Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
TAMARA M. S.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Civ. No. 24‐1184 GBW
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING REMAND
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the Social
Security Agency (“SSA”) decision to deny Plaintiff Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Doc. 16. For the reasons
explained below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and AFFIRMS the judgment of
the SSA.
I. 	PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
Plaintiff filed an initial application for SSDI and SSI on June 1, 2020, alleging
disability beginning February 1, 2017. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 118, 270-77.
Plaintiff’s application was denied on initial review on September 7, 2021, and again on
reconsideration on April 25, 2023. AR at 139‐73. On December 6, 2023, a hearing was
held by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR at 20‐48. Prior to the hearing,
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Plaintiff amended the alleged onset date to June 1, 2020. AR at 305. With this new
onset date, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was ineligible for SSDI and only evaluated
Plaintiff’s claim for SSI. AR at 118. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on
February 12, 2024. AR at 118‐31. The Appeals Council denied review on September 18,
2024, AR at 1, making the February 2024 decision the final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff then
filed the present action on November 21, 2024. Doc. 1.
II. 	STANDARD OF R EVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a court may review a final decision of the
Commissioner only to determine whether it (1) is supported by “substantial evidence”
and (2) comports with the proper legal standards. Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
933 F.2d 799, 800–01 (10th Cir. 1991). “In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, [the Court]
neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor substitute[s] [its] judgment for that of the agency.”
Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Casias, 933 F.3d at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The record must
demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, but an ALJ is not required to
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discuss every piece of evidence.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 1996).
“[I]n addition to discussing the evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ also must
discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as
significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Id. at 1010. “The possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the] findings from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir.
2007).
III. 	ALJ EVALUATION
A. Legal Standard
For purposes of both Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income, an individual is disabled when he or she is unable “to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine whether a person satisfies these
criteria, the SSA has developed a five‐step test. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 1 If the
1 Plaintiff initially applied for both SSDI and SSI. The five‐step test for determining disability is the same
for both types of benefits, although the test is codified in two separate sections of the Code of Federal
Regulations. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520 governs SSDI; § 416.920 governs SSI.
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Commissioner finds an individual disabled at any step, the next step is not taken. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4).
At the first four steps of the analysis, the claimant has the burden to show: (1) he
is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) he has a “severe medically
determinable . . . impairment . . . or a combination of impairments” that has lasted or is
expected to last for at least one year; and that either (3) his impairments meet or equal
one of the “Listings” of presumptively disabling impairments; or (4) he is unable to
perform his “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i–iv); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005).
Step four of this analysis consists of three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017,
1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) in light of “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(3). A claimant’s RFC is “the most [he or she] can still do despite [physical
and mental] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). Second, the ALJ determines the physical
and mental demands of the claimant’s past work. “To make the necessary findings, the
ALJ must obtain adequate ‘factual information about those work demands which have
a bearing on the medically established limitations.’” Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1024 (quoting
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82‐62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3 (Jan. 1, 1982)). Third, the ALJ
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determines whether, in light of the RFC, the claimant is capable of meeting those
demands. Id. at 1023, 1025.
If the ALJ concludes that the claimant cannot engage in past relevant work, he or
she proceeds to step five of the evaluation process. At step five, the burden of proof
shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is able to perform other work in
the national economy, considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
On February 12, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application
for SSI benefits. See AR at 118‐31. In denying Plaintiff’s application, the ALJ applied the
five‐step sequential analysis. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2020, the amended alleged onset date. AR at
121.
At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: type
II diabetes mellitus, diabetic neuropathy, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
hypertension, hypothyroidism, obesity, displaced segmental fracture of shaft of
humerus of the right arm, anxiety disorder, unspecified depressive disorder, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Id.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s severe impairments—both
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individually and in combination—did not meet or equal the severity of an impairment
in the Listings. AR at 121‐22. He determined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in
understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others;
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself; but
these limitations did not satisfy the Paragraph B criteria for a finding of disability under
Listings 12.00. AR at 122‐23.
At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) except she requires a
sit/stand option allowing for every 30 minutes of sitting work, she has the ability
to stand for 5 minutes while remaining on task; she can frequently finger and
feel; she cannot use foot controls; she must avoid concentrated exposure to
vibrations; she must avoid all exposure to workplace hazards such as moving
parts and unprotected heights; and she can frequently reach in any direction. In
addition, the claimant can understand, remember, and carry out detailed but not
complex instructions; can have frequently [sic] interaction with coworkers and
supervisors; can have occasional interaction with the public; and can deal with
frequent changes in a routine work setting.
