AGF MANUFACTURING, INC. v. CORE & MAIN LP et al

2:25-cv-01275Njd30 gen 2026

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AGF MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORE & MAIN LP,
Defendant.
No. 25-cv-1275
SEALED
OPINION & ORDER
CECCHI, District Judge.
Before the Court is plaintiff AGF Manufacturing, Inc.’s (“AGF”) motion for a preliminary
injunction. ECF No. 16; see ECF No. 17 (“Moving Br.”). Defendant Core & Main LP (“Core &
Main”) opposed the motion, ECF No. 60 (“Opp’n Br.”), AGF replied, ECF No. 74 (“Reply Br.”),
and Core & Main further replied, ECF No. 79. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny
AGF’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
I. 	BACKGROUND
AGF manufactures and sells products for fire sprinkler systems, one of which is the
PURGENVENT Model 7900 Automatic Air Vent (AAV) (the “Model 7900 AAV”). ECF No. 18,
Declaration of James P. McHugh (“McHugh Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–4. AGF asserts that the Model 7900
AAV addresses “corrosion within metallic pipes caused by trapped air,” a “significant issue in fire
sprinkler systems.” Id. ¶ 4. According to AGF, the Model 7900 AAV “allows water to flow in
though a first end, strains the water for particulate matter, allows air to rise to the top and
automatically vent, thus minimizing oxygen corrosion on the system.” Id. ¶ 5. AGF states that
Model 7900 AAV is “an embodiment of” U.S. Patent Number 10,391,344 (the “’344 Patent”),
which AGF owns “by assignment.” Id. ¶¶ 10–11. AGF contends that the Model 7900 AAV is
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unique, because it is “the [only] automatic air vent [on] the market that has a reputation of not
leaking.” Id. ¶ 8; see also id. ¶ 13 (“The Model 7900 AAV saw rapid success and substantial
growth since entering the market in 2017.”). This is because, AGF asserts, the Model 7900 AAV
does not use a “Spirotop air vent” like other fire sprinkler air vent products on the market. Id. ¶ 8.
“While the users of the Model 7900 AAV are typically subcontractors responsible for the
installation and maintenance of wet pipe fire sprinkler systems, AGF only sells [the Model 7900
AAV] to distributors.” Id. ¶ 12. AGF sells the Model 7900 AAV “primarily to . . . three
distributors,” one of which is Core & Main. Id. Core & Main, however, does not just distribute
other companies’ products. Core & Main also manufactures, imports, and sells its own fire
sprinkler system products, including the “Lansdale ‘Automatic Air Vent w/ Adjustable Purge
Valve,’ Model LVAV-2” (the “LVAV-2”). Id. ¶¶ 15–16; see ECF No. 63, Declaration of Michael
Moss (“Moss Decl.”) ¶ 4; ECF No. 76-1; ECF No. 76-3, Deposition of Michael Moss (“Moss
Dep.”) 46:8–18. AGF claims that the LVAV-2 “infringes at least Claims 1–5 . . . of the ’344
Patent.” Moving Br. at 1; McHugh Decl. ¶ 19. Moreover, AGF states that, because the LVAV-2
uses “a copy of the Spirotop air release valve,” it will leak and drip. McHugh Decl. ¶ 22. AGF
further states that, because customers are “mistaking [the LVAV-2 for the] Model 7900 AAV,”
AGF will be “damaged by” the LVAV-2’s performance issues. Id.
On February 14, 2025, AGF filed an initial complaint against Core & Main, which it later
amended. ECF Nos. 1, 55. In the amended complaint, filed on April 22, 2025, AGF alleges that
the LVAV-2 infringes “at least Claim 1 of the ’344 Patent.” ECF No. 55 ¶ 59.
On February 28, 2025, AGF filed a motion for a preliminary injunction based solely on its
patent infringement claim. ECF No. 16; see also Moving Br. at 1, 10–11; Opp’n Br. at 3 n.1. AGF
seeks an order from the Court preventing Core & Main “and those in active concert or participation
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with” Core & Main from (1) infringing the ’344 Patent, including “the making, using selling,
offering to sell or importing” the LVAV-2 or (2) transferring “any inventory of the LVAV-2 out
of the possession of [Core & Main] or third parties holding LVAV-2 product for the behalf of”
Core & Main. ECF No. 16 at 2.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“A preliminary injunction ‘is an extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in
limited circumstances.’” Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. v. City of Phila., 949 F.3d 116, 133 (3d
Cir. 2020) (quoting Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir.
