ARONSTEIN v. KENVUE, INC. et al

3:24-cv-04665Njd2 feb 2026

Testo completo

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 8 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 9 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 10 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 11 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 12 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 13 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 14 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 15 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>
2/2/2026
Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document 60 Filed 02/02/26 Page 16 of 16 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JO ARONSTEIN, ef al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 24-4665 (MAS) (RLS)
Vv. MEMORANDUM OPINION
KENVUE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.,
Johnson & Johnson, and Kenvue, Inc.’s* (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 51) the Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) (ECF
No. 40). Plaintiffs’ opposed (ECF No. 54) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 55). The Court has
carefully considered the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under

Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.

' Defendants allege that Johnson & Johnson and Kenvue, Inc. are incorrectly named in this action
because “[t]he correct entity regarding the allegations is Kenvue Brands LLC, successor in interest
to Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.” (Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss 2 n.1, ECF No. 51).

? The individually-named Plaintiffs in this consolidated class action, bringing this action
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, include individual purchasers of the
Band-Aid Products: (1) Jo Aronstein; (2) Mary Jane Castle; (3) Brandi Baldwin-Jones; (4) Sharnay
Moultrie; (5) Carl Saputo, Jr.; (6) Valerie Torres; (7) Joycette Goodwin; (8) Rebekah Badilla;
(9) Frank Ortega; (10) Paula Skopow; (11) Christina Otey; (12) Pradeep Arora; (13) Serge
Belozerov; (14) Elizabeth Witowski; (15) Reinhard Mazariegos; (16) Melissa Pavlick; (17) Eric
Wilim; (18) Sari Weiner; (19) Grace Sit; and (20) Lester Pounder (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). (See
generally Am. Consolidated Class Action Compl. (the “Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 40.)

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

I. BACKGROUND?

A. Factual Background
L. General Overview

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other similarly-situated consumers (the “Class
Members”), bring the present class action litigation alleging claims related to Defendants’ sale of
certain Band-Aid bandages’ (the “Band-Aid Products”). (Am. Compl. § 1.) Plaintiffs allege that
the Band-Aid Products “contain harmful levels of toxic [per- or polyfluoroalkyl substances
(‘PFAS’)]°, a class of harmful ‘forever chemicals’ linked to cancer, hormone disruption, immune
system harm, and other health risks.” Ud. § 2.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants marketed the
Band-Aid Products without disclosing the presence of PFAS despite the fact that “Defendants have
used and continue to use PFAS chemicals in their adhesive bandages for the water-proof qualities.”
(Id. J§ 8, 14.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that: (1) they purchased the Band-Aid Products because
they “reasonably believed they were safe for use around, adjacent to, and near skin and open
wounds”; (2) they “followed the instructions and applied the Band-Aid Products” to their and their
family members’ skin and open wounds; (3) prior to purchase, they relied upon Defendants’
packaging and ingredient list to make their purchasing decisions; (4) they were unaware that the

Band-Aid Products contained harmful levels of PFAS; (5) independent testing and published

3 For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

4 The Band-Aid Products at issue include: (1) Band-Aid Flexible Fabric Comfortable Protection
Bandages (the “Flexible Fabric Bandages”); and (2) Band-Aid OURTONE Flexible Fabric
Bandages (the “OURTONE Bandages”) including OURTONE BR45 Bandages, OURTONE BRS55
Bandages, and OURTONE BR65 Bandages. (Am. Compl. { 1, n.1.)

> PFAS include long-chain PFAS such as perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) and
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (““PFOS”), and short-chain PFAS like GenX. (Am. Compl. {J 161,
171, 201; see also Defs.’ Ex. A to Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 51-4 (detailing PFOA and PFOS).)

