KRASKA v. PIECIAK et al

2:25-cv-13610Njd8 gen 2026

Testo completo

UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TEODOZJA 	KRASKA,
No. 	25-cv-13610 	(MEF) (SDA)
Plaintiff,
OPINION and ORDER
v.
RICHARD 	PIECIAK 	et 	al.,
Defendants.
* 	* 	*
For 	the 	purposes 	of 	this 	brief 	Opinion 	and 	Order, 	the 	Court
largely 	assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	allegations 	and 	procedural
history 	of 	this 	case.
* 	* 	*
The 	relevant 	allegations 	for 	now 	are 	as 	follows.
A woman 1 	worked 	as 	a 	home 	health 	aide. 	See 	Complaint 	(ECF 	1)
i 	2. 	She 	was 	responsible 	for 	taking 	care 	of 	an 	elderly 	woman2
"who 	suffered 	from 	Alzheimer's 	disease." 	Id. 	i 	2, 	9.
She 	was 	not 	paid 	all 	the 	wages 	"to 	which 	she 	was 	entitled
under 	her 	employment 	agreement." 	Id. 	i 	32.
And 	although 	she 	often 	worked more 	than 	40 	hours 	a 	week, 	she 	was
not 	paid 	overtime. 	See 	id. 	i 	25.
1
2
Teodozja 	Kraska.
Zofia 	Pieciak.
* 	* 	*
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In 	light 	of 	the 	above, 	the 	aide 	(from 	here, 	"the 	Plaintiff")
sued 	the 	elderly woman 	and 	her 	two 	sons 3 	(collectively, 	"the
Defendants") .
The 	Defendants 	have 	moved 	to 	dismiss. 	See 	Defendants' 	Brief 	in
Support 	of 	a 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Under 	Rules 	12 (b) ( 1) 	and 	12 (b) ( 6)
of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	("Defendants' 	Brief")
(ECF 	3-1) 	at 	2.
The motion 	is 	denied.
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff 	first 	claims 	that 	the 	Defendants 	violated 	the
federal 	Fair 	Labor 	Standards 	Act 	("FLSA") 	--- 	mainly 	by 	failing
to 	pay 	her 	overtime 	when 	she 	worked 	40+ 	hours 	in 	a 	given 	week.
See 	Complaint~~ 	25, 	28, 	38, 	40-42, 	49-50.
The 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	this 	claim 	cannot 	work. 	See
Defendant's 	Brief 	at 	6-7. 	There 	is 	a 	relevant 	"exemption," 	they
say 	--- 	the 	FLSA 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	people 	who, 	like 	the
Plaintiff, 	"provide 	companionship 	services 	for 	individuals 	who
(because 	of 	age 	or 	infirmity) 	are 	unable 	to 	care 	for
themselves." 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	213(a) (15).
But 	the 	"application 	of 	an 	exemption 	under 	the 	Fair 	Labor
Standards 	Act," 	like 	the 	Defendants' 	cited 	companionship
exemption, 	"is 	a 	matter 	of 	affirmative 	defense 	on 	which 	the
employer 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	proof." 	Corning 	Glass 	Works 	v.
Brennan, 	417 	U.S. 	188, 	196-97 	(1974); 	see 	also 	Packard 	v.
Pittsburgh 	Transp. 	Co., 	418 	F.3d 	246, 	250 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005).
And 	"a 	plaintiff 	is 	not 	required 	to 	plead, 	in 	a 	complaint, 	facts
sufficient 	to 	overcome 	an 	affirmative 	defense." 	Schmidt 	v.
Skolas, 	770 	F.3d 	241, 	251 	(3d 	Cir. 	2014); 	see 	also 	In 	re 	Adams
Golf, 	Inc. 	Sec. 	Litig., 	381 	F.3d 	267, 	277 	(3d 	Cir. 	2004); 	United
States 	v. 	Page, 	116 	F.4th 	822, 	829 	(9th 	Cir. 	2024); 	Michael
Grecco 	Prods., 	Inc. 	v. 	RADesign, 	Inc., 	112 	F.4th 	144, 	154 	(2d
Cir. 	2024).
Accordingly, 	courts 	within 	the 	Third 	Circuit 	"have 	uniformly
held 	that 	unless 	it 	is 	apparent 	from 	the 	face 	of 	the 	complaint
that 	an 	FLSA 	exemption 	applies, 	granting 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss
based 	on 	an 	exemption 	affirmative 	defense 	is 	inappropriate."
