GUTTMAN v. LIFETIME, LLC

2:24-cv-07416Njd17 feb 2026

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ASAF P. GUTTMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIFE FITNESS, LLC,
Defendant.
No. 24-cv-07416 (MEF)(SDA)
OPINION and ORDER
* 	* 	*
For the purposes of this brief Opinion and Order, the Court
largely assumes familiarity with the procedural history and
allegations of this case.
* 	* 	*
The background:
A former gym member1 sued his old gym2 after it terminated his
membership. 	See Complaint and Jury Demand (“Complaint”) (ECF 1-
1) ¶¶ 1, 9-15.
The former gym member (from here, “the Plaintiff”3) pressed
claims of discrimination and retaliation. 	See id. ¶¶ 16-35.
1 	Asaf P. Guttman.
2 	Life Fitness, LLC. 	See Complaint and Jury Demand (ECF 1-1) at
1. 	Elsewhere, the gym is called “LTF Club Operations Company,
Inc.” 	See Notice of Removal (ECF 1) at 1. 	And “Life Time Club
Operations Company, Inc.” 	See Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts Pursuant to L.R. 56.1 (ECF 21-1) ¶ 1.
3 The Plaintiff is pro se. 	So the Court construes his filings
broadly, as it must. 	See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369
(3d Cir. 2003).
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2
The gym (from here, “the Defendant”) has now moved for summary
judgment. 	See Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 21).4
The motion is granted in part.5
* 	* 	*
The Plaintiff’s first claim is for disability discrimination in
violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (the
“ADA”). 	See Complaint ¶¶ 16-19.
4 	The Defendant first moved for summary judgment in January
2025. 	See Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 15). 	The
Plaintiff responded by asking for an extension to file an
amended complaint and serve interrogatories. 	See February 12,
2025 Letter (ECF 19). 	The United States Magistrate Judge
administratively terminated the Defendant’s then-pending summary
judgment motion, opting to allow the Plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint and to reopen fact discovery. 	See April 2, 2025
Order (ECF 20) ¶¶ 2, 5, 7. 	But the Plaintiff did not do either
of these things. 	See July 14, 2025 Letter (ECF 22). 	And so, a
few months later, in June 2025, the Defendant filed a second
summary judgment motion. 	That is the motion now before the
Court. 	The Plaintiff was required to file his opposition to
that motion on or before June 23. 	See June 9, 2025
Automatically Generated Message; D.N.J., United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey 2025 Regular Motion Days,
https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/2025Motions.pdf
(last accessed Feb. 15, 2026). 	But he did not. 	Instead, on
July 8, he filed a letter to “request additional time.” 	July 8,
2025 Letter (ECF 23) at 1. 	Ultimately, via a text order, the
Plaintiff was again provided with a chance to weigh in on the
Defendant’s summary judgment motion. 	See October 30, 2025 Text
Order (ECF 25). 	But instead of doing so, the Plaintiff
explained that he was “unable to meet the requirements set forth
in the order(s).” 	November 11, 2025 Letter (ECF 27). 	Bottom
line: the Plaintiff has not come forward with a substantive
response to the current summary judgment motion, the one filed
in June 2025.
5 	In considering the motion, the Court applies the standard
rules that govern consideration of summary judgment motions.
See Specht v. Suarez, 798 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492 n.9 (D.N.J.
2025).
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3
A plaintiff bringing this sort of claim “must show, as a
threshold matter, that he is ‘disabled’ under the ADA.” 	Bialko
v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000)).6
Why? 	Because the necessary B (a defendant’s allegedly improper
conduct toward the plaintiff --- discrimination) must be
connected up to A (a plaintiff’s disability). 	Without a
disability in the first place, there can be no such connection.
Here, the Plaintiff’s cited disability seems to be that he has a
criminal conviction --- his gym membership was shut down (the
complained-of discrimination) after one of the Defendant’s
employees learned that a person with the Plaintiff’s name was “a
convicted felon.” 	Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
Pursuant to L.R. 56.1 (“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts”)
(ECF 21-1) ¶¶ 19-22; see also Certification of Counsel, Exhibit
5 (“Deposition Transcript”) (ECF 21-11) at 29:21-36:21; 39:10-
16.
But an argument along these lines cannot work, because a
criminal conviction is not a “disability” under the ADA. 	See
West v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 462 F. App’x 170, 171 (3d
Cir. 2011); see also Harris v. Polk County, 103 F.3d 696, 697
(8th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); Paloma v. Murphy, 2024 WL
4903909, at *16-17 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2024).
The Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgement on the
Plaintiff’s ADA disability-discrimination claim.