2

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60 _ Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

research “confirms that Defendants’ Band-Aid Products contain PFAS at the point of sale, and it
is highly likely that Plaintiff[s’] Band-Aid Products, purchased in temporal proximity to those
Band-Aid Products independently tested, . . . contain the same or substantially similar levels of
PFAS”; and (6) “Plaintiff[s] would not have purchased the Band-Aid Products, or would have paid
significantly less for them, had [they] known that the products contained dangerous PFAS[ and]
Plaintiff[s] ... stopped using the Band-Aid Products since learning they contain PFAS.” (ad.
{J 26-28, 32-34, 38-40, 44-46, 50-52, 56-58, 62-64, 68-70, 74-76, 80-82, 86-88, 92-94, 98-100,
104-06, 110-12, 116-18, 122-24, 128-30, 134-36, 140-42.)
2. PFAS Risks

“PFAS are a category of highly persistent—stain-resistant, oil-resistant, and
water-resistant—and toxic manufactured chemicals that have been used in industry and consumer
products since the 1940s.” Ud. 4 157 (citing Our Current Understanding of the Human Health and
Environmental Risks of PFAS, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/pfas/our-current-understanding-human-health-and-environmental-risks-
pfas).) Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that PFAS “are used by Defendants for their
waterproof qualities.” (Id. § 158.) PFAS can be harmful to humans at extremely low levels. (/d.
4163 (citing EPA warns toxic “forever chemicals” more dangerous than once thought,
Washington Post (June 15, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2022/06/15/epa-pfas-forever-chemicals/).) In June 2022, the Environmental
Protection Agency (the “EPA”’) “announced a lifetime health advisory related to PFAS[,|” setting
“lifetime health advisory levels for PFOA at 0.004 [parts per trillion (‘ppt’)] and PFOS at 0.02 ppt”
and “for the short-chain GenX at 10 ppt[.]” Ud. {J 15, 163, 171.) About one month later, the

National Academy of Science, Engineering, and Medicine produced a report regarding PFAS

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

detection, health effects, and testing, recommending “that doctors screen blood tests for a range of
PFAS and advis[ing] that if a patient’s blood shows combined PFAS above 20 nanograms per
milliliter, the person is at high risk of adverse health effects.” (Ud. 4 172.) Then, in 2024, the Biden
Administration issued legally-enforceable drinking water standards limiting PFAS levels allowed
in drinking water, setting a maximum contaminant level of 4 ppt for PFOA and PFOS individually.
(Id. § 173.) The EPA also “set[] a Maximum Contaminant Level health-based goal at zero.” (/d.
q 174.)
3. Studies Testing the Band-Aid Products for PFAS

There are two primary methods of testing for PFAS: (1) “targeted” analysis, which “seeks
to detect the presence of specific PFAS forms in a sample”; and (2) total organic fluorine analysis,
which “detect[s] organic fluorine, which is the foundational element (and defining characteristic)
of PFAS chemicals” and is measured in parts per million (“ppm”) (/d. {§ 175, 177-81.) Plaintiffs
allege two different studies of PFAS testing in their Amended Complaint. (See generally id.)

First, Plaintiffs allege that Mamavation, a “consumer ‘watchdog’ community group, which
provides ‘eco-wellness product investigations for moms],|’” commissioned “scientific studies on
indications of PFAS in bandages, to analyze popular bandages marketed to consumers.” (/d.
47 189, 191 (citing “Band-Aids & Bandages with Indications of PFAS “Forever Chemicals”
Report, Mamavation (Apr. 2, 2024), available at: https://www.mamavation.com/health/band-aids-
bandages-pfas-forever-chemicals-report.html).) The Mamavation testing included “Band-Aid
Flexible Fabric Comfortable Protection Bandages, Band-Aid OURTONE Flexible Fabric BR45
Bandages, Band-Aid OURTONE Flexible Fabric BR55 Bandages, and Band-Aid OURTONE
Flexible Fabric BR65 Bandages manufactured by Defendants.” Ud. § 193.) Of the Band-Aid

branded products tested, the levels of organic fluorine ranged from 169 ppm to 262 ppm on the

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

“absorbent pad” and the testing of the Band-Aid OURTONE Flexible Fabric BR65 Bandages also
yielded a test result of 374 ppm organic fluorine on the “sticky flaps.” Ud. { 196.) In response to
this study, Plaintiffs point to statements from professors that: (1) “‘Because bandages are placed
upon open wounds, it’s troubling to learn that they may also be exposing children and adults to
PFAS. It’s obvious from the data that PFAS are not needed for wound care[]’”; and (2) ““‘It is
discouraging to find yet another important product space, bandaids or bandages, containing PFAS
compounds where transfers into users are conceivable.’” (Ud. {J 197-98.)

