Sample et al v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ANGELA SAMPLE and DWAYNE
SAMPLE,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 1:23-cv-00865-SMD-KRS
ASHFORD TRS SANTA FE, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Angela and Dwayne Sample’s Rule 72(a)
Objection (Doc. 176) to Magistrate Judge Kevin R. Sweazea’s Order (Doc. 175) striking Plaintiffs’
“Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation Under 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and Request for
Modification of Deposition Procedures” (Doc. 171).
BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiffs’ prior counsel was granted leave to withdraw from the
case. Doc. 92. Proceeding pro se, Plaintiffs filed 15 motions1 and 40 notices2 over the next 25
days. On November 18, 2025, Judge Sweazea entered the following text order:
Pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket, pending further order of
the Court Plaintiffs are prohibited from filing any additional “Notices,” regardless of the
purpose or subject matter of the Notice. Plaintiffs are also prohibited until further court
order from filing any additional motions seeking relief of any kind related to discovery,
including but not limited to motions to compel discovery, or related to extending
scheduling order deadlines. This prohibition applies even if the motion is not framed as a
1 See Doc. 99; Doc. 104; Doc. 106; Doc. 107; Doc. 108; Doc. 111; Doc. 119; Doc. 127; Doc. 143;
Doc. 144; Doc. 145; Doc. 151; Doc. 154; Doc. 155; Doc. 160.
2 See Doc. 109; Doc. 110; Doc. 113; Doc. 115; Doc. 121; Doc. 122; Doc. 123; Doc. 124; Doc. 125;
Doc. 126; Doc. 128; Doc. 129; Doc. 130; Doc. 131; Doc. 132; Doc. 133; Doc. 134; Doc. 135;
Doc. 136; Doc. 137; Doc. 138; Doc. 139; Doc. 141; Doc. 142; Doc. 146; Doc. 147; Doc. 148;
Doc. 149; Doc. 150; Doc. 152; Doc. 153; Doc. 156; Doc. 158; Doc. 159; Doc. 161; Doc. 163;
Doc. 166; Doc. 167; Doc. 168; Doc. 169.
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discovery or extension motion per se, so long as the motion seeks relief affecting discovery
or discovery deadlines. The parties may proceed in the interim with the Rule 30 depositions
of the three hotel employees permitted by the Court’s order entered on October 24, 2025,
see Dkt. # 98, which must take place, as stated in the October 24 order, by December 23,
2025. If Plaintiffs fail to comply with this order, the Court will strike all prohibited filings.
In addition, the Court forewarns Plaintiffs for the third time that Plaintiffs’ continuing
failure to comply with procedural rules and court orders may result in the Court imposing
sanctions without further warning or notice, including monetary sanctions, revocation of
authorization to file electronically, filing restrictions, and/or dismissal of this case[.]
Doc. 170 (“November 18, 2025 Order”). Later that day, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for
Reasonable ADA Accommodation. Doc. 171. Plaintiffs asserted this was not barred by Judge
Sweazea’s November 18, 2025 Order because it did not request modification of discovery
deadlines or discovery relief. Id. at 1. Plaintiffs asked the Court to “[m]odify the deposition
procedures to Rule 31 written depositions or provide specific oral Rule 30 accommodations”;
address the “previously filed ADA-related motions that remain pending”; and “[p]ermit Plaintiffs
meaningful access to this litigation as required by 42 U.S.C. § 12132.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs requested
one of the following as a reasonable accommodation to allow Plaintiff Dwayne Sample to
participate in these proceedings:
Option 1: Conduct the three permitted depositions under Rule 31 (written questions).
This is the least-restrictive accommodation and was previously requested before the filing
ban.
Option 2: Conduct oral Rule 30 depositions but with ADA modifications, including:
• Slowed pace of questioning
• Breaks every 10–15 minutes
• Written copies of questions provided
• Permission for Mr. Sample to answer in writing when needed
• No rapid-fire or compound questioning
Option 3: A brief ADA accommodations hearing.
