Eskinazi v. Corporate Subscription Management Services, LLC et al

2:25-cv-04879Njd17 feb 2026

Testo completo

1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LEIANNE ESKINAZI,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORPORATE SUBSCRIPTION
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-04879 (BRM) (JRA)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are Defendants Corporate Subscription Management Services, LLC, d/b/a
Couranto (“Couranto”) and Julie Auslander’s (“Auslander”) (together, “Defendants”) Motion to
Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF No. 36) Plaintiff Leianne Eskinazi’s (“Eskinazi”) Amended Complaint1
(ECF No. 26) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Eskinazi filed an Opposition on November 3, 2025 (ECF
No. 40), and Defendants filed a Reply on November 11, 2025 (ECF No. 41).
Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in connection with the Motion and
having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Rule 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and
1 Both Eskinazi and Defendants refer to both Eskinazi’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) and her first
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26). (See, e.g., ECF No. 36-1 at 15; ECF No. 40 at 9.) The Court
reads references to the Complaint to mean Eskinazi’s Amended Complaint, which supersedes the
original Complaint. W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165,
171 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[An amended complaint] supersedes the original and renders it of no legal
effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.” (internal
quotation and citation omitted)).
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for good cause having been shown, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
For purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Amended
Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Eskinazi. See Phillips v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court also considers any “document
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
A. Factual Background
Eskinazi spent over twenty years “doing [human resources (“HR”)] work” before joining
Couranto, a company that “streamlines access across licensed content, research, market data,
subscriptions, and contracts of all types” to “300,000 global users.” (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 11–12.) Prior
to joining Couranto, she amassed experience with software that generates monthly financial
statements, as well as the migration of various accounting and payroll systems. (Id. ¶ 13.) She had
also become familiar with an “ADP time reporting software” and benefit tracking software. (Id.)
Additionally, Eskinazi helped with the opening of a new warehouse facility. (Id.) Because of this
background and experience, Auslander, the President of Couranto, approached Eskinazi for the
role of Director of Finance and Human Resources. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
In her HR role at Couranto, she worked “on payroll, [Couranto’s] compliance and . . .
policy manual, health insurance renewals, time and attendance tracking, employee performance
reviews, [the] employee incentive program, and [the] employee wellness program, among other
things.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Her finance related responsibilities included reviewing the American Express
credit card balance, bank accounts, weekly production for publisher payments, international
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invoices, mail, operating expenses, commercial insurance, processing the weekly check run for
publisher payments, and processing the biweekly payroll. (Id. ¶ 14.)
According to Eskinazi, in 2014, she became partners with Auslander, Rifkin, and Ken
Redler (“Redler”). (ECF No. 26 ¶ 16.) 	Auslander sent Eskinazi an email, outlining an earlier
discussion between Auslander, David Rifkin (“Rifkin”), and Eskinazi on March 24, 2014. (ECF
No. 26-2 at 21; id. ¶ 15.) The email reads, in relevant part, as follows:
1. 	You would receive 3% of the company’s stock. This would vest
as long as you remain with the company for a minimum of five
years or unless and until the company or any portion of the
company is sold, in which case you would vest immediately.
2. 	You would have the title of Vice President / Accounting and HR,
and you would be part of the Senior Management Team
(currently Julie, David and Ken, and now four of us with you).
You would participate in all meetings of the Senior Management
Team.
3. 	As part of our commitment towards your personal development
we will direct Doug to work with you to begin to: [a]ssume some
of his responsibilities[,] [i]mprove your skills in communicating
financial results[,] [and] [e]nable you to provide strategic
financial direction for the Company[.]
4. 	Assuming you would like to do so, you will be asked to head up
a concerted effort to add at least one person to our Technology
Group staff. David will host and lead a discussion with Ken that
will assure Ken’s compliance in this endeavor.
5. 	As a partner, the company will pay your health insurance as we
do for all the partners; currently this is 100% of our health
insurance costs.
6. 	As a partner, the company will pay for your car lease up to a
maximum of $400 per month.
7. 	As a partner, the company will pay for gasoline up to $50 per
month.
8. 	As a partner, the company will pay for your home internet
service.
9. 	As a partner, the company will pay for your cell phone service
up to $100 per month.
10. As a partner, the company will provide you with use of a
timeshare for one week every year.
(ECF No. 36-2 at 21.)
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As a partner, Eskinazi “received health insurance, a car, gas, internet, and cell payments.”
(ECF No. 26 ¶ 16.) She also had use of a timeshare. (Id.) At some point, she assumed the
responsibilities of two “outside” chief financial officers. (Id.) However, Eskinazi “was consistently
excluded from meetings and treated differentially in compensation than her male, younger, and/or
perceived to be healthier partners.”2 (Id.)
In June 2016, Eskinazi underwent triple arthrodesis surgery and took time off to recuperate
but “was pressured to return to work.” (Id. ¶ 17.) During her medical leave, Auslander and Doug
Wilder (“Wilder”), the Chief Financial Officer at the time, would visit her in person, and the three
of them would do work. (Id.)
At Couranto, Eskinazi trained Chris Verga (“Verga”), Shamim Arman (“Arman”), Michael
Ruber (“Ruber”), and Dawn Lewis (“Lewis”), the four senior employees in Finance and HR, who
ultimately “received higher title[s] and pay than” Eskinazi. (Id. ¶ 18.) Despite their positions and
compensation, a number of these senior employees struggled with their responsibilities. (Id. ¶ 19.)
For instance, in December 2020, Arman “could not implement Bill.com.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Although
Eskinazi came up with the solution, it was Ruber who received credit from July 2021 to July 2022.
(Id.) Eventually, “Bill.com was the full responsibility of” Eskinazi’s again. (Id.) In July 2022,
Lewis was “supposed to process all payments under $10,000 but then it was increased to over
$25,000 as she needed [Eskinazi’s] help to” process all payments “under $25,000.” (Id.)