Second, Plaintiffs allege that in 2024, Plaintiffs also had independent lab testing completed
to determine whether the Band-Aid Products contained PFAS. (/d. § 199.) “To perform this testing,
Plaintiffs sought an independent laboratory that utilized EPA-approved methodology to detect
PFAS constituents in the adhesive strips and pads of the Band-Aid Products.” Ud. J 200.) Plaintiffs
allege that “independent testing... determined that PFAS, including certain long-chain PFAS like
PFOA, were present at detectable levels within each of the Band-Aid Products.” (/d. J 201-04.)

4. The Band-Aid Products

Plaintiffs allege that the PFAS found in Defendants’ Band-Aid Products go “well beyond
the limitations set forth by the government on drinking water” and are at “harmful levels.” (d.
49 175, 203.) Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]he presence of harmful levels of PFAS in the
Band-Aid Products that are applied to open wounds is material to Plaintiffs, customers, and
putative Class Members[,|” particularly in light of the existing guidance about harmful PFAS
levels. Ud. {| 205-06.)

According to Plaintiffs, despite the presence of such PFAS, Defendants have made a
variety of statements regarding the Band-Aid Products and their safety. (See generally id.)

Specifically, Defendants have made statements, including that: (1) they make a “sustainability

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60 _ Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

promise,” stating the Band-Aid brand is “working for a healthy future”; (2) “We prioritize safety
and quality in the development of every wound care product”; (3) “Every piece of material in our
BAND-AID Brand bandages and every ingredient in our antibiotic treatments are chosen with
safety as the top concern. We thoroughly vet each supplier and only partner with those who meet
our rigorous standards”; (4) and “Our manufacturing facilities undergo regular audits and
certification so that we can ensure our products are manufactured with the highest standards and
comply with most discerning regulatory standards.” (Ud. {J 223-26, 234-39.) According to
Plaintiffs, “[t]hroughout the class period, Defendants have targeted consumers who seek the
highest quality and safest bandages, and have done so by falsely and misleadingly representing
that their Band-Aid Products are safe, healthy, and made with the ‘best ingredients,’ and that the
bandages and packaging are environmentally friendly.” Ud. 4 236, 239.) Further, according to
Plaintiffs, “Defendants’ representations that their Band-Aid Products are healthy for humans and
the environment ... are false because products containing toxic, synthetic ingredients like PFAS
chemicals are neither safe for consumers nor safe for the environment.” (Ud. § 248.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs initially filed suit in April 2024. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) In January
2025, the Court consolidated the several then-pending actions containing substantially similar
allegations. (See generally Consolidation Order, ECF No. 28.) On March 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
a Consolidated Class Action Complaint (see generally Consolidated Compl., ECF No. 29), and
subsequently filed the operative Amended Complaint (see generally Am. Compl.) which strikes
certain allegations contained in the Consolidated Class Action Complaint (see generally Stip. &

Order, ECF No. 42).

