HANNUM v. JACKSON TOWNSHIP et al

3:25-cv-02987Njd29 gen 2026

Testo completo

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ELENOR HANNUM,
Civil Action No. 25-2987 (ZNQ) (TJB)
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
JACKSON TOWNSHIP, et al.,
Defendants.
QURAISHI, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion,” ECF
No. 11) filed on June 13, 2025, by Defendant Jackson Township Attorney Gregory McGuckin
(“Defendant”). Defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of his Motion. (“Moving Br.,”
ECF No. 11-1.) Plaintiff Elenor Hannum (“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition (“Opp.,” ECF No. 13),
to which Defendant replied (“Reply,” ECF No. 14).
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the Motion
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART
Defendant’s Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 2024, Jackson Township held a council meeting regarding the adoption
of various resolutions and ordinances. 	(“Compl.,” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10–11.) 	The council meeting
provides for a public hearing where the public may address the town council regarding the
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ordinances that have been proposed for adoption. (Id. ¶ 15.) Each member of the public is given
five minutes to speak. (Id.)
One of the ordinances for consideration, Ordinance 06–24, was going to establish a new
position of Director of Public Safety within Jackson Township. 	(Id. ¶ 12.) 	Sergeant John
Rodriguez (“Sgt. Rodriguez”) was given the first opportunity to speak during the public hearing
section of the meeting related to Ordinance 06-24. (Id. ¶ 16.) After the five-minute mark, Sgt.
Rodriguez was permitted to continue speaking and demanded more information about a wrongful
death settlement unrelated to the ordinance. (Id. ¶ 21.) The Council President1 directed Defendant,
the Township attorney, to respond to Sgt. Rodriguez’s question. (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant stated that
the unfavorable testimony of Police Chief Matthew Kunz (“Chief Kunz”) led to the settlement.
(Id.) Sgt. Rodriguez’s remarks went about a minute over his allotted time. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Following Sgt. Rodriquez, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to speak. (Id. ¶ 24.) In her
remarks, she stated that Ordinance 06-24 was being advanced as part of a political agenda to attack
Chief Kunz. 	(Id. ¶ 25.) 	According to Plaintiff, the Mayor bore some animosity towards Chief
Kunz because he refused to coverup an incident involving the Mayor’s son. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff
also asserted that the Council President had a financial conflict of interest and was therefore unfit
to vote on ordinances related to the police. 	(Id. ¶ 27–28.) 	Plaintiff additionally stated that the
Council President was in a romantic relationship with Jeff Henba (“Henba”), the Union President
for the Police Benevolent Association, who had been advocating for the passage of Ordinance 06-
24. (Id. ¶ 32.) This relationship, according to Plaintiff, created a conflict of interest that should
have also precluded the Council President from voting on the ordinance. (Id.)
1 The Council President, Jennifer Kuhn, is a defendant in this matter but has not joined in this Motion.
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At that point, the Council President pushed her microphone away and purportedly asked
Defendant what she could do. 	(Id. ¶ 33 n.1.) 	Defendant responded that the Council President
could “declare her out of order,” at which point the Council President declared Plaintiff out of
order and had her removed from the meeting. (Id ¶¶ 33, 43.)
Henba was given the next opportunity to address the town council. (Id. ¶ 44.) He started
his remarks by stating that he would “like to address a few residents in town who spewed lies on
social pages these last few weeks . . . .” (Id. ¶ 45.) Although not related to the ordinance, Henba
was able to discuss the “lies” for approximately twenty seconds. (Id. ¶ 46.) None of the statements
made by Henba related to the ordinance and he was not interrupted at any point. (Id. ¶ 47.)
A year later, on February 27, 2025, Plaintiff again made remarks at another Jackson
Township public hearing, this time concerning a different ordinance that proposed lowering
property maintenance fines. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50.) Her remarks concerned an alleged conflict of interest
for Councilman Mordechai Burnstein (“Burnstein”). (Id. ¶ 51.) Burnstein ultimately interrupted
Plaintiff, and Defendant did not stop or otherwise intervene to prevent him from speaking over
her. (Id. ¶¶ 52–53.) Plaintiff then began to express her concern that reducing property maintenance
fines would result in applicants failing to conduct proper site visits and care for the property in an
appropriate manner. (Id. ¶ 54.) At that point, the Council President interrupted Plaintiff, stating
that the “hearing is about an ordinance, not applications,” and declared Plaintiff out of order. (Id.)
Again, Defendant did not intervene. (Id. ¶ 58.)
Later at that same hearing, Plaintiff once again made public remarks concerning a land use
ordinance. 	(Id. ¶ 59.) 	This time, Plaintiff asked the Township Council why the ordinance was
being changed and who it was being changed for. (Id. ¶ 61.) The Council President responded
that Plaintiff had three minutes to speak and that the council was not going to answer Plaintiff’s
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questions. (Id. ¶ 64.) Plaintiff then stated that she found it “quite interesting” that the land use
ordinance at issue had been changed twelve times since the Council President had taken her
position. (Id. ¶ 65.)
