Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ELVIS ALEJANDRO JIMENEZ LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 1:26-cv-01259-MIS-LF
WARDEN, Torrance County Detention Center;
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, in her official
capacity as Field Office Director of the El Paso Field
Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; TODD
M. LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
and TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
Acting Attorney General of the United States,
Respondents.
ORDER DENYING PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Elvis Jimenez Lopez’s pro se Petition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), ECF No. 1, filed April 22, 2026.
The Federal Respondents filed a Response on May 1, 2026 (“Response”),1 ECF No. 6. Upon
review of the Parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, the Court will DENY the
Petition.
1 The Clerk’s Office served all Respondents with the Petition pursuant to this District’s Standing
Order Regarding Service of Process in Immigration Habeas Petitions filed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Case 1:26-
mc-00004, ECF No. 3 (D.N.M. Jan. 28, 2026). ECF No. 3. However, as has become customary in these cases, the
Warden did not respond to the Petition.
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I. Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Cuba who entered the United States unlawfully on or about April
12, 2022. See Form I-213, ECF No. 6-1 at 2. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested by a Border Patrol
Agent, placed in removal proceedings, and released on his own recognizance. Id.; Pet. ¶ 2, ECF
No. 1 at 14;2 Order of Release on Recognizance, ECF No. 1 at 41-43. He subsequently filed
applications for asylum and for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. Pet. ¶ 2;
Receipt for Form I-485 Application to Adjust Status, ECF No. 1 at 46. Additionally, his wife, who
is a lawful permanent resident, has filed a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf.
Pet. ¶ 2; Receipt for Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative, ECF No. 1 at 48.
On August 29, 2025, Petitioner was seen pulling a tractor trailer that had been reported
stolen. Ector County Sheriff’s Office Offense Report, ECF No. 1 at 51. Petitioner was arrested
for theft by possession and transported to the Ector County (Texas) Law Enforcement Center. Id.
On September 26, 2026, the owner of the tractor trailer executed an Affidavit of Non-Prosecution
requesting that the Ector County District Attorney’s Office dismiss the charges and decline to
prosecute Petitioner. ECF No. 1 at 52. According to Petitioner, the charges were subsequently
dismissed. Pet. ¶ 3.
However, on November 3, 2025, apparently while Petitioner was still in detention on the
theft charges, he was transferred to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
See id. He is currently detained at the Torrance County Detention Center in Estancia, New Mexico.
Pet. ¶ 30.
2 Where the Court cites to paragraph numbers, it cites to “Attachment A to Petition (AO 242):
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF AND SUPPORTING FACTS SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (28 U.S.C. § 2241),” ECF No. 1 at 12-24.
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On January 20, 2026, an Immigration judge denied Petitioner bond based solely on a
determination that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and
therefore the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to order Petitioner’s release on bond. Id. ¶¶ 24,
31; Order of the Immigration Judge (Jan. 20, 2026), ECF No. 1 at 57.
On April 14, 2026, the Immigration Judge revisited the issue and denied bond again, this
time on two alternative grounds: (1) “Detention is mandatory. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N
Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)”; and (2) “If the Court had jurisdiction to grant a bond, the Court would deny
bond because the Respondent has not met his burden of showing that he is not a danger to the
community.” Order of the Immigration Judge (Apr. 14, 2026), ECF No. 1 at 60.
On April 22, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF
No. 1 at 1-36. On April 24, 2026, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause instructing
Respondents to answer the Petition and show cause why it should not be granted. ECF No. 4. On
March 10, 2026, Respondents filed a Response. ECF No. 6.
II. Legal Standard
Federal courts possess authority to review the legality of executive detention through the
writ of habeas corpus. Title 28, United States Code, section 2241 expressly authorizes courts to
issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Tenth Circuit has recognized that
“[c]hallenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes
v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-
88 (2001)). “The fundamental purpose of a § 2241 habeas proceeding is to allow a person in
custody to attack the legality of that custody, and the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012)
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(quotation marks omitted) (quoting McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir.
1997)).
III. Discussion
Petitioner argues that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and his detention
without an individualized assessment as to his dangerousness or flight risk violates Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶¶ 37, 45. Petitioner acknowledges that on April 14, 2026,
an Immigration Judge issued an Order finding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant bond and, in the
alternative, that Petitioner failed to establish he is not a danger to the community. Id. ¶ 24.
However, he argues that “no Immigration Judge has evaluated whether I present a danger to the
community or a risk of flight, and no neutral decision-maker has assessed whether my continued
detention is necessary or whether less restrictive alternatives would reasonably ensure my
appearance at future immigration proceedings.” Id. ¶ 25. Petitioner seeks immediate release from
custody or, alternatively, a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 35.
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 3. However, they “acknowledge that this Court recently reached the
opposite conclusion in Duhan v. Noem, Case No. 2:26-cv-00019-MIS-JFR, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20895 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2026) on facts substantially similar to those currently before the Court.”