1989)). “Like all equitable relief, a preliminary injunction is ‘never awarded as of right,’ but
rather . . . involves the exercise of ‘equitable discretion.’” Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Pa.
Env’t Hearing Bd., 108 F.4th 144, 150 (3d Cir.) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24, 32 (2008)), amended on denial of reh’g, 110 F.4th 612 (3d Cir. 2024). In exercising
this discretion, courts consider the following four factors: “(1) the [movant’s] likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) the [movant’s] risk of irreparable injury absent preliminary relief; (3) the balance
of equities; and (4) the public interest.” Del. State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Safety
& Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 202 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). If the movant
fails to show either of the first two factors, the Court may not issue preliminary injunctive relief.
See Erie Indem. Co. v. Stephenson, 157 F.4th 265, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2025); see also Ferring
Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Absent a showing of
irreparable harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, even if the other three elements are
found.”); Automated Merch. Sys., Inc. v. Crane Co., 357 F. App’x 297, 300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]
movant cannot be granted a preliminary injunction unless it establishes both of the first two factors,
i.e., likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.” (alteration in original) (citation
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omitted)). However, if the movant establishes both a likelihood of success and that irreparable
harm is likely absent preliminary injunctive relief, the Court then balances all four factors. Del.
State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, 108 F.4th at 202.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court will deny the preliminary injunction motion because AGF has failed to establish
that it will “more likely than not” suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief.
Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin, 133 F.4th 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2025). To
establish irreparable harm in the patent infringement context, the movant must show (1) that absent
a preliminary injunction, it will likely suffer irreparable harm and (2) a causal nexus between the
irreparable harm and the infringement. See Macom Tech. Sols. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Techs.
AG, 881 F.3d 1323, 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
In support of its request for a preliminary injunction, AGF lists three types of harm: (1)
price erosion, (2) loss of market share, and (3) reputational injury. See Moving Br. at 12–16. In
the patent context, these harms can be irreparable. See LEGO A/S v. ZURU Inc., 799 F. App’x
823, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[L]oss of revenue, goodwill, and market position are evidence of
irreparable harm.”); Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“Price erosion, loss of goodwill, damage to reputation, and loss of business opportunities are all
valid grounds for finding irreparable harm.”); see also Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians
of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Irreparable harm ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that
compensation in money alone cannot atone for it.’” (citation omitted)). However, AGF has failed
to make the requisite showing on any of these harms. See Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. Mylan
Pharms. Inc., 967 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[A] bare assertion of irreparable harm is
never sufficient to prove such harm or justify the ‘extraordinary remedy’ of a preliminary
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injunction.” (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24; and citing Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102–03 (3rd Cir. 1988))). The Court will address why AGF’s
evidence on each of these harms is inadequate to justify preliminary injunctive relief at this
juncture.
A. 	Price Erosion
AGF first argues that, absent a preliminary injunction, it “will need to lower its price to
compete with the knock-off version of its patent-protected product being sold by Defendants, who
are offering for sale an infringing product that is confusingly similar in overall appearance to the
Model 7900 AAV and that performs the same function as the Model 7900 AAV.” Moving Br. at
12. To support this claim, AGF relies almost entirely on the declaration of James P. McHugh, the
President of AGF and a joint inventor of the ’344 Patent. Id. at 10, 12–15; see also ECF No. 55-
1. In that declaration, Mr. McHugh states that absent an injunction, AGF will need to lower the
price of the Model 7900 AAV. McHugh Decl. ¶ 23. He further states that “[i]f AGF is forced to
lower [the] price [of the Model 7900 AAV] during the pendency of this litigation . . . , AGF will
face difficulty raising the price of the Model 7900 AAV” after the litigation. Id. ¶ 25. Based on
this, Mr. McHugh states that Core & Main’s actions “will cause irreparable harm” via “price
diminution.” Id. ¶ 26.
