Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
WILLIAM NATANAEL RACANCOJ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-01589-KG-GJF
TODD BLANCHE, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on William Racancoj’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 6. Because Petitioner’s challenge
presents a purely legal question, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and
grants his petition for the reasons below.
I. Background
In December 2025, Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested
Petitioner in Chicago at O’Hare International Airport. Doc. 1 at 2. Petitioner remains detained
at the Torrance County Detention Center in New Mexico. Id. at 1. Petitioner has not been
afforded a bond hearing. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond hearing in
front of a neutral adjudicator. Doc. 1 at 7.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
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III. Analysis
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention violates the INA and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that release is warranted.
A. Petitioner’s detention violates the INA.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89
(2018). First, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs noncitizens detained at a port of entry or shortly after
entry, who are treated as “[noncitizens] seeking admission into the country.” Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Absent exceptions not relevant here, § 1225
“mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL
3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.).
By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) sets forth “the default rule” for detaining noncitizens
“already in the country.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Section § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and
detention of noncitizens, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General...pending a decision on
whether [they are] to be removed.” Under federal regulations, noncitizens detained under
§ 1226(a) are entitled to individualized bond hearings at the “outset of detention.” Jennings, 583
U.S. at 306.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue, the
Court concludes that § 1226 governs here.1 See Barco Mercado v. Francis, 2025 WL 3295903,
1 There is currently a circuit split on this issue. The Second Circuit has held that
individuals like Petitioner are entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Cunha v.
Freden, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. 2026). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have
reached the opposite conclusion. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir.
2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). The Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed
this issue.
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at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide and noting that challengers
prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across fifty courts). ICE
arrested Petitioner after his initial entry into the United States and did not apprehend him at or
near the border. Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply because
Petitioner effected an entry into the United States by living here in Elkhart, Indiana. Doc. 1 at 6.
Therefore, Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates the INA.
Moreover, this Court’s prior decisions control. The Government concedes that the
material facts here are materially indistinguishable from those in Patel v. Noem, 2026 WL
103163 (D.N.M.), where the Court held that § 1226 governs. See Doc. 6 at 2. The Court has
reached the same conclusion in numerous similar cases. See, e.g., Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra,
2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M.); Arroyo Lopez v. Noem, 2026 WL 776332, at *3 (D.N.M.);
Aguilar v. Lyons, 2026 WL 851237, at *2 (D.N.M.). The Government acknowledges that these
decisions control the outcome here if followed. Doc. 6 at 2. Because the Government offers no
new basis for Petitioner’s continued detention, Petitioner is entitled to relief.
B. Petitioner’s detention violates the Due Process Clause.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from depriving
any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due
process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. The Government’s power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer
plenary once an alien enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all
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persons.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status
changes accordingly.”). Given that § 1226(a) is controlling here, Petitioner “is entitled—as a
right—to an individualized bond hearing.” Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, 2025 WL 3485771, at *5
(D.N.M.). Petitioner’s continued detention without such review “constitutes an ongoing
violation of [his] right to due process.” Id.
C. The proper remedy is release.
The Court next turns to the appropriate remedy. Federal courts are authorized under
§ 2243 to “dispose of [a habeas petition] as law and justice require” and thus possess broad
discretion to fashion appropriate relief. Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435, 443 (10th Cir. 2012);
see also Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that a federal court
“possesses power to grant any form of relief necessary to satisfy the requirement of justice”)
(emphasis in original). Given the Government’s conduct here, release is warranted. See Singh v.
Carnes, 2026 WL 446579, at *1 (D.N.M.) (ordering release where the Government “failed to
articulate a legitimate interest in Petitioner’s continued detention”); Palomeque-Carrion v.
Bondi, 2026 WL 895567, at *2 (D.N.M.) (same); Alfaro Herrera v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 91470, at
*1 (D. Colo.) (same).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court orders that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, is granted. The Government shall
release Petitioner within 24 hours of this Order. The Government shall not impose any
new conditions of release beyond those in place prior to Petitioner’s detention.
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2. Before Petitioner’s removal order becomes final, the Government is enjoined from
redetaining Petitioner absent a predetention hearing before a neutral immigration judge at
which the Government must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner
poses a danger or flight risk. This Order does not affect the Government’s ability to
detain Petitioner once his removal order becomes final—at that point, his detention is
governed by the mandatory detention provision of § 1231.
3. The Government shall file a status report within ten (10) business days of this Order
certifying compliance.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access
system.
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