Jackson 	v. 	Sweet 	Home 	Healthcare, 	2017 	WL 	1333001, 	at 	*2 	(E.D.
3 	Richard 	Pieciak 	and 	Edward 	Pieciak.
2
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Pa. 	Apr. 	5, 	2017); 	see 	also 	Marn 	v. 	ELS 	Educ. 	Servs., 	Inc., 	2020
WL 	7383193, 	at 	*4 	(D.N.J. 	Dec. 	15, 	2020); 	McKinney 	v. 	Union 	City
Med. 	Supply, 	Inc., 	2019 	WL 	3812451, 	at 	*3 	(D.N.J. 	Aug. 	14,
2019) .
Does 	the 	"face 	of 	the 	complaint," 	Jackson, 	2017 	WL 	1333001, 	at
*2, 	make 	it 	"apparent," 	id., 	that 	the 	FLSA 	companionship
exemption 	kicks 	in 	here?
No. 	A federal 	regulation 	indicates 	that 	the 	companionship
exception 	does 	not 	apply 	when 	the 	employee 	spends 	more 	than 	20
percent 	of 	her 	time 	engaged 	in 	"the 	provision 	of 	care," 	29
C.F.R. 	§ 	552.6(b). 	And 	here, 	the 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	would 	"wake 	up 	about 	6:00 	am 	to 	take 	care 	of 	[the
elderly 	woman] 	and 	would 	be 	on-call 	continuously 	until 	at 	least
10:00 	pm through midnight." 	Complaint 	1 	18. 	This 	is 	much more
than 	20 	percent 	of 	the 	Plaintiff's 	time.
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff 	also 	claims 	that 	the 	Defendants 	violated 	the 	New
Jersey 	State 	Wage 	and 	Hour 	Law, 	mainly by 	failing 	to 	pay 	her
overtime. 	See 	id. 	11 	25, 	28, 	54-55, 	60-61.
The 	Defendants' 	response: 	the 	claim must 	be 	dismissed 	because
the 	Plaintiff 	"only provide[d] 	services 	for 	less 	than 	25 	hours
per 	week" 	and 	was 	paid 	all 	of 	the 	"wages 	[to] 	which 	[she] 	was
entitled." 	Defendants' 	Brief 	at 	8.
But 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the 	complaint's 	allegations 	must 	be
taken 	as 	true, 	see 	McTernan 	v. 	City 	of 	York, 	564 	F.3d 	636, 	646
(3d 	Cir. 	2009), 	and 	per 	the 	complaint 	the 	Plaintiff 	worked 	"18
hours 	per 	day, 	7 	days 	per 	week." 	Complaint 	1 	22; 	see 	id. 	1 	25
(noting 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	"regularly work[ed] 	in 	excess 	of 	40
hours 	per 	week); 	id. 	1 	55 	(similar); 	id. 	1 	67 	(similar).
And 	also 	per 	the 	complaint, 	"[the] 	Plaintiff 	was 	not 	paid 	for
all 	hours 	worked." 	Id. 	1 	27.
A "movant 	cannot 	prevail 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	by 	asserting
that 	the 	true 	facts 	are 	not 	as 	alleged 	in 	the 	[c]omplaint."
Meds. 	Co. 	v. 	Eagle 	Pharms, 	Inc., 	2016 	WL 	4418230, 	at 	*1 	(D.N.J.
Aug. 	17, 	2016); 	see 	also 	Acevedo 	v. 	Monsignor 	Donovan 	High 	Sch.,
420 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	337, 	342 	(D.N.J. 	2006) 	(similar); 	Zas 	v. 	Canada
Dry 	Bottling 	Co. 	of 	New 	York, 	L.P., 	2014 	WL 	3396486, 	at 	*1
(D.N.J. 	July 	9, 	2014) 	(similar); 	Su 	v. 	Li, 	2011 	WL 	3329882, 	at
*5 	(D.N.J. 	Aug. 	1, 	2011) 	(similar).
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But 	that 	is 	what 	the 	Defendants 	are 	attempting 	to 	do 	here.
* 	* 	*
Same 	problem 	as 	to 	the 	Plaintiff's 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim.