Mr. McHugh does not ground these statements in any independent evidence, nor does AGF
point to sufficient evidentiary materials as support for Mr. McHugh’s statements. In other words,
“[t]here is no evidence, other than Mr. [McHugh’s] speculation, that” the Model 7900 AAV “will
suffer from price erosion.” Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 17-509, 2018 WL 3742610, at *9
(D. Del. Aug. 7, 2018). As such, AGF has not clearly shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable
harm via price erosion. See, e.g., United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., Inc., No. 23-975,
2024 WL 2805082, at *11 (D. Del. May 31, 2024) (“Because I think that Plaintiff’s price erosion
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argument is speculative, I conclude that Plaintiff’s price erosion argument cannot support a finding
of irreparable harm.”); Jacki Easlick, LLC v. CJ Emerald, No. 23-2000, 2024 WL 310125, at *9
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2024) (“Plaintiffs claim that AE’s infringing conduct will lead to price erosion
after consumers become accustomed to seeing the Accused Product’s lower advertised prices. But
again, Plaintiffs fail to point to anything more than conclusory statements that this would be likely
to occur.”); Baxalta, 2018 WL 3742610, at *9; Integra Lifesciences Corp. v. Hyperbranch Med.
Tech., Inc., No. 15-819, 2016 WL 4770244, at *15–17 (D. Del. Aug. 12, 2016) (concluding that
plaintiffs’ “price erosion theory” could not “amount to support for Plaintiffs’ claim of irreparable
harm” because the theory stood “on very shaky evidentiary ground”); MicroAire Surgical
Instruments, LLC v. Arthrex, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 604, 640 (W.D. Va. 2010) (“The mere assertion
that allowing a competitor to keep producing and selling an allegedly infringing product will lead
to irreversible price erosion, without more, is insufficient to constitute a finding of irreparable
harm.”); see also Automated Merch., 357 F. App’x at 301 (holding that the district court
erroneously found irreparable harm based on price erosion theory where “the only support for this
theory of harm is the district court’s conclusory statement that price erosion is possible”). Indeed,
it also bears noting that, according to AGF’s response to interrogatories, AGF has not lowered the
price of the Model 7900 AAV since Core & Main introduced the LVAV-2. See ECF No. 65-2 at
6 (Response Number 5). As such, AGF’s evidence in support of its price erosion theory is
insufficient to establish irreparable harm.1
1 In support of its price erosion theory, AGF points out that the Model 7900 AAV and the LVAV-
2 “directly compete[].” Reply Br. at 2, 29–30. For the reasons stated below in the Court’s
discussion of AGF’s loss of market share theory, that evidence—standing alone—is insufficient.
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B. 	Loss of Market Share
AGF next argues that, absent a preliminary injunction, it will “lose market share” to Core
& Main, who is “offering an infringing and confusingly similar product.” Moving Br. at 13; id. at
14 (“Because the LVAV-2 is confusingly similar in overall appearance to the Model 7900 AAV
by design, AGF will no longer reap the benefit of having an automatic air release vent that is
distinct from the other available automatic air release vents.”). Again, AGF primarily relies on
Mr. McHugh’s declaration, wherein he states that (1) “[w]e will lose market share to [Core &
Main], whether we lower the price of the Model 7900 AAV or not” and (2) AGF will suffer loss
of market share “if injunctive relief is not granted.” McHugh Decl. ¶¶ 23, 26. AGF also argues
that “the LVAV-2 directly competes with the Model 7900 AAV.” Reply Br. at 27; see also
McHugh Decl. ¶ 15 (“Core & Main . . . [is] responsible for the making, importation, offering for
sale, distribution, and sale of a product that competes with the Model 7900 AAV.”). To support
this contention, AGF points out that Michael Moss, a Vice President at Core & Main, “testified
that he agreed that the LVAV-2 and the Model 7900 AAV directly compete.” Reply Br. at 27
(citing Moss Dep. at 17:13–15).
AGF’s market share theory evidence is insufficient to support the extraordinary relief it
seeks. Although it is undisputed that the Model 7900 AAV and the LVAV-2 directly compete,
evidence of direct competition is neither required nor sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm.