Later in the hearing, during an “Any Topic” period, Plaintiff made additional remarks
concerning the ordinances and brought up her removal from the Town Council meeting a year
earlier. (Id. ¶¶ 67–68.) The Council President also addressed the public, stating that “attacks on
council and anyone up on the dais is not going to be accepted” and that anyone who makes such
remarks will be declared out of order. (Id. ¶ 70.)
Plaintiff now brings seven causes of action: (1) violation of the First Amendment (Count I
and II); violation of Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution (Count III); violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV); violation of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution (Count V); violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count VI); and Attorney’s
Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Count VII).
II. 	SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over the federal-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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III. 	DISCUSSION 2
In his Motion, Defendant makes four points: (1) Plaintiff does not allege the requisite facts
to hold Defendant liable for violating the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff’s complaint does not
comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8; (3) Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for
attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 cannot be brought as a standalone claim; and (4)
Defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court will address each
of these arguments below.
A. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
A district court may grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion
under 12(b)(6), the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.”
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor,
Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). Moreover, the court must accept as true all the plaintiff's
well-pleaded factual allegations and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The
court, however, may ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely
state the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. 	See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
2 The Complaint does not clarify whether Defendant is being sued in his individual or official capacity. Although
Plaintiff’s Opposition states that Defendant is being sued in his official capacity (Opp. at 17), it is well-established
that a plaintiff may not amend her complaint in a brief filed in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Com. of Pa. ex
rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo., Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be
amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant are in his official capacity, the Court finds those claims to be duplicative of the suit against Jackson
Township. As such, those claims will be dismissed as redundant. See Cuvo v. De Biasi, 169 F. App’x 688, 693 (3d.
Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claims brought against township officers in their official capacity because they were
redundant of the claims brought against the township); Matos v. Laielli, Civ. No. 15-8140, 2016 WL 6275161, at *2
n.1 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2016) (“Insofar as any claims have been asserted against [the defendant] in his official capacity,
they are dismissed as duplicative of the claims against the County.”); Janowski v. City of N. Wildwood, 259 F. Supp.
3d 113, 131–32 (D.N.J. 2017) (“[W]here claims against an officer in his official capacity are duplicative of claims
against the municipality, those claims are properly dismissed as redundant.”).
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(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 	Finally, the court must
determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has
a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially
plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663).
1. 	First Amendment Claims (Counts I and II) 3
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims are brought in Counts I and II, which allege that § 3-
12 of the Jackson Township Administrative Code is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to
Plaintiff.
“A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its text alone and does not consider
the facts or circumstances of a particular case.” United States v. Marcavage, 609 F. 3d 264, 273
(3d Cir. 2010). “An as-applied attack, in contrast, does not contend that a law is unconstitutional
as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived
that person of a constitutional right.” Id.
With respect to Plaintiff’s facial challenge to § 3-12, that claim is not properly brought
against Defendant. “A plaintiff challenging the validity of a state statute may bring suit against
the official who is charged with the statute’s enforcement only if the official has either enforced,
or threatened to enforce, the statute against the plaintiffs.” 1st Westco Corp. v. School. Dist. of
Phila., 6 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, the ordinance provides as follows:
Any person who shall disturb the peace of the Council, make
abusive or slanderous remarks, or conduct himself or herself in an
3 In his Motion, Defendant argues that he did not engage in any affirmative acts that violated Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights. (Moving Br. at 6.) He then summarily asserts that this argument applies to all of Plaintiff’s causes
of action, without substantively addressing Plaintiff’s claims under the New Jersey Constitution (Counts III and V),
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count VI), or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV).
(Id.) Because Defendant’s Motion substantively addresses only Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims (Counts I and
II)—and fails to meaningfully argue for dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims (other than Count VII) under Rule
12(b)(6)—the Court declines to address those remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
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uncivil, 	disruptive 	or 	threatening 	manner 	during 	a 	Township
Council meeting shall be asked by the presiding officer to submit to
proper order. If the person continues the manner of behavior and/or
speech delineated above, the presiding officer may ask said person
to either submit to proper order or voluntarily leave the proceedings.
If the person still continues the manner of disruptive behavior or
speech during the course of the meeting, the presiding officer may
ask that the person be removed from the Township Council meeting
by a sworn officer of the Township Police Department.
Township of Jackson, Administrative Code § 3-12(b) (emphases added). The ordinance therefore
charges the “presiding officer” with determining whether a person needs to submit to proper order
when making public remarks at the Council meeting. This interpretation is further supported by
the allegations in the Complaint, which state that it was the Council President who declared
Plaintiff out of order. 	(Compl. ¶¶ 33, 58.) 	Given that Defendant is not charged with the
enforcement of § 3-12, and the allegations in the Complaint make clear he was not the individual
who declared Plaintiff out of order, Plaintiff’s claim (Count I) that facially attacks the
constitutionality of § 3-12 will be dismissed as to Defendant. See 1st Westco Corp., 6 F.3d at 116.
Plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to § 3-12 against Defendant fares no better. 	In the First
Amendment context, a council meeting may be a limited public forum, at which “content-based
restraints are permitted, so long as they are designed to confine the forum to the limited and
legitimate purposes for which it was created.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 280
(3d Cir. 2009). 	However, “viewpoint discrimination is impermissible in any forum.” 	Ctr. For
Investigative Reporting v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 975 F.3d 300, 313 (3d Cir. 2020).
As alleged, Plaintiff was prevented from speaking about a topic which the Council
President disagreed with or found to be offensive, while at the same time other individuals were
permitted to make comments that were favorable or agreeable, even if those comments were made
beyond the allotted the time. 	(Compl. ¶¶ 20–23, 28–33.) 	While this may constitute viewpoint
discrimination, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations that would subject Defendant to
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liability for such discrimination. As alleged, the Defendant only stated, “. . . you could declare her
out of order, but I don’t . . .,” at which point the Council President declared Plaintiff out of order
and had her removed from the proceeding. 	(Id. ¶ 33 n.1.) 	The remaining allegations concern
Defendant’s silence or inaction in preventing the Council President from allegedly violating
Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 58.) At no point, however, did Defendant personally take any action
against Plaintiff. 	As the Township Attorney, he lacked the authority to declare Plaintiff out of
order and there are no allegations that he ordered, let alone suggested, that Plaintiff be removed
from the hearing. 	At most, Defendant responded to a question from the Council President, but
such a limited and incomplete statement is insufficient to plausibly plead that Defendant is liable
for violating Plaintiff’s first amendment rights. See Miller v. Goggin, 672 F. Supp. 3d 14, 42 (E.D.
Pa. 2023) (dismissing first amendment claim where the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that
the defendants used a town ordinance to prevent the plaintiff from speaking). 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims (Count I and II) will be dismissed against Defendant.
2. 	42 U.S.C. § 1988
42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows a prevailing party in a § 1983 case to obtain reasonable attorney’s
fees. It is well established, however, that § 1988 is not a standalone cause of action. See Latino
Project, Inc. v. City of Camden, 701 F.2d 262, 265 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he section is intended
to complement the various acts which do create federal causes of action for the violation of federal
civil rights.”); Mollo v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com’rs, Civ. No. 07-1655, 2009 WL 5216976,
at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (holding that § 1988 does not create a separate cause of action). To
the extent Plaintiff prevails on her federal civil rights claims, she may file a motion for attorney’s
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 at that time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s separate cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Count VII) will be dismissed with prejudice but without prejudice to her right
to renew her request by motion at a later time should she prevail in this litigation.
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B. 	Rule 8
Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Each averment must be “simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Taken together, Rules 8(a) and 8(d)(1) “underscore the emphasis
placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.” 	In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90
F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 	“The statement should be plain because the
principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of
the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.” Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Huczko,
810 F. App'x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)).
The “statement should be short because ‘[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified
burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the
relevant material from a mass of verbiage.’” Id. (quoting Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42) (alteration
in original). 	A complaint may permissibly be dismissed based on Rule 8 noncompliance.
Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. Whether the “short and plain statement” requirement is satisfied is a
“context-dependent exercise.” West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98
(3d Cir. 2010). 	“Violations of the short and plain statement rule have included complaints that
were too long, repetitious, or confused.” Parker v. Learn the Skills Corp., No. 03-6936, 2004 WL
2384993, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2004).
Here, Defendant contends that “the Complaint fails to assert any plain statement as to
action performed by [Defendant] in compliance with Rule 8” and improperly relies on group
pleading. (Moving Br. at 9.) These arguments lack merit. As discussed earlier in this Opinion,
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the Complaint satisfies the pleading requirement of Rule 8 by alleging that Defendant, through
both his actions and inactions, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights. The Complaint
clearly identifies Defendant’s role, specifies when he acted or failed to act, and provides the
context surrounding those actions and inactions. Moreover, the Complaint is neither excessively
long nor so confusing, ambiguous, or unintelligible as to deprive Defendant of fair notice of the
claims asserted against him. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint satisfies the pleading
requirements of Rule 8.
C. 	Defendant’s Attorney’s Fees
Defendant also seeks his own attorney’s fees pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which “authorizes
a district court to award attorney’s fees to a defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” 	Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 834 (2011).
“Attorney's fees for prevailing defendants under this standard are ‘not routine, but are to be only
sparingly awarded.’” Raab v. City of Ocean City, New Jersey, 833 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2016).
A threshold requirement, however, is that the defendant be a prevailing party. 	See Barnes
Foundation v. Township of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2001). Insofar as Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claims will be dismissed without prejudice, and the Court has not yet resolved
Plaintiff’s claims under the New Jersey constitution, New Jersey Civil Rights Act, and Fourteenth
Amendment, Defendant is not presently a prevailing party. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for
attorney’s fees is denied as premature. 	This determination is without prejudice to Defendant’s
right to renew his application at a later time should he prevail in this litigation.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART
Defendant’s Motion. An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: January 29, 2026
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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