Stokes et al v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
HANNAH STOKES,
Plaintiff,
and
TANYA SUZANNE STOKES,
Plaintiff-in-Intervention,
vs. 	No. 1:25-cv-00550-WJ-GBW
ECHO GLOBAL LOGISTICS, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion to Remand [Doc. 9] filed by Plaintiff-
in-Intervention Tanya Suzanne Stokes, and Joinder in Motion to Remand [Doc. 10] filed by
Plaintiff Hannah Stokes. 	Having reviewed the Motion, Joinder, Defendant’s Response in
Opposition to Remand [Doc. 12], Plaintiff in Intervention’s Reply [Doc. 14], and Plaintiff’s
Joinder in the Reply [Doc. 15], the Court finds that the Motion to Remand is not well-taken and
denies the request to remand to State court.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 22, 2023, Luis Angel Garcia was hauling for SB Transport, Inc., travelling
westbound in the right lane of I-10 in Lordsburg, New Mexico, beside a vehicle operated by
Plaintiff Hannah Stokes. [Doc. 1-2 at 2]. Garcia entered the left lane and collided with the vehicle
occupied by Plaintiff Hannah Stokes and Plaintiff-in-Intervention Tanya Suzanne Stokes. [Doc.
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1-2 at 2]. Plaintiff Hannah Stokes lost control of the vehicle, which rolled several times, allegedly
causing injury to Plaintiff Hannah Stokes and Plaintiff-Intervenor Tanya Stokes. [Doc. 1-2; 1-3].
Both Plaintiff and Plaintiff-in-Intervention settled with SB Transport, Inc., and Luis Angel
Garcia. 	[Doc. 1-2 at 2; Doc. 1-3 at 2]. 	Plaintiff Hannah Stokes then filed her Complaint for
Negligence and Personal Injury against Echo Global Logistics [Doc. 1-2] in the First Judicial
District Court, County of Santa Fe, State of New Mexico, on December 3, 2024. The Complaint
asserts state law claims of negligence, negligent hiring, entrustment, training and supervision,
negligence per se, and vicarious liability against Echo Global Logistics. 	[Doc. 1-2]. 	The
Complaint alleges that Echo Global Logistics hired SB Transport to transport merchandise from
Ft. Worth, Texas to Downey, California. [Doc. 1-2 at 2].
Eight days later, on December 11, 2024, Tanya Suzanne Stokes filed an Unopposed Motion
to Intervene in the state-court action brought by Hannah Stokes. [Doc. 1-5 at 6]. The Motion to
Intervene stated:
“Movant’s counsel conferred with counsel for Plaintiff on December 11,
2024 and counsel stated he is unopposed to the relief requested
herein.”
[Doc. 1-5 at 10]. On December 13, 2024, the State court then entered its Order Granting Leave to
Intervene. [Doc. 1-5 at 12]. The Order recited that the Order was being entered “[g]iven that the
Motion is unopposed. [Doc. 1-5 at 12]. Tanya Stokes’ Complaint was then filed on January 7,
2025. [Doc. 1-3]. The allegations of the Complaint filed by Tanya Stokes are almost identical to
the allegations of the Complaint filed by Hannah Stokes. Compare Doc. 1-2, ¶¶ 1-24 and Doc. 1-
3, ¶¶ 1-24. 	One of the few differences between the two is that the Complaint filed by Hannah
Stokes expressly alleges that Hannah Stokes seeks less than $75,000 [Doc. 1-2 at 1], while the
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Complaint filed by Tanya Stokes contains no allegation regarding the amount of damages sought
by Tanya Stokes.
On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff-in-Intervention Tanya Stokes served responses to Echo Global
Logistics’ requests for admissions. [Doc. 1-4]. In the responses, Tanya Stokes admitted that she
seeks greater than $75,000. [Doc. 1-4 at 2]. Echo Global Logistics then removed the case to this
Court on June 11, 2025. [Doc. 1]. The Notice of Removal states, and it is undisputed, that Plaintiff
Hannah Stokes and Plaintiff-in-Intervention Tanya Stokes are citizens of New Mexico, Echo
Global Logistics is a citizen of Delaware, and complete diversity of citizenship exists. [Doc. 1 at
1-2]. The Notice of Removal also states that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 [Doc. 1
at 1-2] and Plaintiff Hannah Stokes and Plaintiff-Intervenor Tanya Stokes do not dispute that Tanya
Stokes seeks in excess of $75,000.
On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff-in-Intervention Tanya Stokes filed a Motion to remand this case
to State court. [Doc. 9]. Plaintiff Hannah Stokes filed a joinder in the Motion to Remand. [Doc.
