Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
SAMUAL HADEGE MENGIS,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00510-SMD-GJF
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Doc. 1. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant
law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Samual Hadege Mengis, a citizen of Eritrea, is being held in Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE’s”) custody at the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral,
New Mexico. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 34, 38. On or about July 17, 2019, Petitioner entered the United States
without inspection to seek asylum and was immediately detained. Id. ¶ 34. In November 2019,
he was released on an $8,000 bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Petitioner asserts
that following his release, he filed an I-589 application for asylum, has complied with all
immigration requirements, and has no criminal record. Id. ¶ 35.
On November 24, 2025, approximately seven years after his initial entry, Petitioner was
detained at a border patrol checkpoint in Texas while employed as a truck driver. Id. ¶ 37.
Petitioner initially sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Texas, El Paso
Division; however, he was subsequently transferred to the Otero County Processing Center in New
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Mexico. Id. ¶ 38. Petitioner has a Master Calendar Hearing scheduled for April 1, 2026. Id. ¶ 40.
He is not subject to a final order of removal. Id.
Petitioner challenges his ongoing detention, asserting that the denial of a bond hearing
violates the Immigration and Nationality Act and Due Process. Id. ¶¶ 43–53. Specifically,
Petitioner alleges that he is part of the nationwide class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz, which
held that all noncitizens who “(1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection;
(2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of
Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination” are entitled to a bond hearing and
cannot be subjected to mandatory detention. Id. ¶¶ 31–33; see also Bautista v. Santacruz, No.
5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), reconsideration
granted in part, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713982 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).
Accordingly, Petitioner requests immediate release or, alternatively, a constitutionally adequate
bond hearing.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
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Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
Mass. 2025); see also, Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Because
Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2019 and was released on bond after his arrival,
he falls outside the scope of mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Doc. 1 ¶ 34. That
subsection applies to applicants for admission, such as those who present at a port of entry or are
apprehended in the immediate vicinity of the border. See id. ¶ 37. Rather, Petitioner is entitled to
a bond hearing under § 1226(a). See Aragon v. Noem, No. 2:26-CV-00065, 2026 WL 458449, at
*2 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 3485771,
at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025); Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025
WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031-
KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025); see also Figuera v. Ripa, No. 26-CV-
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20307-JB, 2026 WL 467569, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2026); Wuilmer v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3236
(NEB/JFD), 2026 WL 458457, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026); Villatoro v. Ripa, No. 2:26-CV-
00213-SPC-DNF, 2026 WL 452432, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2026).
II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018).
The Government has offered neither a justification nor a formal process for the deprivation
of Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. Petitioner alleges compliance with immigration
requirements since his 2019 release on bond. See Doc. 1 at 1. The record does not show a change
in the circumstances that justified his re-detention. While release on bond is not equivalent to legal
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authorization to remain in the country, any modifications to Petitioner’s status must still comport
with constitutional procedural safeguards.
The United State’s power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and was deprived
of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
The Government concedes that the material facts of this case are similar from those in
Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063-SMD-GJF, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb.
11, 2026). See Doc. 7 at 2–3. Furthermore, the Government acknowledges that Martin Ramirez
controls the outcome here should the Court adhere to that precedent. See id. Because Respondents
have offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief
pursuant to § 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869; Cortez-Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771,
at *3.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 24 hours of this Order being entered;
3) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by notifying Petitioner’s counsel when and where he can be collected, and by
providing all necessary identity and travel documents to board a domestic flight to
return to his primary address;
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4) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
5) Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
6) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
7) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order and to entertain
any motions for attorneys’ fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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