Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:26-cv-00200Njd30 gen 2026

Testo completo

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HECTOR FRANCISCO PONCE GARCIA,
Civil Action No. 26-cv-00200
MEMORANDUM ORDER
January 30, 2026
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, et al.
Respondents.
SEMPER, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
(“Petition”) of Hector Francisco Ponce Garcia (“Petitioner”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
together with a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a proposed order to show
cause. (ECF Nos. 1—3.) For the reasons stated below, the Petition is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Petition was filed on January 10, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner alleged that his
detention was unlawful and sought immediate release or, in the alternative, an individualized bond
hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 13.)
On January 12, 2026, the Court issued a text order concluding that, under recent decisions
of this District interpreting the interaction between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226, Petitioner was
subject to detention under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). (ECF No. 5.) The Court ordered Respondents
to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge no later
than January 14, 2026, and directed Respondents to file notice of the outcome of that hearing
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within three days. (Id.) The Court further ordered that Petitioner not be removed from the United
States during the pendency of these proceedings. (Id.)
That same day, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion for a TRO and enjoined Respondents
from removing Petitioner from the District of New Jersey absent further order of the Court. (ECF
No. 7.) Counsel entered appearances for both Petitioner and Respondents shortly thereafter. (ECF
Nos. 6, 9, 12.)
Petitioner subsequently filed amended habeas submissions to correct and supplement the
original filing. (ECF Nos. 11, 15.) On January 16, 2026, Respondents filed a Response opposing
habeas relief, together with supporting exhibits, including a Form I-213 and documentation
relating to the reinstated removal order. (ECF No. 16.) Petitioner filed a Reply brief the following
day. (ECF No. 19.)
On January 20, 2026, Respondents submitted a status report to inform the Court that despite
the January 14, 2026 order (ECF No. 7), Petitioner was moved to a detention facility in Folkston,
Georgia. (ECF No. 20.) The status report further advised the Court of Petitioner’s scheduled return
to New Jersey on January 25, 2026. (Id.) Petitioner thereafter moved to seal certain exhibits to his
amended petition. (ECF No. 21.)
On January 27, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to compel Respondents to return him to the
District of New Jersey. (ECF No. 22.) Upon information and belief, Petitioner is now “detained
somewhere in Texas, allegedly on his way to being transferred again to Louisiana.” (Id. at 4.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
The threshold issue is which provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act governs
Petitioner’s current detention. The Court begins by acknowledging that Petitioner is subject to a
reinstated order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), and that his applications for withholding
of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture were denied by an Immigration
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Judge on June 30, 2025, with an administrative appeal currently pending before the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (ECF Nos. 1 ¶¶ 7–8; 16 at 1.) Under Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings following reinstatement of a prior removal order are
generally detained pursuant to § 1231 rather than § 1226. 594 U.S. 523, 538–541 (2021).
That general rule, however, does not resolve the narrower question presented here: whether
DHS may lawfully re-detain a noncitizen who, while subject to a reinstated removal order, was
previously granted release on bond by an Immigration Judge and remained at liberty for several
years without revocation of that bond or any finding of changed circumstances. (See ECF No. 16
at 1.) The record reflects that in May 2018, an Immigration Judge conducted an individualized
bond hearing, determined that Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community,
and ordered his release upon the posting of a $10,000 bond. (ECF No. 19 at 16.) DHS did not
appeal that bond determination, nor did it subsequently move to revoke or modify the bond. (Id.)
Respondents do not dispute the existence or validity of the 2018 bond order. (See ECF No.
16.) Instead, they argue that Petitioner’s January 1, 2026 arrest initiated a new period of mandatory
detention under § 1231(a), rendering the prior bond determination irrelevant. (Id. at 2.) The Court
is unpersuaded.
Nothing in § 1231(a) authorizes DHS to disregard an extant bond order entered by an
Immigration Judge absent revocation, modification, or materially changed circumstances. Nor
have Respondents identified any statutory or regulatory provision permitting ICE unilaterally to
nullify an IJ’s bond determination years after the fact, particularly where Petitioner complied with
the conditions of release and remained in the community without incident. (See ECF No. 16.) To
the contrary, long-standing principles of administrative regularity require the agency to adhere to
its own adjudicative decisions unless and until they are lawfully set aside. See United States ex rel.
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954).
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Moreover, the Court notes that Petitioner’s procedural posture has not materially changed
since his release in 2018. He remains in withholding-only proceedings, and his appeal of the June
30, 2025 denial of withholding relief is still pending before the BIA. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.) Respondents
do not contend that Petitioner violated the conditions of his bond, posed a new danger to the
community, or became a flight risk. (See ECF No. 16.) Under these circumstances, DHS’s decision
to re-arrest and detain 	Petitioner without a new individualized custody determination is
inconsistent with the statutory framework and basic principles of due process. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that Respondents have failed to establish lawful authority to detain Petitioner
without bond and that continued detention under these facts cannot be sustained under § 1231(a).
Finally, the Court addresses Petitioner’s transfer from New Jersey following the issuance
of the temporary restraining order. On January 12, 2026, the Court expressly ordered that Petitioner
not be removed from the District of New Jersey during the pendency of these proceedings. (ECF
Nos. 5, 7.) Respondents subsequently transferred Petitioner to ICE custody in Georgia, then Texas.
(ECF No. 19 at 8; ECF No. 22 at 4.) The effect of Petitioner’s transfer was to frustrate this Court’s
ability to supervise compliance with its orders and to provide effective habeas relief. Under § 2241,
the Court retains authority to order Respondents to return Petitioner to the District where
jurisdiction properly attached at the time of filing. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441
(2004). Accordingly,
IT IS on this 30th day of January 2026,
ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF
No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondents shall release Petitioner Hector Francisco Ponce Garcia from
immigration detention upon of the entry of this Order; and it is further
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ORDERED that Respondents shall immediately facilitate Petitioner’s return to the District
of New Jersey following his release; and it is further
ORDERED that for a period of fourteen (14) days following Petitioner’s release,
Respondents shall not re-arrest or re-detain Petitioner on the same factual and legal grounds
addressed in this Order to ensure full effectuation of the Court’s habeas judgment and to prevent
immediate circumvention of the relief granted; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jamel K. Semper
Hon. Jamel K. Semper
United States District Judge
Dated: January 30, 2026
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