Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

3:24-cv-04736Njd29 gen 2026

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LOLITA A., o/b/o, VINCENT A., deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 24-04736 (GC)
OPINION
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Lolita A. (Plaintiff)’s appeal on behalf of
deceased Claimant Vincent A.1 (Claimant) from the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (Commissioner)2 denying Claimant’s application for Social
Security Disability (SSD) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. After
careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire Administrative Record, the Court
decides this matter without oral argument in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(Rule) 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause
shown, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision.
1 	Plaintiff and Claimant are identified by first name and last initial. 	See D.N.J. Standing
Order 2021-10. Vincent A. is the deceased subject of the disability determination on appeal and
Lolita A. is his spouse who was substituted as Plaintiff upon his death.
2 	Frank Bisignano became Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on May 7,
2025. This change has no bearing on the instant matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the
person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
2
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural Background
Claimant had an associate’s degree and worked as a home health aide and stock clerk. (AR
79, 101, 257.) 3 On June 16, 2014, Claimant filed an application for SSD, alleging that he became
disabled as of February 3, 2014. (Id. at 219-227, 238.) Claimant alleged that he could not work
because of “heart disease [sic] heart only working at 30%, depression, and short term memory
los[s].” (Id. at 241.) The application was denied on September 24, 2014. (Id. at 138-142.) Upon
reconsideration, Claimant’s application was denied again on December 19, 2014. (Id. at 146-148.)
On December 31, 2014, Claimant filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). (Id. at 149-150.) That hearing took place on March 31, 2017. (Id. at 70-106.)
On May 3, 2017, the ALJ issued Claimant an unfavorable decision, finding Claimant not
disabled. 	(Id. at 8-26.) 	Claimant requested a review of the ALJ’s decision before the Appeals
Council, and on April 23, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review. (Id. at
1-7.) The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final decision. (Id.)
On September 12, 2018, Claimant appealed that unfavorable decision to this Court. (Id. at
660-664.) Upon review, on May 25, 2021, the Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded
for further proceedings. (Id. at 676-691.) On December 28, 2021, pursuant to the Court’s Order,
the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s 2017 decision and remanded the case back to an ALJ for
further proceedings. (Id. at 693-697.)
3 	“AR” refers to the Administrative Record, available at ECF No. 4. This Opinion cites the
internal page numbers when referring to the Administrative Record. Page numbers for all other
docket citations refer to the page numbers stamped by the Court’s e-filing system and not the
internal pagination of the parties.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
3
Separately, on June 1, 2018, Claimant filed another application for SSD alleging disability
as of May 4, 2017. (Id. at 695.) The State agency found Claimant disabled as of May 4, 2017
based upon that application. 	(Id.) 	While remanding the ALJ’s unfavorable 2017 decision
regarding Claimant’s first application with an onset date of February 3, 2014, the Appeals Council
also found that the latter finding of disability with an onset date of May 4, 2017 was supported by
substantial evidence; the Appeals Council affirmed this latter finding of disability, making it the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Id.) The Appeals Council remanded for further proceedings only
the determination of disability for the period from February 3, 2014 until May 4, 2017. (Id.) That
is the time period now at issue before this Court.
On February 14, 2023, Claimant passed away due to cardiorespiratory arrest, fatal
arrhythmia, and coronary artery disease. (Id. at 833.) On March 8, 2023 Claimant’s widow, Lolita
“Lolly” A., filed a Notice Regarding Substitution of Party Upon Death of Claimant and is now the
Plaintiff in this action. (Id. at 832.) On September 11, 2023, the ALJ conducted an administrative
hearing. (Id. at 612-623.) On December 27, 2023, that ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision.
(Id. at 590-611.) 	The ALJ concluded that although the evidence showed that the Claimant had
“moderate limitations” and could not perform past relevant work, he retained the ability to perform
“other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id. at 597, 602-603.)
Therefore, the ALJ found that Claimant was “not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the
Social Security Act” for the period with an onset date of February 3, 2014. 	(Id. at 604.) 	On
February 26, 2024, this decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.)
On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF
No. 1.) 	Plaintiff raises four arguments. 	First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s analysis of
Claimant’s obesity “defies meaningful judicial review at step 3” and “avoid[s] any comment,
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
4
analysis or discussion of how obesity was factored in to the RFC4 in conjunction and combination
with heart disease, hypertension, vertigo or even the consideration of obesity all by itself[.]” (ECF
No. 7 at 17.) 	Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed and discounted the
medical opinion of Dr. Williamson, the Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist. 	(Id. at 33-36.)
Third, Plaintiff argues that the RFC “fails to account for the ALJ’s own findings that [Claimant]
suffered “moderate limitations” in 3 of the 4 broad areas of mental functioning.” (Id. at 36-38.)
Lastly, Plaintiff broadly contends that the ALJ failed to explain why he found that Claimant
retained the ability to “sustain a 40 hour workweek performing unskilled sedentary work within
competitive tolerances.” (Id. at 30; see generally id. at 19-25, 30-32.)
B. 	The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ used the requisite five-step sequential evaluation process to determine that
Claimant was not disabled. 	(AR 594-595.) 	See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (describing the
five-step process).
At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2019, and “did not engage in substantial gainful activity during
the period from his alleged onset date of February 3, 2014 through his last date insured.” 	(AR
595-596.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant “had the following severe impairments: status
post right wrist fracture; coronary artery disease; hypertension; vertigo secondary to sinusitis;
obesity, depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.” 	(Id. at 596.) 	The ALJ noted that these
medically determinable, severe impairments “significantly limit the [C]laimant’s ability to perform
4 	Residual functional capacity (RFC) is defined as “the most you can still do despite your
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
5
basic work activities.” 	(Id.) 	The ALJ found that Claimant’s had another impairment,
hyperlipidemia, which was not severe. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ noted that he “considered all of the
[C]laimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, when
assessing the [C]laimant’s residual functional capacity.” (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that none of Claimant’s impairments nor any combination of
impairments met or medically equaled the severity of any of the impairments listed in the
applicable regulation. (Id. at 596-598.) See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (regulation pointing ALJs
to “appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 of this chapter”).
At step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC assessment to determine whether Claimant could
perform the requirements of his past relevant work. 	(Id. at 598-602.) 	The ALJ concluded that
Claimant:
had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), with exceptions. The claimant could
never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; never be exposed to
unprotected heights or hazardous machinery; occasionally climb
stairs and ramps; never crawl; occasionally kneel; occasionally
stoop and crouch; do frequent fingering and handling; occasionally
balance; 	and 	never 	have 	exposure 	to 	extremes 	in 	vibration,
environmental conditions or concentrated pulmonary irritants. The
claimant 	could 	have 	occasional 	contact 	with supervisors, 	co-
workers, and the public; and was able to do only simple and routine
tasks.
(Id. at 598-599.) To arrive at this conclusion, the ALJ stated that he “considered all [of Claimant’s]
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with
the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 	(Id. at 599 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529,
416.929 and Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p (Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims),
2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017)).) The ALJ also considered “opinion evidence in accordance
with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1527.” (Id.)
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
6
In considering Claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ stated that he must follow a two-step
process. 	(Id.) 	First, the ALJ must determine whether “there is an underlying medically
determinable physical or mental impairment . . . that could reasonably be expected to produce the
[C]laimant’s pain or other symptoms.” (Id.) Second, if there is such an impairment, the ALJ must
then evaluate “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the symptoms “to determine the
extent to which they limit the [C]laimant’s work-related activities.” (Id.)
Applying these standards, the ALJ reviewed the record and found step one satisfied. (Id.)
The ALJ then proceeded to step two and found that “to the extent that the [C]laimant alleges that
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his conditions resulted in disability during the
time relevant to this decision, this is not consistent with the evidence in the record.” (Id.)
The ALJ then discussed the objective medical evidence he considered in his RFC
assessment. 	(Id. at 599-601.) 	The ALJ found that “the objective medical evidence of record
regarding the [C]laimant’s impairments supports a finding that the claimant is limited to sedentary
work, subject to the additional limitations specified in the residual functional capacity finding
above.” (Id. at 601.) Subsequently, the ALJ discussed the role that opinion evidence played in his
RFC assessment. (Id. at 601.) The ALJ found the opinion of DDS consultants merited “partial
weight.” (Id.) The ALJ found Dr. Williamson’s (Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist) opinion
that 	Claimant’s “overall prognosis remained guarded due to the chronicity and severity of his
symptoms, which appeared to be genuine and debilitating” to have “little weight” and “not
consistent with the overall record” because “[t]he record reflects that as of April 11, 2016, anxiety
was better controlled at home” and “according to the [C]laimant’s function report, his conditions
did not adversely affect his ability to get along with others.” (Id.) The ALJ found the opinion of
Dr. Jeffrey Gelderen (Claimant’s orthopedist) to also merit “little weight” because the report was
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
7
made before the alleged onset date. 	(Id.) 	Lastly, Claimant’s mother submitted a third-party
function report to which the ALJ gave “appropriate weight” given that “[d]ue to the personal
connection with the [C]laimant, it is difficult to provide an objective review of the claimant’s
limitations.” (Id.)
The ALJ based his RFC assessment on the above considerations and concluded that
Claimant “was unable to perform any past relevant work.” (Id. at 602.) The ALJ stated that “the
demands of the [C]laimant’s past relevant work” as a caregiver, “as actually performed and as
generally performed in the national economy, exceed the [C]laimant’s residual functional
capacity.” (Id.)
Finally, at step five, the ALJ considered whether jobs exist in the national economy that
Claimant could perform given his age, education, work experience, and RFC results. (Id. at 602-
603.) 	Based on hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, a vocational expert testified that
Claimant could perform jobs such as “scale operator,” “table worker,” and “final assembler.” (Id.
at 603.) 	The ALJ determined that the vocational expert’s testimony was consistent with the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Claimant “was capable
of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy.” (Id.) As a result, the ALJ concluded that Claimant was not disabled for SSD purposes.
(Id. at 603-604.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Standard of Review
The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). In conducting this review, the Court is “not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose
[its] own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). Instead, the Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
8
whether the conclusions reached are rational” and “supported by substantial evidence.” Gober v.
Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla’; it means ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694
F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Evidence is not substantial “if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—particularly certain types of
evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion.” Nazario v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence,” the Court is “bound by those findings, even if [it] would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.” 	Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Legal issues, in contrast,
are subject to a plenary or de novo review. See Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 208 n.10
(3d 	Cir. 	2019) 	(“We 	exercise 	plenary 	review 	over 	legal 	conclusions 	reached 	by 	the
Commissioner . . . .”) (quoting Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359).
B. 	Determining Disability
To be eligible for SSD due to disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must
establish that they are “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 	The individual’s impairment must be severe to the point that the
individual cannot engage in his or her previous work or in “any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy,” i.e., work that exists in significant numbers either in
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
9
the region where the individual lives or in several regions of the country. 	42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(B); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427-28. A physical or mental impairment is one that “results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Disability determinations are made individually “based on evidence adduced at a hearing.” Sykes
v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
C. 	Sequential Evaluation
The Social Security Administration has developed a sequential, five-step process for
evaluating disability claims. The process considers whether the claimant:
(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)-(f)). “The evaluation will continue through each step unless it can
be determined at any point that the claimant is or is not disabled.” Rios v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
444 F. App’x 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). The claimant bears the
ultimate burden of proof at the first four steps, at which point the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at the fifth step. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 201 (“The burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps
except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.”) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff makes four arguments in support of her appeal. 	First, she argues that the ALJ
failed to meaningfully consider Claimant’s obesity at step three and when assessing the RFC.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion of the
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 9 of 25 PageID: <pageID>
10
Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist, who found Claimant disabled. Third, Plaintiff argues that
the RFC fails to account for Claimant’s moderate limitations in mental functioning. 	Lastly,
Plaintiff broadly asserts that the ALJ failed to explain why Claimant could sustain a 40-hour
workweek performing sedentary work.5 On review of the ALJ’s decision (see AR 590-611) and
the Administrative Record (see generally ECF No. 4), the Court finds good cause to affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
5 	Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in finding Claimant was not disabled from February 3,
2014 until December 31, 2019. (ECF No. 7 at 26-29.) Plaintiff contends this is error because the
Appeals Council only remanded to the ALJ the consideration of disability for the period from
February 3, 2014 to May 4, 2017 and a separate proceeding already determined Claimant was
disabled as of May 4, 2017, which is before the December 31, 2019 end date noted by the ALJ in
the decision at issue here. (See id. at 28.) The Court finds any such error harmless. “In the context
of social security cases, errors in ALJ decisions have been excused as mere scrivener’s errors when
the ALJ’s intent was apparent.” Mary L. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-14158, 2022 WL 1058370, at *7
(D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2022) (quoting Amy A. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-7655, 2021 WL 5864063, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2021)); see also Mark R. v. O’Malley, Civ. No. 22-0379, 2024 WL 772550, at *9
(D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2024) (finding scrivener’s error where ALJ stated claimant’s RFC limited him to
light work when finding claimant unable to perform past relevant work, but earlier in step four
ALJ had concluded claimant could perform medium work and “it is clear from the transcript and
from the ALJ’s hypothetical posed to the vocational expert that the ALJ intended to limit Plaintiff
to a limited range of medium work”). Here, the Affirmation and Order of the Appeals Council is
clear on the time period remanded for the ALJ’s consideration. 	The Appeals Council specified
that it affirmed the agency’s determination that Claimant was disabled as of May 4, 2017 but “the
period prior to May 4, 2017 requires further adjudication” and the ALJ would “complete the
administrative record and issue a new decision for the period prior to May 4, 2017.” (AR 695.)
Neither party disputes that February 3, 2014 to May 4, 2017 is the time period at issue. A “full
and fair reading” of the ALJ’s decision, Mark R., 2024 WL 772550, at *9, shows that the ALJ
understood and intended to only decide disability for that specified time period. (AR 593 (“The
alleged onset date of disability is February 3, 2014. Per the remand order, the time period under
adjudication is from the alleged onset date to May 4, 2017.”).) Thus, there is no harm from this
error. The ALJ’s finding that Claimant was not disabled from February 3, 2014 through December
31, 2019, the date last insured, does not impact Claimant’s separate disability determination from
May 4, 2017 onward. See Nieves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 198 F. App’x 256, 260 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Our determination [that the ALJ’s decision denying claimant’s application for disability
insurance benefits for a period beginning in January 2001 was based on substantial evidence] is in
no way swayed by the fact that in October of 2003 an ALJ determined that the petitioner was
disabled. As per 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), our review is limited to the evidence in the record at the time
of the 2001 decision of the ALJ and we are therefore not required, nor able, to consider this
subsequent ALJ ruling when rendering our decision.”).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 10 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
11
A. 	The ALJ’s Consideration of Claimant’s Obesity
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not 	meaningfully 	consider 	Claimant’s 	obesity
independently at step three or in combination with his other impairments when evaluating
Claimant’s RFC. 	(ECF No. 7 at 8-19.) 	Plaintiff contends that where the ALJ did discuss
Claimant’s 	obesity, 	that 	discussion 	includes 	only 	“pre 	written 	template 	culled 	from 	the
Commissioner’s decision-writing catalog of boilerplate,” (id. at 17), contrary to the “meaningful
consideration” required by the Third Circuit decision Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security, 577
F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009), (id. at 11-12.) Defendant responds that the ALJ properly accounted for
Claimant’s obesity at step three and in assessing the RFC. (ECF No. 11 at 11-17.) Additionally,
Defendant argues that even assuming arguendo that the ALJ failed to properly consider Claimant’s
obesity at step three, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that any error was harmful. (Id. at
13-14.) Further, Defendant contends that Diaz is inapplicable or, in the alternative, distinguishable
from this case as the ALJ in Diaz did not offer any discussion of obesity, unlike the ALJ here. (Id.
at 15-16.)
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 19-2p 6 provides guidance on how to evaluate obesity in
disability claims. See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 19-2p (Evaluating Cases Involving Obesity),
2019 WL 2374244 (May 20, 2019). “Obesity is not a listed impairment; however, the functional
limitations caused by the MDI of obesity, either alone or in combination with another
impairment(s), may medically equal a listing.” 	Id. at *2. 	However, SSR 19-2p disclaims that
“[w]e will not make general assumptions about the severity or functional effects of obesity
6 	This SSR rescinded and replaced the earlier SSR 02-1p (Evaluation of Obesity), 2002 WL
34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002), which in turn had rescinded and replaced SSR 00-3p (Evaluation of
Obesity), 2000 WL 33952015 (May 15, 2000). To the extent Plaintiff cites either SSR 02-1p and
00-3p, they are not controlling. (ECF No. 7 at 9-13.)
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 11 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
12
combined with another impairment(s)” and clarifies that “[w]e evaluate each case based on the
information in the case record.” Id. at *4.
In Diaz, 7 the plaintiff argued that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ did not consider her severe obesity. 577 F.3d at 503. The Third Circuit
held that:
[Because the SSR] instructs that “obesity may increase the severity
of 	coexisting 	or 	related 	impairments 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	the
combination of impairments meets the requirements of a listing. . . .
an ALJ must meaningfully consider the effect of a claimant’s
obesity, individually and in combination with her impairments, on
her workplace function at step three and at every subsequent step.”
Id. at 504 (quoting SSR 00-3p, 2000 WL 33952015). While there are no “magic” words an ALJ
must employ, the ALJ “must provide a ‘discussion of the evidence’ and an ‘explanation of
reasoning’ for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review.” Id. (quoting Burnett
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000)).
“[W]hen an ALJ ‘explicitly contemplate[s] . . . obesity at the appropriate step (i.e., when
assessing [a plaintiff’s] RFC),’ the ALJ meets the burden imposed by Diaz.” Maria A. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 21-19431, 2025 WL 88349, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2025) (quoting Hoyman v.
Colvin, 606 F. App’x 678, 680 (3d Cir. 2015). 	In Diaz, the Third Circuit remanded the ALJ’s
7 	Defendant argues that Diaz is inapposite as it discussed and applied SSR 00-3p, one of the
prior SSRs regarding obesity that has since been rescinded. (ECF No. 11 at 15.) While Diaz does
apply the then-controlling SSR 00-3p, the now-controlling SSR 19-2p applicable in this case still
requires consideration of the limiting effects of obesity when assessing a claimant’s RFC, 2019
WL 2374244, at *4, which is the same issue discussed in Diaz. 577 F.3d 503-04; see also Jesus
O. v. O’Malley, Civ. No. 22-5637, 2024 WL 4318604, at *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2024) (“Other
courts have observed that SSR 02-1p and SSR 19-2p ‘are largely consistent in their discussion of
how obesity should be analyzed[.]’”) (quoting Heck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 20-
2133, 2021 WL 6693720, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2021), report and recommendation adopted
sub nom. Heck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 20-2133, 2022 WL 228163 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26,
2022) (collecting cases)).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 12 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
13
determination for further proceedings because the ALJ determined that claimant’s obesity was a
severe impairment but did not analyze its impact on her workplace performance. Diaz, 577 F.3d
at 504-05. 	However, “[w]ere there any discussion of the combined effect of [the claimant’s]
impairments,” the outcome may have been different. Id. at 504 (emphasis in original).
Here, unlike the decision in Diaz, the ALJ meaningfully considered Claimant’s obesity
independently and in combination with his other impairments. 	In his application, Claimant did
not list obesity as a condition that limited his ability to work. (AR 241.) Nevertheless, the ALJ
first discussed Claimant’s obesity at step two, when he determined it was a severe impairment that
“significantly limit[s] the [C]laimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” (Id. at 596.) At
step three, in considering whether Claimant’s impairments met or medically equaled the severity
of any of the listed impairments, the ALJ specifically discussed obesity. (Id. at 597.) Obesity may
put claimants at higher risk for other impairments and “is often associated with musculoskeletal,
respiratory, cardiovascular, and endocrine disorders.” SSR 19-2p, 2019 WL 2374244, at *3. The