10]. 	Echo Global Logistics responded in opposition to the Motion to Remand. 	[Doc. 12].
Plaintiff-Intervenor Tanya Stokes then filed a Reply [Doc. 14] and Plaintiff Hannah Stokes filed a
joinder in the Reply [Doc. 15].
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff-in-Intervention Tanya Stokes’ Motion to Remand argues that this case must be
remanded to State court because the Complaint-in-Intervention was not a voluntary act by Plaintiff
Hannah Stokes but, instead, was involuntary, and therefore the Complaint-in-Intervention cannot
serve as a basis for removal of the case originally filed by Hannah Stokes. [Doc. 9]. Defendant
Echo Global Logistics contends that the voluntary/involuntary doctrine is inapplicable in this case,
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Defendant has sufficiently established the existence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332, and that the case should not be remanded to State Court. [Doc. 12].
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil
actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995). If a case is filed in state court, though,
§ 1441 permits a defendant to remove that civil action to federal court—so long as the action
“could originally have been filed in federal court.” Woods v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 833 F. App’x
754, 756 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2005).
Much the same, “there is a presumption against removal jurisdiction.” Laughlin, 50 F.3d at 873.
Diversity jurisdiction must be “strictly construed.” Penteco Corp. Ltd. P’ship-1985A v. Union Gas
Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Healy v. Ratta, 292
U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (“The policy of the [diversity] statute calls for its strict construction.”). And
removed cases may be remanded back to state court. If, for example, there is no basis for subject-
matter jurisdiction then § 1447(c) says remand is required.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), if a case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, “a
notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant . . . of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may be ascertained that the case is one which
is or has become removeable”. Section 1446(c)(3)(A) further provides that if the case stated by
the initial pleading is not removable solely because the amount in controversy is less that the
amount specified in Section 1332, information in responses to discovery “shall be treated as an
‘other paper’ under subsection (b)(3).” Answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for
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admissions are considered “other paper” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and such responses can properly
be considered when determining removability. Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1035–
36 (10th Cir. 1998).
An exception to removability under § 1446(b)(3) exists when the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction are met only through an act of another party that is involuntary on the part of the
plaintiff. An order or act that is involuntarily imposed on a plaintiff cannot defeat plaintiff’s choice
of forum and cannot serve as the basis for removal of the case from state to federal court. 	See
Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92 (1898); DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601
F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1979). See, also, Caribe Chem Distributors Corp. v. S Agric. Insecticides, Inc.,
96 F. 4th 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2024) (discussing adoption of the rule in various United States Circuit
courts). 	However, the Supreme Court has recognized that voluntary changes in the parties and
claims effectively reconfigure the lawsuit and may bring the suit newly within or newly outside a
federal court’s jurisdiction. 	Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549
(2005); Royal Canin, Inc. v. Wulllschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 39 (2025).
Plaintiff-in-Intervention and Plaintiff vehemently argue that the complaint-in-intervention
was not a voluntary act by the original Plaintiff and therefore cannot render the suit removable.
[Doc. 9, 14]. However, the record does not establish that any of the acts in this case were
involuntary as applied to the Plaintiff. 	There was no court order compelling Plaintiff-in-
Intervention to intervene in the case. Plaintiff-Intervenor Tanya Stokes did so voluntarily. [Doc.
1-5 at 6]. 	Importantly, although given the opportunity to object to or oppose the intervention,
Plaintiff Hannah Stokes did not do so. Instead, Hannah Stokes did not oppose the intervention and
voluntarily consented to the order granting leave to intervene. 	[Doc. 1-5 at 6; Doc. 1-5 at 12].
Last, the response to Defendant’s request for admissions establishing the necessary amount in
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controversy was not the result of any court order or other involuntary compulsion. 	[Doc. 1-4].
Therefore, the involuntary action doctrine is not applicable in this case and does not require remand
by this Court.1
The parties do not dispute that the Notice of Removal sufficiently establishes that, at the
time of removal, complete diversity of citizenship existed between the parties aligned as plaintiffs
and the party defendant. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87-88
(2014). Nor do the parties dispute that, when considered as a whole, the amount in controversy in
this case exceeds the sum of $75,000. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the Motion to Remand should be denied.
IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Remand [Doc. 9] filed by Plaintiff-in-Intervention Tanya
Suzanne Stokes, joined in by Plaintiff Hannah Stokes [Doc. 10], is DENIED.
/s/__________________________________
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff-in-Intervention cites several district court level decisions
from other jurisdictions that a complaint-in-intervention cannot be used as a basis for removal of
a previously unremovable case. [Doc. 9 at 2-3]. However, the cases cited appear to involve issues
of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and not diversity jurisdiction under § 1332.
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