To clarify reasonable modifications based on the TBI.
Id. at 3.
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The following day, on November 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a “Notice of Pending ADA
Motion and Request to Stay Depositions Until Accommodation Is Decided,” advising the Court
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation and requesting a stay of all depositions
pending the Court’s ruling. Doc. 174. Also on November 19, 2025, Judge Sweazea entered a text
order striking Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation:
The Motion violates the Court’s temporary prohibition against further motions related to
discovery. See Dkt. # 170. There is no ADA claim alleged in the Complaint. The disability
accommodations sought by the motion are sought in connection with discovery.
Furthermore, the issue of whether to allow the requested accommodation is already before
the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs’ previously filed “Motion to Compel Written Depositions,”
Dkt. # 155, and Defendant’s “Motion For Entry of Protective Order And To Quash
Plaintiffs’ Pro Se Purported Depositions Upon Written Question,” Dkt. # 157. In addition,
the broader issue of ADA accommodations is already before the Court in Plaintiffs’
previously filed “Motion For Reasonable Accommodations And Extension of Time Due
To Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI),” Dkt. # 111. Plaintiffs state that the Motion, Dkt. # 171,
does not violate the Court's prohibition order, Dkt. # 170, because the Court has not yet
ruled on Plaintiffs’ previous requests for ADA accommodations. Plaintiffs are forewarned
that filing repetitive motions seeking identical relief to already filed motions because the
Court has not yet ruled on the previously filed motions may subject Plaintiffs to Rule 11
sanctions for filing a document that is presented for an “improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ
P. 11(b)(1).
Doc. 175 (“November 19, 2025 Order”).
Approximately one hour later, Plaintiffs filed the instant Rule 72(a) objection. Doc. 176.
Plaintiffs asserted four bases for their objection: (1) that ADA accommodations are required even
when no ADA claim is filed; (2) that disability accommodation motions cannot be barred by a
filing ban; (3) that Plaintiffs have submitted documentation of a disability requiring
accommodation; and (4) that Rule 11 was misapplied.
On November 24, 2025, Defendant Ashford TRS Santa Fe filed an “Omnibus Response”
(Doc. 178), advising that without further instruction from the Court, it would not file substantive
responses to Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Judicial Review and Relief” (Doc. 127); Plaintiffs’ Motion to
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Substitute Attorney (Doc. 140); Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Amend Pending Reconsideration Motion to
Compel Discovery Due to New Evidence and Opposing Counsel’s Refusal to Comply” (Doc. 143);
Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Leave to Amend Complaint and to Reinstate
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. as a Defendant” (Doc. 144); Plaintiffs’ “Motion for
Reconsideration of Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions Due to Deposition Abuse,
Discovery Misconduct, and Pattern of Counsel Harassment” (Doc. 145); Plaintiffs’ “Motion to
Compel Outstanding Disclosures and for Sanctions” (Doc. 151); Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Terminate
Depositions, for Protective Order, and for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3) and
30(d)(2)” (Doc. 154); Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Compel Written Depositions” (Doc. 155); and
Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Specific Sanctions of $7,500 or More for Discovery Misconduct, Bad-Faith
Delays, and Violation of Court Orders” (Doc. 160). Ashford’s Omnibus Response did not mention
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation or Rule 72(a) Objection. See Doc. 178.
Within an hour of Ashford filing its Omnibus Response and before Ashford filed any
substantive response to the Rule 72(a) Objection, Plaintiffs filed a “reply” purportedly to address
Defendant’s Omnibus Response. Doc. 179. Without any citation to the Omnibus Response,
Plaintiffs state that Ashford “incorrectly asserts it is exempt from responding to Plaintiffs’ Rule 72
Objections by December 3, 2025.” Id. at 1. Plaintiffs also assert, without relevant supporting
authority, that “[a]voiding a response is not permitted under Rule 72.”3 Id. at 2.