ALJ “closely considered” relevant listings to the risks associated with obesity, such as 1.18
(Abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity) and 4.04 (Ischemic heart disease). (AR 596-
597.) He concluded:
With 	respect 	to 	Listing 	1.18, 	the 	record 	does 	not 	document
abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity, documented by: (a)
chronic joint pain or stiffness; (b) abnormal motion, instability, or
immobility of the affected joint(s); (c) anatomical abnormality of the
affected joint(s) under the criteria of Listing 1.18C; and (d)
impairment-related 	physical 	limitation 	of 	musculoskeletal
functioning under the criteria of Listing 1.18D.
With respect to Listing 4.04, although the claimant has heart disease,
the record does not document the results from exercise tolerance
testing 	per 	4.04A, 	nor 	three 	separate 	ischemic 	episodes, 	nor
coronary artery disease, demonstrated by angiography (obtained
independent of Social Security disability evaluation) or other
appropriate medically acceptable imaging.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 13 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
14
(Id. at 596-597.) The ALJ then noted that obesity “may be a factor in both ‘meets’ and ‘equals’
determinations” of listed impairments and concluded “even when obesity is considered in
combination with the claimant’s other impairments, the claimant does not meet or equal any of the
listings in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.” (Id. at 597.)
When discussing the Claimant’s impairments at step four, the ALJ concluded that “[w]ith
respect to the [C]laimant’s status post right wrist fracture; coronary artery disease; hypertension;
vertigo secondary to sinusitis; obesity; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder, the record reflects
that these are severe impairments, and the claimant has some resulting limitations, which are
reflected in the above residual functional capacity finding.” (Id. at 599 (emphasis added).) The
ALJ also discussed the medical evidence that led to this conclusion, including evidence of
Claimant’s Body Mass Index (BMI):
As of February 10, 2015, the [C]laimant . . . was 65 inches tall,
weighed 245 pounds, and BMI was 40.86.[8] . . . As of October 24,
2016, the [C]laimant . . . was 5 feet 6 inches tall, weighed 250
pounds, and BMI was 40.3. . . . As of February 28, 2017, the
[C]laimant . . . weighed 252 pounds and BMI was 42.02.
(Id. at 600.) As such, the Court finds that, considering the ALJ’s decision as a whole, the ALJ
properly considered Claimant’s obesity. Furthermore, “[a]n ALJ fulfills his obligation to consider
a claimant’s impairments in combination with one another if the ALJ explicitly indicates that he
has done so and there is ‘no reason not to believe him.’” Granados v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ.
No. 13-781, 2014 WL 60054, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2014) (quoting Morrison ex rel. Morrison v.
8 	The medical records note that Claimant’s BMI was “above the upper parameter” during
visits in 2015, 2016 and 2017. (See, e.g., AR 535, 549, 552, 555, 949.) Plaintiff notes that “the
BMI of 40 and above is obesity ‘class III’ representing an ‘extremely high’ disease risk,” (ECF
No. 7 at 13 n.2), Defendant does not dispute this classification.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 14 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
15
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 268 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2008)). Here, the ALJ expressly indicated he
did as much at steps two, three and four. (AR 596-600.)
Even assuming arguendo that the ALJ did not properly consider Claimant’s obesity,
Plaintiff has demonstrated no prejudicial error requiring remand. “Ordinary harmless error review,
in which the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate harm, is applicable to administrative
appeals. [The plaintiff] therefore must ‘explain [ ] . . . how the . . . error to which he points could
have made any difference.’” Holloman v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409, 413 (2009)).
Plaintiff does not identify any evidence in the record that the ALJ disregarded evidence supporting
that Claimant’s obesity, alone or in conjunction with other impairments, met or medically equaled
the severity of a listed impairment. “[C]ourts in this Circuit have regularly rejected challenges to
an ALJ’s consideration of a claimant’s obesity at step three where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate
how further consideration of [his] obesity would have changed the ALJ’s ultimate determination
that [he] was not entitled to benefits.” Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *7 (collecting cases). Instead,
Plaintiff recounts the history of Social Security Rulings regarding obesity, states that the effect of
claimant’s obesity must be “meaningfully considered,” and takes issue with the ALJ’s “boilerplate”
discussion.9 	(ECF No. 7 at 8-19.) 	But the general argument “that a plaintiff’s weight would
necessarily limit [his] functional abilities without explaining how obesity would affect the ALJ’s
analysis” is insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden. 	Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *9. 	It “is
9 	This Court can conduct a meaningful review from the ALJ’s decision as a whole. Maria
A., 2025 WL 88349, at *7 n.5. “And regardless, an ALJ is not required ‘to use particular language
. . . 	in conducting [the] analysis.’” 	Id. (quoting Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir.
2004)).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 15 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
16
particularly insufficient when the ALJ relied on medical evidence from physicians who were aware
of the plaintiff’s obesity,” id., as the ALJ did here, (AR 599-600).
B. 	The ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion of Dr. Williamson, the
Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist. (ECF No. 7 at 33-36.) Plaintiff does not challenge the
ALJ’s weighing of the other medical opinions in the record. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision
to give “little weight” to Dr. Williamson’s opinion that Claimant’s symptoms were chronic, severe,
genuine and debilitating was improper because Dr. Williamson’s opinion was consistent with the
record. 	(Id. at 34-35.) 	Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s argument “is merely a request to
reweigh the evidence, contrary to the deferential standard of review” and this Court may reverse
the Commissioner’s decision “only if the evidence ‘compels’ reversal, not merely because the
evidence supports a contrary decision.” (ECF No. 11 at 19 n.4 (emphasis in original).)
“When weighing medical opinions in Social Security matters, administrative law judges
must consider a range of factors, but all they must explain are the reasons for their decisions.”
Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 638 (3d Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original).
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), for claims filed after March 27, 2017, an ALJ is required to
consider medical opinions and determine persuasiveness of the opinions by considering specific
factors listed in the regulations. 	These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3)
relationship of the medical source to the claimant, including length of the treatment relationship,
frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment relationship, and extent of the treatment
relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) other relevant factors. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 16 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
17
Supportability10 and consistency11 are the most important factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Accordingly, an ALJ must “explain how [he] considered [these two] factors” but need not “explain
how [he] considered” the other factors.” Id.
When giving this explanation, the ALJ “need not reiterate the magic words ‘support’ and
‘consistent’ for each doctor.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639. Rather, it is sufficient for the ALJ to
“weave 	supportability 	and 	consistency 	throughout 	[his] 	analysis 	of 	which 	doctors 	were
persuasive.” Id. And when conducting this analysis, the ALJ is not required to provide a “written
analysis about how [he] considered each piece of evidence.” Joseph P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
Civ. No. 21-13524, 2023 WL 1929945, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2023) (quoting Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 5858 (Jan. 18, 2017)).
Instead, “[t]he new regulations reflect a ‘reasonable articulation standard’” in which the “decision
need only ‘allow a subsequent reviewer . . . to trace the path of an adjudicator’s reasoning.’” Id.
(quoting 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5858). At the same time, the Court “need[s] from the ALJ not
only an expression of the evidence [he] considered which supports the result, but also some
indication of the evidence which was rejected.” David T. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-9118, 2022 WL
10 	“Supportability” means that the “more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s)
or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1); see also Zaborowski, 115
F.4th at 639 (describing the “supportability” factor as an inquiry into “whether medical opinions
were [] based on ‘objective medical evidence and supporting explanations’”).
11 	“Consistency” means that the “more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will
be.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); see also Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639 (describing the
“consistency” factor as an inquiry into “whether medical opinions were . . . consistent with other
medical opinions in the record”).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 17 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
18
73498, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2022) (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Here, Plaintiff challenges only the ALJ’s consistency analysis. (ECF No. 7 at 34.)
The ALJ’s opinion sufficiently explains how Dr. Williamson’s opinion is inconsistent with
the record, thereby giving it little weight. 	Dr. Williamson opined that Claimant’s “overall
prognosis remained guarded due to the chronicity and severity of his symptoms, which appeared
to be genuine and debilitating in nature.” (AR 601.) The ALJ articulated that Dr. Williamson’s
opinion merited “little weight” because:
These opinions are based on a one-time examination, and these
opinions are not consistent with the overall record. The record
reflects that as of April 11, 2016, anxiety was better controlled at
home; but he felt anxious about working, was unable to focus, and
was concerned about his stamina (Exhibit 11F at 1). Anxiety was
noted to be stable (Exhibit 11F at 2). Also, according to the
claimant’s function report, his conditions did not adversely affect his
ability to get along with others (Exhibit 5E at 6).
(Id. at 601.) Plaintiff claims that Dr. Williamson’s opinion was consistent with the overall record
and should have been given greater weight. But “a reviewing court may not undertake a de novo
review of the ALJ’s decision and may not re-weigh the evidence of record. In other words, even if
the reviewing court would have decided the case differently, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed
if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Hyer v. Colvin, 72 F. Supp. 3d 479, 490 (D. Del. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion. The ALJ cited to examples in
the record demonstrating that while Claimant experienced symptoms of anxiety and depression,
those symptoms were managed and did not prevent Claimant from getting along with others. (AR
601 (citing to statements from Claimant’s function report (Ex. 5E, AR 265-272) and Office Visit
Notes from Claimant’s primary care provider (Ex. 11F, AR 533-556).) Further, the ALJ cited to
Dr. Williamson’s own treatment notes which recounted Claimant’s abilities, finding: “there was
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 18 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
19
no evidence of a formal thought disorder”; Claimant’s knowledge and abstract reasoning abilities
were “intact” and “in the average range” and Claimant could “perform simple addition and
subtraction.” (Id. at 600.) See Sheare v. Berryhill, Civ. No. 17- 1227, 2018 WL 4225059, at *10-
11 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2018) (finding that ALJ appropriately assigned little weight to doctor’s
opinion because it was contrary to the record and “[the doctor’s own] treatment notes do not
include clinical observations that suggest that [the claimant] was as restricted to the extreme
limitations that the [doctor’s] medical source statement suggests”), report and recommendation
adopted, Civ. No. 17-1227, 2018 WL 4219386 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018).
Plaintiff, relying on Nazario v. Commissioner Social Security, also argues that the ALJ may
not “reject[] evidence or mak[e] findings on the basis of ‘stability’ of impairments.” (ECF No. 7
at 35-36.) However, this case does not present the same deficiencies the Third Circuit found in
