SUGG v. VIRTUSA et al

3:18-cv-08036Njd23 dic 2025

Testo completo

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LEO SUGG, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
VIRTUSA,
Defendant.
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: 	Civil Action No. 18-8036 (GC)(JTQ)
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:
: 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
: 	AND ORDER
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:
:
This decision addresses Defendant Virtusa’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Strike
the Reply Report of Plaintiff’s Statistical Expert David Lang, Ph.D. ECF No. 135. The
Court has fully reviewed the submissions of the parties and decides the motion
without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The underlying dispute arises out of a class action lawsuit in which Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant has engaged in and promoted racially discriminatory hiring,
staffing, and promotion practices favoring employees of South Asian descent. Plaintiff
seeks to certify a class of non-South Asian applicants, employees, and former
employees of Defendant who allegedly suffered from the discriminatory conduct and
practices. Plaintiff avers that the appropriate classes are: (1) all current and former
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non-South Asian employees of Virtusa who were not promoted; (2) all former non-
South Asian employees of Virtusa who were involuntarily terminated; and (3) all non-
South Asian individuals who applied for employment at Virtusa and were not hired.
Plaintiff retained David Lang, Ph.D. (“Dr. Lang”) to serve as his statistical
expert witness. ECF No. 139 (“Opp. Br.”) at 2. Dr. Lang’s initial report, which was
served on July 29, 2024, used data provided by Defendant as to employee race,
nationality, or both. Id. at 2-3. Based upon this data, Dr. Lang opined that: (1) 89.2%
of hired employees were of Asian descent; (2) white employees were significantly less
likely to receive a high appraisal score for promotion purposes; and (3) white
employee terminations were 17.7% involuntary compared to 8.1% of Asian employee
terminations. ECF No. 139-2 at 5-10. From these findings, Dr. Lang concluded that
“there is significant evidence that non-Asian employees are being discriminated
against at Virtusa in terms of hiring, employee ratings and promotions, and through
terminations.” Id. at 16.
Plaintiff Leo Sugg (“Decedent”) passed away on September 3, 2024. On
September 	18, 	2024, 	the 	matter 	was 	stayed. 	Thereafter 	on 	March 	21, 	2025,
Decedent’s wife, Gwynne Sugg, was substituted in as Plaintiff by way of Court Order.
ECF No. 129.
On February 20, 2025, Defendant deposed Dr. Lang. Opp. Br. at 2. At the
deposition, Defendant questioned Dr. Lang about Table 9 in his report, which
concerns involuntary terminations. ECF No. 139-3 at 127:24-128:21, 129:22-130:2.
Defendant’s counsel noted that the Table reflected only 11 involuntary terminations
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of white employees over a ten-year period. Id. Plaintiff alleges that after the
deposition, 	Dr. 	Lang 	recognized 	that 	there 	might 	have 	been 	an 	error 	in 	his
terminations analysis and thus Dr. Lang decided to revisit the data. Opp. Br. at 5.
Defendant retained Paul White, Ph.D. (“Dr. White”)—a Labor Economist—to
rebut Dr. Lang’s report and testimony. Defendant served Plaintiff with Dr. White’s
report on March 10, 2025. ECF No. 135 (“Mov. Br.”) at 2. And on May 5, 2025, Plaintiff
served Dr. Lang’s reply report. 	It is this report that is the subject of the instant
motion. Id.
Upon a closer look, Dr. Lang apparently discovered subsets of employee
populations (within Defendant’s data) that he left out of his report and analyses—a
mistake he chose to fix in his reply report. Opp. Br. at 5. In making his original
terminations analysis, Dr. Lang identified and studied 103 terminated (either
voluntarily or involuntarily) white employees. ECF No. 139-2 at 11. However, in his
reply report, Dr. Lang identified and studied 618 terminated white employees and
drew statistical conclusions based on this number. ECF No. 139-5 at 4-5, 16. 	With
respect to Dr. Lang’s analysis of employee promotion data, Dr. Lang originally used
an employee population of 1,964 individuals. No. 139-2 at 8. That sample size
ballooned in his reply report to a total of 6,056 individuals. ECF No. 139-5 at 11.
These two changes seemingly resulted in a substantial increase in the proposed
putative class sizes. See ECF No. 139-5 at 11, 16.