3 Plaintiffs cite two cases for the proposition that “Courts routinely hold that a party must respond to Rule 72
objections: “Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2011)” and “Gonzales v. Qwest Commc’ns, 2005 WL
366290 (D. Colo.) (“Responses to objections are required unless the court orders otherwise.”).” See Doc. 179 at 3.
Hernandez v. Thaler concerned a petition for federal habeas relief from a conviction in Texas state court, and did not
involve any objections—or responses—under Rule 72(a). And while the Tenth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion
in a case captioned Gonzales v. Qwest Communications, the database identifier provided by Plaintiffs does not appear
attached to an existing case. In Gonzales v. Qwest Communications, 160 F. App’x 688 (10th Cir. 2005), the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant summary
judgment—in other words, the underlying objection was raised under Rule 72(b) concerning dispositive motions,
rather than Rule 72(a) concerning nondispositive matters. The language quoted by Plaintiffs—“Responses to
objections are required unless the court orders otherwise”—does not appear in the Tenth Circuit’s decision.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive matter must be affirmed unless “it has
been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“The district judge in the case must consider timely
objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to
law.”). The “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard is extremely deferential. To overturn
the magistrate judge’s decision as clearly erroneous under Rule 72(a), the district court must have
a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow
Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ first three bases for objection relate to the requested “ADA accommodations”
raised in Doc. 171 and other motions. The fourth basis challenges the following language in Judge
Sweazea’s November 19, 2025 Order: “Plaintiffs are forewarned that filing repetitive motions
seeking identical relief to already filed motions because the Court has not yet ruled on the
previously filed motions may subject Plaintiffs to Rule 11 sanctions for filing a document that is
presented for an ‘improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.’” See Doc. 175. Plaintiffs argue that (1) that ADA accommodations
are required even when no ADA claim is filed; (2) that disability accommodation motions cannot
be barred by a filing ban; (3) that Plaintiffs have submitted documentation of a disability requiring
accommodation; and (4) that Rule 11 was misapplied. None of these grounds identifies a part of
Although courts make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff's failure to cite to proper legal authority, courts do not
excuse the use of fabricated or misleading authorities. Morgan v. Cmty. Against Violence, No. 23-cv-353-WPJ/JMR,
2023 WL 6976510, *7 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023). Plaintiffs are cautioned that they must comply with this Court’s Local
Rules, the Court’s Guide for Pro Se Litigants, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any future filings that contain
citations to nonexistent cases may result in sanctions, including the filing being stricken, filing restrictions being
imposed, or dismissal of the case. See id at *8 (collecting cases where sanctions were deemed appropriate).
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Judge Sweazea’s November 19, 2025 Order that Plaintiffs seek to set aside, much less anything
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” For at least the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ objection is
denied.
First, Judge Sweazea has not yet ruled on Plaintiffs’ requested accommodations. Judge
Sweazea’s November 19, 2025 Order struck the Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation,
but as the parties appear to agree, the relief requested in the Motion for Reasonable ADA
Accommodation is not new. See Doc. 171 at 3 (“Plaintiffs filed relevant disability-related motions
BEFORE the filing ban.”); Doc. 176 at 2 (“Because the Court has not ruled on pending motions
(Dkts. 111, 155), Plaintiffs cannot safely proceed with depositions without guidance.”); see Doc.
187 at 4 (“Plaintiffs . . . filed a Motion again requesting the same relief as is requested in the many
other pending motions.”). For example, Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Reasonable Accommodations and
Extension of Time Due to Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)” sought “reasonable procedural flexibility
consistent with Plaintiff’s disability” in connection with requested extensions of motion and
discovery deadlines. Doc. 111 at 3. In their “Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Protective
Order and Sanctions Due to Deposition Abuse, Discovery Misconduct, and Pattern of Counsel
Harassment,” Plaintiffs requested “a Protective Order limiting improper questions” and that “any
future depositions [] be Court-supervised or remote with safeguards.” Doc. 145 at 4.