Nonetheless, Lewis was better compensated than Eskinazi. (Id.) Additionally, although Amparo
Guerrero (“Guerrero”) was responsible for the “international payments B stream,” Eskinazi had to
2 Based on the Amended Complaint, it is unclear whether Eskinazi suffered from any disability
during 2014. Indeed, the first indication of any ailment is June 2016 when Eskinazi had surgery to
fuse her right ankle and for her osteoarthritis. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 17.)
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handle that work.3 (Id.) So, while Eskinazi was experiencing “health conditions,” she had to juggle
“Bill.com, voiding returned checks, and training” a new employee. (Id.) These responsibilities led
her to spend an extra two to three hours working each day. (Id.) In December 2022, because of the
extra time she had to spend at work and her “growing health concerns,” she stepped back from
working at Certify My Company, another one of Auslander’s companies. (Id. ¶ 20.)
In March 2023, Eskinazi’s mental and physical pain greatly increased. (Id.) She needed
triple right ankle surgery and fusion pins and to work from home. (Id.) Eskinazi emailed Auslander
and Lewis on June 26, 2023, asking to go to the office two days a week “due to the problems with
her foot and her second-floor condo walk up.” (Id. ¶ 21.) During this time, she had to “run checks
and mail” on Tuesdays and perform bank deposits on Thursdays. (Id.)
On July 1, 2023, Eskinazi was asked to fill out an ADA form,4 which she did, saying she
needed remote work. (Id. ¶ 22.) Indeed, “[m]any [Couranto] employees work remotely, even in
customer service and IT.” (Id. ¶ 23.) The following day, unable to walk due to the pain in her ankle
and groin, Eskinazi went to the emergency room. (Id. ¶ 22) She was hospitalized for three days
and was sent to rehab for six weeks. (Id.) Despite her limping, Eskinazi spent two of the six weeks
working with the assistance of a cane because she “kn[e]w[] [Couranto] [would] not like to give
her full time off to recover.” (Id.) Couranto required her to be in the office on July 13, 2023. (Id.)
Eskinazi pointed out there were other employees who lived close by and who could “help
her with checks, mail[,] and deposits[,] . . . but [Couranto] refused to provide this accommodation.”
(Id.) Instead, Couranto informed Eskinazi she had to work fifteen to twenty hours for the time
3 The Amended Complaint does not include information about Guerrero’s age or whether she is
disabled.
4 Although Eskinazi does not indicate what an ADA form is, the Court assumes she is referring to
an Americans with Disabilities Act form.
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being, working “only on Amex reconciliation and bank reconciliations.” (Id. ¶ 23.) However,
Eskinazi would lose the car provided by Couranto and “other benefits[,] which . . . m[ade] it
completely impossible financially for her to work[.]” (Id.) Eskinazi noted she would “be better off
on short term disability not working.” (Id.) Couranto informed Eskinazi “it could not hold the job
open for a [six-]month leave.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Still, Eskinazi took a leave of absence. (Id.)
By September 9, 2023, Eskinazi was admitted back to the hospital and had hip replacement
surgery two days later. (Id. ¶ 25.) She was discharged on September 13, 2023. (Id.) From
September 26, 2023, to October 17, 2023, she was at physical therapy three times a week. (Id.) On
October 27, 2023, she was cleared to return to work at the beginning of December 2023. (Id.)
Eskinazi was ultimately “fired on November 7, 2023” at the age of sixty-four. (Id.)
B. Procedural History
Eskinazi filed the Complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (“SDNY”), initiating this action on February 18, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants
waived service of a summons of this action on March 3, 2025. (ECF No. 9.) On April 28, 2025,
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) On May 7, 2025, Eskinazi filed a letter motion
seeking an extension of time to file a response to Eskinazi’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12), which
the court granted (ECF No. 13). On May 20, 2025, the parties stipulated this action could have
been brought in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in the Newark
Vicinage (“DNJ”) and asked the court to transfer the case. (ECF No. 14.) The next day, the court
ordered the case transferred from SDNY to DNJ.5 (ECF No. 15.)
5 On May 22, 2025, the case was assigned to the Hon. Leo M. Gordon, Judge of the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation, and the Hon. Jose R. Almonte, U.S.M.J. The
Hon. Renee Marie Bumb, U.S.D.J., reassigned the case to the undersigned for all further
proceedings on July 15, 2025. (ECF No. 23.)
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Eskinazi filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants on July 20, 2025. (ECF No. 26.)
On August 19, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s judicial preferences, Defendants filed a letter
requesting a pre-motion conference, previewing their arguments for dismissing the Amended
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 28.) Eskinazi filed a response to Defendants’ pre-
motion letter on September 9, 2025. (ECF No. 31.) Having reviewed the letters, the Court
determined a pre-motion conference would not be beneficial and ordered the parties to proceed
with motion practice. (ECF No. 32.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 26, 2025. (ECF No. 36.) Eskinazi filed
an Opposition on November 3, 2025. (ECF No. 40.) Defendants filed a Reply on November 11,
2025. (ECF No. 41.)
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court is “required to
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged
in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party].” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. “[A] complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . .” Id.
at 231 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (alterations in original). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, assuming
factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This
“plausibility standard” requires the complaint allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 	accusation” 	must 	be 	pled; 	it 	must 	include 	“factual
enhancements” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of
action. Id. (citations omitted). In assessing plausibility, the Court may not consider any “[f]actual
claims and assertions raised by a defendant.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 345 (3d Cir.
2022).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Indeed,
after Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or “bare-bones” allegations will no longer survive a motion
to dismiss: “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. This
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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alleged.” Id. at 678. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal emphasizes a plaintiff must show the
allegations of his or her complaints are plausible. See id. at 670.
While the Court generally may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the
complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held “a court
may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss
[to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56].” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184
F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any “document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426
(quoting Shaw v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)). However, “[w]hen the
truth of facts in an ‘integral’ document are contested by the well-pleaded facts of a complaint, the
facts in the complaint must prevail.” Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th at 342.