The 	Defendants 	say 	that 	claim 	cannot 	work 	as 	to 	the 	elderly
woman's 	two 	sons, 	because 	"[at] 	all 	relevant 	times, 	[the]
Plaintiff 	and 	[the 	elderly 	woman], 	alone, 	had 	a 	contract."
Defendants' 	Brief 	at 	5. 	But 	that 	is 	not 	what 	the 	complaint
alleges. 	See 	id. 	err 	30 	(claiming 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	"entered
into 	a 	contract 	with 	[the] 	Defendants 	to 	work 	as 	[a]
caretaker/health 	aide 	in 	exchange 	for 	hourly 	wages") 	(emphasis
added).
Similarly, 	the 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	there 	can 	be 	no 	breach 	of
any 	contract 	because 	they 	complied 	with 	it. 	"It 	is 	not
disputed," 	they 	argue, 	"that 	[the] 	Plaintiff 	set 	[an] 	$840.00
per 	week 	salary" 	and 	that 	she, 	in 	fact, 	"received 	$840.00 	every
week 	as 	per 	the 	Agreement." 	Defendant's 	Brief 	at 	5.
But 	the 	assertion 	that 	the 	contract 	called 	for 	a 	weekly 	$840
payment 	is 	contained 	only 	in 	a 	legal 	brief, 	so 	it 	is 	out 	of
bounds 	here. 	See 	Pension 	Benefit 	Guar. 	Corp. 	v. 	White 	Consol.
Indus., 	Inc., 	998 	F.2d 	1192, 	1196 	(3d 	Cir. 	1993).
And 	in 	any 	event, 	the 	complaint, 	whose 	allegations 	must 	be 	taken
as 	true 	for 	now, 	does 	not 	allege 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	received
what 	was 	due
See 	id. 	err 	32
refus[ed] 	to
to 	her 	under 	the 	contract. 	Quite 	the 	opposite.
(alleging 	that 	the 	Defendant-sons 	"fail[ed] 	or
pay 	[the] 	Plaintiff 	all 	of 	the 	wages 	to 	which 	she
was 	entitled 	under 	her 	employment 	agreement")
* 	* 	*
Finally, 	the 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's 	unjust
enrichment 	claim 	(and 	the 	quantum meruit 	claim, 	too) 	must 	be
dismissed 	because 	those 	remedies 	are 	available 	"only when 	there
is 	not 	a 	contract 	at 	all." 	Defendants' 	Brief 	at 	6.
But 	the 	law 	is 	more 	specific 	than 	that: 	"an 	unjust 	enrichment
claim 	cannot 	work 	when 	it 	simply 	duplicates 	the 	contentions 	that
are 	pressed 	under 	a 	claim 	for 	breach 	of 	a 	written 	contract."
18W Holdings, 	Inc. 	v. 	Sing 	for 	Serv., 	LLC, 	763 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	651,
663 	(D.N.J. 	2025) 	(emphasis 	added).
Here, 	the 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	she 	"was 	short 	paid," 	Complaint
err 24, 	because 	the 	Defendants 	did 	not 	pay 	her 	the 	required
4
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overtime. 	See 	id. 	And 	this 	"short 	pa[yment]," 	id., 	is 	at 	the
heart 	of 	her 	unjust 	enrichment/quantum meruit 	claims.
Does 	the 	Plaintiff's 	demand 	for 	additional 	payment 	just
"duplicate[]," 	18W Holdings, 	763 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	663, 	what 	she
was 	supposed 	to 	get 	anyway 	under 	the 	contract 	that 	was
assertedly 	breached? 	Maybe. 	But 	the 	Defendants 4 	do 	not 	try 	to
explain 	why 	that 	might 	be 	the 	case 	--- 	and 	therefore 	have 	not
made 	any 	argument 	as 	to 	why 	there 	is 	remedial 	"duplicat[ion]"
here, 	between 	the 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim on 	the 	one 	hand 	and
the 	unjust 	enrichment/quantum meruit 	claims 	on 	the 	other.
* 	* 	*
The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	at 	ECF 	3 	is 	denied.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	7th 	day 	of 	January, 	2026, 	~(fc'ORDERED.
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
4 	Who 	have 	the 	burden. 	See 	Hedges 	v. 	United 	States, 	404 	F.3d
744, 	750 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005)
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