PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION v. COMMERCIAL INVESTIGATION & ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, INC.

3:25-cv-05677Njd17 feb 2026

Testo completo

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 1 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 2 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 3 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 4 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 5 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 6 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 7 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 8 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 9 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document 9 Filed 02/17/26 Page 10 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 1 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-5677 (MAS) (TJB)
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
COMMERCIAL INVESTIGATION &
ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s
(“PBGC”) unopposed Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant Commercial Investigation
& Adjustment Co., Inc., as Plan Administrator of the Commercial Investigation & Adjustment Co.,
Inc. Retirement Plan (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 6.) The Court has carefully considered PBGC’s
submission and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For
the reasons stated below, the Court grants PBGC’s Motion.

1. BACKGROUND!

This action arises under Title IV of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461. The Court, therefore, discusses the relevant statutory

framework, before summarizing the relevant facts.

' For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true, “except those relating to the amount of damages[.|” See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe,
431 F.3d 162, 165 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 3d
Cir. 1990)).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 2 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

A. Statutory Framework

PBGC is a wholly owned United States government corporation and “is the federal agency
that administers and enforces the nation’s defined benefit pension plan insurance program
established” by ERISA. (Compl. § 5, ECF No. 1) When an underfunded pension plan covered
under Title IV is terminated, PBGC “pays statutorily guaranteed pension benefits to plan
participants and their beneficiaries.” Ud.) PBGC is authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 1342 to commence
proceedings in the appropriate United States District Court to terminate a defined benefit pension
plan when it determines that: (1) such plan has not met the minimum funding standard required
under Section 412 of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”); (2) the plan will be unable to pay benefits
when due; or (3) termination is necessary to protect the interests of the plan’s participants. (/d.
qq 13-14); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), (2). Typically, when an underfunded defined benefit
pension plan is terminated, PBGC becomes the statutory trustee of the plan and uses insurance
funds to pay the plan’s unfunded benefits. (/d. J 15); 29 U.S.C. § 1322. A district court may appoint
PBGC as the statutory trustee if termination is necessary to protect the interests of plan participants.
(Compl. 16); 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c). When the plan administrator and PBGC have not agreed on a
plan termination date for a defined benefit pension plan covered by Title IV, a district court may
establish the date of termination. (Compl. § 17); 29 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(4). Pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 1342(c), a trustee for a defined benefit pension plan shall be appointed by the District Court upon
granting a decree of plan termination. (Compl. { 18.) PBGC may also request that it be appointed
as trustee of a defined benefit pension plan in any case. (/d.); 29 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

B. Factual Background

PBGC brings this action regarding the Commercial Investigation & Adjustment Co., Inc.

Retirement Plan (the “Plan’”) pursuant to ERISA. (Compl. § 1.) Defendant conducted

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 3 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

claims-related investigations, primarily for large auto insurance companies, until it ceased
operations. (/d. J 6.) The Plan is a single-employer defined benefit plan, effective July 1, 1994,
and is covered under ERISA. (/d. §§ 7-8.) Defendant is the Plan’s contributing sponsor and
administrator. Ud. §§ 9-10.) Defendant has not filed the required 550-SF Short Form Annual
Return/Report of Small Employee Benefit Plan (“Form 5500”) since filing its 2020 form for the
2019 plan year. Ud. §§ 11-12.) Defendant ceased operations, terminated all employees, and
abandoned the Plan. (Ud. § 21.)

PBGC determined that the Plan will be unable to pay benefits when due and that
termination of the Plan is necessary to protect the interest of the Plan’s participants. Ud. ¥ 20.)
PBGC thus issued a Notice of Determination (the “Notice”) to Defendant on February 28, 2025,
informing Defendant of such. (Id. § 22.) PBGC sent its Notice to Douglas O’Neill (“O’Neill”),
President of Defendant, by e-mail message. Ud. § 23.) That same day, PBGC additionally
published an advertisement in the Asbury Park Press to notify Plan participants of the
determination and the fact that it was taking steps to assume responsibility for the Plan as its
statutory trustee. (Id. ¥ 28.)

C. Procedural Background

PBGC filed its Complaint on May 27, 2025, requesting an order with the following relief:
(1) an adjudication that the Plan is terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c); (2) appointment of
PBGC as statutory trustee of the Plan pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c); (3) the establishment of
February 28, 2025, as the termination date of the Plan pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(4); (4) an
order directing Defendant to transfer, convey and deliver all records, assets, and property of the
Plan to PBGC as trustee upon request pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1); and (5) such other relief

the Court deems just and proper. (/d. at 6-7.) After requesting entry of default and the Clerk’s Entry

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 4 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

of Default, (Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 4; Clerk’s Entry of Default), PBGC
filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment (P1.’s Mot., ECF No. 6).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 557 authorizes a court to enter default judgment “against
a properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading.” La. Counseling &
Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Makrygialos, LLC, 543 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Anchorage
Assocs. v. VI. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990)). Entry of default judgment is
left to the district court’s discretion. See Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984).
Default judgment is a disfavored remedy because it does not resolve a plaintiff’s claims on the
merits. Loc. 365 Pension Fund v. Kaplan Bros. Blue Flame Corp., No. 20-10536, 2021 WL
1976700, at *2 (D.N.J. May 18, 2021) (quoting United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728
F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1984)).