* 	* 	*
6 	See also Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir.
2002) (noting that “‘disability’” is “the first requirement of
a[n ADA] discrimination case”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1));
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“Disability is the threshold requirement to claim
discrimination under the ADA.”); Kellogg v. Energy Safety
Servs., Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The first
element of a discrimination claim under the ADA is proof that
the plaintiff has a qualifying ‘disability’ under the
statute.”); Eustace v. S. Buffalo Mercy Hosp., 36 F. App’x 673,
674 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A discrimination claim under the ADA
requires . . . proof that the plaintiff was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.”).
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4
The Plaintiff also presses a second claim under the ADA, for
retaliation. 	See Complaint ¶¶ 20-23.
“[U]nlike a general ADA discrimination claim, an ADA retaliation
claim does not require that the plaintiff demonstrate a
disability within the meaning of the ADA.” 	Sulima v. Tobyhanna
Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).
But the Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation count does not work for
another reason.
An ADA retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to “first
establish that he was engaged in protected conduct.” 	Cottrell
v. Good Wheels, 458 F. App’x 98, 100 (3d Cir. 2012) (cleaned
up).
Typical examples of protected activity are asking for an
accommodation, like a ramp to smooth the path for a person in a
wheelchair. 	Or making a filing with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 	Or complaining about certain workplace
conditions. 	See Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d
183, 184-86, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2003).
But while the Plaintiff here has pointed to complaints he made
to the Defendant-gym, his grievances are a long way from the
sorts of complaints that can amount to protected conduct under
the ADA. 	Cf. Stouch v. Township of Irvington, 354 F. App’x 660,
667 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant retaliated against him
after he complained about “various pieces of lost personal
property, such as swimming trunks and goggles.” 	Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 26, 40; see also Deposition
Transcript at 9:2-18, 11:5-24, 12:13-16, 21:11-15, 50:4-51:8.
But these are complaints about the everyday working of the gym
and its lost-and-found system. 	They are not protected conduct
under the ADA. 	Cf. Nelson-Rogers v. Kaiser Permanente, 2020 WL
917067, at *12-13 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2020) (concluding that filing
a complaint about air quality at one’s place of employment is
“not protected conduct under the ADA”); Stouch, 354 F. App’x at
667 (noting that the plaintiff’s “complaints to supervisors and
OSHA about the communications room were not related to any
disability but, rather, focused on his dissatisfaction with the
conditions of the room”).
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5
To cite another example, the Plaintiff complained that his
“membership [was] not . . . upgraded in time,” so for a brief
interval7 he did not get access to a particular area at one of
the gym locations in the Defendant’s chain. 	See Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 34, 40; see also Deposition
Transcript at 9:18-10:9, 10:13-11:2, 12:18-22, 20:13-20, 21:11-
15.
But same point. 	This is simply not the stuff of “protected
conduct” shielded from retaliation by the ADA.
Summary judgment must be granted as to the Plaintiff’s second
ADA claim. 	“[A] reasonable jury could not conclude that [the
Plaintiff’s membership] termination was causally connected to
any activity protected under the ADA.” 	Oirya v. Mando Am.
Corp., 2024 WL 1462500, at *8 (11th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024). 	There
is no evidence here of any such protected activity.8
* 	* 	*
With the federal claims out of the case, what remains is a
series of state-law claims. 	See Complaint ¶¶ 1, 24-35.
7 	The issue was resolved on the same day it emerged. 	See
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 36; Deposition
Transcript at 38:2-4.
8 	An added note. 	At two points in the complaint, the Plaintiff
refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 	See Complaint ¶¶ 1, 17. 	The first
reference suggests the Plaintiff wishes to press a stand-alone
Section 1981 claim. 	See id. ¶ 1. 	But to make out such a claim,
a plaintiff must put forward, among other things, evidence that
he “is a member of a racial minority,” and that there was
“intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant.”
Brown v. Phillip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001).
But the Plaintiff does not speak to either of these. 	The second
time it is referenced in the complaint, Section 1981 comes up in
the context of the Plaintiff laying out his ADA discrimination
count. 	See Complaint ¶ 17. 	That suggests the Plaintiff (who is
pro se, see footnote 3) may mean to be invoking 42 U.S.C. §
1981a, which, among other things, “expands” the remedies
available for ADA discrimination claims. 	See Israelitt v.
Enter. Servs. LLC, 78 F.4th 647, 659 (4th Cir. 2023). 	But the
Court has concluded that summary judgment must be granted in the
Defendants’ favor as to the ADA discrimination claim. 	So the
remedies that might be available under Section 1981a for such a
claim are not relevant here.