AR at 123. In making this finding he concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. AR at 125.
However, Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record. Id. He found persuasive the opinions of consultative examiner
Rod Merta, PhD.2 AR at 128. He found the medical opinions of Dorothy Leong, MD;
2 2 The ALJ referred to Dr. Merta as “Rod Mertak, PhD.” AR at 128. Record evidence refers to him as Rod
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Helen Malabed, MD; Richard Sorensen, PhD; and Victor Salgado, MD unpersuasive
due to inconsistencies with evidence in the record and due to the fact that several of the
doctors examined Plaintiff before her motor vehicle accident that led to the fracture of
her right arm, one of Plaintiff’s severe impairments. AR at 127‐28.
At step five, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC and determined that she could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy. AR at 129‐30. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could
perform the requirements of three representative occupations: (1) Document preparer
(DOT 249.587‐018); (2) Addresser (DOT 209.587‐010); and (3) Table worker, sorter (DOT
739.687‐182). AR at 130. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled from February 1, 2017, through the date of the decision. AR at 130‐31.
IV. 	P ARTIES ’ POSITIONS
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to evaluate or “provide any
indication that he was even aware of” the Section I checkbox findings provided by Dr.
Richard Sorenson and (2) failing to “articulate a reasoned, evidence‐supported rationale
for rejecting the potentially disabling opinions of…Dr. Rod J. Merta.” Doc. 16 at 7, 11.
Defendant responds that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed, because (1) a
consultant’s Section I findings are general findings as to limitation, not conclusions
G. Merta, AR at 61, or Rod J. Merta, AR at 1185. Rod J. Merta appears to be the correct spelling of his
name.
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about what workplace restrictions are justified, and as such do not constitute separate
restrictions from those outlined in the doctor’s narrative conclusion; (2) even if Section I
findings were considered part of an opinion, ALJs do not need to separately assess
every part of a medical opinion to find the opinion as a whole unpersuasive; (3) the ALJ
did actually adopt workplace restrictions addressing all four functional areas where Dr.
Sorensen found limitations; and (4) regarding Dr. Merta’s opinion, the ALJ reasonably
interpreted the opinion, found it persuasive, and fashioned an RFC that accounted for
the opinion. Doc. 20 at 5‐13.
Overall, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed because the
RFC was supported by substantial evidence and Plaintiff is impermissibly asking the
Court to reweigh evidence. Id. at 13.
V. 	A NALYSIS
A. The Opinion of Dr. Richard Sorensen
Plaintiff argues that remand is warranted because the ALJ failed to discuss or
indicate that he was aware of the Section I checkbox opinions provided by Dr. Richard
Sorensen in his Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (“MRFCA”). Doc. 16
at 7; see AR at 59‐61.
Agency‐contracted reviewing psychologists, like Dr. Sorensen, typically use
MRFCA forms to assess a claimant’s mental RFC. See Young v. Berryhill, 2018 WL
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840022, at *14 n.11 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2018); Program Operations Manual System
(“POMS”) DI § 24510.060(A)(1). Two sections of the MRFCA form are relevant here:
Section I and Section III.
Section I requires a consultant to “record preliminary conclusions about the
effect of [a claimant’s impairments] on each of four general areas of mental function.”
POMS § DI 254510.061(A). If a consultant finds that a claimant is moderately limited in
any area, “[t]he degree and extent of the capacity or limitation must be described in
narrative format in Section III.” POMS § DI 24510.063(B)(2). Section III “is for recording
the formal narrative mental RFC assessment and provides for [the consultant] to
prepare a narrative statement for each of” those four areas of mental function. POMS §
DI 24510.065(A). In short, Section I provides a “worksheet to ensure that [a consultant]
has considered each…pertinent mental activit[y] and the claimant’s…degree of
limitation,” POMS § DI 25020.010(B)(1), while Section III is used by medical consultants
to record their “formal mental RFC assessment” and is assessed by adjudicators as such,
Carver v. Colvin, 600 F. Appʹx 616, 619 (10th Cir. 2015).
