HARPER v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES

3:23-cv-01533Njd17 feb 2026

Testo completo

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TOSHIKO HARPER,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-1533 (MAS) (JBD)

V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPT. OF
HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant State of New Jersey Department of
Human Services’ (““DHS,” or “Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 61.)
Plaintiff Toshiko Harper (“Plaintiff”) opposed (ECF No. 62), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 63).
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral
argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.

IL BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (““SOF’’)
(SOF, ECF No. 61-2), Response to the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSOF”) (DSOF,
ECF No. 62-4 at 1-6), Counter-Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“CSOF”) (CSOF, ECF
No. 62-4 at 6-16), and Response to the Counter-Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

(“RCSOF”) (RCSOF, ECF No. 63-1), and are undisputed by the parties unless otherwise noted.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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A. Factual Background

This matter arises from Plaintiff’s request to receive a religious exemption from DHS’s
COVID-19 vaccination policy. (See generally SOF; DSOF.) Plaintiff became a Christian as an
adult in the 1980s, and is “Christian, a believer of Christ, no specific denomination.” (SOF § 28;
DSOF 28.) Plaintiff began her employment at New Lisbon Developmental Center (“NLDC”) as
a Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) in 2005 and was subsequently promoted to Senior LPN. (SOF
43; DSOF 4 3.)

DHS’s residents or “clients” range in age from their twenties to their eighties and may
suffer from medical conditions such as seizure disorders, diabetes, and/or cardiac issues. (SOF § 1;
DSOF ¥ 1.) Some of those residents are “highly resistant to wearing a mask.” (SOF § 2; DSOF
{ 2.) Plaintiff’s job duties involved direct contact with NLDC’s residents. (SOF ¥ 4; DSOF 4 4.)
As such, Plaintiff was in close physical proximity to the residents and her co-workers performing
“hands-on” or “on-the-floor” nursing duties including: (1) administering oral medications;
(2) injecting clients with syringes; (3) monitoring vital signs; (4) attending to clients’ feeding and
medicating through percutaneous endoscopic gastronomy (“PEG”) tubes and “flushing the tubes”;
(5) administering “rescue meds” through a rectal jelly to treat seizures; (6) assisting physicians
with physical examinations, including examinations of clients confined to their beds; and
(7) treating and cleaning injuries such as scratches, lacerations, abrasions, and bedsores. (SOF 4 5;
DSOF 4 5.)

Beginning with Executive Order (“EO”) 103 on March 9, 2020, and pursuant to the
declaration of a public health emergency under the Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J.S.A.
26:13-1, et. seg., and a state of emergency under the New Jersey Civilian Defense and Disaster

Control Act, Governor Murphy issued a series of EOs to address the State’s response to the

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COVID-19 pandemic. (SOF § 6; DSOF § 6.) On November 5, 2021, the U.S. Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) issued an Interim Final Rule requiring staff in certain
federally-funded settings, such as NLDC, to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by January 4,
2022. (SOF § 7; DSOF 4 7; CSOF 4 62-63; RCSOF 4] 62-63.) DHS, thereafter, adopted policies
implementing the COVID-19 vaccine mandate and issued related notices to its employees. (SOF
4 9; DSOF § 9; CSOF 4§ 67-68; RCSOF {ff 67-68.) Those policies set forth the State’s vaccine
requirement procedures, the application process for a religious exemption, and the disciplinary
procedures for violating the vaccine policy. (SOF 4 9; DSOF § 9.)

In anticipation of receiving a large number of religious exemption requests, DHS created
a “Request for Religious Exemption from Vaccination Requirement” form. (SOF § 10; DSOF § 10;
CSOF { 69; RCSOF § 69.) To address employees’ exemption requests submitted due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, each Chief Executive Officer of DHS’s five developmental centers was
tasked with identifying the job titles at their centers that entailed “direct client contact.” (SOF § 21;
DSOF 4 21; CSOF 4 72; RCSOF 72.) The Senior LPN job was one such title identified at NLDC.
(SOF § 22; DSOF 22.)

