2:26-cv-01470•KARCZ v. MEZOUAK et al
Testo completo
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL KARCZ,
No. 26-cv-1470 (MEF) (JSA)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
IMAD EL MEZOUAK et al.,
Defendants.
* * *
For the purposes of this brief Opinion, the Court largely
assumes familiarity with the procedural history and facts of
this case.
* * *
Some background based on the uncontested evidence.
A man! created a Facebook page. See Complaint for Injunctive
Relief, Damages, and Declaratory Judgment (“Complaint”) (ECF 1)
I 7.
In January 2026, certain people? “launched a coordinated attack”
and took over the page by “exploiting Meta’s support protocols.”
Id. @ 13.
The man tried to take back control of the page. See id. @ 15.
But that ultimately did not work. See id. @ 17.
* * *
1 Michael Karcz.
2 Imad El Mezouak, Naima El Khayati, Najia El Mezouak, and Samir
Ayach.
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT.
INFORMATION
GPO.
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In light of the above, the man (from here, “the Plaintiff”) sued
the people who took over the Facebook page (collectively, “the
Defendants”) .3
The Plaintiff’s papers included an application for a temporary
restraining order. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Ex Parte
Temporary Restraining Order (“Plaintiff’s Brief”) (ECF 1-2) at
1.
Around 60 minutes after the TRO application was filed, the Court
entered an administrative stay. See Temporary Restraining Order
(ECF 3); see also Feb. 19, 2026 Text Order (ECF 6).
The stay aimed to buy a small bit of time, so that the
Defendants could weigh in and the Court could evaluate things
after hearing from both sides. See generally Zheng v. Bondi,
2025 WL 2808542, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025).
But it was not clear that the Defendants had been properly
served. See Certification of Service (ECF 4) at @7 3-9. And
serving them, it seemed, might be difficult --- the Defendants
are said to be located outside of the United States. See
Complaint @ 6.
The Plaintiff then filed a motion for “alternative” service.
See Emergency Letter Motion for Authorization of Alternative
Service and Expedited Discovery (ECF 8) at l.
That motion was granted in relevant part by the United States
Magistrate Judge, see Feb. 23, 2026 Letter Order (ECF 10) at 6,
and the Plaintiff filed proof of service, indicating that he had
served the Defendants in the “alternative” manner approved by
the Magistrate Judge. See Certification of Service (ECF 11)
1.
Along the way, the Court (i) converted the Plaintiff’s TRO
application into a preliminary injunction application, see Mar.
4, 2026 Text Order (ECF 17); and (ii) set a response deadline
for the Defendants. See Feb. 24, 2026 Order (ECF 14).
The deadline came and went. No response. And the Defendants
have not appeared.
3. The Plaintiff has no lawyer. He is pro se.
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Against this backdrop, take up now the Plaintiff’s unopposed‘
application for a preliminary injunction.
* * *
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
Move through these four factors now.
* * *
Has the Plaintiff established that he is likely to succeed on
the merits? The Court’s conclusion: yes.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act*® by taking over his Facebook page.
See Complaint FI 19-21.
“To state a civil claim for a violation of the [Act], a
plaintiff must allege: 1) . . . loss; 2) caused by; 3) a
violation of one of the substantive provisions set forth in §
1030(a); and 4) conduct involving one of the factors in §
1030 (c) (4) (A) (1) (1) -(V).” Sealord Holdings, Inc. v. Radler,
2012 WL 707075, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012); accord Cassetica
Software, Inc. v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 2009 WL 1703015, at *3
(N.D. Ill. June 18, 2009); Mobile Mark, Inc. v. Pakosz, 2011 WL
3898032, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2011); Christie v. Nat’l
Inst. for Newman Stud., 2019 WL 1916204, at *4 & n.5 (D.N.J.
Apr. 30, 2019)
The Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the argument that each of
these four boxes has been checked.
To see why, walk through them one at a time.
* * *
Start with the first of the four Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
elements, loss.
4 For now, at least.
° 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.
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Under the Act, “loss” includes “the cost of responding to an
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (11).
The Plaintiff, “a professional Network Security Specialist,” has
put forth uncontested evidence that he spent 25 hours
investigating the Facebook page takeover. Complaint @ 21(a).°®
And the Plaintiff swears that “restor[ing] the system to its
pre-breach operational state” will require paid advertising
campaigns. Id. @{ 21(b).’
This shows that the Plaintiff is likely to establish that he
suffered a “loss” here. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv.
Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
“any economic losses [the] plaintiffs bore in securing or
remedying their systems in the wake of . . . alleged [Act]
violations” would “count towards” satisfying the “loss”
reguirement); Univ. Sports Publ’ns Co. v. Playmakers Media Co.,
725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that “the costs
of investigating security breaches constitute recoverable
‘losses’” under the Act) (citations omitted); Maximum Indep.