See SmartSky Networks, LLC v. Gogo Bus. Aviation, LLC, No. 2023-1058, 2024 WL 358136, at
*4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2024) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction based on movant’s failure
to establish irreparable harm despite evidence that “the parties are in direct competition and that
there is consumer stickiness in the market”); ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns,
Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“To be clear, we are not suggesting . . . that there can
be no irreparable harm absent direct competition.”); Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Rsch., Inc., 439
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F. App’x 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have never held, however, that in order to establish
irreparable harm a patentee must demonstrate . . . that it is in direct competition with the
infringer.”). Instead, “direct competition is one factor suggesting potential for irreparable harm.”
Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Lab’ys, Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
Here, AGF fails to supplement its evidence of direct competition. For instance, it points
to no evidence in the record “that any consumers who chose” Core & Main’s LVAV-2 “would
have chosen” the Model 7900 AAV “rather than, for example,” another automatic air vent on the
market. SmartSky Networks, 2024 WL 358136, at *4. Relatedly, AGF does not appear to provide
any evidence that it and Core & Main are the only two producers of automatic air vents. Opp’n
Br. at 30 (citing McHugh Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, 17; and ECF No. 65-2 at 9–10); see Natera, 106 F.4th at
1378–79; Baker Hughes Inc. v. Nalco Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 374
F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2010). And AGF does not provide any data to show that sales of the
Model 7900 AAV have decreased since Core & Main introduced the LVAV-2.2 See Novartis
Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 595–
96 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The District Court observed that the promotion and sale of MNTS had already
had a measurable effect on Maalox’s market share as reflected by a decrease in sales of Maalox
that corresponds to the increased sales for MNTS. We are satisfied that this loss of market share
constitutes irreparable harm.”); Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharms. Inc., 821
F. Supp. 2d 681, 694 (D.N.J. 2011) (“Plaintiffs have lost at least two-thirds of its market share,
and expects its market share to decrease further as generic products usually obtain about 90% of
2 The Court notes again that Core & Main is one of AGF’s three primary customers. McHugh
Decl. ¶ 12. Therefore, AGF’s inability to marshal evidence that Core & Main itself has reduced
its purchases of the Model 7900 AAV (in favor of its own product, the LVAV-2) is particularly
notable.
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the market.”), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark
Pharms. Inc., USA, 748 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Instead, the only other support that AGF points to on this issue are Mr. McHugh’s
conclusory statements, which do not convince the Court that a loss of market share is imminent.
See Jacki Easlick, LLC, 2024 WL 310125, at *9; CommScope, Inc. v. Rosenberger Tech.
(Kunshan) Co., No. 19-15962, 2021 WL 1560717, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2021) (“[T]he loss of
market share . . . must be imminent and non-speculative.”); Integra Lifesciences, 2016 WL
4770244, at *13 (“[I]t is well-settled that the ‘lost market share must be proven (or at least
substantiated with some evidence) in order for it to support entry of a preliminary injunction.’”
(citation omitted)); Caldwell Mfg. Co. N. Am., LLC v. Amesbury Grp., Inc., No. 11-6183, 2011
WL 3555833, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2011) (finding that plaintiff failed to show that it would
suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction because “[t]he only evidence of irreparable
harm submitted” was a speculative and conclusory affidavit from the plaintiff’s vice president
stating that “Amesbury will displace Caldwell’s products and Caldwell will lose market share”).
Moreover, AGF argues elsewhere that “the Model 7900 AAV is the only automatic air vent [on]
the market that has a reputation of not leaking.” Moving Br. at 4 (citing McHugh Decl. ¶ 8). If
that is true, imminent irreparable harm seems unlikely, as the relevant sophisticated end-users (e.g.,
subcontractors) would not permanently abandon the Model 7900 AAV in favor of an inferior
product that introduces a leak into their fire safety system. Thus, AGF’s evidence in support of its
market share theory is insufficient to establish irreparable harm.3
3 The record contains evidence of both historical and projected sales for the LVAV-2. See Moss
Decl. ¶ 4; ECF No. 76-1. However, “[e]vidence of potential lost sales alone does not demonstrate
irreparable harm.” LEGO, 799 F. App’x at 833.
