Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MAURICIO INTERIAN-CABRERA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-00473-KG-JFR
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Jose Giberto Interian-Cabrera’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 6. For the reasons below,
petitioner’s habeas petition is granted.
I. Background
Mr. Interian-Cabrera, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1998 without
inspection. Doc. 1 at 2. Over the past 27 years, “he has maintained employment, often working
two jobs over six or seven days a week.” Id. He has no criminal history. Id. at 12. At the time
of his detention, “he resided in Oregon.” Id. at 5.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) apprehended Mr. Interian-Cabrera in
Oregon. Id. The Government has not provided him with a bond hearing, “abruptly arrested and
detained Mr. Interian-Cabrera on November 3, 2025.” Id. ICE has “kept Mr. Interian-Cabrera
detained at the Cibola County Correctional Center.” Id.
Mr. Interian-Cabrera submitted “a brief along with over forty (40) pages of evidence
demonstrating hi slack of criminal history, strong work ethic, and strong ties to the U.S. that
were established” in three decades here. Id. at 12. However, the presiding immigration judge
determined that Mr. Interian-Cabrera was not eligible for bond because he is an “Applicant
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seeking Admission.” Id. at 7. Mr. Interian-Cabrera argues his detention violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 2–3. He seeks release, or, in the alternative, a bond hearing in front of a neutral
adjudicator. Id.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court concludes that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Mr.
Interian-Cabrera’s detention, and (B) the appropriate remedy is a hearing at which the
Government must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention is
warranted.
A. Section 1226 governs Mr. Interian-Cabrera’s detention.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89
(2018). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking
admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” The “provision
mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL
3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). By contrast, § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and
detention, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” of noncitizens “pending a decision on
whether [they are] to be removed.” Noncitizens “detained under this second detention regime
are entitled to individualized bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Id.
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Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court concludes that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v.
Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide
and noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges
across fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL
45288, at *2 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as
a noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” (emphasis
added). Noncitizens “seeking admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the
United States. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the
country years earlier” are not “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth
Circuit decision holding that “[w]hile [noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they
are...seeking admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5
(5th Cir.). The Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed this question.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Mr. Interian-Cabrera’s detention. ICE arrested
him approximately 27 years after his initial entry into the United States and apprehended him in
Oregon, not at the border. Doc. 1 at 5. Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision
does not apply because Mr. Interian-Cabrera effected an entry into the United States by living
here for three decades. Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. As the Government concedes, the
facts of this case are “substantially similar” to those in Patel v. Noem, 2026 WL 103163
(D.N.M.), where this Court granted relief. Doc. 6 at 2.
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B. Mr. Interian-Cabrera’s detention violates his right to due process.
Because Mr. Interian-Cabrera is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court must
determine what process is due. Mr. Interian-Cabrera seeks a bond hearing at which the
Government bears “the burden of proving that Petitioner is not a flight risk or a danger to the
community.” Doc. 1 at 11. In determining what process is required, the Court considers (1) “the
private interest” affected; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation” through the procedures used
and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) “the Government’s interest,” including
the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedures would entail. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Each Mathews factor supports a bond hearing where the burden is on the Government to
justify detention. First, Mr. Interian-Cabrera’s liberty interest is substantial. A noncitizen’s
“interest in liberty...is particularly strong” after months of detention without a meaningful bond
hearing. Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1243 (D.N.M.) (finding a strong
liberty interest where petitioner had been detained for less than three months). Here, Mr.
Interian-Cabrera has been detained for four months and remains separated from his family. Doc.
1 at 5–6. Prolonged civil detention without an individualized determination of flight risk or
dangerousness weighs heavily in the due process analysis. Salazar, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1243.
Second, shifting the burden “likely will reduce the risk of the continuing erroneous
deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest.” Id. Petitioner submitted over 40 pages of evidence
to the immigration judge in support of bond, yet the immigration judge issued a summary order
declining jurisdiction without making factual findings regarding flight risk or dangerousness.
Doc. 1 at 12. Requiring Respondents to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner
is a flight risk and/or a danger to the community ameliorates” the risk that Petitioner will remain
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detained “without meaningful consideration” of the relevant evidence. See Salazar, 806 F. Supp.
3d at 1243.
Third, the Government’s interest does not outweigh these concerns. Where a petitioner
has submitted materials “attempting to show that he is neither a flight risk nor dangerous...the
Government has no interest in detaining Petitioner absent a showing by them” that detention is
justified. Id. at 1244. The administrative burden of shifting the burden of proof is minimal,
particularly given that “[t]he Government has vast resources at its disposal to gather information
about Petitioner’s eligibility for bond.” Id.
IV. Conclusion
The Court therefore grants Mr. Interian-Cabrera’s petition, Doc. 1. The Court directs the
Government to provide Mr. Interian-Cabrera with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before an
immigration judge within seven days of this Order. At that hearing, the Government must justify
Mr. Interian-Cabrera’s detention by clear and convincing evidence. If the Government fails to
do so, it must release Mr. Interian-Cabrera. The Court also orders the Government to file a status
report within ten days of this Order confirming that it has provided Mr. Interian-Cabrera with a
bond hearing or released him.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
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authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
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