III. 	DECISION
A. Breach of Contract
Defendants argue that Eskinazi has failed to state a breach of contract claim because she
cannot show the existence of a contract. (ECF No. 36-1 at 9–10.) According to Defendants,
Eskinazi’s breach of contract claim is based on the March 2014 email between Eskinazi and
Auslander,6 which Defendants contend is merely an offer to discuss a partnership and not a
“definitive offer capable of acceptance.” (Id. at 10.) Furthermore, Defendants point out Eskinazi
has failed to “allege that a contract was written up or executed, that she provided any consideration
6 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts generally focus on the facts as alleged in the
complaint. However, courts may consider documents integral to the complaint. In re Rockefeller
Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). The email in question is integral to
Eskinazi’s Amended Complaint as it relies heavily upon the email’s terms and effect. Id. The email
includes the following language: “Please review this outline as a starting point of the synopsis of
our conversation.” (ECF No. 36-2 at 21.)
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for the creation of [the] contract, or even any terms of [the] contract.” (Id.) Indeed, Defendants
further contend Eskinazi has not supplied factual allegations that “her termination breached any
provision” of the alleged contract. (Id.)
According to Eskinazi, there was a valid contract between the parties, which Defendants
supposedly breached. (ECF No. 40 at 11 (“[T]here was . . . offer, acceptance, reliance, and
performance on both sides.”).) Relying on Castle Couture, LLC v. Azaria Bridal LLC, Eskinazi
argues there was a manifestation of agreement to the content of the alleged email offer because (1)
there was a “meeting of the minds to the terms of [the alleged] contract,” (2) Eskinazi “‘agreed’ to
the terms,” and (3) Defendants failed to “object for months.” (Id. at 10 (quoting Civ. A. No. 17-
6857, 2020 WL 5587449, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2020)).) Additionally, Eskinazi notes any missing
terms in the supposed email offer are immaterial, and their absence does not prevent the formation
of a contract between the parties. (Id. at 10–11 (citing D’Agostino v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 17-11603, 2025 WL 2161679 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2025), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 2237652
(D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2025)).)
Defendants raise three points in response to Eskinazi’s Opposition. First, Defendants
reiterate the email in question was merely a preliminary discussion and not a definite offer, which
lacks any “mention of when and how [Eskinazi] would join as a member.” (ECF No. 41 at 6–7.)
Because the supposed email offer is missing this “essential term,” Defendants contend the email
was “only the starting point of a discussion.” (Id. at 7.) Second, Defendants argue Eskinazi’s
response to the email did not provide an “unqualified acceptance to conclude the manifestation of
assent.” (Id. (quoting Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. 1992)).) Third,
Defendants insist the email is too incomplete and indefinite to establish an enforceable contract.
(Id. at 8–9.)
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“[T]he basic features of a contract” are “offer, acceptance, consideration, and performance
by both parties.” Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 556 (N.J. 2013). “A contract arises
from offer and acceptance[] and must be sufficiently definite ‘that the performance to be rendered
by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.’” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608
A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. 1992) (quoting W. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 138 A.2d 402, 410 (N.J. 1958)). To
make out a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a contract, (2)
plaintiff’s performance of the contract, (3) defendant’s failure to do what the contract required, and
(4) damages to the plaintiff from defendant’s breach of the contract. Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245
A.3d 570, 577 (N.J. 2021) (citing Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016)).
Eskinazi has failed to state a breach of contract claim because she has failed to sufficiently
allege the existence of a contract. Goldfarb, 245 A.3d at 577. Under New Jersey law, a contract
arises from offer and acceptance. Id. Despite Eskinazi’s insistence that the March 2014 email was
an offer capable of acceptance, it is not. Ming Zhang v. Minuskin, Civ. A. No. 2702-17T2, 2019
WL 6770020, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 12, 2019) (“Whether an offer capable of
acceptance has been made depends upon ‘what meaning the words should have conveyed to a
reasonable person cognizant of the relationship between the parties and all of the antecedent and
surrounding facts and circumstances.’” (quoting Esslinger’s, Inc. v. Alachnowicz, 172 A.2d 433,
437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961))). As Defendants point out, the language included in the
March 2014 email “should have conveyed” Defendants were merely beginning discussions with
Eskinazi. Ming Zhang, 2019 WL 6770020, at *2. Indeed, Defendants introduce and describe the
key information in the email as a mere “starting point.” (ECF No. 36-2 at 21.)
Accordingly, 	Eskinazi’s 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
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B. Title VII: Age, Sex, and Disability Discrimination Claim7
With respect to Eskinazi’s sex discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII,
Defendants argue Eskinazi has alleged “nothing more than the conclusory allegation that her
termination must have been due to her age, sex, or disability.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 11.)
Eskinazi disagrees with Defendants and contends she has sufficiently stated her sex-based
discrimination claim. (ECF No. 40 at 13.) With respect to this claim, Eskinazi notes she “has shown
she is a woman, . . . suffered a termination, . . . was qualified for her position and the position of
other men, and that favoritism was shown to males.” (Id. (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 11–14, 18–19,
26).)
In reply, Defendants again argue Eskinazi has failed to state her sex discrimination claim
because the claim as alleged is “conclusory” and unsupported by “details about the comparators’
qualifications [or] positions.” (ECF No. 41 at 9 (citing Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009)).) Moreover, Defendants contend Eskinazi’s sex discrimination claim cannot
survive a motion to dismiss because Eskinazi “provides no specific facts [to] show[] that any
adverse employment action was motivated by . . . gender biased animus.” (Id. at 11.)
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show
(1) “s/he is a member of a protected class,” (2) “s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to
attain or retain,” (3) “s/he suffered an adverse employment action,” and (4) “the action occurred
under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Mandel v.
