Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
FRAOL GONFA SEBOKA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-00793-KG-KK
DORA CASTRO, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Fraol Gonfa Seboka’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 7. Petitioner alleges his detention
exceeds the six-month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001), and that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Doc. 1 at 2. For the reasons below,
Petitioner’s habeas petition is granted.
I. Background
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, entered the United States without inspection
on November 26, 2024. Docs. 1 at 9, 7 at 3. United States Border Patrol (“USBP”) arrested
Petitioner and detained him in Florence, Arizona. Doc. 7 at 3. USBP paroled Petitioner on
December 17, 2024. Id.
On January 21, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner
in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. An immigration judge ordered Petitioner be removed on April 28,
2025, but granted withholding of removal to Ethiopia, finding that Petitioner had a credible fear
of persecution. Id. The order of removal became administratively final on April 29, 2025, after
Petitioner withdrew his reservation of appeal. Doc. 1-9 at 1. Petitioner has been detained at the
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Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico, awaiting removal to a third country.
Doc. 7 at 3–4.
On August 8, 2025, an ICE agent met with Petitioner to advise him that he would be
deported to a third country. Doc. 7-1 at 3. Since the meeting, ICE has reviewed Petitioner’s case
twice—once in October 2025 and again in February 2026—but has not identified a possible
destination country. Id. Petitioner now seeks release from continued detention, arguing that the
six-month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas has expired, and that his removal is
not reasonably foreseeable as ICE has not found an alternative country to accept him. Doc. 1 at
11. The Government concedes that Petitioner’s detention has passed the six-month period but
maintains that it is “actively seeking a third country that will accept Petitioner.” Doc. 7 at 7.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. Analysis
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), when a noncitizen is ordered
removed, the Government must execute the removal within a 90-day “removal period.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
§ 1231(a)(2). As relevant here, the “removal period begins” when the removal order “becomes
administratively final.” § 1231(a)(1)(B).
Although the Government may continue to detain an “inadmissible” noncitizen beyond
the 90-day removal period, see § 1231(a)(6), it may not detain them “indefinitely.” Zadvydas,
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533 U.S. at 699. A six-month detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. This
presumptively reasonable period does not begin until the noncitizen is detained. See Callender v.
Shanahan, 281 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating that the presumptively reasonable
period under Zadvydas :could not have begun until [the petitioner] was detained by ICE”); see
also Cheng Ke Chen v. Holder, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (“Zadvydas time”
cannot run “while a petitioner is not in custody”). After six months, if the noncitizen “provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” Zadvydas, 533 US. at 701.
Under these principles, Petitioner has met his initial burden under Zadvydas. See id.
Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on April 29, 2025. Doc. 1-9 at 1.
Petitioner has been detained pending removal for a period of eleven months—well beyond the
six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleges
that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable because (1) he cannot be deported to Ethiopia, (2)
“ICE has historically managed to remove only a tiny fraction of non-citizens granted
withholding” to alternative countries, (3) ICE has not identified any countries that may accept
him, nor any timelines in which these countries may render a decision, and (4) deportation to any
alternative country would “require additional, lengthy proceedings.” Doc. 1 at 12–13. Such
evidence demonstrates that Petitioner’s removal is not significantly likely to occur in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
The Government offers no concrete evidence rebutting Petitioner’s showing. While the
Government asserts it is “diligently looking for a third country willing to accept Petitioner,” Doc.
7 at 7, it has not shown that it has indeed contacted any third countries. The Government has not
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requested travel documents for Petitioner or offered anything more than general statements
concerning its internal processes. Such generalized statements regarding the likelihood of
removal are insufficient to rebut Petitioner’s showing of “good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701; see e.g., Ye v. Bondi, 2025 WL 4034264, at * 5 (W.D. Okla.) (noting that “ICE’s internal
process lacks sufficient specificity with regard to Petitioner’s likelihood of removal”); Yan-Ling
X. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3123793, at * 4 (E.D. Cal.) (“The phrase ‘significant likelihood’ requires
something more than a mere possibility that removal will occur.”). Because the Government has
not demonstrated that Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, Petitioner
is entitled to release from custody subject to reasonable conditions of supervision.
III. Conclusion
The Court grants the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1. Because the Court
grants relief under the INA, it declines to address Petitioner’s other claims.
The Government must release Petitioner within seven (7) business days. The
Government is enjoined from redetaining Petitioner unless it provides an individualized bond
hearing before an Immigration Judge under § 1226(a). The Government shall also file a status
report within ten (10) business days of this Order confirming that Petitioner has been released.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access
system.
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