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

The operative Amended Complaint now contains fifteen counts. (See generally Am.
Compl.) Four of the counts are alleged on behalf of the nationwide class or, in the alternative, on
behalf of statewide classes: (1) breach of express warranty (“Count One”); (2) breach of implied
warranty (“Count Two”); (3) fraudulent concealment (“Count Three”); and (4) unjust enrichment
(“Count Four’”).° (Id. §§| 305-44.) Two counts are alleged as to the California subclass: (1) violation
of California unfair competition law (“Count Five”); and (2) violation of the California false
advertising law (“Count Six”). Ud. §§ 345-70.) One count is alleged as to the Florida subclass:
violation of Florida’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“Count Seven”). Ud. 9] 371-85.)
Two counts are alleged as to the Georgia subclass: (1) violation of the Georgia Fair Business
Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390, et seg. (‘Count Eight”); and (2) violation of Georgia’s
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370, et seg. (‘Count Nine”). Ud.
§{ 386-422.) One count is alleged as to the Hawaii subclass: violation of Hawaii Revised Statute
§ 480, et seg. (“Count Ten”). Ud. $f] 423-38.) One count is alleged as to the Illinois subclass:
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Count Eleven’).
(Id. §§ 439-55.) One count is alleged as to the Michigan subclass: violation of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903, ef seg. (“Count Twelve”). (Ud.
q§ 456-70.) Two counts are alleged as to the New York subclass: (1) violation of New York
General Business Law (““NYGBL”) § 349 (“Count Thirteen”); and (2) violation of NYGBL § 350
(“Count Fourteen”). Ud. §§ 471-502.) Lastly, one count is alleged as to the Pennsylvania

subclass: violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

® Counts One through Four are brought on behalf of the nationwide class under New Jersey law,
or in the alternative, on behalf of the California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas statewide classes under each individual
state law. (Am. Compl. {J 306, 319, 328, 338.)

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 8 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

(“Count Fifteen”). Ud. J 503-18.) Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its
entirety. (See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 51.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure’ 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a matter
for want of standing “because standing is a jurisdictional matter.” Ballentine v. United States, 486
F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged
under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.” Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may either “attack the complaint on its face .. . [or] attack the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings.” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

A facial challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds
to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Awanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438
(D.N.J. 1999). As such, a facial challenge “calls for a district court to apply the same standard of
review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the
alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358
(3d Cir. 2014). District courts considering a facial challenge, then, must construe the allegations
in the complaint as true and determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Mortensen, 549
F.2d at 891; Cardio-Med. Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir.
1983). “Thus, ‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [for lack of standing], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter’ that would establish standing if accepted as true.” In re Horizon

7 All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60 _ Filed 02/02/26 Page 9 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations in
original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Il. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise multiple arguments in support of their motion to dismiss: (1) Plaintiffs
lack standing; (2) Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that PFAS chemicals on the Band-Aid
Products could cause harm; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege actionable misrepresentations, omissions,
or reliance; (4) Plaintiffs fail to state the nationwide claims; and (5) Plaintiffs fail to state claims
under the various state consumer protection laws. (See generally Defs.’ Moving Br., ECF No.
51-1.) Because Defendants’ argument on standing is dispositive, the Court need only address the
first argument.

“[T]he question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered within the framework
of Article III [of the Constitution,] which restricts judicial power to ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’”
Township of Lyndhurst, N.J. v. Priceline.com Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations
in original) (quoting Assn of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970)). A
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating it has standing. TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 430-31 (2021). If Article III standing cannot be established on the
part of the named plaintiffs, a district court “must dismiss a putative class action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Finkleman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2016).

Under Article III, a plaintiff has standing if it has: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by
a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The “injury in fact” inquiry is often

determinative of standing. Ellison v. Am. Bd. of Orthopaedic Surgery, 11 F.4th 200, 205 (3d Cir.

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60- Filed 02/02/26 Page 10 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

2021). “The requirements for an injury-in-fact are well established: a plaintiff must show that [it
has] suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and
‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” In re Plum Baby Food Litig., 637 F. Supp.
3d 210, 223 (D.N.J. 2022) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

A. Benefit of the Bargain

According to Defendants, “Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their economic injury theory
of harm, which is their sole theory of injury” because they have not alleged an economic
injury-in-fact. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 9-12.) Plaintiffs argue in opposition that they have standing
because they “sufficiently allege [that] they did not receive the benefit of their bargain.” (Pls.’
Opp’n Br. 7, ECF No. 54.)

