Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JING LIANG JIANG,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. CIV 25-0922 KG/GBW
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jing Liang Jiang’s habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, Doc. 1, and Respondents’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), Doc. 4. For the reasons below, the Court grants Respondents’ motion and
dismisses Mr. Jiang’s petition without prejudice.
I. 	Background
Mr. Jiang, a 58-year-old Chinese citizen, “entered the United States on March 28, 2002,
fleeing political persecution in China.” Doc. 1 at 5. In 2003, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied
Mr. Jiang’s application for asylum and ordered him removed. Doc. 1 at 5. “ On August 23, 2004,
the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, rendering his removal order
administratively final.” Doc. 1 at 5.
Since 2004, Mr. Jiang “has married…a United States citizen…maintained continuous,
lawful employment,” and “dutifully filed taxes.” Doc. 1 at 7. He “has no criminal arrests or
convictions during his entire 23-year residence in the United States.” Doc. 1 at 8. In 2024, “Mr.
Jiang’s U.S. citizen spouse filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf,” which
remains pending. Doc. 1 at 8.
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“On August 13, 2025,” Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) “arrested Mr.
Jiang without warning at or near his home in Long Island City.” Doc. 1 at 8. He is “currently in
ICE custody at Cibola County Correctional Center.” Doc. 1 at 3.
Mr. Jiang now seeks release from custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Doc. 1. He
argues that his detention is unlawful on constitutional and statutory grounds because “[t]he six-
month presumptively reasonable detention period under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001)” expired “over twenty years ago.” Doc. 1 at 5. He further alleges that removal is not
reasonably foreseeable because “twenty-one years have passed without removal”; “China has
consistently refused to accept its nationals subject to removal from the United States”; and ICE
“cannot obtain travel documents from China.” Doc. 1 at 13.
The Government opposes relief, arguing that Mr. Jiang’s detention is lawful because the
Zadvydas clock began when ICE took him into custody in August 2025, not when his removal
period expired. Doc. 4 at 5.
II. 	Standard of Review
In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view[s] these allegations in the light most
favorable to the” petitioner. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). A
habeas petition withstands dismissal only if it alleges “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Aguilera
v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001) (a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition may “be
dismissed…under Rule 12(b)(6)”).
A habeas petition seeks “release from unlawful physical confinement.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas review is proper where an immigration detainee is
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“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), when a noncitizen is ordered
removed, the Government must execute the removal within a 90-day “removal period.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
§ 1231(a)(2). As relevant here, the “removal period begins” when the removal order “becomes
administratively final.” § 1231(a)(1)(B).
Although the Government may continue to detain an “inadmissible” noncitizen beyond
the 90-day removal period, see § 1231(a)(6), it may not detain them “indefinitely.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 699. A six-month detention is “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 680. This period
runs only while the noncitizen is actually “detained.” Callender v. Shanahan, 281 F. Supp. 3d
428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also Ke Chen v. Holder, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (N.D. Ala.)
(“Zadvydas time” cannot run “while a petitioner is not in custody”); Chun Yat Ma v. Asher, 2012
WL 1432229, at *3 (W.D. Wash.) (same). After six months, if the noncitizen “provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future,” the burden shifts to the Government to rebut that showing. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.
III. 	Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court finds that (A) Mr. Jiang’s detention remains within the
Zadvydas six-month period and (B) Mr. Jiang fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
A. 	Mr. Jiang’s detention has not exceeded the presumptively reasonable period.
Based on the allegations in Mr. Jiang’s petition, his detention remains within the
presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas. Mr. Jiang states that, although his removal
order became administratively final in 2004, ICE did not detain him until August 2025,
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approximately three months ago. Doc. 1 at 5. Because the Zadvydas period is triggered by
actual detention, see Callender, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 435, Mr. Jiang’s three-month confinement
remains well within the six-month presumptively reasonable period.
Mr. Jiang argues that the presumptively reasonable detention period “expired twenty
years ago,” six months after the order of removal became administratively final. Doc. 1 at 12.
Mr. Jiang cites Ulysse v. Department of Homeland Security, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1325 (M.D.
Fla. 2003), and Farez-Espinoza v. Chertoff, 600 F. Supp. 2d 488, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) in support
of his view. The Court disagrees. Mr. Jiang confuses the 90-day “removal period,” which began
when his order of removal became final in 2004, see § 1231(a)(1)(B), with the six-month
“presumptively reasonable period of detention” under Zadvydas, which could not have begun
until he was detained by ICE. See Cheng Ke Chen, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1192
(“Because Zadvydas clearly involved detention…it defies common sense to suggest
that Zadvydas time can run while a petitioner is not in custody.”); Chun Yat Ma, 2012 WL
1432229, at *3 (same); Callender, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 435 (same). The Court declines to follow
Farez-Espinoza, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1325, and Ulysses, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 488, which represent
an unpersuasive minority view.
B. 	Mr. Jiang’s fails to state a plausible Zadvydas claim.
Because Mr. Jiang’s detention remains presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas, the
Court considers whether he nonetheless states a plausible claim. Courts are divided on whether
Zadvydas permits challenges within the first six months of post-order detention. Some courts
categorically bar such challenges, see Malets v. Horton, 2021 WL 11549981, at *3 (N.D. Ala.),
while others allow them if the noncitizen “proves that removal is not reasonably foreseeable,”
Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The Court need not resolve
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this unsettled issue because Mr. Jiang fails to state a claim under either approach. Under the first
standard, Mr. Jiang’s petition is premature. Under the more permissive framework, Mr. Jiang
fails to demonstrate that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. He offers only conclusory
assertions: that China “consistently refuses” repatriation, that removal “would have occurred”
long ago if it were possible, and that ICE “cannot obtain travel documents from China.” Doc. 1
at 13. Without more than generalized statements about China’s practices, the petition fails.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court grants Respondents’ motion to dismiss and dismisses
Mr. Jiang’s petition without prejudice. Mr. Jiang may refile his petition if his post-order
detention exceeds six-months.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• 	Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the NEF
(Notice of Electronic Filing) accompanying this
document. Electronically filed documents can be
found on the court’s PACER public access system.
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