Plaintiff did not receive the COVID-19 vaccine. (SOF § 11-12; DSOF f 11-12.) Plaintiff,
however, previously received vaccinations when she enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserves in 1982.
(SOF 4 13; DSOF § 13.) Additionally, in February 2008 (while employed at NLDC) Plaintiff
received a tetanus, or Tdap, vaccine after cutting her hand on a rusty can while working at NLDC.
(SOF 4 13; DSOF 4 13.) Then, in November 2023, Plaintiff received a Tdap vaccine after being
bitten by a dog. (SOF § 13; DSOF ¥ 13.) Plaintiff received these vaccine shots to prevent tetanus

and as a preventative measure against bacterial and skin infection because she believed she had

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been exposed to harmful bacteria as a result of the cut and dog bite wounds. (SOF § 14; DSOF
q 14.)

On or about December 3, 2021, Plaintiff submitted to DHS a “Request for Religious
Exemption from Vaccination Requirement” form, with an accompanying one-page letter. (SOF
{| 16; DSOF § 16.) On the form she stated that: (1) her “sincerely held belief is God created [her]
with a well-functioning immune system that was not to be tempered [sic] with”; (2) she “will be
held accountable to God if [she] defile[s] this uniquely created temple”; (3) “to violate [her] temple
by injecting any vaccines would mean [she] decided to lay aside [her] convictions concerning what
[she has] been taught and practice regarding the Word of God”; and (4) “[w]hen [she] accepted
Jesus Christ into [her] heart as [her] Lord and Savior that’s when [her] body became a temple that
should not [] be defiled.” (SOF § 16; DSOF § 16; Ex. M to PI.’s Opp’n Br (“Exemption Request”),
ECF No. 62-17.)

On February 24, 2022, DHS informed Plaintiff that it denied her religious exemption
request. (SOF § 23; DSOF {4 23.) DHS provided Plaintiff with Preliminary and Amended
Preliminary Notices of Disciplinary Action containing disciplinary charges of violation of
administrative procedures and/or regulations involving safety and security, violation of a rule,
regulation, policy, procedure, order or administration decision and other charges and the potential
disciplinary action of removal. (SOF 4 24; DSOF 24.) Plaintiff appealed the charges, which
resulted in a hearing on July 19, 2022, before a DHS hearing officer, who upheld the charges and
the removal on July 28, 2022. (SOF § 25; DSOF § 25.) On July 29, 2022, DHS issued a Final
Notice of Disciplinary Action to Plaintiff with the disciplinary action of removal, effective March

31, 2022. (SOF § 26; DSOF § 26.)

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B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a Complaint bringing three counts. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed the operative Amended Complaint asserting the following claims:
(1) failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs pursuant to Title VII (Count I); (2) disparate
treatment in violation of Title VII (Count II); (3) failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious
beliefs pursuant to the NJLAD (Count II); and (4) disparate treatment in violation of Title VII
(Count IV). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 35.) Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 37), Plaintiff opposed (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 41), and
Defendant replied (Def.’s Reply to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 42). The Parties thereafter reached
a stipulation whereby Defendant withdrew its Motion to Dismiss and Count III and Count IV of
the Amended Complaint were dismissed. (See generally Stip. and Order, ECF No. 54.)

Following the close of fact discovery on September 2, 2025, Defendant filed the instant
motion seeking summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Def.’s Mot. for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 61.) In her opposition brief, Plaintiff withdrew Count II' of her
Amended Complaint leaving only her Title VII failure to accommodate claim. (P1.’s Opp’n Br. 10,
ECF No. 62.) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is now ripe for resolution.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court should grant summary judgment
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson vy. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir.

! The Court, accordingly, grants summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Count II of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.

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2000). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must construe all facts and inferences in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386,
393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine dispute of
material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect
to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. . . the burden on the moving
party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Jd. at 325.

Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the nonmoving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citations omitted). The opposing party
must present actual evidence that creates a genuine dispute as to a material fact for trial. Anderson,
477 US. at 247-48; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth types of evidence on which the
nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion that genuine disputes of material fact exist). If
the nonmoving party has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial[,] . . . there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] of material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex,
477 US. at 322-23).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence
and decide the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine dispute for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. Big

Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The summary

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judgment standard, however, does not operate in a vacuum. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.

Ill. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining claim (Count I)’ that
Defendant violated Title VII by failing to accommodate her religious exemption request. (See
Def.’s Moving Br. 21-27, 35-39, ECF No. 61-1; see generally Def.’s Reply Br., ECF No. 63.)
Defendant argues that: (1) the record and applicable law support its undue hardship determination;
and (2) Plaintiff has not established that her anti-vaccine beliefs are religious in nature under Third
Circuit precedent. (Def.’s Moving Br. 35-39; Def.’s Reply Br. 1-13.)

A. Failure to Accommodate

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... religion... .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Pursuant to the statutory definitions, “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . .. religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e()).

To establish failure to grant a religious accommodation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show

that: (1) she held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job requirement; (2) she informed

* Because Plaintiff withdrew Count II of her Amended Complaint and the Court grants summary
judgment in favor of Defendant on that count, it only addresses Defendant’s arguments regarding
the remaining count, Count I.

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her employer about the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to comply with the
conflicting requirement. Smith v. City of Atlantic City, 138 F.4th 759, 774 (3d Cir. 2025) (citations
omitted). ““The burden then shifts to the employer to show that it either made a good faith effort to
accommodate the religious belief, or the accommodation would work an undue hardship upon the
employer.” Boodoo v. AMP Home Care LLC, No. 24-1056, 2025 WL 2840801, at *11 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 7, 2025) (citing Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2009)).

It is not disputed that Plaintiff was terminated solely for failing to comply with the vaccine
policy, nor is it disputed that Defendant was informed of the conflict between Plaintiff’s beliefs
and the policy. (SOF 4 23-26; DSOF {ff 23-26.) These undisputed facts satisfy the second and
third elements. See Boodoo, 2025 WL 2840801, at *11. This matter, accordingly, turns on whether
there is a genuine dispute that: (1) Plaintiffs anti-vaccination beliefs are sincerely held religious
beliefs;> and, if so, (2) whether accommodating those beliefs presented an undue hardship for
Defendant. Because it is a threshold issue, the Court first addresses whether Plaintiff’s
anti-vaccination beliefs are sincerely religious.

B. Whether Plaintiff’s Beliefs are Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to establish that her anti-vaccine beliefs that were the

subject of her exemption request are religious in nature. (Def.’s Moving Br. 35-39; Def.’s Reply

3 Plaintiff contends that Defendant is estopped from arguing that Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are
not genuine because Defendant did not challenge the “genuineness and sincerity of” Plaintiff’s
religious beliefs in its position statement to the EEOC, or in its answer. (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 11-12.)
However, there is no preclusive effect here based on the arguments raised by Defendant in the
EEOC charge because there was no final decision made and administrative decisions that are not
reviewed by a state or federal court “may not preclude .. . subsequent Title VII claim[s].” Zoney
v. Select Specialty Hosp., 142 F. Supp. 3d 494, 501 (S.D. Miss. 2015) (citations omitted).
Moreover, Defendant is not challenging the genuineness or sincerity of Plaintiff’s beliefs, but
whether Plaintiff has established that her beliefs were sincerely held religious beliefs pursuant to
Title VII as a matter of law under Third Circuit precedent. (See Def.’s Moving Br. 35-39.)