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6
As to those, the Defendant asserts that “[t]ypically, a federal
court would engage in a supplemental-jurisdiction analysis to
determine whether it has the requisite authority to decide these
state-law claims.” 	Legal Brief in Support of Defendant LTF Club
Operations Company, Inc. i/s/a Lifetime, LLC’s Renewed Motion
for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Brief”) (ECF 21-3) at 9-10.
That would make sense if jurisdiction in this case was anchored
in federal-question jurisdiction (as to the ADA claims) and the
supplemental jurisdiction that stretches out from there (to
cover the state-law claims).
And the Defendant removed this case to federal court on just
that jurisdictional theory. 	See Notice of Removal (ECF 1) ¶¶
14-15.
But the Defendant also leaned on another jurisdictional theory.
It contended that this Court has jurisdiction under the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	See id. ¶ 16.
If there is, indeed, diversity jurisdiction here, it would seem
that the demise of the federal-law ADA claims is immaterial ---
because one way or another the state-law claims must be taken
on.
As to the merits of the state-law claims, the Defendant’s
argument is terse --- just over a page, mainly focused on the
argument that that the Plaintiff “has never identified which
State laws [the Defendant] allegedly violated.” 	Defendant’s
Brief at 10; see also id. (“In addition to his federal claims,
[the P]laintiff pleaded unspecified violations of various
unnamed New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Minnesota State
‘human rights laws.’”).
But this may not be persuasive.
New York, for example, has a law called the New York State Human
Rights Law. 	See N.Y. Exec. Law. § 290 et seq. 	Why should the
Court conclude that the Plaintiff has not identified it
particularly enough in his complaint? 	See Complaint at 4
(invoking the “New York State Human Rights Law”); id. ¶ 29
(same); see also id. at 5 (“New York State City Human Rights
Law”).
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Moreover, 	it 	may 	be 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	Court's 	normal
treatment 	of 	prose 	complaints 9 	not 	to 	take 	the 	Plaintiff's
invocation 	of 	"the 	New 	Jersey 	State 	Human 	Rights 	Law," 	see 	id.
ii 	1, 	25, 	29, 	as 	a 	reference 	to 	the 	"New 	Jersey 	Law Against
Discrimination." 	See 	N.J. 	Stat. 	Ann. 	§ 	10:5-1 	et 	seq.
Against 	the 	backdrop 	set 	out 	above, 	the 	Court 	will 	allow 	the
parties 	to 	make 	supplemental 	submissions 	related 	to 	the
Plaintiff's 	state-law 	claims 	--- 	as 	to, 	for 	example, 	whether
there 	is 	diversity 	jurisdiction 	here; 	and 	as 	to 	whether 	the
Defendant's 	summary 	judgment motion 	works 	on 	the 	merits. 	The
Defendant's 	supplemental 	submission 	is 	due 	on March 	17. 	The
Plaintiff's 	is 	due 	on 	April 	17. 	Each 	shall 	be 	in 	the 	form 	of 	a
letter 	brief 	that 	musters 	the 	relevant 	case 	law; 	the 	letter
briefs 	may 	attach 	any 	necessary 	excerpts 	from 	the 	discovery.
* 	* 	*
As 	to 	the 	two 	Americans 	with 	Disabilities 	Act 	claims 	and 	the
Plaintiff's 	Section 	1981 	claim 	(to 	the 	extent 	one 	is 	being
raised), 	the 	Defendant's 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	at 	ECF 	21
is 	granted.
As 	to 	the 	remaining 	state-law 	claims, 	the 	Defendant's 	ECF 	21
motion 	is 	administratively 	terminated. 	This 	case 	will 	be
returned 	to 	the 	Court's 	active 	docket 	on 	April 	18, 	after 	the
further 	briefing 	described 	above 	has 	been 	filed.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	17th 	day 	of 	February, 	2026,,,$5 ORDERED.
:'/;,!}/y
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
9 	See, 	e.g., 	Webb 	v. 	Hillside 	Mun. 	Police 	Dep't, 	2026 	WL 	91682,
at 	*1 	n.5 	(D.N.J. 	Jan. 	13, 	2026); 	see 	also 	Higgins 	v. 	Beyer, 	293
F.3d 	683, 	688 	(3d 	Cir. 	2002) 	("[a]s 	Higgins 	filed 	his 	complaint
prose, 	we 	will 	apply 	the 	applicable 	law, 	irrespective 	of
whether 	a 	prose 	litigant 	has 	mentioned 	it 	by 	name.") 	(cleaned
up).
7
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