Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DANIELA TAILY SALAZAR-MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:25-cv-00961-KG-KBM
TODD M. LYONS, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Daniela Taily Salazar-Martinez’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 17. The Court held a hearing on
the petition on November 13, 2025. Doc. 22. For the reasons below, the Court grants Ms.
Salazar’s habeas petition and orders her immediate release.
I. Background
Ms. Salazar, a citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States in 2020 under a B-2
visitor visa. Doc. 17 at 2. On October 3, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
determined that Ms. Salazar overstayed her visa and used fraudulent documents to work and
therefore removed her to Mexico. Doc. 17 at 2.
Ms. Salazar reentered the United States on November 6, 2024, claiming fear of
persecution if returned to Mexico. Doc. 1 at 8. On April 3, 2025, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
granted Ms. Salazar withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and deferral of removal
to Mexico, finding that she would likely face persecution there. Doc. 1 at 9. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) now holds Ms. Salazar at the Otero County Processing Center in
Chaparral, New Mexico under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). Doc. 1 at 3, 5.
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In May 2025, ICE headquarters conducted a 180-day post-order review and decided to
continue Ms. Salazar’s detention. Doc. 21 at 6. In September 2025, ICE informed Ms. Salazar
that it intends to remove her to a third country. Doc. 1 at 9.
Ms. Salazar filed this habeas petition on October 2, 2025, seeking immediate release.
Doc. 1 at 15. Ms. Salazar argues that her prolonged detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because her removal is not reasonably
foreseeable. Doc. 1 at 15. The Government opposes the petition, arguing that Ms. Salazar’s
claim is barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that she has failed to show
that her removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Doc. 17 at 11. The Court held a hearing on the
petition on November 13, 2025. Doc. 22.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available under § 2241 if a noncitizen’s detention “violat[es] the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court (A) holds that exhaustion does not bar Ms. Salazar’s
habeas claim and (B) orders Ms. Salazar released because there is no significant likelihood that
ICE will remove her in the reasonably foreseeable future.
A. Exhaustion does not bar Ms. Salazar’s claims.
The Court, first, rejects the Government’s argument that Ms. Salazar failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Doc. 17 at 11–14. A party may not seek federal judicial review
until pursuing “relief…available from [the relevant] administrative agency.” Reiter v. Cooper,
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507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993). “The exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a prerequisite
for § 2241 habeas relief,” Cantrall v. Chester, 454 Fed. Appx 679, 681 (10th Cir. 2012), but
there is a “narrow exception to the exhaustion requirement” where “a petitioner can demonstrate
that exhaustion is futile.” Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2010). Here,
further administrative review by ICE would be futile because ICE headquarters already evaluated
Ms. Salazar’s custody and decided to continue her detention. Doc. 21 at 5–6. Exhaustion is
therefore unnecessary, and judicial review is appropriate.
B. Ms. Salazar’s detention violates the Fifth Amendment.
The Court, next, concludes that Ms. Salazar’s detention violates due process. “[T]he
Government ordinarily secures [a noncitizen]’s removal during” the 90 days after issuing a final
order for the person to be removed. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
During that 90-day “removal period,” the noncitizen is typically detained. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
682. After that, the Government may continue detaining the noncitizen for as long as is
“reasonably necessary” to secure their removal. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Because a statute permitting “indefinite detention of” a noncitizen “would raise” Fifth
Amendment due process concerns, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued
detention is no longer authorized.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 699. A six-month detention
period is presumptively reasonable. Id. After that, if the noncitizen “provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,”
the Government “must…rebut that showing” or release the noncitizen. Id. at 701. “[F]or
detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what
counts as the reasonably foreseeable future…shrink[s].” Id. The remedy for a Zadvydas claim is
generally release of the petitioner under conditions of supervision. E.g., Gomez v. Mattos, 2025
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WL 3101994, at *7 (D. Nev.); Trejo v. Warden of ERO, 2025 WL 2992187, at *10 (W.D. Tex.);
Douglas v. Baker, 2025 WL 2997585, at *5 (D. Md.).
Under these principles, Ms. Salazar demonstrated that removal is not reasonably
foreseeable. ICE has detained her for seven months since her removal order was finalized in
April 2025, exceeding Zadvydas’ six-month presumptively reasonable period. Doc. 21 at 7. An
IJ granted her withholding of removal, which categorically bars her removal to Mexico, her
country of citizenship. Doc. 1 at 10. Furthermore, ICE has not “identif[ied] any country that has
agreed to accept her.” Doc. 21 at 7. The burden thus shifts to the Government to show that
removal in the foreseeable future is likely.
The Government fails to meet its burden, and its own evidence confirms that removal is
not likely in the foreseeable future. ICE submitted repatriation requests to four countries, but
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic denied the requests, and South Sudan and El Salvador
have not responded. Doc. 17 at 4. The Government’s requests have remained pending for over
five months. Doc. 17 at 4. The Government has not provided the Court with a clear timeline or
plan for removal and therefore failed to prove that removal is reasonably foreseeable.
At the evidentiary hearing, the Government argued that Ms. Salazar’s removal remains
foreseeable because several countries have not yet declined its repatriation requests. Draft Tr. at
7–8.1 But the mere possibility of repatriation to third countries, without concrete progress, is
insufficient to justify continued detention. See Momennia v. Bondi, 2025 WL 3011896, at *10
(W.D. Okla.) (“[M]ere intent to find a third country,” absent “specific communications between
the United States and an identified country” is “too speculative to permit indefinite detention”),
1 The Court’s citation to the hearing transcript refers to the court reporter’s original, unedited
version. Any final transcript may contain some differences in page and line numbers.
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R&R adopted, 2025 WL 3006045 (W.D. Okla.); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *3 (D.
Kan.) (same); see also Fermine v. Dir. of Immigr. & Customs, 2007 WL 2284606, at *4 (W.D.
La.) (finding no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future where
Trinidad had not yet refused ICE’s repatriation request). Here, ICE’s pending requests to El
Salvador and South Sudan have remained unanswered for over five months. Doc. 17 at 4. If
these countries refuse to accept Ms. Salazar, the Government cannot identify which other
countries may be available for repatriation or provide a timeline for additional requests. Draft
Tr. at 6–7. Allowing the Government to exhaust all potential countries would effectively result
in unconstitutional indefinite detention.
IV. Conclusion
The Court grants Ms. Salazar’s habeas petition, Doc. 1, and orders the Government to
release Ms. Salazar from custody by November 19, 2025, at 5 p.m. MST under reasonable terms
of supervision set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). The Court also orders the Government to file
on the docket a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 affirming that Ms. Salazar was released in
compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
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authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
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