Brokerage, LLC v. Smith, 218 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636-37 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (concluding that the costs associated with “[a]ssessing
and repairing damage to computer[] files” were “‘compensable’ ”
losses under the Act); St. Johns Vein Ctr., Inc. v. StreamlineMD
LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1061 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (determining
that allegations of, among other things, “lost time and effort
needed to take subsequent remedial measures” and “expenses
[associated with] responding to the [d]efendants’ unauthorized
access and use” were sufficient to allege “loss” under the Act)
(cleaned up); NovelPoster v. Javitch Canfield Grp., 140 F. Supp.
3d 954, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that the costs
associated with restoring a website to its pre-takeover
6 The evidence cited in this Opinion is from the Plaintiff’s
complaint and the attachments to it. The Plaintiff “certif [ied]
under penalty of perjury” that the contents of the complaint are
“true and correct.” See Complaint at 16. So it can be relied
on here. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 320 n.2 (3d Cir.
2016) (treating statements “in verified complaints and other
court filings” that are “signed under penalty of perjury
as equivalent to statements in an affidavit”).
7 This, too, is not contested.
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condition and “conducting a damage assessment” --- these “fit
within the [Act’s] definition of ‘loss’”).
* * *
Move now to the third of the four Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
elements® --- whether the Plaintiff can likely establish “a
violation of one of the substantive provisions set forth in §
1030(a).” Sealord Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 707075, at *4.
Among other things, the referenced section of the Act, Section
1030(a) (5) (C), prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a protected
computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct
caus[ing] damage and loss.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (C).
Break Section 1030(a) (5) (C) down into its parts. And then take
the analysis in the following order. “[P]rotected computer.”
Then “access[] . . . without authorization.” Then
“[Ti]ntentional[]” conduct. And finally “damage and loss.”
Protected computer
The Facebook page at issue here is located on Meta’s servers.
See Complaint 7 20. Those are “protected computer[s].” See
Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Nguyen, 2023 WL 8686924, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2023) (so holding), report and recommendation
adopted, 2024 WL 6047147 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2024); Facebook,
Inc. v. Sluchevsky, 2020 WL 5823277, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28,
2020) (similar), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL
5816578 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020); see also Just Be Inc. v.
Brisendine, 2019 WL 2274990, at *2 n.2 (D. Or. May 3, 2019)
(“Instagram’s servers . . . are protected computers under the
8 The second element, causation, is plainly established here on
a likelihood-of-success basis. The Plaintiff must show that
“the losses [he] claim[s] were the reasonably foreseeable result
of the alleged [Act] violations, and that any costs” he has or
will incur are “reasonably necessary.” Glob. Pol’y Partners,
LLC v. Yessin, 686 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing
United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.
2000)). And the evidence described in the text, as to the
asserted costs of the investigation --- these were both
“reasonably foreseeable” and “reasonably necessary.” See
Animators at L., Inc. v. Cap. Legal Sols., LLC, 786 F. Supp. 2d
1114, 1121 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“an investigation is often required
to determine the cause and scope of a computer intrusion”).
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[Act]”) (citing Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d
1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2016)), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 2270592 (D. Or. May 28, 2019); cf. hiQ Labs,
Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 999 (9th Cir. 2019)
(holding that LinkedIn’s servers are “protected computer[s]”
under the Act), judgment vacated on other grounds, 141 S. Ct.
2752 (2021).
No Authorization
As to the next part of the Section 1030(a)(5)(C) analysis, the
Court concludes that the Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits of his claim that the Defendants “access[ed]” Meta’s
servers “without authorization.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (C).
Why? Because the Plaintiff’s unopposed-for-now evidence is that
the Defendants “launched a coordinated attack,” see Complaint 1
13 and took control of the Facebook page in question. See id.
Gi 17-18.
That clears the bar. See, e.g., United States v. Weigand, 2022
WL 5123035, at *11, *14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2022) (holding this
element satisfied when an individual “accessed . . . emails from
[a] Yahoo! email account without . . . permission”), aff’d, 2025
WL 1554931 (3d Cir. June 2, 2025); Delta Pilots Ass’n v. Melvin,
2018 WL 11602002, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2018) (concluding
that “a sophisticated hack of [a] website” qualified as
“access[ing] a protected computer without authorization”)
(cleaned up).
Intent
The next part of the Section 1030(a) (5) (C) analysis: is the
Plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that the
Defendants’ conduct was “[i]ntentional[]”?
Yes. Following the initial “attack,” see Complaint @{ 13, the
Plaintiff temporarily regained control of the Facebook page
several times. See id. § 15. But each time, the Defendants
regained access just “hours later.” See id. 7 16. Aftera
“Tug-of-War” lasting several days, see id. 9 15, the Plaintiff
permanently lost control. See id. @ 17.
