No. 10 at 4-5, Respondents cannot justify his detention through his pending asylum application,
id. at 5-6, and his purported mandatory detention does not comport with due process under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), id. at 6-7. He requests immediate release rather than
“another futile bond hearing.” Id. at 7. In this regard, he argues that the Immigration Judge’s
alternative finding that Petitioner poses a flight risk “conflicts with the Government’s prior
determination that he posed no flight risk and overlooks his U.S. citizen two-year-old daughter,
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his valid employment authorization, his TPS, and his pending Form I-589.” Id. at 8. He argues
that if the Court orders a bond hearing it should place the burden of proof on the Government. Id.
at 9.
The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is not unlawful. Initially, for the reasons
explained in this Court’s decision in Lopez-Romero v. Lyons, 2:25-cv-01113-MIS-JHR, 2026 WL
92873 (D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2026), the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), which provides that the Attorney General may exercise his discretion to either detain or
release a noncitizen on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). Petitioner does not
dispute that on January 2, 2026, the Immigration Judge held a custody redetermination hearing
and denied Petitioner release on bond on two alternative grounds: (1) “[t]he Court lacks
jurisdiction to grant a bond under Matter of YAJURE HURTADO, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)”;
and (2) “[i]n the alternative, [Petitioner] has not met his burden of showing that he is not a flight
risk.” Resp. ¶ 11. The Due Process Clause is satisfied when a noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) receives an adequate bond hearing. See Barry v. Lyons, Case No. 1:26-cv-00504-KWR-
KRS, 2026 WL 926218, at *7 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2026) (“[T]he Court finds that a bond hearing
pursuant to § 1226(a) provides Petitioner with the process he is due.”); Montero Cordova v. Noem,
Case No. 1:26-cv-00526-KWR-DLM, 2026 WL 867689, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2026) (“The
Court finds that due process affords Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a), and the hearing
need not occur prior to his re-detention.”).
To the extent that Petitioner argues that the bond hearing was inadequate because the
Immigration Judge issued his flight-risk ruling on an alternative basis, the Court is not persuaded.
There is no reason to discount the Immigration Judge’s risk-of-flight holding
because it was handed down on an in-the-alternative basis. In-the-alternative
holdings are understood as providing, on their own, a sufficient foundation for a
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court’s ruling. See Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension
Fund v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 140, 147 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949)).2
Therefore, the Immigration Judge’s in-the-alternative holding, that the Petitioner is
a risk of flight, supplies an adequate basis for the Immigration Judge’s
determination that the Petitioner should remain detained.3
Chiquito Barzola v. Warden, No. 2:25-cv-17326 (MEF), 2025 WL 3443487, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 1,
2025) (footnotes in original); see also Chait v. Blanche, Case No. CIV-26-311-D, 2026 WL
915596, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 3, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1010480
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 14, 2026); Kumar v. De Anda-Ybarra, Case No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL
753944, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 17, 2026).
To the extent that Petitioner argues that the bond hearing was inadequate because the
Immigration Judge’s flight-risk finding appears inconsistent with the Government’s earlier
decision to release Petitioner on his own recognizance pending removal proceedings, the Court
finds that the Immigration Judge’s flight-risk determination is not subject to judicial review. 8
U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of
this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the
Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial
of bond or parole.”); see also Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 786-87 (10th Cir. 2012); Chen
v. Dorneker, CASE NO. 21-3230-JWL, 2021 WL 5769354, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2021).
2 This is why, for example, an in-the-alternative holding can have a preclusive
effect. See, e.g., Anderson v. Comm’r, 698 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) (“all ‘independently
sufficient alternative findings should be given preclusive effect’ ”); 18 Wright & Miller’s Federal
Practice & Procedure § 4421 & n.27 (3d ed. 2025) (noting that extending issue preclusive effect to
each “independently sufficient finding[ ]” is the “view with substantial support in federal
decisions”).
3 That sufficient basis is also a lawful basis, because, as noted, the laws of the
United States permit detention following a finding of a flight risk. See, e.g., Skinner, 2014 WL
70066, at *5.
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The Court discerns no other basis to find that the January 2, 2026 bond hearing was
inadequate. Petitioner does not argue, for example, that he was deprived of the opportunity to
present evidence that he is not a flight risk. Kumar, 2026 WL 753944, at *2 (finding that the
petitioner’s argument regarding the adequacy of the bond hearing was “too underdeveloped to
warrant habeas relief” because, for example, the petitioner “does not indicate that he was denied
the opportunity to present evidence at the bond hearing”).
Because Petitioner received due process, and because the Court cannot review the
Immigration Judge’s bond determination, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner Andres Eduardo Chacin Acurero’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. 1, is DENIED;
2. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and
3. This case is now CLOSED.
………………………………………….
MARGARET STRICKLAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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