7 Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). In other words, disability is not
covered under Title VII. See Blair v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Civ. A. No. 03-717, 2004 WL 2283560,
at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2004). Accordingly, neither a disability nor age discrimination claim is
cognizable under Title VII, and such a claim brought under Title VII must be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
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M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). However, to survive a motion to
dismiss, a plaintiff need not establish the elements of a prima facie case; a plaintiff merely must
‘put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.’” Gladden v. Solis, 490 F. App’x 411, 412 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fowler, 578
F.3d at 213).
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, on top of being “proficient at Excel, Word, ADP,
and QuickBooks,” Eskinazi “was the past President of the [local chapter of the] American Payroll
Association and a Board Member for 8 years, . . . spent 23 years at Weave Corporation as Assistant
Controller,” was “Assistant Controller” at a furniture store, and “worked on payroll, the
compliance and company policy manual, health insurance renewals, time and attendance tracking,
employee performance reviews, [an] employee incentive program, and [an] employee wellness
program.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 12.) According to Eskinazi, this background, particularly her background
in payroll software, is what led Auslander to approach her for the Director of Finance and Human
Resources position. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Given her seniority, Eskinazi notes she was able to perform the
“essential functions of her job . . . remotely” despite the “pain in her ankle and groin” because all
of her in-person responsibilities were merely “secretarial and administrative.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
Eskinazi has put forth sufficient facts to survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss her sex
discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII. The parties do not dispute Eskinazi is a member
of a protected class based on her sex, nor do they dispute she suffered an adverse employment
action. Instead, they dispute whether Eskinazi has put forth sufficient facts with respect to her
qualifications for the position she sought to retain, and whether the adverse employment action
could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. (ECF No. 36-1 at 11–12.) Although
Defendants do not contest Eskinazi was qualified for the job when she was hired, they argue she
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became “unwilling to go to the office to complete job duties that required her in person.” (ECF
No. 36-1 at 11.) But Eskinazi contends these in person duties were not “essential functions of her
job.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 22.) Construing all inferences in her favor, the Court takes her allegations
about his experience and her explanation of the position’s essential functions to mean she was
qualified for the position. Gladden v. Vilsack, 483 F. App’x 664, 665 (3d Cir. 2012).
Moreover, Eskinazi has articulated facts that raise an inference of sex discrimination.
According to Eskinazi, her sex discrimination claim is supported by several factual allegations: (1)
a male coworker received credit for her work, (2) her “job was only returned to her when [a male
coworker] did not want to do it anymore,” and (3) one of her male coworkers could not implement
Bill.com, a key responsibility as Director of Finance, but “received [a] higher title and pay than
her.” (ECF No. 40 at 13 (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 18–19).) While included in her Opposition, it is
unclear where in the Amended Complaint Eskinazi included the allegation that her job was only
returned to her after a male coworker did not want to do it anymore. (But see ECF No. 26 ¶ 19);
Com. of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding the
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss). Still, accepting
Eskinazi’s asserted facts in the Amended Complaint as true, the remaining two factual allegations
support an inference she was terminated on account of her sex. Baughman v. Marathon Petroleum
Logistics Servs., LLC, Civ. A. No. 24-287, 2025 WL 492003, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2025)
(finding an inference of discrimination where plaintiff was terminated after “she was treated more
poorly than male employees by” her supervisor and “other male colleagues,” including by
excluding her from meetings and criticizing her). As in Baughman, Eskinazi alleges in the lead up
to her termination, she was treated more poorly than her male counterparts despite being more
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capable. Id. at *4. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s sex discrimination claim
brought under Title VII is DENIED.
C. Title VII: Hostile Work Environment
Because Eskinazi has not alleged she was subjected to any discriminatory intimidation,
Defendants argue Eskinazi cannot establish a hostile work environment claim. (ECF No. 36-1 at
13.) According to Defendants, Eskinazi has not included any facts that show Defendants directed
harassing conduct at Eskinazi because of her disability. (Id. at 14.) Additionally, Defendants
contend Eskinazi has merely put forth facts unique to disparate treatment and failure to
accommodate claims, which cannot support a hostile work environment claim. (Id. at 13.)
Eskinazi argues Defendants’ central attack on her hostile work environment claim is
whether she has sufficiently shown the discrimination directed at her based on her sex, age, and
disability was “severe and pervasive.” (ECF No. 40 at 15.) Eskinazi highlights a litany of facts
included in her Amended Complaint that purportedly show such discrimination was in fact “severe
and pervasive.” (Id. at 15–17.) She also notes courts in the Third Circuit prefer to address the
question of whether “the conduct in question is severe or pervasive” after discovery at the summary
judgment stage. (Id. at 15 (citing Hopkins v. AMAZON.COM.DEDC, LLC, Civ. A. No. 24-10005,
2025 WL 2350469, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2025) (collecting cases)).)
Defendants, however, argue the facts highlighted by Eskinazi “are, at most, discrete
employment decisions or workplace disagreements, not a pattern of discriminatory intimidation or
abuse.” (ECF No. 41 at 13.)
To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a “plaintiff must establish that 1) the
employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex, 2) the discrimination was
severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of
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respondeat superior liability.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir.
2013); see also Hamzat v. Pritzker, Civ. A. No. 14-6440, 2017 WL 2798247, at *3 (D.N.J. June
28, 2017) (applying same framework to a Title VII disability based hostile work environment
claim); Retzler v. McDonalds, Civ. A. No. 20-1256, 2020 WL 1164797, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10,
2020) (articulating same framework for a Title VII age based hostile work environment claim).
“The first four elements establish a hostile work environment, and the fifth element determines
employer liability.” Id. (citing Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104
(3d Cir.2009)). The hostile work environment standard is an objective one, based on “an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). “However, even where ‘many of [a] plaintiff[’s] allegations, standing
alone, would be insufficient to state a cause of action,’ the allegations may be [enough] to state a
claim when ‘[v]iewed cumulatively.’” Lauto v. Dover. Pub. Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 21-18246, 2022
WL 3646573, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2022) (quoting Shepard v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 803 A.2d 611,
626 (N.J. 2002)).