“Under the benefit of the bargain theory, a plaintiff [may] successfully plead an economic
injury by alleging that she bargained for a product worth a given value but received a product
worth less than that value.” Jn re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Marketing, Sales
Pracs. & Liab. Litig., 903 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2018). “The economic injury is calculated as the
difference in value between what was bargained for and what was received.” Id. Notably,
“Thjlowever, ‘[p|laintiffs receive[] the benefit of their bargain so long as there were no adverse
health consequences, and the product work[ed] as intended[.|’” In re Plum Baby Food, 637
F. Supp. 3d at 223 (alterations in original) (quoting James y. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos.,
No. 10-3049, 2011 WL 198026, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2011)).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they “were deprived of the benefit of their bargain since the
Band-Aid Products they purchased were worth less than they would have been if free from
defects.” (Am. Compl. {ff 382, 452, 468, 516; Pls.” Opp’n Br. 8.) According to Plaintiffs, they

“bargained for safe bandages but received products contaminated with PFAS—chemicals that the

10

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 11 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

EPA recognizes as harmful even at ‘near zero’ levels[,]” yet “[t]esting confirmed PFAS presence
at 188-262 ppm (Mamavation) and up to 6.7 ng/g (independent testing).” (Pls.” Opp’n Br. 8 (citing
Am. Compl. {ff 163-64, 196, 204).) As Defendants note, however, “Plaintiffs have not alleged any
adverse health consequences from using the bandages, and there is no claim that the bandages did
not work as intended, to cover minor scrapes and wounds.” (Defs.’ Moving Br. 10.)

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misrepresented their products,
Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to support their claims. “To allege economic harm under
the benefit[ Jof[ ]|the[ Jbargain theory, it is required that plaintiffs identify the specific
misrepresentation that induced their purchase.” In re Plum Baby Food, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 224
(citing Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 16-7492, 2017 WL 2999026, at *9 (D.N.J. July 14,
2017)). For example, in In re Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litigation, plaintiffs alleged that they were
induced to purchase “BlueTEC Clean Diesel” vehicles because they were purportedly better for
the environment. No. 16-881, 2016 WL 7106020, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2016). There, plaintiffs
pointed to specific statements made by defendants about the technology, including marketing
statements like: (1) “the world’s cleaniest [sic] and most advanced diesel”; (2) “ultra-low
emissions, high fuel economy and responsive performance”; (3) “up to 30% lower greenhouse-gas
emissions than gasoline”; and (4) Mercedes “represents that its BlueTEC vehicles ‘convert[] the
nitrogen oxide emissions into harmless nitrogen and oxygen’ and ‘reduces the nitrogen oxide in
the exhaust gases by up to 90%.’” Jd. at *5. Based on these highly specific statements, the court
found that “at the motion to dismiss stage and as to the standing issue, [p]laintiffs have plausibly
pled that the products did not live up to the claims made by [d]efendants.” Jd. at *4.

Here, however, Plaintiffs point to Defendants’ product statements such as: (1) “Better

Ingredients, Better Processes”; (2) “Every piece of material in our BAND-AID Brand

11

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 12 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

bandages .. . are chosen with safety as the top concern”; and (3) “Our scientists ensure the safety
and efficacy of our products through clinical studies and laboratory models”. (Am. Compl. ¥ 224.)
Plaintiffs allege that these, and other, statements “lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the
Band-Aid Products are safe, healthy, made with the ‘best ingredients,’ and environmentally
conscious.” (/d. { 236.) None of the statements Plaintiffs point to, however, directly relate to the
presence of PFAS in components of the Band-Aid Products. (See generally id.) Rather, all of the
statements Defendants make about the Band-Aid Products could still be true, even if PFAS exists
in certain product components, as Plaintiffs have not alleged facts about any studies about the
presence of PFAS in bandages actually causing harm or any adverse health consequences to users.®
(See generally id.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations, therefore, are not sufficient to establish Article II standing under a
benefit of the bargain theory of economic harm. See, e.g., In re Plum Baby Food, 637 F. Supp. 3d
at 223-25 (finding plaintiffs did not have Article III standing where they claimed a presence of
heavy metals in baby food and alleged that “they did not receive the benefit of the bargain because
they believed they were buying ‘healthy, nutritious’ baby food products” because the complaint
lacked “factual support of adverse health consequences or plausible allegations of future risk[s]”);
Koronthaly v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 374 F. App’x 257, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiff lacked

