GOODWIN v. T-MOBILE USA, INC.

2:24-cv-05655Njd17 feb 2026

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARVIN GOODWIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:24-cv-05655 (BRM) (LDW)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Marvin Goodwin’s (“Plaintiff”) second amended
complaint (“Second Amended Complaint”). (ECF No. 15.) Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s
motions for reconsideration of the Court’s prior Opinion and Order. (ECF No. 17; ECF No. 18.)
Having reviewed and considered same, for the reasons set forth below and for good cause having
been shown, the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, and the motions for reconsideration
are DISMISSED as moot.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court will construe the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true for the
purpose of this Opinion. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The
Second Amended Complaint raises claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523,1 and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, as well as
1 Plaintiff indicates he is raising claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. (See ECF No. 15 at 2–3.) However, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523.
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a state law breach of contract claim. (ECF No. 15 at 2–3.) Plaintiff brings his claims against T-
Mobile USA, Inc. (“Defendant T-Mobile”). (Id. at 1.)
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff submits in October 2024, he discovered
Defendant T-Mobile “wrongfully provided law enforcement access to Plaintiff’s private cell phone
records” based on “electronic signatures which law enforcement purported to be those of judges.”
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges the unauthorized release of his phone records violated “the Stored
Communicates Act; Plaintiff’s privacy rights; and applicable consumer protection laws.” (Id. at
2.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Id. at 2–3.)
B. Procedural History
On July 3, 2024, after granting Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the
Court screened Plaintiff’s initial complaint for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See
ECF No. 3; ECF No. 4.) The Court dismissed the initial complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. (See id.) The Court permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.) On July 2, 2025,
the Court screened the first amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed
the amended complaint without prejudice. (ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12.) The Court provided Plaintiff
with leave to file a second amended complaint. (See id.)
On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff submitted his Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 15.)
Subsequent to the filing of his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed two motions for
reconsideration of the Court’s July 2, 2025, Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiff’s first amended
complaint upon screening. (ECF No. 17; ECF No. 18.) As the Court provided Plaintiff with leave
to file his Second Amended Complaint, and the Second Amended Complaint re-raises the claims
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in his first amended complaint, the Court will accept the Second Amended Complaint for filing
and will dismiss the motions for reconsideration as moot.
At this time, the Court must review the Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2), to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321-
66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action
is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A
because Plaintiff is a prisoner who is proceeding as indigent.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “[a] pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “‘sufficient
factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470,
483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are
liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support
a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
III. 	DECISION
Plaintiff 	alleges 	Defendant 	T-Mobile 	violated 	his 	rights 	under 	the 	Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523, the Stored Communications
Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, and state law for breach of contract. (ECF No. 15 at 2–3.)
A. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Plaintiff alleges Defendant T-Mobile violated the ECPA, also referred to as the Federal
Wiretap Act, by “disclosing Plaintiff’s private communications without valid legal process.” (Id.
at 3.)
A plaintiff pleads a prima facie case under the ECPA by “showing that the defendant ‘(1)
intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured another person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic communication, (5) using a device.’” In
re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003)). The ECPA provides a private
remedy against an individual who “intercepts” private electronic communication. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511; see also 18 US.C. § 2510(4); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d
Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 20, 2004). A defendant is only liable when he or she “intercept[s]”
information “contemporaneously with [its] transmission.” Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113.
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Plaintiff alleges only Defendant T-Mobile unlawfully provided law enforcement with his
phone records. (ECF No. 15 at 2.) Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a claim that Defendant
illegally intercepted Plaintiff’s private phone calls contemporaneously with their transmission.
Plaintiff alleges no facts that Defendant intercepted Plaintiff’s phone calls in any way. As such,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under ECPA, and this claim will be
dismissed without prejudice.
B. Stored Communications Act Claim
Plaintiff raises a claim against Defendant T-Mobile for a violation of the SCA. (ECF No.
15 at 3.) Plaintiff submits Defendant provided law enforcement access to Plaintiff’s private cell
phone records based on warrants with electronic signatures that law enforcement officers
“purported to be those of judges.” (See ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 15 at 2.) Plaintiff appears to
allege Defendant violated their own internal policies regarding electronic signatures because the
signatures did not actually belong to judges. (ECF No. 15 at 2.)
Stating a claim under the SCA requires a plaintiff to show the defendant “(1) intentionally
accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains,
alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage in such system.” In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d at
145–56 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a))).
Plaintiff fails to plead facts to state a SCA claim. The Court construes the Second Amended
Complaint as alleging Defendant T-Mobile exceeded its authority to access its own facility and
obtained Plaintiff’s stored electronic communications for law enforcement. Plaintiff claims
Defendant T-Mobile provided law enforcement with his phone records. Plaintiff also appears to
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allege Defendant T-Mobile acted upon warrants that had false judge signatures. Plaintiff fails to
provide any facts regarding how the signatures were false. Plaintiff also fails to allege facts that
Defendant knew the signatures did not belong to a judge. The Second Amended Complaint fails
to plead sufficient facts to show the Defendant T-Mobile exceeded its authority when it complied
with a signed warrant and provided Plaintiff’s phone records to law enforcement. As such, Plaintiff
fails to sufficiently plead a SCA claim, and said claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
As the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court therefore
declines supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law breach of contract claim. That claim
is therefore dismissed without prejudice at this time.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 15) without prejudice. As the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint, the Court will dismiss as moot the motions for reconsideration (ECF No. 17;
ECF No. 18). The Court shall give Plaintiff thirty days to file a third amended complaint if he
chooses to cure the deficiencies discussed above. An appropriate Order follows.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 17, 2026
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