Eskinazi has alleged facts to support her hostile work environment claim at this point in
the litigation. Here, Defendants’ primary argument against Eskinazi’s hostile work environment
claim is the Amended Complaint “does not contain any allegations that she was subjected to any
discriminatory intimidation, let alone anything that would rise to the level of being pervasive or
severe.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 13.) Eskinazi, on the other hand, highlights the facts in her Amended
Complaint she claims would support pervasive and severe conduct that would support such a
claim. (ECF No. 40 at 15–17 (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 17–19, 21–22, 25–26).) According to
Defendants, these allegations are, “at most, discrete employment decisions or workplace
disagreements, not a pattern of discriminatory intimidation or abuse.” (ECF No. 13.)
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Here, “because Defendant[s’] challenge to [Eskinazi’s] hostile work environment claim is
centered around the severe and pervasive element, the Court joins other district courts in [the
Third] Circuit who have determined that this issue is best reserved for summary judgment.”
Hopkins, 2025 WL 2350469, at *6 (collecting cases). Construing the allegations in the light most
favorable to Eskinazi, Eskinazi has set forth sufficient facts to plead a plausible hostile work
environment claim based on her sex, age, and perceived disability. Hopkins, 2025 WL 2350469,
at *6 (concluding the plaintiff had made out a hostile work environment claim by alleging, in part,
he was passed over in favor of younger employers and was denied training or access to programs
necessary to do his job “dating back to 2020”). As in Hopkins, Eskinazi has alleged severe and
pervasive conduct dating back to 2020. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 18.) For example, she alleges she trained
younger, non-disabled and several male staff in June 2020 who ended up with more senior titles
and more pay. (Id.) Additionally, in “July 2021 to July 2022,” despite coming up with solutions to
problems at work, she claims male coworkers were receiving the credit. (Id. ¶ 19.) Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s hostile work environment claim brought pursuant to Title
VII is DENIED.
D. ADEA: Age Discrimination
Defendants argue Eskinazi fails to state an age discrimination claim under the ADEA. (ECF
No. 36-1 at 10–11.) According to Defendants, Eskinazi has “failed to provide a sufficient factual
predicate.” (Id. at 11.)
Eskinazi contends she has sufficiently pled such a claim. (ECF No. 40 at 11.) Specifically,
Eskinazi highlights the following facts from the Amended Complaint: “she is over 40, suffered a
termination, . . . was qualified for the position, and favoritism was shown to younger employees.”
(Id. (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 11–14, 18–19, 26).) Eskinazi also points out the following: (1) she
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trained younger staff who “ended up earning more,” (2) “Defendants refused to get her help,” (3)
“younger people would get credit for her work,” (4) “younger employees would . . . get her work
entirely as she was presumed to be slower,” and (5) “younger[,] less competent employees were
not fired.” (Id. (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 18–19, 26).)
Defendants argue Eskinazi’s age discrimination claim is deficient because the facts she
provided to raise an inference that Couranto terminated her on the basis of her age are conclusory.
(ECF No. 41 at 10.) In support of that argument, Defendants rely on Guirguis v. Movers Specialty
Services, Inc., 346 F. App’x 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s race based
discrimination claim where the claim relies only on “factually unsupported legal conclusion[s]”)
and Hassell v. Johnson & Johnson, Civ. A. No. 13-4109, 2014 WL 174426, at *5 (D.N.J. May 1,
2014) (dismissing the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim brought pursuant to the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination because the claim was buttressed only by conclusory statements),
With respect to an age discrimination claim, it is sufficient to allege a prima facie case to
defeat a motion to dismiss. Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021).
However, “it is not necessary.” Id. Instead, the “complaint need only allege enough facts to ‘raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element.’” Id.
(quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Although Defendants question whether Eskinazi has alleged enough facts to give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination, applying the standard articulated in Martinez, the Court
holds Eskinazi has put forth enough facts to survive dismissal of her ADEA age discrimination
claim. 986 F.3d at 267. While Defendants seek to cast the factual allegations in support of this
claim as “conclusory” (ECF No. 41 at 11) the Third Circuit has explained facts of this kind are
sufficient. Martinez, 986 F.3d at 267.
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First, Eskinazi was 64 years old at the time of her termination and is covered under the
ADEA. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 26); see Kaprowski v. Esti Foods, LLC, Civ. A. No. 21-14693, 2022 WL
2289559, at *3 (D.N.J. June 24, 2022). Second, as discussed above, she suffered an adverse
employment action when she was fired from her job. Kaprowski, 2022 WL 2289559, at *3. Third,
she alleges, and the Court accepts as true, she was qualified for her former position. Id. Fourth, she
alleges facts, which the Court accepts as true, raising a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal age was the reason for her termination. Id. Eskinazi notes she was “consistently treated
different[ly] in compensation and worse than her . . . younger counterparts at the [c]ompany.” (ECF
No. 26 ¶¶ 18, 26.) She also alleges men were receiving credit for her work. (Id. ¶ 19.) “These facts
raise the reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover evidence of discriminatory motive.”
Martinez, 986 F.3d at 267. Defendants seek to cast these allegations as “merely subjective
perceptions [that] lack the factual enhancement required to plausibly suggest discriminatory
intent” under Twombly and Iqbal. (ECF No. 41 at 11.) But these are the kinds of “suspicious
details” that help move the needle from the possible to the plausible. Martinez, 986 F.3d at 267.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s age discrimination claim brought under the
ADEA is DENIED.
E. ADA: Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate
1. 	Disability Discrimination
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Eskinazi’s disability discrimination claims because
she has put forth “nothing more than the conclusory allegation that her termination must have been
due to her age, sex, or disability.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 11.) More specifically, Defendants note
Eskinazi has “not allege[d] that anyone made any negative comments related to [her] . . . disability
or that she was treated differently in any material ways than . . . employees who do not share her
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protected characteristics.” (Id.) Defendants point out Eskinazi has “not allege[d] a single fact
connecting her . . . disability to her termination.” (Id.)