On May 15, 2025, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff pursuant to Local Civil
Rule 16.1 and 37.1, demanding that Plaintiff either withdraw Dr. Lang’s reply report
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or alternatively agree to a reasonable compromise that would (1) allow Defendant to
re-depose Dr. Lang on his new analyses, (2) produce Dr. Lang’s work papers in their
entirety, (3) permit Dr. White to submit a supplemental report responding to Dr.
Lang’s new findings and opinions, and (4) adjust the schedule for class certification
briefing to account for any additional, necessary discovery stemming from Dr. Lang’s
reply report. Mov. Br. at 4. Plaintiff agreed to the second and third requests but
refused the others. Id. This motion followed.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Strike Under Rule 26
Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(A), a party must disclose the identity of any witness
it may use at trial. If a party intends to offer expert testimony, the party is required
to disclose the expert and provide a written report for each expert, including “a
complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis for and
reasons for them.” Haskins v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138041,
at *5 (D.N.J. Sep. 26, 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)). Should a
scheduling order permit rebuttal or reply reports, a party may provide such testimony
only if the evidence is “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same
subject matter identified by another party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). Although
rebuttal and reply reports may cite to new evidence if the evidence is “offered to
directly contradict or rebut the opposing party’s expert . . .[,]” reports that discuss the
same subject matter without directly contradicting the contents of an adversary’s
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report “do not qualify as proper rebuttal.” Withrow v. Spears, 967 F. Supp. 2d 982,
1001 (D. Del. 2013).
Importantly, it is settled law that “rebuttal cannot be used to correct a party’s
case-in-chief.” Haskins, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138041, at *7. Put differently, if the
rebuttal or reply contain new opinions or information contradicting the initial report,
the report should be stricken. See generally Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530
(D.N.J. 2004); Reckitt Benckiser, Inc. v. Tris Pharma, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146631, at *9, *29 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2011) (affirming magistrate judge’s decision to
strike a supplemental report relying on and including substantially new data outside
of the scope of the expert’s original report). However, if the report contains “an
elaboration of and is consistent with” the opinions and issues discussed in the original
report, the rebuttal need not be stricken. Pritchard v. Dow Agro Scis., 263 F.R.D. 277,
284-85 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
B. Motion to Strike Under Rule 37
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “governs sanctions against a
party who fails to provide discovery as required by the discovery rules or a court
order.” Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 84 (D.N.J. 2006). Specifically, “[i]f
a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or
(e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on
a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or
is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). In addition to, or instead of, this sanction, “on
motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard[,]” a court may also “order
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payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure,”
“inform the jury of the party’s failure,” or impose other “appropriate sanctions,
including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)—(vi).” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c)(1)(A)-(C).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Dr. Lang’s reply report should be stricken because it is
neither a proper reply report nor a proper supplemental report under Rule 26(e). Mov.
Br. at 5-6. Defendant submits that Dr. Lang’s reply report contains significant
deviations from the original report. Id. Among other things, Dr. Lang’s reply report
relies upon several thousand new individuals and advances entirely new opinions and
statistical analyses from this population. Id. at 1, 6. Defendant further argues that
the report should be stricken under Rule 37(c) because the delayed disclosure of Dr.
Lang’s alleged mistake in population sets was neither justified nor harmless. Id. at
8-10.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the report is a proper reply report. Opp. Br.
at 17. Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Lang addressed numerous critiques asserted in
the rebuttal report and only changed the population sets after recognizing his earlier
mistake 	Id. 	at 	13. Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	Dr. 	Lang 	made no 	changes 	to 	his
methodology and “simply re-ran his prior analyses, using the corrected dataset[.]” Id.
at 7, 12. With respect to Rule 37, Plaintiff contends that because the reply report and
analyses are proper, Rule 37 sanctions are unavailable and inappropriate. Id. at 20.
A. Reply Report Under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii)
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Here, the Court sides with Defendant and finds that Dr. Lang’s report does not
constitute a proper reply. Nothing Plaintiff argues changes this conclusion.