Id. They further assert “that this Court’s decision in Duhan v. Noem, would control the result here
if the Court adheres to that decision, as the facts are not materially distinguishable for purposes of
the Court’s decision on the legal issue of which statutory provision authorizes Petitioner’s
detention.” Id. at 4.
After careful consideration, the Court is constrained to find that Petitioner’s detention is
lawful. Initially, for the reasons explained in this Court’s decision in Lopez-Romero v. Lyons,
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2:25-cv-01113-MIS-JHR, 2026 WL 92873 (D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2026), the Court finds that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides that the Attorney General
may exercise his discretion to either detain or release a noncitizen on bond or conditional parole.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2); see also Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 786 (10th Cir. 2012).
Here, on April 14, 2026, an Immigration Judge held a bond hearing and denied Petitioner’s
release on bond on two alternative grounds: (1) “Detention is mandatory [under] Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)”; and (2) “If the Court had jurisdiction to grant a bond, the
Court would deny bond because [Petitioner] has not met his burden of showing that he is not a
danger to the community.” ECF No. 1 at 60. The Due Process Clause is satisfied when a
noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) receives an adequate bond hearing. Chacin Acurero
v. Castro, Case No. 2:26-cv-00565-MIS-JFR, 2026 WL 1180219, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 30, 2026);
Palacios Rodriguez v. Mullin, Case No. 2:26-cv-01179-MIS-KK, 2026 WL 1164820, at *2
(D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2026); see also Barry v. Lyons, Case No. 1:26-cv-00504-KWR-KRS, 2026 WL
926218, at *7 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2026) (“[T]he Court finds that a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)
provides Petitioner with the process he is due.”); Montero Cordova v. Noem, Case No. 1:26-cv-
00526-KWR-DLM, 2026 WL 867689, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2026) (“The Court finds that due
process affords Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a), and the hearing need not occur prior to
his re-detention.”). There is no evidence that Petitioner’s bond hearing was inadequate.
To the extent that Petitioner argues that the April 14, 2026 bond hearing was inadequate
because the Immigration Judge issued his dangerousness ruling on an alternative basis, the Court
is not persuaded. As another court has explained with regard to an Immigration Judge’s alternative
finding that a noncitizen was a flight risk:
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There is no reason to discount the Immigration Judge’s risk-of-flight holding
because it was handed down on an in-the-alternative basis. In-the-alternative
holdings are understood as providing, on their own, a sufficient foundation for a
court’s ruling. See Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension
Fund v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 140, 147 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949)).3
Therefore, the Immigration Judge’s in-the-alternative holding, that the Petitioner is
a risk of flight, supplies an adequate basis for the Immigration Judge’s
determination that the Petitioner should remain detained.4
Chiquito Barzola v. Warden, No. 2:25-cv-17326 (MEF), 2025 WL 3443487, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 1,
2025) (footnotes in original); see also Chait v. Blanche, Case No. CIV-26-311-D, 2026 WL
915596, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 3, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1010480
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 14, 2026); Kumar v. De Anda-Ybarra, Case No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL
753944, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 17, 2026).
To the extent that Petitioner argues that the April 14, 2026 bond hearing was inadequate
because the Immigration Judge’s dangerousness finding relies on criminal charges that were
subsequently dismissed, the Court finds that the Immigration Judge’s dangerousness determination
is not subject to judicial review.5 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary
judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set
3 This is why, for example, an in-the-alternative holding can have a preclusive
effect. See, e.g., Anderson v. Comm’r, 698 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) (“all ‘independently
sufficient alternative findings should be given preclusive effect’ ”); 18 Wright & Miller’s Federal
Practice & Procedure § 4421 & n.27 (3d ed. 2025) (noting that extending issue preclusive effect to
each “independently sufficient finding[ ]” is the “view with substantial support in federal
decisions”).
4 That sufficient basis is also a lawful basis, because, as noted, the laws of the
United States permit detention following a finding of a flight risk. See, e.g., Skinner, 2014 WL
70066, at *5.
5 The Court can envision a scenario where an immigration judge makes an in-the-alternative finding
of flight risk or dangerousness, but the record is so devoid of evidence or argument supporting such a finding that the
Court would be unable to conclude that the bond hearing satisfied due process. This is not that case.
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aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of
any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”); see also Mwangi, 465 F. App’x at 786-
87; Chen v. Dorneker, CASE NO. 21-3230-JWL, 2021 WL 5769354, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2021).
The Court discerns no other basis to find that the April 14, 2026 bond hearing was
inadequate. Petitioner does not argue, for example, that he was deprived of the opportunity to
present evidence that he is not dangerous. Kumar, 2026 WL 753944, at *2 (finding that the
petitioner’s argument regarding the adequacy of the bond hearing was “too underdeveloped to
warrant habeas relief” because, for example, the petitioner “does not indicate that he was denied
the opportunity to present evidence at the bond hearing”).
Because Petitioner received an adequate bond hearing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s
detention does not violate his due process rights.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner Elvis Alejandro Jiminez Lopez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
ECF No. 1, is DENIED;
2. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and
3. This case is now CLOSED.
………………………………………….
MARGARET STRICKLAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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