Eskinazi 	disagrees. 	She 	lists 	several 	facts 	she 	contends 	do 	support 	a 	disability
discrimination claim. (ECF No. 40 at 13–14 (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 11–14, 17–19, 21–22, 25–26).)
Based on these facts, Eskinazi argues she has shown that she “has a disability, . . . was qualified,
and . . . was terminated in suspected conditions.” (Id. at 13.)
Defendants argue the facts in Eskinazi’s Amended Complaint are nonetheless insufficient
to support a disability discrimination claim because Eskinazi has not “allege[d] that she was
qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job, or [that] [she] was performing those
essential functions, either with or without . . . reasonable accommodation[s].” (ECF No. 41 at 12.)
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., prohibits a
“covered entity” from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of [a] disability
in regard to . . . the . . . discharge of employees, . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, a plaintiff is disabled if she (1) has a
“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more” of her “major life activities”;
(2) has “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.”
Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).
“[M]ajor life activities include . . . working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). To state a prima facie case
of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff “must show that she: (1) is disabled; (2) is otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations
by her employer; and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action as a result of her disability.”
Petti v. Ocean Cnty. Bd. of Health, 831 F. App’x 59, 63 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Hohider v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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First, taking her factual assertions as true, Eskinazi has alleged facts showing she is
disabled under the ADA based on the “regarded as” definition of disability. See, e.g., Hanafy v.
Hill Int’l, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 3d 419, 434 (E.D. Pa. 2023). Although she has not pointed to a specific
medical condition, she notes she was “unable to walk due to pain in her ankle and groin,” she “was
hospitalized . . . and sent to rehab,” and she filled out an “ADA form . . . saying she needed remote
work.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 22.) Together, these factual allegations support the inference her employer
was “aware of [her] condition . . . at the time of h[er] termination,” which is enough to demonstrate
her employer regarded her as disabled, “creat[ing] a reasonable inference h[er] termination was
‘because of an actual or perceived physical . . . impairment.’” Hanafy, 669 F. Supp. 3d at 434
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). Second, as discussed above, taking Eskinazi’s factual
allegations 	as 	true, 	for 	purposes 	of 	this 	Motion, 	Eskinazi 	has 	sufficiently 	alleged 	facts
demonstrating she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable
accommodations by her company. See supra at Section III.B; see, e.g., Thankgod v. Bellwether
Behav. Health, Civ. A. No. 19-20617, 2021 WL 5195662, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2021) (“While his
accommodation would have inherently precluded him from doing ‘heavy lifting,’ it was
nevertheless reasonable and, because he would have been able to perform the other essential
functions with that accommodation, he has adequately alleged that he was a qualified individual
for ADA purposes.”). Third, Eskinazi has put forth sufficient facts to demonstrate she suffered an
adverse employment action because of her disability. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 22, 23, 26 (noting she was
“unable to walk due to pain in her ankle and groin,” had requested remote work via an “ADA
form,” was not permitted to work remotely, and ultimately was “fired on November 7, 2023”).)
Accordingly, 	Defendants’ motion 	to 	dismiss 	Eskinazi’s 	disability 	discrimination 	claim 	is
DENIED.
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2. 	Failure to Accommodate
To state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA based on Defendant
Couranto’s failure to accommodate Eskinazi’s alleged disability, Eskinazi must allege facts
demonstrating:
(1) [s]he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2)
[s]he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer;
and (3) [s]he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment
decision as a result of discrimination . . . [which] include[s] refusing
to make reasonable accommodations for [her] disabilit[y].
Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2009). If an employee requests
an accommodation, the employer and employee must determine an accommodation that is
reasonable through a “flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 187. Both employers and employees
“have a duty to assist in the search for [an] appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in
good faith.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Employers can demonstrate good faith by “meet[ing] with the
employee who requests an accommodation, request[ing] information about the condition and what
limitations the employee has, ask[ing] the employee what he or she specifically wants, show[ing]
some sign of having considered employee’s request, and offer[ing] and discuss[ing] available
alternatives when the request is too burdensome.” Id. at 317. However, a plaintiff cannot
demonstrate a lack of good faith “if[,] after [the employer] confer[s] with the employee to find
possible accommodations, the employee then fails to supply information that the employer needs
or does not answer the employer’s request for more detailed proposals.” Id.; see also Tatum v.
Hosp. of Univ. of Pa., 57 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 216 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 2000).
As to Eskinazi’s failure to accommodate claim, Defendants only argue Eskinazi has
conceded “some of her essential job functions required her physical presence in the office, making
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her proposed accommodation of working from home full time unreasonable.” (ECF No. 36-1 at
12.) However, Defendants do not include a citation to the Amended Complaint to support that
argument. (Id.) Indeed, as the Court reads the Amended Complaint, Eskinazi alleges the “essential
functions of her job . . . can be done remotely, and anything in person were secretarial and
administrative duties” beyond the scope of her role. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 22.) Therefore, as discussed
above and for purposes of the motion to dismiss, Eskinazi has pleaded facts demonstrating she is
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job. See, e.g., Thankgod, 2021 WL
5195662, at *2. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s failure to accommodate
claim is DENIED.
F. 	NJLAD: 	Age, 	Sex, 	and 	Disability 	Discrimination 	(and 	Hostile 	Work
Environment)8
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) protects against various forms of
discrimination, including discrimination based on age, sex, and disability. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §
10:5-12. In general, to establish a prima facie case for unlawful termination under the NJLAD, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was
qualified for the position held, (3) the plaintiff was terminated despite adequate qualifications, and
(4) after termination the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications.
8 The Court does not summarize the parties’ arguments with respect to Eskinazi’s age, sex, and
disability discrimination claims or her hostile work environment claim brought under the NJLAD
as they mirror the arguments made with respect to the federal law equivalents of same. See supra
Sections III.B, III.C., III.D., III.E.1.