Plaintiff tries to make much of the fact that Dr. Lang’s report addresses certain
of Dr. White’s criticisms. Though true, that alone does not render the report a proper
“reply,” nor does it accurately characterize the report, since less than a quarter of it
actually address Dr. White’s critiques. See ECF No. 139-5 at 4-7. 	And even those
sections frequently discuss, if not rely, on Dr. Lang’s “supplemental analyses.” Id. at
4-6.
The point of this new report is obvious: Dr. Lang and Plaintiff seek to establish
a larger potential class size for certification purposes. Plaintiff acknowledges that
without the reply report, the class sizes suggested in the initial report may be
inadequate for Rule 23 purposes. This is not the purpose of a reply report. Indeed, a
reply is not a “redo” and should not allow a party to press the reset button on analyses,
findings, and conclusions. See Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 550 (D.N.J.
2004)
Yet, that is precisely what Dr. Lang’s reply does here. Dr. Lang advances new
opinions and new analyses in this report, most significantly regarding the number of
white employees involuntarily terminated. ECF No. 139-5 at 16. But Dr. White’s
rebuttal does not address the number of terminations at all. See generally ECF No.
139-4. Accordingly, Dr. Lang’s supposed reply brief is improper. See Withrow, 967 F.
Supp. 2d at 1001 (finding that reply reports addressing issues not raised on rebuttal
to be improper). 	Consequently, the Court strikes it. 	See Haskins, 2013 U.S. Dist.
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LEXIS 138041, at *7.
B. Supplemental Report Under Rule 26(e)
Even assuming arguendo Dr. Lang’s reply report were proper under Rule 26(a)
(as set forth supra it is not), it would still need to be stricken under Rule 26(e).
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Lang supplemented his reply report to correct for a
mistake made in the population sets in his original report, pursuant to Rule 26(e).
Dr. Lang contends that the original population sets mistakenly relied on data
provided by Defendant later in discovery. Dr. Lang maintains that he believed, at the
time, that those data sets were cumulative, including data produced earlier in
discovery. Opp. Br. at 5. However, the data was not cumulative, which, according to
Plaintiff, caused subsets of employee populations left out of the original population
sets. Id. Plaintiff’s position on this issue is contrary to law.
“Rule 26(e) is not an avenue to correct failures of omission because the expert
did an inadequate or incomplete preparation, add new opinions, or deepen or
strengthen existing opinions.” In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig. (No.VI), F.R.D.
424, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Instead, courts
interpret Rule 26(e) to permit supplementation in instances where an expert “receives
newly produced information after submitting his expert report or when an expert
discovers numerical errors in his or her calculations.” Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha
v. Lotte Int'l Am. Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23654, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2019)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Rule 26(e) thus “creates a duty not a
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right.” Luke v. Family Care & Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 F. App’x 496, 500 (9th Cir.
2009).
What Dr. Lang attempted to do here is not a situation where an expert sought
to remedy a small mistake or miscalculation based on “newly produced information.”
Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23654, at *10 (emphasis
added). Plaintiff concedes as much in his briefing, when Plaintiff expresses concern
over Dr. Lang’s initial report and statistics, stating that they may be insufficient to
“establish[] Rule 23’s numerosity element when moving for class certification.” Opp.
Br. at 25. From this statement, it is evident that Plaintiff intended to rely on Dr.
Lang’s 	reply 	report 	to 	demonstrate 	this 	critical 	component 	to 	establish 	the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23. But it is axiomatic that a supplemental report
“cannot be used to correct a party’s case-in-chief.” Haskins, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138041, at *7. As such, Defendant cannot use Rule 26(e) to remedy the inadequacies
of Dr. Lang’s initial report. In short, because Dr. Lang’s reply report fails to qualify
as a supplemental report under Rule 26(e), it must be stricken.1
IV. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Having considered the papers submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78 and for the reasons set forth above;
IT IS on this 23rd day of December, 2025
1 The Court declines to address the Parties’ Rule 37 arguments because it has already
deemed the report to be an improper reply, which must be stricken.
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ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Reply Report of
Plaintiff’s Statistical Expert David Lang, Ph.D. (ECF No. 135) is GRANTED; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Reply Report of Plaintiff’s Statistical Expert David
Lang, Ph.D. is hereby stricken from the record; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is to terminate ECF No. 135.
s/ Justin T. Quinn
HON. JUSTIN T. QUINN
United States Magistrate Judge
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