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C. 	Reputational Harm
Lastly, AGF argues that, absent a preliminary injunction, “the LVAV-2 will cause
irreparable harm to AGF’s reputation of providing high quality and reliable products because the
LVAV-2 is confusingly similar to the Model 7900 AAV,” but allegedly “has leaking and dripping
problems.” Moving Br. at 16. In other words, AGF argues that customers will buy the LVAV-2
thinking that it is actually the Model 7900 AAV, experience leaking and dripping issues, and then
attribute those problems to AGF—not Core & Main. Id. at 15–16; Reply Br. at 27–28. But AGF
solely relies on Mr. McHugh’s declaration to support this claim. Moving Br. at 15–16 (citing
McHugh Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, 17, 22, 26). In particular, AGF points to Mr. McHugh’s statements that (1)
“the Model 7900 AAV is the [only] automatic air vent in the market that has a reputation of not
leaking,” (2) other products—including the LVAV-2—regularly drip and leak, and (3) confusion
between the Model 7900 AAV and the LVAV-2 will harm AGF’s reputation. McHugh Decl. ¶¶
8, 17, 22, 26.
AGF’s evidence is insufficient to establish irreparable injury via reputational harm. By
relying primarily on Mr. McHugh’s general statements, AGF has failed to adequately support its
claim that customers are likely to erroneously attribute the LVAV-2’s dripping and leaking issues
to AGF. See Jacki Easlick, LLC, 2024 WL 310125, at *8; Nivel Parts & Mfg. Co., LLC v. Textron,
Inc., No. 17-cv-146-J-32JRK, 2017 WL 1552034, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2017) (“Nivel’s
evidence of . . . loss of goodwill . . . confined to Moore’s declaration, constitutes little more than
conjecture.”); MicroAire Surgical, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (“[B]ased solely upon conclusory
statements as to Arthrex’s reputation for quality, MicroAire has, upon this rationale, simply failed
to meet its burden of proving the likelihood of irreparable harm absent the issuance of an
injunction.”); cf. also CellzDirect, 664 F.3d at 930 (affirming district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction where irreparable harm, including reputational harm, was supported by expert
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testimony). For example, AGF’s reputational harm theory hinges on customers confusing the
LVAV-2 with the Model 7900 AAV—or at least incorrectly believing that the LVAV-2 is an AGF
product. Moving Br. at 16 (“Reports of failures, including leaking, of the LVAV-2 will cause
irreparable harm to AGF’s reputation of providing high quality and reliable products because the
LVAV-2 is confusingly similar to the Model 7900 AAV.”). However, AGF’s primary customers
are distributors, who in turn sell to sophisticated end-users, such as contractors. See Moving Br.
at 4, 6 (citing McHugh Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, 12). And AGF presents no evidence that any distributor or
end-user has either (1) confused the LVAV-2 for the Model 7900 AAV or (2) thought that the
LVAV-2 is an AGF product. See Brandywine Prod. Grp. Int’l v. Universal Distribution Ctr. LLC,
No. 16-2248, 2016 WL 5402744, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016) (denying motion for a preliminary
injunction because “[h]ypothetical or speculative [reputational] harm cannot provide a basis for
enjoining [a defendant] without further development of the record”). Thus, AGF’s evidence in
support of its reputational harm theory is insufficient to establish irreparable harm.
* 	* 	*
The purpose of a preliminary injunction “is to protect the moving party from irreparable
injury until the court can render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen
Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1995). AGF has failed to carry its evidentiary
burden on irreparable harm. Therefore, the Court will deny its request for a preliminary injunction
without prejudice.4 See Ferring Pharms., 765 F.3d at 219; see, e.g., Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Task
4 The Court notes that AGF filed its application for a preliminary injunction prior to filing its
amended complaint, ECF Nos. 16, 55. The Court further recognizes that there may have been
subsequent developments pertaining to the record relevant to AGF’s application for preliminary
injunctive relief. For example, the amended complaint references an alleged “communication[—
albeit with no detail—]indicating a belief that Core & Main’s LVAV-2 was AGF’s Model 7900
AAV.” ECF No. 55 ¶ 42. Accordingly, the Court will deny AGF’s motion without prejudice.
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Mgmt. Inc, 792 F. App’x 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding that “[t]he District Court did not abuse
its discretion in denying . . . request for a preliminary injunction” where movant “did not
demonstrate that he would be irreparably harmed by the denial of injunctive relief”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS on this 30th day of January 2026;
ORDERED that AGF’s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 16) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that this Opinion and Order will be filed under temporary seal. It shall be
unsealed unless an appropriate motion to seal (pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5.3(c)) is filed by
February 20, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Claire C. Cecchi
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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