an injury-in-fact to confer standing where plaintiff asserted “a subjective allegation that . . . trace

amounts of lead in. . . lipsticks are unacceptable” but conceded that plaintiff “ha[d] suffered no

8 While the Amended Complaint alleges facts related generally to PFAS studies and potential
health risks for humans who “may be exposed to PFAS through a variety of pathways, including
ingestion, inhalation, and skin absorption” (see, e.g., Am. Compl. {| 157-76, 189-209) and levels
allowable in drinking water (id. | 173), it is silent as to allegations of any potential health effects
caused by bandages containing PFAS or migration of PFAS from bandages into human skin such
that the PFAS in bandages would cause users some type of harm (see generally id.).

12

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60- Filed 02/02/26 Page 13 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

adverse health effects from using the lipsticks”); James v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos.,
No. 10-3049, 2011 WL 198026, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ benefit of the
bargain theory related to shampoo that contained methyl chloride because “[p]laintiffs received
the benefit of their bargain so long as there were no adverse health consequences, and the product
worked as intended”).

B. Premium Price or Alternative Product Theories

“Under the alternative product theory, ‘a plaintiff might successfully plead economic
injury by alleging that, absent the defendant’s conduct, she would have purchased an alternative
product that was less expensive.’” Kimca v. Sprout Foods, Inc., No. 21-12977, 2022 WL 1213488,
at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2022) (quoting In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum, 903 F.3d at 282). “[U]nder
the premium price theory, ‘a plaintiff may plead economic injury by alleging that the defendant
unlawfully advertised its product as being “superior” to others.’” Jd. (quoting In re Johnson &
Johnson Talcum Powder, 903 F.3d at 283).

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs also lack standing under either a premium price or
alternative product theory because the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts regarding “the
price of [the Band-Aid Products] or any other alternative bandage[,]” a requirement under either
theory of injury. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 10-11.) Plaintiffs argue, albeit in a footnote, that they have
sufficiently alleged a cognizable economic injury under a premium price theory based on

2 666

allegations that Defendants’ “‘misrepresentations or omissions caused [them] to overpay for a
product’ and such allegations ‘permit a factfinder to determine that [they] suffered at least some
economic injury.’” (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 8 n.2 (citation omitted).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint contains only one passing reference to potential

competitors to Band-Aid Products, namely TruColour and TrueTone, provided in the context of

13

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60_ Filed 02/02/26 Page 14 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

discussing the independent lab study. (See Am. Compl. { 208.) Plaintiffs do not allege that they
would have bought either of these products, or other competitors’ products, and fail to allege facts
regarding price. (See generally id.) Instead, Plaintiffs merely allege that they would not have
bought the Band-Aid Products or would not have paid the higher “premium” price for the
Band-Aid Products if they knew that the Band-Aid Products contained PFAS. (See, e.g., id. [J 218
(“Defendants are able to charge, and do charge, a premium above the price for bandages charged
by competitors and generic manufacturers.”), 271 (“Plaintiff[s] and Class Members paid money
for Defendants’ Band-Aid Products, and paid a premium for an expected quality above (or at least
comparable to) that of Defendants’ competitors.”), 332 (“Plaintiffs and Class Members all paid a
premium for the Band-Aid brand adhesive bandages based upon the way the product is
represented, which did not include the inclusion of PFAS. Products that contain PFAS are not
worth a premium to a reasonable consumer.”).) These “threadbare” allegations that Plaintiffs paid
an unfair premium are insufficient under either a premium price or alternative product theory. See
Kimca, 2022 WL 1213488, at *8, *8 n.11 (finding insufficient plaintiffs’ “threadbare” allegations
that defendant’s purported “misrepresentations and omissions caused [plaintiffs] to pay an unfair
premium price” where plaintiffs “[did] not identify any other comparable, cheaper, or safer
products to show that they, in fact, paid a premium” for the products at issue); see also In re
Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder, 903 F.3d at 282 (explaining that, under the alternative
product theory, the economic injury is calculated “by determining the difference in price between
the defendant’s more expensive product and the less expensive alternative’’).