In the Section I “worksheet” portion of his MRFCA, Dr. Sorensen found that
Plaintiff was moderately limited in numerous areas of mental functioning, including:
 	Understanding and remembering detailed instructions;
 	Carrying out detailed instructions;
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 	Maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods;
 	Working in coordination with or in proximity to others without being
distracted by them;
 	Completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and performing at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods;
 	Interacting appropriately with the general public;
 	Accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from
supervisors;
 	Getting along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or
exhibiting behavioral extremes;
 	Responding appropriately to changes in the work setting; and
 	Setting realistic goals or making plans independently of others
AR at 59‐60. Dr. Sorensen did not provide a substantive explanation in the narrative
portion of each section, see id., and instead expanded on his findings in the “MRFC
Additional Explanation” portion of the form. AR at 60‐61. At the end of his narrative,
Dr. Sorensen opined that “[a]n RFC of Unskilled would be appropriate at this time.”
AR at 61. While detailed, Dr. Sorensen’s narrative arguably did not account for all of
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the moderate limitations noted in Section I. 3 See id.
Plaintiff cites the Tenth Circuit’s holding that “if a consultant’s Section III
narrative fails to describe the effect that each of the Section I moderate limitations
would have on the claimant’s ability, or if it contradicts limitations marked in Section I,
the MRFCA cannot properly be considered part of the substantial evidence supporting
an ALJ’s RFC finding.” Carver, 600 F. Appʹx at 619 (emphasis added). Further, an ALJ
“should [not] turn a blind eye to any moderate limitations enumerated in Section I that
are not adequately explained in Section III.” Lee v. Colvin, 631 F. Appʹx 538, 541 (10th
Cir. 2015). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by rejecting the Section III narrative
opinion that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work and finding the opinion
unpersuasive “without even mentioning the multitude of Section I checkbox limitations
which were suggestive of significant social limitations.” Doc. 16 at 9; see AR at 127.
Plaintiff argues that remand is warranted because the ALJ effectively “turned a blind
eye” to the Section I checkbox limitations. Doc. 16 at 10.
The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument unavailing. It is certainly true that an ALJ
could commit reversable error by accepting part of an MRFCA while not discussing
3 Dr. Sorensen opined that Plaintiff should be limited to “unskilled work.” AR at 61. “Unskilled work
generally requires only the following: (1) ‘[u]nderstanding, remembering, and carrying out simple
instructions’; (2) ‘[m]aking judgments that are commensurate with the functions of unskilled work—i.e.,
simple work‐related decisions’; (3) ‘[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co‐workers and usual
work situations’; and (4) ‘[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.’” Nelson v. Colvin, 655 F. App’x
626, 629 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting SSR 96‐9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *9 (July 2, 1996)). This limitation
accounts for most, but not necessarily all of the Section I moderate findings. See AR at 59‐60.
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contradictions between Section I and Section III. See, e.g., Martinez v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL
2662329, at *5 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 2023) (finding remand was warranted when an ALJ
failed to incorporate or explain why he rejected Section I findings of moderate
limitation despite finding the consultants’ opinions persuasive). However, in the case
at hand, the ALJ found Dr. Sorensen’s opinion unpersuasive. AR at 127. As such, it
would be illogical to require him to provide a more detailed discussion as to each
portion of an opinion he ultimately found unpersuasive. The appropriate question,
rather, is whether the ALJ reasonably determined and articulated the persuasiveness of
Dr. Sorensen’s opinion using the factors outlined in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(a), (c). The most important factors to consider when evaluating the
persuasiveness of medical opinions are (1) supportability and (2) consistency. Id. §
404.1520c(c).
The ALJ stated that he found Dr. Sorensen’s opinion unpersuasive because:
While the evidence does show the claimant is capable of unskilled work,
the evidence also shows the claimant has social limitations not opined by
Dr. Sorensen. Moreover, findings of the consultative examination
revealed no evidence of a cognitive impairment and satisfactory attention,
recall, and calculation.
AR at 127. The Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in his
articulation. First, the ALJ addressed supportability when he noted gaps in the
evaluation regarding Plaintiff’s social limitations. Id. Second, the ALJ addressed
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consistency when he rejected the finding that Plaintiff should be limited to
“unskilled work,” see AR at 61, because she showed no evidence of cognitive
impairment and had satisfactory attention, recall, and calculation. AR at 127,
1183 (“Claimant’s MMSE Total score of 30 out of 30 suggests no cognitive
impairment[.]”). The ALJ did not have to assess every part of the medical
opinion to find it unpersuasive as the regulation only requires a “source‐level
articulation.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1).