Nazario. In Nazario, the Third Circuit remanded to award the claimant benefits because it found
that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ determined the claimant
was not disabled in part because of a treating doctor’s note that the claimant’s condition was
“stable.” 	794 F. App’x at 209, 211. 	The Third Circuit found that the ALJ had relied on this
comment while ignoring other conflicting, probative evidence about claimant’s impairments, some
of which was also included in notes from that same doctor. Id. at 210-11. Here, the ALJ considered
the 	entire 	record 	in 	evaluating 	the 	consistency 	of 	Dr. Williamson’s 	opinion. 	The ALJ
acknowledged that Claimant reported to his primary care provider that he “felt anxious about
working” and “was unable to focus” in addition to noting the provider’s finding that Claimant’s
anxiety was stable. (AR 601.) 	The ALJ also considered Claimant’s function report in which
Claimant self-reported that his impairments did not adversely affect his ability to get along with
others. (Id.) And unlike in Nazario, the ALJ here found that Claimant had “severe impairments”
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 19 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
20
of depressive disorder and anxiety disorder and included relevant limitations in the RFC. (Id. at
596, 599.) See also Bonnie Lou B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 21-18157, 2022 WL 18024211,
at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) (“[U]nlike Nazario, the ALJ found that [p]laintiff here did have an
impairment, Alzheimer’s Disease, but the impairment did not significantly limit [p]laintiff’s ability
to perform basic-work related activities during the relevant time period.”); Kelly P. v. Kijakazi, Civ.
No. 20-14535, 2023 WL 5321033, at *19 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2023) (“[T]he fact that a claimant is
“stable and well controlled with medication” does not necessarily establish that a claimant can
return to work. . . . [But u]nlike the reasoning of the ALJ in Morales [and Nazario], . . . the ALJ’s
‘finding was based on the objective medical evidence contained in the psychotherapy treatment
notes, and is not ‘overwhelmed’ by contrary evidence in the record.’”) (citations omitted); John P.
v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20- 8455, 2022 WL 2314966, at *16 (D.N.J. June 28, 2022) (finding “the fact
that [the p]laintiff's symptoms were characterized as ‘stable’ on medication was only one factor
that [the ALJ] identified when explaining why he discounted the more extreme opinions of [other
doctors]” and holding that the ALJ’s weighing of these medical opinions was properly based on
objective medical evidence in the record). Therefore, because the ALJ’s analysis complied with
the applicable regulations and his conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s
evaluation of Dr. Williamson’s opinion was proper.
C. 	The ALJ’s Consideration of Claimant’s Moderate Limitations in Mental
Functioning
Plaintiff also argues that the RFC fails to account for the ALJ’s finding that the Claimant
suffered from “moderate limitations” in mental functioning caused by his severe impairments
identified and discussed in steps two and three. (ECF No. 7 at 36-38.) Defendant responds that
the ALJ sufficiently articulated his reasoning, and the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 11 at 17-24.) 	Defendant contends that the ALJ specifically accounted for Claimant’s
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 20 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
21
moderate mental limitations and “an ALJ’s finding on the broad areas of mental functioning does
not categorically bind the ALJ in terms of the mental RFC assessment.” (Id. at 22-23.) The Court
agrees with Defendant that the ALJ accounted for Claimant’s moderate limitations, by imposing a
“simple tasks” limitation in the RFC.
First, “no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding
has been made at steps two and three.” 	Hess, 931 F.3d at 209. 	Findings that a claimant has
functional limitations in steps two or three are relevant to the RFC determination but do not require
the use of any particular language; the ALJ must only explain how the RFC reflects what a claimant
can do despite those identified limitations. Id. at 209-10. “[A]s long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid
explanation,’ a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’
difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’” 	Id. at 211. 	A “simple tasks” limitation
“relate[s] to [a claimant’s] mental abilities necessary to perform ‘unskilled work.’” Id. at 210.
In Hess, the Third Circuit found that an RFC limiting a claimant “to jobs requiring
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple
work-related decisions” was a “simple tasks” limitation that appropriately accounted for the
claimant’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace. Id. at 210. Similarly, here
the ALJ found that Claimant had moderate limitations in “understanding, remembering, or
applying information”; “interacting with others”; and “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining
pace.” 	(AR 597-598.) 	In the RFC, the ALJ concluded that Claimant “could have occasional
contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and was able to do only simple and routine
tasks.” (Id. at 599.) This is a “simple tasks” limitation appropriately addressing Claimant’s mental
abilities to perform unskilled work. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 210-11.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 21 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
22
The ALJ offered a valid explanation for the “simple tasks” limitation included in the RFC.
To reach this conclusion regarding Claimant’s abilities given his “moderate limitations” in mental
functioning, the ALJ first considered the examination notes from Dr. Williamson, which indicated
that: “there was no evidence of a formal thought disorder”; Claimant’s “overall fund of knowledge
appeared to be in the average range; abstract reasoning appeared to be in the average range; abstract
reasoning appeared intact; he was well oriented to time, place, and person, as well as recent current
events”; and Claimant “could repeat up to 2 digits forward and 2 digits backwards” and “perform
simple addition and subtraction.” (AR 600.) The ALJ found Dr. Williamson’s overall opinion—
that Claimant’s “prognosis remained guarded due to the chronicity and severity of his symptoms,
which appeared to be genuine and debilitating in nature”—inconsistent given those observations
and the overall record, and assigned it little weight. (Id. at 601.) The ALJ also considered more
recent treatment notes from Claimant’s primary care provider. 	(Id.) 	Those treatment notes
indicated that Claimant was anxious about working and reported difficulty with focus but his
anxiety was noted to be stable. (Id. at 601.)
The ALJ also considered and weighed other opinion medical evidence. He assigned partial
weight to the DDS consultants’ findings that Claimant had “moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence or pace” because the consultants did not have the benefit of the latest
medical evidence, nor did they incorporate the entirety of Claimant’s limitations. 	(Id.) 	After
examining this evidence, the ALJ concluded that “to the extent that the [C]laimant alleges that the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his conditions resulted in disability during the time
relevant to this decision, this is not consistent with the evidence in the record.” (Id. at 599.) The
ALJ thus concluded that Claimant was limited to sedentary work, with a “simple tasks” limitation.
(Id. at 598-599, 601.) 	Based on the Court’s review, the ALJ offered a valid explanation for
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 22 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
23
imposing the “simple tasks” limitation and properly addressed Claimant’s moderate limitations in
mental functioning. 	See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213-14 (finding ALJ offered a valid explanation for
imposing simple tasks limitation where ALJ highlighted record evidence that “led her to give little
weight to assertions that [the claimant] had serious mental difficulties and to credit evidence that
[the claimant] could perform simple work”).
D. 	The ALJ’s Discussion of the RFC
Plaintiff also makes a sweeping assertion that the ALJ failed to explain why Claimant
retained the ability to “sustain a 40 hour workweek performing unskilled sedentary work within
competitive tolerances.” 	(ECF No. 7 at 30; see generally id. at 19-25, 30-32.) 	In making this
argument, Plaintiff does not raise specific challenges to the RFC apart from the arguments the
Court has already addressed, but to the extent Plaintiff’s intention is to challenge the RFC more
broadly, the Court rejects this argument.
“[A]n ‘RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence
supports each conclusion.’” Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *14 (quoting Harris v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., Civ. No. 09-3219, 2010 WL 2874352, at *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2010)). However, “an ALJ does
not need to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [his] RFC
analysis” but rather “must merely ‘articulate how the evidence in the record supports the RFC
determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work-related activities, and
explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in the record.’” Id. (first quoting Lorie H. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 20-13192, 2022 WL 2803168, at *6 (D.N.J. July 18, 2022) (citations
omitted); then quoting Hernandez-Flores v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 13-4738, 2015 WL
4064669, at *6 (D.N.J. July 1, 2015) (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff argues that contrary to the requirements in the Commissioner’s Rulings, the ALJ
failed to assess Claimant’s work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis. (ECF No. 7 at
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 23 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
24
32-33 (citing SSR 96-8p (Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual
Functional Capacity in Initial Claims), 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996)).) The ALJ is not
held to such a strict standard. 	“Though S.S.R. 96-8p requires that functions such as sitting,
standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling, ‘must be considered,’ in the RFC
calculation, it does not require every function to be specifically delineated in the RFC.” Maria A.,
2025 WL 88349, at *17. Here, the ALJ properly addressed Claimant’s work-related abilities in the
RFC, and his determination is supported by a narrative discussion.
The ALJ discussed Claimant’s medical history, self-reported abilities, medical opinions of
consultative examiners and other record evidence. (Id. at 599-601.) The ALJ’s analysis referenced
evidence specifically relevant to “sedentary work.”12 The ALJ considered medical evidence in the
record evaluating Claimant’s ability to lift 10 pounds, including a report from one of Claimant’s
doctors as well as opinion evidence from the DDS consultants. 	(Id. at 601.) 	With respect to
Claimant’s ability to walk, stand and sit, the ALJ considered Claimant’s 2014 function report,
where he described difficulty with lifting, squatting, walking and standing but not with sitting. (Id.
12 	The SSA defines “sedentary work” as work that:
involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally
lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a
certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in
carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing
are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). 	SSR 83-10 additionally provides that “[b]y its very nature, work
performed primarily in a seated position entails no significant stooping. Most unskilled sedentary
jobs require good use of the hands and fingers for repetitive hand-finger actions. . . . Since being
on one’s feet is required “occasionally” at the sedentary level of exertion, periods of standing or
walking should generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should
generally total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” 	SSR 83-10 (Titles II and XVI:
Determining Capability to Do Other Work--the Medical-Vocational Rules of Appendix 2), 1983
WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 24 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 25 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document14_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 25 PagelD: <pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LOLITA A., 0/b/o, VINCENT A., deceased,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-04736 (GC)
V.
OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Lolita A. (Plaintiff)’s appeal on behalf of
deceased Claimant Vincent A.' (Claimant) from the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (Commissioner)* denying Claimant’s application for Social
Security Disability (SSD) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. After
careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire Administrative Record, the Court
decides this matter without oral argument in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(Rule) 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause

shown, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision.

I Plaintiff and Claimant are identified by first name and last initial. See D.N.J. Standing
Order 2021-10. Vincent A. is the deceased subject of the disability determination on appeal and
Lolita A. is his spouse who was substituted as Plaintiff upon his death.

2 Frank Bisignano became Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on May 7,

2025. This change has no bearing on the instant matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the
person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural Background
Claimant had an associate’s degree and worked as a home health aide and stock clerk. (AR
79, 101, 257.) 3 On June 16, 2014, Claimant filed an application for SSD, alleging that he became
disabled as of February 3, 2014. (Id. at 219-227, 238.) Claimant alleged that he could not work
because of “heart disease [sic] heart only working at 30%, depression, and short term memory
los[s].” (Id. at 241.) The application was denied on September 24, 2014. (Id. at 138-142.) Upon
reconsideration, Claimant’s application was denied again on December 19, 2014. (Id. at 146-148.)
On December 31, 2014, Claimant filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). (Id. at 149-150.) That hearing took place on March 31, 2017. (Id. at 70-106.)
On May 3, 2017, the ALJ issued Claimant an unfavorable decision, finding Claimant not
disabled. 	(Id. at 8-26.) 	Claimant requested a review of the ALJ’s decision before the Appeals
Council, and on April 23, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review. (Id. at
1-7.) The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final decision. (Id.)
On September 12, 2018, Claimant appealed that unfavorable decision to this Court. (Id. at
660-664.) Upon review, on May 25, 2021, the Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded
for further proceedings. (Id. at 676-691.) On December 28, 2021, pursuant to the Court’s Order,
the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s 2017 decision and remanded the case back to an ALJ for
further proceedings. (Id. at 693-697.)
3 	“AR” refers to the Administrative Record, available at ECF No. 4. This Opinion cites the
internal page numbers when referring to the Administrative Record. Page numbers for all other
docket citations refer to the page numbers stamped by the Court’s e-filing system and not the
internal pagination of the parties.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

3
Separately, on June 1, 2018, Claimant filed another application for SSD alleging disability
as of May 4, 2017. (Id. at 695.) The State agency found Claimant disabled as of May 4, 2017
based upon that application. 	(Id.) 	While remanding the ALJ’s unfavorable 2017 decision
regarding Claimant’s first application with an onset date of February 3, 2014, the Appeals Council
also found that the latter finding of disability with an onset date of May 4, 2017 was supported by
substantial evidence; the Appeals Council affirmed this latter finding of disability, making it the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Id.) The Appeals Council remanded for further proceedings only
the determination of disability for the period from February 3, 2014 until May 4, 2017. (Id.) That
is the time period now at issue before this Court.
On February 14, 2023, Claimant passed away due to cardiorespiratory arrest, fatal
arrhythmia, and coronary artery disease. (Id. at 833.) On March 8, 2023 Claimant’s widow, Lolita
“Lolly” A., filed a Notice Regarding Substitution of Party Upon Death of Claimant and is now the
Plaintiff in this action. (Id. at 832.) On September 11, 2023, the ALJ conducted an administrative
hearing. (Id. at 612-623.) On December 27, 2023, that ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision.
(Id. at 590-611.) 	The ALJ concluded that although the evidence showed that the Claimant had
“moderate limitations” and could not perform past relevant work, he retained the ability to perform
“other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id. at 597, 602-603.)
Therefore, the ALJ found that Claimant was “not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the
Social Security Act” for the period with an onset date of February 3, 2014. 	(Id. at 604.) 	On
February 26, 2024, this decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.)
On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF
No. 1.) 	Plaintiff raises four arguments. 	First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s analysis of
Claimant’s obesity “defies meaningful judicial review at step 3” and “avoid[s] any comment,
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

4
analysis or discussion of how obesity was factored in to the RFC4 in conjunction and combination
with heart disease, hypertension, vertigo or even the consideration of obesity all by itself[.]” (ECF
No. 7 at 17.) 	Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed and discounted the
medical opinion of Dr. Williamson, the Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist. 	(Id. at 33-36.)
Third, Plaintiff argues that the RFC “fails to account for the ALJ’s own findings that [Claimant]
suffered “moderate limitations” in 3 of the 4 broad areas of mental functioning.” (Id. at 36-38.)
Lastly, Plaintiff broadly contends that the ALJ failed to explain why he found that Claimant
retained the ability to “sustain a 40 hour workweek performing unskilled sedentary work within
competitive tolerances.” (Id. at 30; see generally id. at 19-25, 30-32.)
B. 	The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ used the requisite five-step sequential evaluation process to determine that
Claimant was not disabled. 	(AR 594-595.) 	See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (describing the
five-step process).
At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2019, and “did not engage in substantial gainful activity during
the period from his alleged onset date of February 3, 2014 through his last date insured.” 	(AR
595-596.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant “had the following severe impairments: status
post right wrist fracture; coronary artery disease; hypertension; vertigo secondary to sinusitis;
obesity, depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.” 	(Id. at 596.) 	The ALJ noted that these
medically determinable, severe impairments “significantly limit the [C]laimant’s ability to perform
4 	Residual functional capacity (RFC) is defined as “the most you can still do despite your
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

5
basic work activities.” 	(Id.) 	The ALJ found that Claimant’s had another impairment,
hyperlipidemia, which was not severe. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ noted that he “considered all of the
[C]laimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, when
assessing the [C]laimant’s residual functional capacity.” (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that none of Claimant’s impairments nor any combination of
impairments met or medically equaled the severity of any of the impairments listed in the
applicable regulation. (Id. at 596-598.) See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (regulation pointing ALJs
to “appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 of this chapter”).
At step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC assessment to determine whether Claimant could
perform the requirements of his past relevant work. 	(Id. at 598-602.) 	The ALJ concluded that
Claimant:
had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), with exceptions. The claimant could
never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; never be exposed to
unprotected heights or hazardous machinery; occasionally climb
stairs and ramps; never crawl; occasionally kneel; occasionally
stoop and crouch; do frequent fingering and handling; occasionally
balance; 	and 	never 	have 	exposure 	to 	extremes 	in 	vibration,
environmental conditions or concentrated pulmonary irritants. The
claimant 	could 	have 	occasional 	contact 	with supervisors, 	co-
workers, and the public; and was able to do only simple and routine
tasks.
(Id. at 598-599.) To arrive at this conclusion, the ALJ stated that he “considered all [of Claimant’s]
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with
the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 	(Id. at 599 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529,
416.929 and Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p (Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims),
2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017)).) The ALJ also considered “opinion evidence in accordance
with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1527.” (Id.)
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

6
In considering Claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ stated that he must follow a two-step
process. 	(Id.) 	First, the ALJ must determine whether “there is an underlying medically
determinable physical or mental impairment . . . that could reasonably be expected to produce the
[C]laimant’s pain or other symptoms.” (Id.) Second, if there is such an impairment, the ALJ must
then evaluate “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the symptoms “to determine the
extent to which they limit the [C]laimant’s work-related activities.” (Id.)
Applying these standards, the ALJ reviewed the record and found step one satisfied. (Id.)
The ALJ then proceeded to step two and found that “to the extent that the [C]laimant alleges that
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his conditions resulted in disability during the
time relevant to this decision, this is not consistent with the evidence in the record.” (Id.)
The ALJ then discussed the objective medical evidence he considered in his RFC
assessment. 	(Id. at 599-601.) 	The ALJ found that “the objective medical evidence of record
regarding the [C]laimant’s impairments supports a finding that the claimant is limited to sedentary
work, subject to the additional limitations specified in the residual functional capacity finding
above.” (Id. at 601.) Subsequently, the ALJ discussed the role that opinion evidence played in his
RFC assessment. (Id. at 601.) The ALJ found the opinion of DDS consultants merited “partial
weight.” (Id.) The ALJ found Dr. Williamson’s (Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist) opinion
that 	Claimant’s “overall prognosis remained guarded due to the chronicity and severity of his
symptoms, which appeared to be genuine and debilitating” to have “little weight” and “not
consistent with the overall record” because “[t]he record reflects that as of April 11, 2016, anxiety
was better controlled at home” and “according to the [C]laimant’s function report, his conditions
did not adversely affect his ability to get along with others.” (Id.) The ALJ found the opinion of
Dr. Jeffrey Gelderen (Claimant’s orthopedist) to also merit “little weight” because the report was
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

7
made before the alleged onset date. 	(Id.) 	Lastly, Claimant’s mother submitted a third-party
function report to which the ALJ gave “appropriate weight” given that “[d]ue to the personal
connection with the [C]laimant, it is difficult to provide an objective review of the claimant’s
limitations.” (Id.)
The ALJ based his RFC assessment on the above considerations and concluded that
Claimant “was unable to perform any past relevant work.” (Id. at 602.) The ALJ stated that “the
demands of the [C]laimant’s past relevant work” as a caregiver, “as actually performed and as
generally performed in the national economy, exceed the [C]laimant’s residual functional
capacity.” (Id.)
Finally, at step five, the ALJ considered whether jobs exist in the national economy that
Claimant could perform given his age, education, work experience, and RFC results. (Id. at 602-
603.) 	Based on hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, a vocational expert testified that
Claimant could perform jobs such as “scale operator,” “table worker,” and “final assembler.” (Id.
at 603.) 	The ALJ determined that the vocational expert’s testimony was consistent with the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Claimant “was capable
of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy.” (Id.) As a result, the ALJ concluded that Claimant was not disabled for SSD purposes.
(Id. at 603-604.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Standard of Review
The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). In conducting this review, the Court is “not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose
[its] own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). Instead, the Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

8
whether the conclusions reached are rational” and “supported by substantial evidence.” Gober v.
Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla’; it means ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694
F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Evidence is not substantial “if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—particularly certain types of
evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion.” Nazario v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence,” the Court is “bound by those findings, even if [it] would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.” 	Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Legal issues, in contrast,
are subject to a plenary or de novo review. See Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 208 n.10
(3d 	Cir. 	2019) 	(“We 	exercise 	plenary 	review 	over 	legal 	conclusions 	reached 	by 	the
Commissioner . . . .”) (quoting Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359).
B. 	Determining Disability
To be eligible for SSD due to disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must
establish that they are “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 	The individual’s impairment must be severe to the point that the
individual cannot engage in his or her previous work or in “any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy,” i.e., work that exists in significant numbers either in
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

