FLAGSTAR BANK, N.A. v. NOWAK et al

2:25-cv-08611Njd27 feb 2026

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FLAGSTAR BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff,
v.
BARBARA NOWAK, ARTUR NOWAK,
and NICOLE NOWAK,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-8611
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Defendants Barbara Nowak, Artur
Nowak, and Nicole Nowak’s (“Defendants”) “Motion to Reassign,” see ECF No. 17;
and it appearing that Plaintiff Flagstar Bank N.A. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against
Defendants on April 23, 2023 asserting breach of contract and violations of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, see ECF No. 1.4, Compl., at ¶¶ 53–83; see also ECF No. 5.1, ¶ 19
(alleging, in an amended complaint, the same counts plus fraud-based claims);
and it appearing that Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on June 6, 2025 purportedly
based on federal question jurisdiction, see ECF No. 1;
and it appearing that Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand principally contending removal
was untimely, see ECF No. 5;
and it appearing that, on June 30, 2025, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand was referred to the
assigned Magistrate Judge, see D.E. dated June 30, 2025;
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge issued a Letter Order setting an initial scheduling
conference for August 4, 2025, see ECF No. 3;
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and it appearing that Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and objected to the
Magistrate Judge’s referral due to a lack of consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), see ECF No. 6, at 7;
and it appearing that Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief in support of Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand, in which Plaintiff took “no position” on Defendants’ objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
referral, see ECF No. 9, at 5;
and it appearing that, on July 7, 2025, Plaintiff requested a short adjournment of the August
4, 2025 initial scheduling conference, see ECF No. 7;
and it appearing that Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s request, see ECF No. 8;
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge issued a Text Order on July 11, 2025 granting
Plaintiff’s adjournment request and rescheduling the initial scheduling conference for September
26, 2025, see ECF No. 10;
and it appearing that Defendants thereafter filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
order granting Plaintiff’s adjournment request, requested this Court set aside the extended
adjournment and reinstate the initial scheduling conference date, and argued the order was “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law within the meaning of Rule 72(a),” see ECF No. 12, at 3;
and it appearing that Defendants correspondingly submitted a “Motion for Relief Under
Due Process & Equal Protection” seeking non-substantive relief related to how discovery was
handled based on procedural Due Process concerns, see ECF No. 13;
and it appearing that, on July 15, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued (1) an order denying
Defendants’ objection under Rule 72(a) to the Magistrate Judge’s order granting Plaintiff’s
adjournment request, see ECF No. 14; and (2) an order denying Defendants’ “Motion for Relief
Under Due Process & Equal Protection,” see ECF No. 15;
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and it appearing that Defendants filed an “Express Objection to [The] Magistrate [Judge’s]
Jurisdiction Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Relief Under Due Process & Equal Protection,” in
which Defendants reiterated they “[did] not provided consent, express or implied, for a magistrate
judge to preside over any portion of this case,” including adjudicating Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand, granting Plaintiff’s adjournment request, and denying Defendants’ “Motion for Relief
Under Due Process & Equal Protection,” see ECF No. 16, at 3;
and it appearing that, as a result of the Magistrate Judge’s orders (ECF Nos. 14–15),
Defendants filed a “Motion to Reassign” seeking, in relevant part, “immediate reassignment of
ECF Nos. 14 and 15, which were erroneously ruled upon by [the] Magistrate Judge . . . despite the
filing of a jurisdictional objection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a),” see ECF No. 17, at 1;
and it appearing that Defendants’ “Motion to Reassign” was referred to the District Judge
rather than the Magistrate Judge, see D.E. dated Sept. 8, 2025;
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge issued a Text Order on July 24, 2025 clarifying
that, while trial or final judgment requires party consent, a Magistrate Judge retains independent
authority over scheduling and general case management, such as scheduling and/or adjourning
initial scheduling conferences, see ECF No. 18 (citing Local Civil Rule 16.1 (outlining the role of
magistrate judges in this district));
and it appearing that, on August 1, 2025, Defendants filed a “Constitutional Objection to
[The] Magistrate Judge’s Jurisdiction and Demand For Article III Adjudication of All Matters,”
effectively reiterating Defendants’ objection to the Magistrate Judge’s authority to adjudicate
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, grant Plaintiff’s adjournment request, and deny Defendants’
“Motion for Relief Under Due Process & Equal Protection,” see ECF No. 19;
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and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge issued at Letter Order on September 9, 2025,
holding, in pertinent part, that the case remains pending exclusively in federal court, see ECF No.