While the ALJ could have been more specific in his discussion of the
medical evidence, his decision meets the Tenth Circuit’s minimum articulation
requirement, and the Court can sufficiently follow the ALJ’s reasoning. See
Keyes‐Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Where…we can
follow the adjudicator’s reasoning in conducting our review, and can determine
that correct legal standards have been applied, merely technical omissions in the
ALJ’s reasoning do not dictate reversal.”). The Court therefore finds that the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards in analyzing Dr. Sorensen’s medical opinion,
and his decision was supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Casias, 933 F.2d at 800, and
should be affirmed.
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B. The Opinion of Dr. Rod Merta
Plaintiff’s second argument for reversal is that the ALJ failed to “articulate a
reasoned, evidence‐supported rationale for rejecting the potentially disabling opinions
of…Dr. Rod J. Merta.” Doc. 16 at 11. Dr. Merta conducted a consultative examination
of Plaintiff on May 12, 2021, and provided the following functional assessment:
Claimant can reason, and she is capable of understanding verbal and
written instructions, but at times her physical pain and/or depression may
interfere with her overall cognitive functioning at a level between
“Moderate—some limitations, to Marked—significant limitations.” When
not so impeded, she is capable of sustaining concentration on many if not
all the cognitive functions contained with her ADLS, hobbies and work‐
related tasks, and she can pace herself and persist until completion. As for
social interaction, when Claimant is experiencing physical pain and/or
depression, she is likely to isolate herself, and at such times, Claimant’s
normal social interaction may be impaired at a level of “Moderate—some
limitations.”
AR at 1185. The ALJ found Dr. Merta’s opinion supported, persuasive, and consistent
with other evidence in the record. AR at 128.
Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s RFC is not reflective of the necessary limitations
found in Dr. Merta’s opinion such as time off task or periods of social isolation. Doc. 16
at 13; see also doc. 25 at 5. Plaintiff contends that remand is necessary so that the ALJ can
“either adopt some time off task or absence from work or provide a thorough, evidence‐
based rationale as to why these aspects of Dr. Merta’s opinion were unworthy of
adoption” as part of the RFC. Doc. 16 at 13. The Court finds that the ALJ properly
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considered Dr. Merta’s opinion and crafted an RFC accordingly.
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]his Court must review Dr. Merta’s opinion and
determine for itself whether an opinion of periods of ‘marked’ limits to Plaintiff’s
cognitive functioning or ‘likely to isolate herself’ during periods of exacerbated
depression and pain indicates some period, however intermittent, during which
Plaintiff be off task or isolate from others.” Doc. 25 at 5. Such a review is exactly what
the Court cannot do. See Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 956 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“[Plaintiff’s] contentions amount to an argument that this court should reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do.”). The only issues for the court to consider are whether
the ALJ applied the correct law and whether his determination was supported by
substantial evidence. See Jeri A. C. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 3868150, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 30,
2022) (“It is not this court’s nor the parties’ place in substantial evidence review to
decide the ‘best’ understanding of [the doctor’s] opinion. Rather, it is the court’s duty
to determine whether the ALJ’s understanding is supported by the evidence.”).
Dr. Merta found that Plaintiff normally had satisfactory cognitive abilities, but at
times of heightened pain or depression, she could have limitations with understanding,
concentration, persistence, and social interaction. AR at 1183, 1185. The ALJ reasonably
accounted for these limitations when he formulated Plaintiff’s RFC: she was limited to
mainly sedentary work with short standing periods; she was limited to detailed but not
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complex instructions; she could have frequent interaction with coworkers and
supervisors and only occasional interaction with the public. AR at 123. The Court finds
that these accommodations reasonably account for the limitations discussed in Dr.
Merta’s opinion. Since the Court finds the RFC supported by reasonable evidence it
“may not displace the agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even
though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (citations omitted).
The Court therefore finds that the ALJ appropriately followed all the required
legal standards, and his findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Court will
not reweigh the evidence before it and therefore finds that the decision of the
Commissioner should be affirmed.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc.
16) and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________________
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presiding by Consent
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