When determining whether to enter default judgment, three assessments guide the Court’s
analysis. See Victory s Dawn, Inc. v. Clemons, No. 21-9744, 2022 WL 3402491, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug.
12, 2022). First, “where a defendant fails to respond to a complaint, the Court must ensure that the
plaintiff properly served the defendant.” /d. (citing Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d
14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)). Second, the Court must ensure that “the unchallenged facts” within the
complaint give rise to a “legitimate cause of action.” Jd. (quoting Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky,
558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (D.N.J. 2008)). When conducting this assessment, the Court assumes as
true all allegations in the complaint, except legal conclusions and allegations regarding damages.

See DIRECTY, Inc., 431 F.2d at 165 n.6 (citing Comdyne I, 908 F.3d at 1149). Third, the Court

2 All references to a “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 5 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

must determine whether default judgment is appropriate by weighing three factors (the “Emcasco
factors”): “(1) whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense; (2) the prejudice suffered
by the plaintiff seeking default; and (3) the defaulting party’s culpability in bringing about default.”
Trs. of UFCW Loc. 152 Health & Welfare Fund v. Avon Food, Inc., No. 17-2178, 2018 WL 372167,
at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2018) (citing Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (d Cir. 1987)).

Til. DISCUSSION

A. Proper Service

First, the Court must determine whether PBGC properly served Defendant. Gold Kist, 756
F.2d at 19; Chef's Warehouse Mid-Atl., LLC v. Bayou Boys LLC, No. 25-721, 2025 WL 2535617,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 3, 2025). The plaintiff “bears the burden of proof on that issue.” Grand Entm t
Grp. v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The plaintiff can
meet this burden “by a preponderance of the evidence using affidavits, depositions, and oral
testimony.” Mills v. Ethicon, 406 F. Supp. 3d 363, 392 (D.N.J. 2019) (citation omitted).

Defendant is a corporation. (Compl. § 6.) A corporation located in the United States may
be served “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or
general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
.... Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).

PBGC has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was properly
served with the Summons and Complaint. PBGC pleads that O’Neill is president of Defendant and
filed an Affidavit of Service indicating that O’Neill was personally served at his home address.
(Aff. of Service, ECF No. 3; Compl. § 23; see also Ex 1 to Compl., ECF No. 1-3 (addressed to

O’Neill as “President” of Defendant).) PBGC has therefore properly served Defendant. Knights

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 6 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Forward Hotels & Dev., LLC, No. 17-2789, 2019 WL 2636070, at *4 (D.N.J.
June 27, 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B)).

B. Jurisdiction

The Court next turns to whether it may exercise jurisdiction over the parties. “[W]hen entry
of a default judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, the
district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and
the parties.” D’Onofrio v. Il Mattino, 430 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Williams v.
Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986)).

Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to: (1) 29 U.S.C.
§ 1303(e)(3) because the statute explicitly provides that “[t]he district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought by [PBGC] under this subchapter”; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because this is a civil action arising under ERISA; and (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1345 because the PBGC is
a United States agency. The Court, accordingly, has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it is a corporation that is both
incorporated in and has its principal place of business in New Jersey. (Compl. { 6); 7rs. of United
Food & Com. Workers Union v. Union Org. for Soc. Servs., No. 22-541, 2023 WL 3862039, at *3
(D.N.J. June 6, 2023).

C. Sufficiency of PBGC’s Causes of Action

Next the Court must determine whether the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.
PBGC moves for termination of the Plan and appointment as trustee of the Plan pursuant to 29
U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(2), (c). (PI.’s Moving Br. 5, ECF No. 6-1.) PBGC alleges that the Plan is unable
to pay benefits when due and was abandoned by Defendant, and that Defendant has not provided

consent to terminate the Plan or agreed to a termination date. (/d.; Compl. JJ 20-22, 24.)

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 7 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Title IV of ERISA authorizes PBGC to commence court proceedings to terminate a pension
plan upon determining that “the plan [is] unable to pay benefits when due” and after PBGC issues
notice to the plan administrator of its determination. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2). Once an action has
been brought, a district court may issue a “decree adjudicating that the plan must be terminated in
order to protect the interests of the participants.” Id. § 1342(c)(1). PBGC alleges that the Plan is
unable to pay benefits when due because Defendant ceased operations, and the Plan was effectively
abandoned. (Compl. {| 20-22.) PBGC also alleges that it issued a Notice of Determination to
Defendant on February 28, 2025. Ud. § 22.) The Court therefore finds that PBGC has sufficiently
alleged its claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(2), (c)(1). See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Ward Tech. Prods., Inc., No. 22-2312, 2024 WL 5232834, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2024), R.& R.
adopted, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ward Tech. Prods., Inc., No. 22-2312, 2025 WL 1768207
(E.D. Cal. June 26, 2025).