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Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Bergen Com. Bank
v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 953(N.J. 1999)).
1. 	Age Discrimination
Age discrimination claims under the ADEA and NJLAD are “governed by the same
standards.” Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). For the reasons
discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s NJLAD age discrimination claim is
DENIED. See supra Section III.D.
2. 	Sex Discrimination
Claims brought under Title VII and NJLAD “are analyzed under the same standard.”
Barnes v. Off. Depot, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-1703, 2009 WL 4133563, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2009)
(listing cases). For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s NJLAD
sex discrimination claim is DENIED. See supra Section III.B.
3. 	Disability Discrimination
NJLAD disability claims and ADA claims are governed by the same standard. Lawrence,
98 F.3d at 70. For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s NJLAD
disability discrimination claim is DENIED. See supra Section III.E.
4. 	Hostile Work Environment
NJLAD hostile work environment claims and Title VII are analyzed under the same
standard. Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying the same
elements to hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII and NJLAD). For
the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s NJLAD hostile work
environment claims based on her sex, age, and perceived disability are DENIED. See supra
Section III.C.
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G. NJLAD: Retaliation
Defendants raise their arguments against Eskinazi’s retaliation claim for the first time in
their reply brief. (Compare ECF No. 36-1 (omitting any argument against Eskinazi’s NJLAD
retaliation claim) with ECF No. 41 (including an argument against Eskinazi’s NJLAD retaliation
claim.) As such, the Court considers these arguments waived. See Rivers v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, Loc. 673, Civ. A. No. 15-3070, 2016 WL 389983, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2016) (citing
Anspach v. City of Phila., 503 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Hilburn v. Dep’t of Corr.,
Civ. A. No. 07-6064, 2010 WL 703202, at *11 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2010) (“Typically, an argument not
raised in an opening brief is waived.” (citing Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster
Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))); Zemel v. Korchmar, Civ. A. No. 20-
9972, 2020 WL 6391193, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2020) (“Even if, arguendo, [the defendant] is
correct in her assertion that Count 6 is duplicative, this is a new argument raised in a reply brief
and will not be considered . . . . Thus, . . . the motion to dismiss Count 6 will be denied.”);
Teleconference Sys. v. Proctor & Gamble Pharms., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331 n.13 (D. Del.
2009) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief should not be heard.” (citing Laborers’ Int’l
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO, 26 F.3d at 398)); Valerino v. Hoover, 643 F. App’x 139, 142 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[D]istrict courts . . . generally deem arguments made only in reply briefs to be
forfeited.” (quoting MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C. Cir.
2010))). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Eskinazi’s NJLAD retaliation claim is
DENIED. But see Section III.I.1 (dismissing Eskinazi’s NJLAD retaliation claim with respect to
Auslander).
H. NJ EPA: Unequal Pay based on Sex, Age, Disability
Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Eskinazi’s New Jersey Equal Pay Act (“NJ EPA”)
claims because while she alleges “several people [who] she trained for unspecified positions were
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paid more than her[,] [s]he does not say what those individuals’ job duties were, whether they were
disabled, or whether they were of a similar age to her.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 15.) Additionally,
Defendants point out she has not “provide[d] the difference in their salaries, the key component of
these causes of action.” (Id.)
Eskinazi argues she “only needs to raise an inference that she is being denied equal pay for
equivalent work due to her” disability, age, and sex. (ECF No. 40 at 17.) According to Eskinazi,
she has done so by alleging “she trained four younger, male and/or nondisabled senior employees
who all got higher titles and pay than her.” (Id. (citing ECF No. 26 ¶ 18.).)
In reply, Defendants reassert Eskinazi’s Amended Complaint is deficient. (ECF No. 41 at
14–15.) Defendants note although Eskinazi provided “name[s] of the employees she alleges were
better paid because they were either younger, men or not disabled, she d[id] not provide any
information regarding where the employees worked, what roles they held, what salaries they
received, or how their salaries compared to” Eskinazi’s salary. (Id.) Defendants also point out an
inconsistency in the Amended Complaint: Dawn Lewis, a woman, was paid more than Eskinazi.
(Id. at 15.)
The NJ EPA “amended the [NJLAD] to require pay equality across all protected classes.”
Perrotto v. Morgan Advanced Materials, PLC, Civ. A. No. 18-13825, 2019 WL 192903, at *1
(D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2019) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:11–56:1). The NJ EPA makes it unlawful
[f]or an employer to pay any of its employees who is a member of a
protected class at a rate of compensation, including benefits, which
is less than the rate paid by the employer to employees who are not
members of the protected class for substantially similar work, when
viewed as a composite of skill, effort and responsibility.
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N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(t). “For the purposes of this subsection, ‘member of a protected class’
means an employee who has one or more characteristics, including . . . age, . . . sex, [and]
disability.” Id.
“Generally, courts considering [NJ EPA] claims analyze such claims under the framework
of the federal EPA.” Spiewak v. Wyndham Destinations, Inc., Civ. A. No. 20-13643, 2023 WL
869309, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2023) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)). To put forth a prima facie case
of unequal pay discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that “employees of the opposite sex were
paid differently for performing ‘equal work’—work of substantially equal skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar working conditions.” Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d
Cir. 2000).9 “[F]ail[ure] to offer any factual context for these claims, such as who these [younger,
non-disabled,] male employees were, where they worked, what roles they held, what salaries they
received, or how their salaries compared to [the] [p]laintiff’s” may render these claims fatal under
Rule 12(b)(6). Hyra v. Chipotle Servs., Civ. A. No. 24-8836, 2025 WL 417055, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb.
6, 2025).
1. 	Unequal Pay Based on Sex
Eskinazi identifies three male comparators who “received higher . . . pay than her”—Verga,
Arman, and Ruber.”10 (ECF No. 26 ¶18–19.) Eskinazi notes Verga, Arman, and Ruber were “senior
employees in Finance and HR [with] higher title[s,]” whose salaries were greater than hers. (Id.)