9
the region where the individual lives or in several regions of the country. 	42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(B); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427-28. A physical or mental impairment is one that “results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Disability determinations are made individually “based on evidence adduced at a hearing.” Sykes
v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
C. 	Sequential Evaluation
The Social Security Administration has developed a sequential, five-step process for
evaluating disability claims. The process considers whether the claimant:
(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)-(f)). “The evaluation will continue through each step unless it can
be determined at any point that the claimant is or is not disabled.” Rios v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
444 F. App’x 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). The claimant bears the
ultimate burden of proof at the first four steps, at which point the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at the fifth step. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 201 (“The burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps
except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.”) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff makes four arguments in support of her appeal. 	First, she argues that the ALJ
failed to meaningfully consider Claimant’s obesity at step three and when assessing the RFC.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion of the
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 9 of 25 PageID: <pageID>

10
Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist, who found Claimant disabled. Third, Plaintiff argues that
the RFC fails to account for Claimant’s moderate limitations in mental functioning. 	Lastly,
Plaintiff broadly asserts that the ALJ failed to explain why Claimant could sustain a 40-hour
workweek performing sedentary work.5 On review of the ALJ’s decision (see AR 590-611) and
the Administrative Record (see generally ECF No. 4), the Court finds good cause to affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
5 	Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in finding Claimant was not disabled from February 3,
2014 until December 31, 2019. (ECF No. 7 at 26-29.) Plaintiff contends this is error because the
Appeals Council only remanded to the ALJ the consideration of disability for the period from
February 3, 2014 to May 4, 2017 and a separate proceeding already determined Claimant was
disabled as of May 4, 2017, which is before the December 31, 2019 end date noted by the ALJ in
the decision at issue here. (See id. at 28.) The Court finds any such error harmless. “In the context
of social security cases, errors in ALJ decisions have been excused as mere scrivener’s errors when
the ALJ’s intent was apparent.” Mary L. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-14158, 2022 WL 1058370, at *7
(D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2022) (quoting Amy A. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-7655, 2021 WL 5864063, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2021)); see also Mark R. v. O’Malley, Civ. No. 22-0379, 2024 WL 772550, at *9
(D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2024) (finding scrivener’s error where ALJ stated claimant’s RFC limited him to
light work when finding claimant unable to perform past relevant work, but earlier in step four
ALJ had concluded claimant could perform medium work and “it is clear from the transcript and
from the ALJ’s hypothetical posed to the vocational expert that the ALJ intended to limit Plaintiff
to a limited range of medium work”). Here, the Affirmation and Order of the Appeals Council is
clear on the time period remanded for the ALJ’s consideration. 	The Appeals Council specified
that it affirmed the agency’s determination that Claimant was disabled as of May 4, 2017 but “the
period prior to May 4, 2017 requires further adjudication” and the ALJ would “complete the
administrative record and issue a new decision for the period prior to May 4, 2017.” (AR 695.)
Neither party disputes that February 3, 2014 to May 4, 2017 is the time period at issue. A “full
and fair reading” of the ALJ’s decision, Mark R., 2024 WL 772550, at *9, shows that the ALJ
understood and intended to only decide disability for that specified time period. (AR 593 (“The
alleged onset date of disability is February 3, 2014. Per the remand order, the time period under
adjudication is from the alleged onset date to May 4, 2017.”).) Thus, there is no harm from this
error. The ALJ’s finding that Claimant was not disabled from February 3, 2014 through December
31, 2019, the date last insured, does not impact Claimant’s separate disability determination from
May 4, 2017 onward. See Nieves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 198 F. App’x 256, 260 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Our determination [that the ALJ’s decision denying claimant’s application for disability
insurance benefits for a period beginning in January 2001 was based on substantial evidence] is in
no way swayed by the fact that in October of 2003 an ALJ determined that the petitioner was
disabled. As per 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), our review is limited to the evidence in the record at the time
of the 2001 decision of the ALJ and we are therefore not required, nor able, to consider this
subsequent ALJ ruling when rendering our decision.”).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 10 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

11
A. 	The ALJ’s Consideration of Claimant’s Obesity
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not 	meaningfully 	consider 	Claimant’s 	obesity
independently at step three or in combination with his other impairments when evaluating
Claimant’s RFC. 	(ECF No. 7 at 8-19.) 	Plaintiff contends that where the ALJ did discuss
Claimant’s 	obesity, 	that 	discussion 	includes 	only 	“pre 	written 	template 	culled 	from 	the
Commissioner’s decision-writing catalog of boilerplate,” (id. at 17), contrary to the “meaningful
consideration” required by the Third Circuit decision Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security, 577
F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009), (id. at 11-12.) Defendant responds that the ALJ properly accounted for
Claimant’s obesity at step three and in assessing the RFC. (ECF No. 11 at 11-17.) Additionally,
Defendant argues that even assuming arguendo that the ALJ failed to properly consider Claimant’s
obesity at step three, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that any error was harmful. (Id. at
13-14.) Further, Defendant contends that Diaz is inapplicable or, in the alternative, distinguishable
from this case as the ALJ in Diaz did not offer any discussion of obesity, unlike the ALJ here. (Id.
at 15-16.)
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 19-2p 6 provides guidance on how to evaluate obesity in
disability claims. See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 19-2p (Evaluating Cases Involving Obesity),
2019 WL 2374244 (May 20, 2019). “Obesity is not a listed impairment; however, the functional
limitations caused by the MDI of obesity, either alone or in combination with another
impairment(s), may medically equal a listing.” 	Id. at *2. 	However, SSR 19-2p disclaims that
“[w]e will not make general assumptions about the severity or functional effects of obesity
6 	This SSR rescinded and replaced the earlier SSR 02-1p (Evaluation of Obesity), 2002 WL
34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002), which in turn had rescinded and replaced SSR 00-3p (Evaluation of
Obesity), 2000 WL 33952015 (May 15, 2000). To the extent Plaintiff cites either SSR 02-1p and
00-3p, they are not controlling. (ECF No. 7 at 9-13.)
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 11 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

12
combined with another impairment(s)” and clarifies that “[w]e evaluate each case based on the
information in the case record.” Id. at *4.
In Diaz, 7 the plaintiff argued that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ did not consider her severe obesity. 577 F.3d at 503. The Third Circuit
held that:
[Because the SSR] instructs that “obesity may increase the severity
of 	coexisting 	or 	related 	impairments 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	the
combination of impairments meets the requirements of a listing. . . .
an ALJ must meaningfully consider the effect of a claimant’s
obesity, individually and in combination with her impairments, on
her workplace function at step three and at every subsequent step.”
Id. at 504 (quoting SSR 00-3p, 2000 WL 33952015). While there are no “magic” words an ALJ
must employ, the ALJ “must provide a ‘discussion of the evidence’ and an ‘explanation of
reasoning’ for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review.” Id. (quoting Burnett
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000)).
“[W]hen an ALJ ‘explicitly contemplate[s] . . . obesity at the appropriate step (i.e., when
assessing [a plaintiff’s] RFC),’ the ALJ meets the burden imposed by Diaz.” Maria A. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 21-19431, 2025 WL 88349, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2025) (quoting Hoyman v.
Colvin, 606 F. App’x 678, 680 (3d Cir. 2015). 	In Diaz, the Third Circuit remanded the ALJ’s
7 	Defendant argues that Diaz is inapposite as it discussed and applied SSR 00-3p, one of the
prior SSRs regarding obesity that has since been rescinded. (ECF No. 11 at 15.) While Diaz does
apply the then-controlling SSR 00-3p, the now-controlling SSR 19-2p applicable in this case still
requires consideration of the limiting effects of obesity when assessing a claimant’s RFC, 2019
WL 2374244, at *4, which is the same issue discussed in Diaz. 577 F.3d 503-04; see also Jesus
O. v. O’Malley, Civ. No. 22-5637, 2024 WL 4318604, at *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2024) (“Other
courts have observed that SSR 02-1p and SSR 19-2p ‘are largely consistent in their discussion of
how obesity should be analyzed[.]’”) (quoting Heck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 20-
2133, 2021 WL 6693720, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2021), report and recommendation adopted
sub nom. Heck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 20-2133, 2022 WL 228163 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26,
2022) (collecting cases)).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 12 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

13
determination for further proceedings because the ALJ determined that claimant’s obesity was a
severe impairment but did not analyze its impact on her workplace performance. Diaz, 577 F.3d
at 504-05. 	However, “[w]ere there any discussion of the combined effect of [the claimant’s]
impairments,” the outcome may have been different. Id. at 504 (emphasis in original).
Here, unlike the decision in Diaz, the ALJ meaningfully considered Claimant’s obesity
independently and in combination with his other impairments. 	In his application, Claimant did
not list obesity as a condition that limited his ability to work. (AR 241.) Nevertheless, the ALJ
first discussed Claimant’s obesity at step two, when he determined it was a severe impairment that
“significantly limit[s] the [C]laimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” (Id. at 596.) At
step three, in considering whether Claimant’s impairments met or medically equaled the severity
of any of the listed impairments, the ALJ specifically discussed obesity. (Id. at 597.) Obesity may
put claimants at higher risk for other impairments and “is often associated with musculoskeletal,
respiratory, cardiovascular, and endocrine disorders.” SSR 19-2p, 2019 WL 2374244, at *3. The
ALJ “closely considered” relevant listings to the risks associated with obesity, such as 1.18
(Abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity) and 4.04 (Ischemic heart disease). (AR 596-
597.) He concluded:
With 	respect 	to 	Listing 	1.18, 	the 	record 	does 	not 	document
abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity, documented by: (a)
chronic joint pain or stiffness; (b) abnormal motion, instability, or
immobility of the affected joint(s); (c) anatomical abnormality of the
affected joint(s) under the criteria of Listing 1.18C; and (d)
impairment-related 	physical 	limitation 	of 	musculoskeletal
functioning under the criteria of Listing 1.18D.
With respect to Listing 4.04, although the claimant has heart disease,
the record does not document the results from exercise tolerance
testing 	per 	4.04A, 	nor 	three 	separate 	ischemic 	episodes, 	nor
coronary artery disease, demonstrated by angiography (obtained
independent of Social Security disability evaluation) or other
appropriate medically acceptable imaging.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 13 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