PBGC requests the Court to determine that the Plan’s termination date was February 28,
2025. (Pl.’s Moving Br. 5.) PBGC alleges this Court is authorized to establish a termination date
for a plan if PBGC and the plan administrator cannot agree to one. (Compl. 9 13-14, 17.) A
pension plan’s termination date is ordinarily “established by the [PBGC] and agreed to by the plan
administrator[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(3). In the absence of such an agreement, however, “the date
[is] established by the court.” Jd. § 1348(a)(4). Here, PBGC has adequately alleged that there is no
agreement between PBGC and Defendant, and it is therefore appropriate for the Court to establish
a termination date of February 28, 2025. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Jensen's Inc., No. 22-61,
2023 WL 12218681, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. May 1, 2023).

PBGC also requests that the Court appoint it as trustee of the Plan. (Compl. {J 30-31.)

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c), a District Court is permitted to “appoint a trustee” in connection

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 8 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

with a proceeding to terminate a plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1). Here, PBGC has adequately alleged
that this Court has the statutory authority to appoint it trustee of the Plan.

D. Default Judgment Factors

Lastly, the Court must determine whether it should enter default judgment. In doing so, it
considers the following Emcasco factors to determine whether to grant a default judgment under
Rule 55(b): “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied[;] (2) whether the defendant appears
to have a litigable defense[;] and (3) whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct.”
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Hill v. Williamsport
Police Dep t, 69 F. App’x 49, 51 (3d Cir. 2003). The Court examines each factor in turn.

Regarding the first factor, “[w]hen a defendant fails to respond to a plaintiff’s claims, the
plaintiff will be prejudiced absent a default judgment because [the] plaintiff will be left with no
other means to vindicate his .. . claims.” United States v. Vo, No. 15-6327, 2016 WL 475313, at
*3 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2016) (citation omitted); see also Slaughter v. Moya, No. 17-6767, 2018 WL
3742622, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018) (“[B]ecause [d]efendant has failed to appear, [p]laintiffs
suffer prejudice if they do not receive a default judgment because they have no other means of
vindicating their claim.”). Moreover, the Plan can only be terminated with the consent of
Defendant or by a District Court order. See 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c); see United Steelworkers of Am.
Loc. 4805 v. Harris & Sons Steel Co., 706 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (3d Cir. 1983). Because Defendant
has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s claims, the first factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

Second, the Court examines whether Defendant has a litigable defense. Defendant’s failure
to respond to PBGC’s Complaint permits the Court to infer that Defendant does not have a litigable
defense. See, e.g., Chef's Warehouse Mid-Atlantic, LLC v. Bayou Boys LLC, No. 25-721, 2025 WL

2535617, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 3, 2025) (“[I]t is well established that when a party does not answer

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9_ Filed 02/17/26 Page 9 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

or otherwise respond to the complaint, the Court may presume that it has ‘no meritorious defense.’”
(quoting Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Yakubets, 3 F. Supp. 3d 261, 271 (E.D. Pa. 2014))); Malibu
Media, LLC v. Ramiscal, No. 14-7517, 2016 WL 8698533, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2016) (“[T]he
Court may presume that a defendant who has failed to plead, defend, or appear has no meritorious
defense.”). The Court thus presumes that Defendant does not have a meritorious defense to prevent
PBGC from obtaining its requested relief. The second factor, accordingly, weighs in favor of
default judgment.

Third, the Court determines whether Defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct. In the
context of a default judgment, “culpable conduct means actions taken willfully or in bad faith.”
Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 123-24 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Feliciano v.
Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1982)). Defendant’s failure to respond, “permits
the Court to draw an inference of culpability on [its] part.” JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Zoey Trading LLC,
No. 21-19299, 2022 WL 970412, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2022). The third Emcasco factor,
accordingly, weighs in favor of default judgment.

Balancing the three Emcasco factors and weighing all considerations, the Court finds that
default judgment in favor of PBGC against Defendant is appropriate. See Joe Hand Promotions,
Inc. v. Waldron, No. 11-849, 2013 WL 1007398, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2013) (finding that factors
weighed in favor of default judgment where there was no indication of a cognizable defense to
plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff had no alternative means of vindicating its claim, and defendants failed

entirely to respond).

Case 3:25-cv-05677-MAS-TJB Document9 _ Filed 02/17/26 Page 10 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, PBGC’s Motion for Default Judgment is granted. The

Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

a

hMattiyyy

MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: a/ ‘7 L 2026

10

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.