The Court has inherent authority to manage its docket, including the authority to strike
filings. See United States v. Schneider, 594 F.3d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The power of
district courts to manage their dockets is deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence.”). Judge
Sweazea’s November 18, 2025 Order advised Plaintiffs that they were prohibited from filing
additional “Notices” or other motions relating to discovery while Plaintiffs’ previous motions
seeking discovery relief were pending. See Doc. 170. Nothing in Judge Sweazea’s November 19,
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2025 Order prevented Plaintiffs from seeking the relief requested in the Motion for Reasonable
ADA Accommodation, which Plaintiffs previously requested in several discovery motions. These
motions remain before the Court. For similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ objection on the grounds that
Rule 11 was misapplied is not well-taken, as Judge Sweazea’s November 19, 2025 Order did not
impose any sanctions on Plaintiffs.
Second, as Judge Sweazea explained, the accommodations identified in the Motion for
Reasonable ADA Accommodation are sought in connection with discovery. See Doc. 175.
Plaintiffs assert that the Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation “does not seek discovery
relief” (see Doc. 171 at 1), but this disclaimer does not change the underlying nature of the
requested relief, particularly where the requested relief appears in other motions filed by Plaintiffs
in connection with discovery disputes and deadlines. For example, Plaintiffs previously filed a
“Motion to Compel Written Depositions,” moving the Court to compel the written depositions of
John Rickey, Peter Messerer, and Juana Gonzalez. See Doc. 155. In their Rule 72(a) Objection,
Plaintiffs now assert that Rule 31 written questions are requested to accommodate Plaintiff
Dwayne Sample’s traumatic brain injury. See Doc. 176 at 2.
Third, even if the Motion for Reasonable ADA Accommodation did not relate to
discovery, Plaintiffs supply no authority to support their assertions regarding “accommodation
motions.” Plaintiffs appear to rely on Title II of the ADA, citing one statute and two cases in their
Rule 72(a) Objection: 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); and Badillo-
Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004). None of these support Plaintiffs’ position
that “striking an ADA access motion is contrary to law.”
Section 12132 provides that “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
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be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” The term “public entity” means any State or local government;
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or
local government; and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.
42 U.S.C. § 12131. The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. Id. Even assuming Plaintiff
Dwayne Sample is a qualified individual with a disability, Section 12132, by its own terms, does
not apply to federal courts.
Both Tennessee v. Lane and Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly involved access to and
accommodations in state courts. In Lane, the Supreme Court considered an action against the
State of Tennessee and several counties, alleging past and ongoing violations of Title II. 541 U.S.
at 513. The plaintiffs used wheelchairs for mobility and alleged that they were denied access to
the state court system: one was jailed for failure to appear after he was unable to reach the second
floor courtroom where his criminal proceedings were held; and the other was a certified court
reporter who was unable to gain access to a number of county courthouses. Id. at 513–14. In
Badillo-Santiago, the plaintiff challenged accommodations relating to a state court trial involving
the sale of a house. 378 F.3d at 3. After an unfavorable judgment in state court, the plaintiff (the
defendant in the state court trial) filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the presiding
judge, and other government officials, alleging violations of the ADA and violations of his due
process and equal protection rights. Id.
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The Court further notes that even if Title II provided the appropriate mechanism for
Plaintiffs to seek accommodations in this litigation, “reasonable accommodation” does not require
“any and all means” or exempt litigants from complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As the Supreme Court explained in Lane:
Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial services
accessible or to compromise essential eligibility criteria for public programs. It requires
only “reasonable modifications” that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible
for the service.
541 U.S. at 511. Indeed, the First Circuit in Badillo-Santiago affirmed the district court’s decision
to deny the plaintiff’s untimely motion to amend, despite the plaintiff alleging violations of the
ADA. 378 F.3d at 7–8.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Rule 72(a) Objection (Doc. 176) is OVERRULED.
The Court declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ “ADA Access Request and Notice Regarding Deposition
Deadline” (Doc. 181), which is appropriately before Judge Sweazea.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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