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Br. 10-12.) Defendant contends that the evidence establishes that Plaintiff’s beliefs are personal or
moral and principally involve concerns about the vaccine’s health effects. (Def.’s Moving Br.
37-38.) Defendant submits that Plaintiff failed to establish that her vaccine beliefs are
comprehensive in nature because she received vaccinations as an adult, including Tdap shots in
2008 and 2023. (/d. at 38.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that questions of fact preclude summary
judgment on the issue because her beliefs are rooted in her Christian faith, and her beliefs are
sincere. (PI.’s Opp’n Br. 12-20.)

“Whether a belief is sincerely held is a question of fact.” Gray v. Main Line Hosps., Inc.,
717 F. Supp. 3d 437, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (quoting Shields v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., 700 F. Supp.
3d 265, 270-71 (E.D. Pa. 2023)). “While no court should inquire into the validity or plausibility of
a plaintiff’s alleged beliefs, it is nonetheless incumbent upon the court to ensure that the alleged
beliefs are rooted in a plaintiff’s religion and are entitled to the broad protections guaranteed
thereunder.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Aliano v. Township of
Maplewood, No. 22-5598, 2023 WL 4398493, at *5 (D.N.J. July 7, 2023)). ““The notion that all
of life’s activities can be cloaked with religious significance’ cannot transform an otherwise secular
idea into a religious belief.” Maher v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr. Inc., No. 22-1551, 2024 WL 406494,
at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2024) (quoting Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025, 1035 (3d Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 2024 WL 4799870 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2848 (2025))). “[T]he
very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing [a plaintiff], . . . a blanket privilege to make
[her] own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.”
Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court’s focus is

therefore on whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff's beliefs are religious

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in nature or “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical.” Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.
of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 490 Gd Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

To that end, the Third Circuit has adopted a three-pronged approach for determining
whether beliefs are religious. See Kennedy v. PEI-Genesis, 719 F. Supp. 3d 412, 417 (E.D. Pa.
2024) (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032), aff’d, No. 24-1563, 2025 WL 602159 (3d Cir. Feb. 25,
2025). Specifically, it has instructed that a religion: (1) “addresses fundamental and ultimate
questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters;” (2) “is comprehensive in nature
[and]. . . consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching”; and (3) “often can be
recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.” Jd. (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at
1032).

As to “the first factor, beliefs address fundamental and ultimate questions when they
consider and attempt to come to terms with what could best be described as ultimate
questions- questions having to do with, among other things, life and death, right and wrong, good
and evil.” Blackwell v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 22-3360, 2023 WL 362392, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 23, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As to the second factor, beliefs
are comprehensive in nature when they “consist of something more than a number of isolated,
unconnected ideas.” Gray, 717 F. Supp. 3d at 446 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The beliefs, therefore, “cannot be generally confined to one question or one moral teaching” but
must have “a broader scope” and “lay[] claim to an ultimate and comprehensive truth.” Jd. at 447
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As to the third factor, courts must “look to any
formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions such as formal
services, ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at

propagation, observation of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the

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traditional religions.” Blackwell, 2023 WL 362392, at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s request for a religious exemption indicates that her request was premised
on her beliefs that: (1) “God created [her] with a well-functioning immune system that was not to
be tempered [sic] with”; (2) she is “a Christian who believes in the Holy Bible”; (3) her “belief
system is faith and spiritually based on the Holy Bible”; (4) she will “be held accountable to God
if [she] defile[s] [her] uniquely created temple”; (5) these are her “personal faith based, Holy Ghost
inspired beliefs[,]”; (6) her “relationship has no denominations, affiliations, etc.[;]” (7) her faith is
“all about [her] personal relationship with [her] Savior”; (8) her “religious belief[s] prevent[ her]
from receiving . . . ‘[a|ll other vaccines’”; and (9) that “from [her] spiritual perspective ‘Man’”
does not “have [the] right to mandate [her] to inject any substance into [her] body/temple that
would cause [her] to violate [her] belief system.” (See generally Exemption Request.)