25;
and it appearing that, on September 12, 2025, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s
request for the initial scheduling conference on September 26, 2025 to be adjourned pending
resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, see ECF Nos. 26, 27;
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) to this Court recommending Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand be granted and directing
Defendants to file any objections to same by January 5, 2026, see ECF No. 30;
and it appearing that, while a party may refuse to consent to a magistrate judge’s
jurisdiction for certain types of proceedings, it cannot prevent a magistrate judge from being
involved in the case entirely, and the level of consent required depends on the nature of the referral,
see Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 438, n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (clarifying that
the nature of the decision (i.e., dispositive vs. non-dispositive) is what determines the authority of
a magistrate judge and the level of party consent required);
and it appearing that a district judge may refer non-dispositive pre-trial matters to a
magistrate judge without the consent of the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (emphasizing a
district court judge “may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pre-trial matter
pending before the court [subject to certain exceptions not relevant here]”); see also L. Civ. R.
72.1(a)(1) (authorizing magistrate judges to perform “all judicial duties assigned by the Court,”
including “non-dispositive motions”); In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (“in
general, a magistrate judge, without the consent of the parties, has the power to enter orders which
do not dispose of the case”);
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and it appearing that, pursuant to Rule 72(a), when a “pre-trial matter not dispositive of a
party’s claim or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide,” the magistrate judge
must “promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order
stating the decision,” see Fed R. Civ. P. 72(a);
and it appearing that, in such a case, the assigned Article III district judge must “consider
timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is
contrary to law,” see id. (emphasis added); see also 28 US.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (“a judge may
designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pre-trial matter pending before the court”
and “[a] judge of the court may reconsider any pre-trial matter . . . where it has been shown that
the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law”) (emphasis added); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating same);
and it appearing that the “clearly erroneous” standard has been interpreted to mean that “a
reviewing court can upset a finding of fact, even when supported by some evidence, but only if
the court has ‘the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,’” see Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948));
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge’s non-dispositive adjournment order, see ECF
No. 14, was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, see Rule 72(a); see also 28 US.C. §
636(b)(1)(A);
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge’s non-dispositive order denying Defendants’
“Motion for Relief Under Due Process & Equal Protection,” see ECF No. 15, was neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law; see id.;
and it appearing that district judge may refer dispositive pre-trial matters to a magistrate
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judge without the consent of the parties, provided that the magistrate judge solely issues a R&R
subject to the district judge’s review and approval, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (emphasizing a
district court judge “may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court”); see also L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(2)
(authorizing magistrate judges to perform “all judicial duties assigned by the Court,” including
submitting “proposed findings of fact and recommendations” on “dispositive motions”);
and it appearing that, while a party cannot prevent a magistrate judge from hearing such
issues or making a R&R, the party still has the right to file objections to the R&R, and the district
judge must then conduct a de novo review before making a final decision, see 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C); see also L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2) (stating same); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (stating same);
and it appearing that, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the R&R,
any party may serve and file written objections to the R&R; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also
L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2) (stating same); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (stating same);
and it appearing that, a judge of the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge,” and “receive further
evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions,” see L. Civ. R.
72.1(c)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (stating same);
and it appearing that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, see ECF No. 5, is dispositive, see
Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 146 (“[A]n order of remand is no less dispositive than a dismissal order of
a federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where a parallel proceeding is pending in the
state court”);
and it appearing that a district judge may properly assign a motion to remand to a magistrate
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judge, provided the magistrate judge issues a R&R rather than a final order, see e.g., Uddin v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 13-6504, 2014 WL 316988, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014) (district judge
referred a motion to remand to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), who issued
an R&R, and the district judge then reviewed and adopted it); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B);
L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(2);
and it appearing that the Magistrate Judge issued a R&R in this matter recommending that
the District Judge grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, see ECF No. 30;
and it appearing that Defendants have not issued any objections (timely or otherwise) to
the Magistrate Judge’s R&R;
and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this 27th day of February, 2026,
ORDERED that Defendants’ “Motion to Reassign,” ECF No. 17, is DENIED; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s non-dispositive adjournment order, ECF No. 14,
was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law; and it is further
ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s non-dispositive order denying Defendants’
“Motion for Relief Under Due Process & Equal Protection,” ECF No. 15, was neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law;
ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, ECF No. 30, is hereby ADOPTED as the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiffs via
verified mail.
s/ Madeline Cox Arleo
MADELINE COX ARLEO
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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