None of this is contested. And persistent, purposive behavior
is enough to establish intentional action.
This is common sense. A “pattern of behavior” is generally
“sufficient to show intentional” conduct. Varrallo v. Hammond
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Inc., 94 F.3d 842, 849 (3d Cir. 1996). And the Plaintiff has
put such a pattern before the Court.
Damage and Loss
The last Section 1030(a) (5) (C) test: is the Plaintiff likely to
establish “damage and loss?” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (C).
T
Yes as to “loss,” for reasons already discussed above.
And yes as to “damage.” The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
defines “damage” as “any impairment to the . . . availability of
data, a program, a system, or information.” 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e) (8). And the undisputed evidence is that the Plaintiff
was definitively locked out of the Facebook page “[o]n or about
January 24, 2026.” Complaint 7 17. Since at least that date,
the “availability” of “a program” has been “impair[ed].” See,
e.g., GPMM, Inc. v. Tharp, 2021 WL 5416139, at *1, *7 (D. Neb.
Nov. 19, 2021) (holding that a plaintiff “sustained damage
within the meaning of the [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act]” in the
time it was locked out of digital account); United States v.
Grupe, 2018 WL 775358, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2018) (similar).
* * *
Where things stand.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiff must
establish, among other things, that he has a likelihood of
success on the merits.
To do that as to his federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim,
the Plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on each of the
four elements needed to make out the claim.
As set out above, he has done that as to elements one, two, and
three.
Now consider the fourth element.
Namely, does the evidence suggest that the Plaintiff will be
able to establish “conduct involving one of the factors in §
1030 (c) (4) (A) (1) (I) -(V)”? Sealord Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL
707075, at *4.
Yes.
Under § 1030(c) (4) (A) (1) (I), what is needed is “loss to 1 or
more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least
$5,000 in value.” And the Plaintiff has identified more than
7
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$5,000 losses that appear to be covered by the statute. His
uncontested evidence is that the investigative cost was $5,000 -
-- and the necessary paid advertising campaigns will cost
$6,300. See Complaint 7 21.
* * *
In sum: the Plaintiff has established that he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act claim.
* * *
To get a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiff must also clear
three more hurdles.
[1]
He must establish that “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
The Plaintiff has made that showing.
The undisputed evidence is that the Defendants are “actively
stripping the brand’s goodwill” by diverting the page’s traffic
elsewhere. Complaint ~ 18. They post “images that do not
appear to be original” at a rate of “approximately once per
hour,” id. {@ 18 --- and this is jeopardizing the page’s “digital
reputation.” See Plaintiff’s Brief at 5.
This satisfies the irreparable harm requirement. See S&R Corp.
v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control of
reputation . . . and loss of goodwill.”); Kos Pharms., Inc. v.
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Pappan
Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d
Cir. 1998) (same).
[2]
The Plaintiff must also establish that “the balance of equities
tips in his favor.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
For now, it is undisputed the Plaintiff created the Facebook
page. See Complaint @ 7. An injunction would protect the
page’s goodwill and reputation --- and ensure that the Plaintiff
can earn money from the content he posts on it. See id. (I 18,
21. The equities are on his side. The Defendants, who have not
appeared, cannot claim an entitlement to proceeding with their
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likely-unlawful behavior. And any difficulty to them of being
required to turn over control over the Facebook page is slight -
--- and, for now, immaterial. Per the evidence, the page is not
theirs.
[3]
Finally, the Plaintiff must establish “that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
It is. “The public has an interest in ensuring that computers
are not accessed without authorization.” See Facebook, Inc. v.
Power Ventures, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 765, 785 (N.D. Cal. 2017),
aff’d, 749 F. App’x 557 (9th Cir. 2019); accord Meta Platforms,
Inc. v. Ates, 2023 WL 4035611, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 4995717 (N.D. Cal.
June 27, 2023); Sluchevsky, 2020 WL 5823277, at *9, report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5816578 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2020); Nguyen, 2023 WL 8686924, at *11. That interest would be
vindicated by preventing the Defendants from further interfering
with the Plaintiff’s Facebook page.
* * *
In conclusion: based on his federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
claim, the Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction.?
A separate order follows. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; Beukema’s
Petroleum Co. v. Admiral Petroleum Co., 613 F.2d 626, 627 & n.1
(6th Cir. 1979); 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2785 (3d ed. 2025); cf. MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-
Busch Cos., LLC, 940 F.3d 922, 922-23 (7th Cir. 2019).
On this 5th day of March, 2026.
r
Michael E. Farbiarz, U.S.D.J.
9 Given this ruling, there is no need now to consider whether
the Plaintiff would also be entitled to an injunction based on
his other claims. See Complaint FJ 22-29.Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
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