Here, while Plaintiff has established that she is a Christian, her belief that she was “created
[] with a well-functioning immune system not to be t{aJmpered with” is more of an “isolated moral
teaching” or medical belief as opposed to a comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or
ultimate matters. (Exemption Request); Shields, 700 F. Supp. 3d at 272 (finding, on a motion to
dismiss, that a plaintiff was unable to show that her “natural immunity beliefs were religious in
nature” and that her “argument that God bestowed natural immunity upon her” was an “isolated
moral teaching” and “not a comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate
matters”).

Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff received Tdap vaccines in 2023 and 2008. (SOF
4 13; DSOF 4 13.) This further evidences that Plaintiff’s belief is not “comprehensive in nature”

but an “isolated, unconnected idea[]” in that Plaintiff was selective in deciding which vaccines she

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would and would not receive based on her belief that “God created [her] with a well-functioning
immune system that was not to be tempered [sic] with[.]” (Exemption Request); Gray, 717 F. Supp.
3d at 446; Cleckner v. 3M Co., No. 22-2055, 2025 WL 2524849, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 2, 2025)
(finding that plaintiff’s beliefs against altering her immune system were not comprehensive in
nature because they were only applicable to the COVID-19 vaccine); Ritter v. Lehigh Valley Health
Network, No. 22-4897, 2024 WL 643543, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2024) (finding, on a motion to
dismiss, that plaintiffs belief that, among other things, her body was a “temple of His Holy Spirit”
was “not a part of a Christian’s ‘comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate
matters,’” but was more of “an isolated moral teaching” (citations omitted)); Bartholomew v.
Washington, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
because, among other things, plaintiff previously received other vaccinations, and focused his
belief on his own natural immunity which did not establish “a bona fide religious belief against
receiving the C[OVID]-19 vaccine”); see Fallon, 877 F.3d at 492 (finding that plaintiffs belief
that he should not do harm to his body was a “general moral commandment”). Plaintiff’s view,

moreover, “is not manifested in any formal or external signs.” Ritter, 2024 WL 643543, at *5.

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Plaintiff, accordingly, cannot satisfy the second or third Africa factors. Id* The Court
therefore finds that there is no genuine dispute of fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s
anti-vaccination beliefs were sincerely held religious beliefs. The Court, consequently, finds that
Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie failure to accommodate claim pursuant to Title VII.°

IV. CONCLUSION

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable
inferences in her favor, the Court finds that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to
Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim under Title VII (Count I). For the foregoing reasons,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The Court will issue an order consistent

with this Memorandum Opinion.

feedipyl

¢
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: 4 /. / 2p. 2026

* Plaintiff argues that this Court in Alino, 2023 WL 4398493, and courts in Troutman v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., No. 22-395, 2024 WL 3635303 (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2024) and Glover
v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, No. 23-463, 2025 WL 1527494 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2025),
have ruled that “a plaintiffs connection of an anti-vaccination belief to a belief in the Holy Spirit
at the very least creates a question of fact.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 17-19.) What is undisputed and
distinguishable here, however, is the fact that Plaintiff received Tdap vaccines in 2023 and 2008.
(SOF 4 13; DSOF § 13.) Aliano, moreover, was decided on a motion to dismiss, and in all three
cited cases, at least some of the plaintiffs’ exemption requests indicated their objection to the
COVID-19 vaccination’s use of fetal stem cells based on their anti-abortion beliefs—which is not
at issue here. See Aliano, 2023 WL 4398493, at *7 (discussing one plaintiff’s belief that he could
not take the vaccine because of its “origins in abortion”); Troutman, 2024 WL 3635303, at *2
(detailing plaintiff’s opposition to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine on several grounds including
the vaccine’s use of “fetal cell lines derived from elective abortions”); Glover, 2025 WL 1527494,
at *5 (noting plaintiff’s explanation that the “use of aborted fetal cells during the [COVID-19]
vaccine’s development went against his religion”).

> Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie failure to accommodate
claim, it does not reach Defendant’s undue hardship arguments.

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