C. Standing to Pursue Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief “on grounds consistent with the standards articulated

in Rule 23(b)(2) that establish final injunctive relief as an appropriate class-wide remedy, in that

14

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60- Filed 02/02/26 Page 15 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Defendants continue to manufacture, market, and sell the contaminated bandages and omit
material facts.” (Am. Compl. § 299.) Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have not alleged a ‘certainly
impending’ injury and lack standing to seek an injunction.” (Defs.’ Moving Br. 12 (citing In re
Plum Baby Food, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 227).)

“While future harm may be sufficient to satisfy the ‘concreteness’ requirement in the
injury-in-fact analysis and allow a plaintiff to pursue injunctive relief, the risk of harm must be
‘sufficiently imminent and substantial,’ such that exposure to the risk of harm itself generates an
independent injury[.]” Jn re Plum Baby Food, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (quoting TransUnion,
594 U.S. at 435). “The Third Circuit has also held that once a plaintiff knows of the health risks
of a product alleged to be improperly marketed, the ‘law accords people the dignity of assuming
that they act rationally, in light of the information they possess.’” Jd. at 227 (quoting Jn re Johnson
& Johnson Talcum Powder, 903 F.3d at 293). As such, plaintiffs are not at risk of suffering an
economic injury in the future once they are aware of potential health risks associated with a
product. See In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder, 903 F.3d at 292-93 (declining to “give
cognizance to this sort of ‘stop me before I buy again’ claim”).

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that they have “stopped using the Band-Aid Products since
learning they contain PFAS” and do not allege that they would purchase the products again. (See
Am. Compl. {J 28, 34, 40, 46, 52, 58, 64, 70, 76, 82, 88, 94, 100, 106, 112, 118, 124, 130, 136,
143); see, e.g., Hernandez v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., No. 19-15679, 2023 WL
2634496, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2023) (“[V]iewing [p]laintiffs as rational actors in the free market
possessing information that affects their purchasing decisions, there is no risk of future harm where
[p]laintiffs will presumedly no longer purchase [d]efendant’s [products].”). Beyond alleging that

testing of the Band-Aid Products showed levels of PFAS, Plaintiffs do not allege the harm that

15

Case 3:24-cv-04665-MAS-RLS Document60- Filed 02/02/26 Page 16 of 16 PagelD:
<pagelD>

would be caused to users of the Band-Aid Products, making any risk of future harm purely
speculative. (See generally Am. Compl.); see e.g., In re Plum Baby Food, 637 F. Supp. 3d at
226-27 (finding plaintiffs cannot establish injury as required for Article III standing to seek
injunctive relief where plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, but failed to “establish a causal link”
between levels of heavy metal in baby food and the likelihood that would cause physical harm).
Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to demonstrate standing to pursue injunctive relief.’

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs will
be afforded an opportunity to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies identified
herein. The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MICHAEL A. Supp
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: 2/2/2026

Because the Court finds that the named Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek relief under any
theory discussed herein, the Court need not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments, including the
argument about non-Florida plaintiffs lacking standing to bring Florida claims on behalf of the
class. See Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 195 (“Absent standing on the part of the named plaintiffs, we
must dismiss a putative class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); Neale v. Volvo Cars
of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘cases or controversies’ requirement is
satisfied so long as a class representative has standing[.]”).

16

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.