14
(Id. at 596-597.) The ALJ then noted that obesity “may be a factor in both ‘meets’ and ‘equals’
determinations” of listed impairments and concluded “even when obesity is considered in
combination with the claimant’s other impairments, the claimant does not meet or equal any of the
listings in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.” (Id. at 597.)
When discussing the Claimant’s impairments at step four, the ALJ concluded that “[w]ith
respect to the [C]laimant’s status post right wrist fracture; coronary artery disease; hypertension;
vertigo secondary to sinusitis; obesity; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder, the record reflects
that these are severe impairments, and the claimant has some resulting limitations, which are
reflected in the above residual functional capacity finding.” (Id. at 599 (emphasis added).) The
ALJ also discussed the medical evidence that led to this conclusion, including evidence of
Claimant’s Body Mass Index (BMI):
As of February 10, 2015, the [C]laimant . . . was 65 inches tall,
weighed 245 pounds, and BMI was 40.86.[8] . . . As of October 24,
2016, the [C]laimant . . . was 5 feet 6 inches tall, weighed 250
pounds, and BMI was 40.3. . . . As of February 28, 2017, the
[C]laimant . . . weighed 252 pounds and BMI was 42.02.
(Id. at 600.) As such, the Court finds that, considering the ALJ’s decision as a whole, the ALJ
properly considered Claimant’s obesity. Furthermore, “[a]n ALJ fulfills his obligation to consider
a claimant’s impairments in combination with one another if the ALJ explicitly indicates that he
has done so and there is ‘no reason not to believe him.’” Granados v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ.
No. 13-781, 2014 WL 60054, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2014) (quoting Morrison ex rel. Morrison v.
8 	The medical records note that Claimant’s BMI was “above the upper parameter” during
visits in 2015, 2016 and 2017. (See, e.g., AR 535, 549, 552, 555, 949.) Plaintiff notes that “the
BMI of 40 and above is obesity ‘class III’ representing an ‘extremely high’ disease risk,” (ECF
No. 7 at 13 n.2), Defendant does not dispute this classification.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 14 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

15
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 268 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2008)). Here, the ALJ expressly indicated he
did as much at steps two, three and four. (AR 596-600.)
Even assuming arguendo that the ALJ did not properly consider Claimant’s obesity,
Plaintiff has demonstrated no prejudicial error requiring remand. “Ordinary harmless error review,
in which the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate harm, is applicable to administrative
appeals. [The plaintiff] therefore must ‘explain [ ] . . . how the . . . error to which he points could
have made any difference.’” Holloman v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409, 413 (2009)).
Plaintiff does not identify any evidence in the record that the ALJ disregarded evidence supporting
that Claimant’s obesity, alone or in conjunction with other impairments, met or medically equaled
the severity of a listed impairment. “[C]ourts in this Circuit have regularly rejected challenges to
an ALJ’s consideration of a claimant’s obesity at step three where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate
how further consideration of [his] obesity would have changed the ALJ’s ultimate determination
that [he] was not entitled to benefits.” Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *7 (collecting cases). Instead,
Plaintiff recounts the history of Social Security Rulings regarding obesity, states that the effect of
claimant’s obesity must be “meaningfully considered,” and takes issue with the ALJ’s “boilerplate”
discussion.9 	(ECF No. 7 at 8-19.) 	But the general argument “that a plaintiff’s weight would
necessarily limit [his] functional abilities without explaining how obesity would affect the ALJ’s
analysis” is insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden. 	Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *9. 	It “is
9 	This Court can conduct a meaningful review from the ALJ’s decision as a whole. Maria
A., 2025 WL 88349, at *7 n.5. “And regardless, an ALJ is not required ‘to use particular language
. . . 	in conducting [the] analysis.’” 	Id. (quoting Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir.
2004)).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 15 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

16
particularly insufficient when the ALJ relied on medical evidence from physicians who were aware
of the plaintiff’s obesity,” id., as the ALJ did here, (AR 599-600).
B. 	The ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion of Dr. Williamson, the
Commissioner’s examining psychiatrist. (ECF No. 7 at 33-36.) Plaintiff does not challenge the
ALJ’s weighing of the other medical opinions in the record. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision
to give “little weight” to Dr. Williamson’s opinion that Claimant’s symptoms were chronic, severe,
genuine and debilitating was improper because Dr. Williamson’s opinion was consistent with the
record. 	(Id. at 34-35.) 	Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s argument “is merely a request to
reweigh the evidence, contrary to the deferential standard of review” and this Court may reverse
the Commissioner’s decision “only if the evidence ‘compels’ reversal, not merely because the
evidence supports a contrary decision.” (ECF No. 11 at 19 n.4 (emphasis in original).)
“When weighing medical opinions in Social Security matters, administrative law judges
must consider a range of factors, but all they must explain are the reasons for their decisions.”
Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 638 (3d Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original).
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), for claims filed after March 27, 2017, an ALJ is required to
consider medical opinions and determine persuasiveness of the opinions by considering specific
factors listed in the regulations. 	These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3)
relationship of the medical source to the claimant, including length of the treatment relationship,
frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment relationship, and extent of the treatment
relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) other relevant factors. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 16 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

17
Supportability10 and consistency11 are the most important factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Accordingly, an ALJ must “explain how [he] considered [these two] factors” but need not “explain
how [he] considered” the other factors.” Id.
When giving this explanation, the ALJ “need not reiterate the magic words ‘support’ and
‘consistent’ for each doctor.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639. Rather, it is sufficient for the ALJ to
“weave 	supportability 	and 	consistency 	throughout 	[his] 	analysis 	of 	which 	doctors 	were
persuasive.” Id. And when conducting this analysis, the ALJ is not required to provide a “written
analysis about how [he] considered each piece of evidence.” Joseph P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
Civ. No. 21-13524, 2023 WL 1929945, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2023) (quoting Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 5858 (Jan. 18, 2017)).
Instead, “[t]he new regulations reflect a ‘reasonable articulation standard’” in which the “decision
need only ‘allow a subsequent reviewer . . . to trace the path of an adjudicator’s reasoning.’” Id.
(quoting 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5858). At the same time, the Court “need[s] from the ALJ not
only an expression of the evidence [he] considered which supports the result, but also some
indication of the evidence which was rejected.” David T. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20-9118, 2022 WL
10 	“Supportability” means that the “more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s)
or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1); see also Zaborowski, 115
F.4th at 639 (describing the “supportability” factor as an inquiry into “whether medical opinions
were [] based on ‘objective medical evidence and supporting explanations’”).
11 	“Consistency” means that the “more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will
be.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); see also Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639 (describing the
“consistency” factor as an inquiry into “whether medical opinions were . . . consistent with other
medical opinions in the record”).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 17 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

18
73498, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2022) (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Here, Plaintiff challenges only the ALJ’s consistency analysis. (ECF No. 7 at 34.)
The ALJ’s opinion sufficiently explains how Dr. Williamson’s opinion is inconsistent with
the record, thereby giving it little weight. 	Dr. Williamson opined that Claimant’s “overall
prognosis remained guarded due to the chronicity and severity of his symptoms, which appeared
to be genuine and debilitating in nature.” (AR 601.) The ALJ articulated that Dr. Williamson’s
opinion merited “little weight” because:
These opinions are based on a one-time examination, and these
opinions are not consistent with the overall record. The record
reflects that as of April 11, 2016, anxiety was better controlled at
home; but he felt anxious about working, was unable to focus, and
was concerned about his stamina (Exhibit 11F at 1). Anxiety was
noted to be stable (Exhibit 11F at 2). Also, according to the
claimant’s function report, his conditions did not adversely affect his
ability to get along with others (Exhibit 5E at 6).
(Id. at 601.) Plaintiff claims that Dr. Williamson’s opinion was consistent with the overall record
and should have been given greater weight. But “a reviewing court may not undertake a de novo
review of the ALJ’s decision and may not re-weigh the evidence of record. In other words, even if
the reviewing court would have decided the case differently, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed
if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Hyer v. Colvin, 72 F. Supp. 3d 479, 490 (D. Del. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion. The ALJ cited to examples in
the record demonstrating that while Claimant experienced symptoms of anxiety and depression,
those symptoms were managed and did not prevent Claimant from getting along with others. (AR
601 (citing to statements from Claimant’s function report (Ex. 5E, AR 265-272) and Office Visit
Notes from Claimant’s primary care provider (Ex. 11F, AR 533-556).) Further, the ALJ cited to
Dr. Williamson’s own treatment notes which recounted Claimant’s abilities, finding: “there was
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 18 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

19
no evidence of a formal thought disorder”; Claimant’s knowledge and abstract reasoning abilities
were “intact” and “in the average range” and Claimant could “perform simple addition and
subtraction.” (Id. at 600.) See Sheare v. Berryhill, Civ. No. 17- 1227, 2018 WL 4225059, at *10-
11 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2018) (finding that ALJ appropriately assigned little weight to doctor’s
opinion because it was contrary to the record and “[the doctor’s own] treatment notes do not
include clinical observations that suggest that [the claimant] was as restricted to the extreme
limitations that the [doctor’s] medical source statement suggests”), report and recommendation
adopted, Civ. No. 17-1227, 2018 WL 4219386 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018).
Plaintiff, relying on Nazario v. Commissioner Social Security, also argues that the ALJ may
not “reject[] evidence or mak[e] findings on the basis of ‘stability’ of impairments.” (ECF No. 7
at 35-36.) However, this case does not present the same deficiencies the Third Circuit found in
Nazario. In Nazario, the Third Circuit remanded to award the claimant benefits because it found
that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ determined the claimant
was not disabled in part because of a treating doctor’s note that the claimant’s condition was
“stable.” 	794 F. App’x at 209, 211. 	The Third Circuit found that the ALJ had relied on this
comment while ignoring other conflicting, probative evidence about claimant’s impairments, some
of which was also included in notes from that same doctor. Id. at 210-11. Here, the ALJ considered
the 	entire 	record 	in 	evaluating 	the 	consistency 	of 	Dr. Williamson’s 	opinion. 	The ALJ
acknowledged that Claimant reported to his primary care provider that he “felt anxious about
working” and “was unable to focus” in addition to noting the provider’s finding that Claimant’s
anxiety was stable. (AR 601.) 	The ALJ also considered Claimant’s function report in which
Claimant self-reported that his impairments did not adversely affect his ability to get along with
others. (Id.) And unlike in Nazario, the ALJ here found that Claimant had “severe impairments”
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 19 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