Fatally, however, Eskinazi has not alleged facts that support an inference these comparators were
9 The NJ EPA covers not only unequal pay claims based on gender but also unequal pay claims
based on age and disability. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(t).
10 While Eskinazi describes another comparator, Lewis, as a “male . . . counterpart,” in the
immediate paragraph, Eskinazi consistently uses female pronouns to describe Lewis, leading the
Court to infer Lewis is not in fact a male counterpart. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 18–19.)
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performing “equal work.” Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107. She notes she “trained [these] senior
employees” but the Court cannot reasonably infer these comparators were performing “equal
work” based on that fact alone. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 18.) Without more, Eskinazi’s unequal pay claim
based on her sex is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	Age and Disability
Eskinazi’s unequal pay claims based on her age and disability are likewise fatal—she has
not alleged facts to show younger and non-disabled comparators were getting paid more for “equal
work.” (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.) With respect to the comparators who were younger than Eskinazi, which
includes Verga, Arman, Ruber, and Lewis, Eskinazi, again, has not alleged facts to show these four
coworkers were getting paid more for “equal work.” Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107. While she notes
Lewis “was better compensated than her” despite Eskinazi taking over part of her assigned
responsibilities (ECF No. 26 ¶ 19), she has not alleged what Lewis’s remaining responsibilities
are, let alone whether Lewis’s work required equal skill and effort. Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107.
These same deficiencies plague the non-disabled comparators she has put forth. (ECF No. 26
¶¶ 18–19.) Accordingly, Eskinazi’s unequal pay claims based on her age and disability are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	Claims Against Auslander
Defendants argue the Amended Complaint should be dismissed against Auslander for two
reasons: (1) the NJLAD applies only to employers and Eskinazi’s employer is Couranto, not
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Auslander, and (2) “only parties to contracts are liable for breach” and Auslander is not a party to
the agreement at issue.11 (ECF No. 36-1 at 15.)
Eskinazi argues Auslander may be held liable under the NJLAD via an aider and abettor
theory of liability. (ECF No. 40 at 18.) Additionally, Eskinazi contends under New Jersey law, “an
individual supervisor or CEO/President” may be “individually liable” for breach of contract
claims. (Id. (citing Allen v. V and A Bros., Inc, 997 A.2d 1067 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010),
aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 26 A.3d 430 (N.J. 2011)).)
In reply, Defendants point out there is no discussion of “owners being liable for breach of
a contract of the corporation” in Allen. (ECF No. 41 at 15.) They also note Magna Fabric Inc. v.
New York Art & Shipping, LLC is a case involving “an oral guarantee made on behalf of a
corporation,” which, according to Defendants, is not relevant here given the facts as alleged. (Id.
(citing No. A-5322-11T3, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2016, at *7 (App. Div. Aug. 8, 2013)).)
Moreover, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the NJLAD claims against Auslander because
Eskinazi has not put forth facts that could support an aiding or abetting claim. (Id. at 16 (setting
forth the standard for aiding and abetting and arguing Eskinazi’s Amended Complaint is devoid of
facts capable of making out such a claim).)
1. 	NJLAD
With respect to “the NJLAD, ‘individual liability of a supervisor for acts of discrimination
or for creating or maintaining a hostile environment can only arise through the aiding and abetting
mechanism.’” Thange v. Oxford Glob. Res., LLC, Civ. A. No. 19-5979, 2022 WL 2046938, at *10
11 As the motion to dismiss is written, Defendants do not meaningfully attack any of the claims
brought against Auslander except the NJLAD claims and the breach of contract claim. (ECF No.
36-1 at 15.) As such, the Court considers any argument directed at the other remaining claims
against Auslander waived. Hilburn, 2010 WL 703202, at *11 (“Typically, an argument not raised
in an opening brief is waived.”).
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(D.N.J. June 7, 2022) (quoting Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 947 A.2d 626, 645 (N.J.
2008)). “The NJLAD makes it unlawful ‘[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee
or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the
NJLAD], or to attempt to do so.’” Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e)). “[T]he words aiding
and abetting ‘require active and purposeful conduct.’” Cicchetti, 947 A.2d at 645 (quoting Tarr v.
Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 2004)).
Here, Eskinazi has asserted the following NJLAD claims against Auslander: (1) age, sex,
and disability discrimination, (2) hostile work environment, and (3) retaliation. (ECF No. 26
¶¶ 54–58, 71–80.) But, fatally, Eskinazi has not alleged facts that meet the “active and purposeful
conduct” required to hold Auslander liable for any of these claims. Cicchetti, 947 A.2d at 645
(quoting Tarr, 853 A.2d at 929). For instance, Eskinazi does not articulate the “amount of
assistance given by” Auslander, whether Auslander “was present at the time of the asserted”
conduct at issue, or even Auslander’s “state of mind.” Tarr, 853 A.2d at 929. Indeed, in discussing
Auslander specifically, Eskinazi merely alleges Auslander approached Eskinazi for the Director of
Finance and Human Resources role and emailed her in March 2014 regarding terms of
employment. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 13, 15.) Accordingly, Eskinazi’s NJLAD claims against Auslander
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	Breach of Contract
The Court need not decide whether Auslander may be held liable for a breach of contract
because Eskinazi has failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a contract. See supra Section
III.A. Accordingly, the breach of contract claim against Auslander is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause having been shown, Defendants
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Couranto and Auslander’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. The breach of contract claim and the unequal pay claim are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to both Couranto and Auslander. Additionally, the disability and age
discrimination claims brought under Title VII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to
Couranto. Moreover, the following three NJLAD claims brought against Auslander are likewise
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE: (1) age, sex, and disability discrimination, (2) hostile
work environment, and (3) retaliation. An appropriate order follows.
Date: February 17, 2026 	/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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