20
of depressive disorder and anxiety disorder and included relevant limitations in the RFC. (Id. at
596, 599.) See also Bonnie Lou B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 21-18157, 2022 WL 18024211,
at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) (“[U]nlike Nazario, the ALJ found that [p]laintiff here did have an
impairment, Alzheimer’s Disease, but the impairment did not significantly limit [p]laintiff’s ability
to perform basic-work related activities during the relevant time period.”); Kelly P. v. Kijakazi, Civ.
No. 20-14535, 2023 WL 5321033, at *19 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2023) (“[T]he fact that a claimant is
“stable and well controlled with medication” does not necessarily establish that a claimant can
return to work. . . . [But u]nlike the reasoning of the ALJ in Morales [and Nazario], . . . the ALJ’s
‘finding was based on the objective medical evidence contained in the psychotherapy treatment
notes, and is not ‘overwhelmed’ by contrary evidence in the record.’”) (citations omitted); John P.
v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 20- 8455, 2022 WL 2314966, at *16 (D.N.J. June 28, 2022) (finding “the fact
that [the p]laintiff's symptoms were characterized as ‘stable’ on medication was only one factor
that [the ALJ] identified when explaining why he discounted the more extreme opinions of [other
doctors]” and holding that the ALJ’s weighing of these medical opinions was properly based on
objective medical evidence in the record). Therefore, because the ALJ’s analysis complied with
the applicable regulations and his conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s
evaluation of Dr. Williamson’s opinion was proper.
C. 	The ALJ’s Consideration of Claimant’s Moderate Limitations in Mental
Functioning
Plaintiff also argues that the RFC fails to account for the ALJ’s finding that the Claimant
suffered from “moderate limitations” in mental functioning caused by his severe impairments
identified and discussed in steps two and three. (ECF No. 7 at 36-38.) Defendant responds that
the ALJ sufficiently articulated his reasoning, and the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 11 at 17-24.) 	Defendant contends that the ALJ specifically accounted for Claimant’s
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 20 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

21
moderate mental limitations and “an ALJ’s finding on the broad areas of mental functioning does
not categorically bind the ALJ in terms of the mental RFC assessment.” (Id. at 22-23.) The Court
agrees with Defendant that the ALJ accounted for Claimant’s moderate limitations, by imposing a
“simple tasks” limitation in the RFC.
First, “no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding
has been made at steps two and three.” 	Hess, 931 F.3d at 209. 	Findings that a claimant has
functional limitations in steps two or three are relevant to the RFC determination but do not require
the use of any particular language; the ALJ must only explain how the RFC reflects what a claimant
can do despite those identified limitations. Id. at 209-10. “[A]s long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid
explanation,’ a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’
difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’” 	Id. at 211. 	A “simple tasks” limitation
“relate[s] to [a claimant’s] mental abilities necessary to perform ‘unskilled work.’” Id. at 210.
In Hess, the Third Circuit found that an RFC limiting a claimant “to jobs requiring
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple
work-related decisions” was a “simple tasks” limitation that appropriately accounted for the
claimant’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace. Id. at 210. Similarly, here
the ALJ found that Claimant had moderate limitations in “understanding, remembering, or
applying information”; “interacting with others”; and “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining
pace.” 	(AR 597-598.) 	In the RFC, the ALJ concluded that Claimant “could have occasional
contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and was able to do only simple and routine
tasks.” (Id. at 599.) This is a “simple tasks” limitation appropriately addressing Claimant’s mental
abilities to perform unskilled work. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 210-11.
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 21 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

22
The ALJ offered a valid explanation for the “simple tasks” limitation included in the RFC.
To reach this conclusion regarding Claimant’s abilities given his “moderate limitations” in mental
functioning, the ALJ first considered the examination notes from Dr. Williamson, which indicated
that: “there was no evidence of a formal thought disorder”; Claimant’s “overall fund of knowledge
appeared to be in the average range; abstract reasoning appeared to be in the average range; abstract
reasoning appeared intact; he was well oriented to time, place, and person, as well as recent current
events”; and Claimant “could repeat up to 2 digits forward and 2 digits backwards” and “perform
simple addition and subtraction.” (AR 600.) The ALJ found Dr. Williamson’s overall opinion—
that Claimant’s “prognosis remained guarded due to the chronicity and severity of his symptoms,
which appeared to be genuine and debilitating in nature”—inconsistent given those observations
and the overall record, and assigned it little weight. (Id. at 601.) The ALJ also considered more
recent treatment notes from Claimant’s primary care provider. 	(Id.) 	Those treatment notes
indicated that Claimant was anxious about working and reported difficulty with focus but his
anxiety was noted to be stable. (Id. at 601.)
The ALJ also considered and weighed other opinion medical evidence. He assigned partial
weight to the DDS consultants’ findings that Claimant had “moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence or pace” because the consultants did not have the benefit of the latest
medical evidence, nor did they incorporate the entirety of Claimant’s limitations. 	(Id.) 	After
examining this evidence, the ALJ concluded that “to the extent that the [C]laimant alleges that the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his conditions resulted in disability during the time
relevant to this decision, this is not consistent with the evidence in the record.” (Id. at 599.) The
ALJ thus concluded that Claimant was limited to sedentary work, with a “simple tasks” limitation.
(Id. at 598-599, 601.) 	Based on the Court’s review, the ALJ offered a valid explanation for
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 22 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

23
imposing the “simple tasks” limitation and properly addressed Claimant’s moderate limitations in
mental functioning. 	See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213-14 (finding ALJ offered a valid explanation for
imposing simple tasks limitation where ALJ highlighted record evidence that “led her to give little
weight to assertions that [the claimant] had serious mental difficulties and to credit evidence that
[the claimant] could perform simple work”).
D. 	The ALJ’s Discussion of the RFC
Plaintiff also makes a sweeping assertion that the ALJ failed to explain why Claimant
retained the ability to “sustain a 40 hour workweek performing unskilled sedentary work within
competitive tolerances.” 	(ECF No. 7 at 30; see generally id. at 19-25, 30-32.) 	In making this
argument, Plaintiff does not raise specific challenges to the RFC apart from the arguments the
Court has already addressed, but to the extent Plaintiff’s intention is to challenge the RFC more
broadly, the Court rejects this argument.
“[A]n ‘RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence
supports each conclusion.’” Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *14 (quoting Harris v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., Civ. No. 09-3219, 2010 WL 2874352, at *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2010)). However, “an ALJ does
not need to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [his] RFC
analysis” but rather “must merely ‘articulate how the evidence in the record supports the RFC
determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work-related activities, and
explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in the record.’” Id. (first quoting Lorie H. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 20-13192, 2022 WL 2803168, at *6 (D.N.J. July 18, 2022) (citations
omitted); then quoting Hernandez-Flores v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 13-4738, 2015 WL
4064669, at *6 (D.N.J. July 1, 2015) (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff argues that contrary to the requirements in the Commissioner’s Rulings, the ALJ
failed to assess Claimant’s work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis. (ECF No. 7 at
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 23 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

24
32-33 (citing SSR 96-8p (Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual
Functional Capacity in Initial Claims), 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996)).) The ALJ is not
held to such a strict standard. 	“Though S.S.R. 96-8p requires that functions such as sitting,
standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling, ‘must be considered,’ in the RFC
calculation, it does not require every function to be specifically delineated in the RFC.” Maria A.,
2025 WL 88349, at *17. Here, the ALJ properly addressed Claimant’s work-related abilities in the
RFC, and his determination is supported by a narrative discussion.
The ALJ discussed Claimant’s medical history, self-reported abilities, medical opinions of
consultative examiners and other record evidence. (Id. at 599-601.) The ALJ’s analysis referenced
evidence specifically relevant to “sedentary work.”12 The ALJ considered medical evidence in the
record evaluating Claimant’s ability to lift 10 pounds, including a report from one of Claimant’s
doctors as well as opinion evidence from the DDS consultants. 	(Id. at 601.) 	With respect to
Claimant’s ability to walk, stand and sit, the ALJ considered Claimant’s 2014 function report,
where he described difficulty with lifting, squatting, walking and standing but not with sitting. (Id.
12 	The SSA defines “sedentary work” as work that:
involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally
lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a
certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in
carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing
are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). 	SSR 83-10 additionally provides that “[b]y its very nature, work
performed primarily in a seated position entails no significant stooping. Most unskilled sedentary
jobs require good use of the hands and fingers for repetitive hand-finger actions. . . . Since being
on one’s feet is required “occasionally” at the sedentary level of exertion, periods of standing or
walking should generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should
generally total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” 	SSR 83-10 (Titles II and XVI:
Determining Capability to Do Other Work--the Medical-Vocational Rules of Appendix 2), 1983
WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983).
Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document 14 Filed 01/29/26 Page 24 of 25 PageID:
<pageID>

Case 3:24-cv-04736-GC Document14_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 25 of 25 PagelD:
<pagelD>

at 599 (citing Ex. SE, AR 265-272).) The ALJ also considered medical evidence indicating that
Claimant had become more active as of 2016 and reports of Claimant’s weight and BMI throughout
the relevant time period, (7d. at 599-600.) With respect to Claimant’s ability to use his hands and
fingers, the ALJ cited to medical reports which indicated that after Claimant’s right wrist fracture
“[njeurologically, vascular function was intact in all digits,” (id, at 600) and Claimant’s function
report where he indicated that he did not have trouble with seeing or using his hands. Ud. at 599
(citing Ex. 5E, AR 265-272).) As previously discussed, the ALJ also considered and referenced
evidence regarding Claimant’s mental abilities. (See supra Section TLC.) Thus, the ALJ
sufficiently articulated how the evidence in the record supported the RFC determination. See
MariaA., 2025 WL 88349, at *14. “The fact that the ALJ did not engage in a formulaic explanation
of [his] RFC decision in the way Plaintiff suggests does not indicate that [his] decision was not
supported by substantial evidence.” Jd. at *18.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, the Commissioner’s final decision

is AYFIRMED. An appropriate Order follows,

Dated: J anuary 2), 2026 a )

ORGEYSE CASTNER
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

25

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.