USA v. BURNS et al

2:24-cr-00255Njd26 feb 2026

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIE BURNS, et al.,
Defendants.
Criminal Action No. 24-cr-255 (JXN)
OPINION
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court are Defendants Willie Burns (“Burns”) and Doniesha Coar’s (“Coar”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) omnibus pre-trial motions. (ECF Nos. 32, 33.) Plaintiff United States
of America (“Government”) opposed both motions. (ECF No. 37.) The Court has carefully
considered the parties’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to
Local Civil Rule 78.1, which is applicable to criminal cases under Local Criminal Rule 1.1. For
the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ omnibus pre-trial motions are GRANTED in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Starting in January 2024, the Jersey City Police Department investigated Defendants’
involvement in a series of retaliatory gang shootings. (Crim. Compl. at *5.2) Police were “familiar
with” Defendants based on their alleged gang membership. (Id.) On February 8, 2024, Jersey City
Police officers attempted to stop a black Range Rover registered to Coar. (Id.) Coar slowed down,
1 The facts come from the criminal complaint filed against Defendants (Criminal Compl., ECF No. 1), which the Court
may rely on to review a suppression motion. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (“At a suppression
hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at
trial.”) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 173 (1974)).
2 Pincites preceded by an asterisk (*) indicate pagination according to CM/ECF headers.
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ran through a red light, and drove into a gas station. (Id.) Officers saw Burns put something inside
the backseat center armrest as they approached the Range Rover. (Id.)
Coar admitted she had cocaine on her person, which officers found in her jacket pocket.
(Id.) Coar was then arrested. (Id.) In the driver’s side door, officers saw “a red tinted medicine
bottle with the label torn off, which appeared to contain promethazine with codeine.” (Id.)
Officers towed the Range Rover and applied for a search warrant, which a New Jersey
Superior Court judge granted the next day. (See id.; Search Warrant, ECF No. 37-1.) A search of
the Range Rover uncovered more bottles of promethazine, marijuana, and two loaded handguns,
one under the driver’s seat and the other (which had a defaced serial number) in the backseat center
armrest. (Crim. Compl. at *5-6.) Burns previously served five years in prison for aggravated
assault, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of controlled substances. (Id. at *6.)
Police arrested Burns on February 10, 2024. (Id.) The Government filed a three-count
criminal complaint against Defendants ten days later. (See id.) Count One charged Burns with
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(Id. at *2.) Count Two charged Coar for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(C). (Id. at *3.) Count Three charged Coar with possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
(Id. at *4.) Two months later, a grand jury indicted Defendants on the same three counts.
(Indictment, ECF No. 17.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants filed separate omnibus pre-trial motions. Burns moves to suppress the handgun
found in Coar’s Range Rover, arguing he did not consent to the search of the Range Rover, and
requests an evidentiary hearing. (Burns Moving Br. at 4-6, ECF No. 32.) Burns also moves to
compel the disclosure of Brady and Giglio evidence, Jencks materials, 404(b) evidence, expert
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discovery, and the names of witnesses who testified before the grand jury. (Id. at 6-11.) He also
seeks a hearing on the admissibility of his prior convictions and requests leave to file additional
pre-trial motions if needed. (Id. at 11-12.)
Coar notes she intends to file her own motion to suppress but cannot do so absent additional
discovery. (Coar Moving Br. at 3, ECF No. 33.) She claims “[t]he government made a good faith
effort to provide the discovery, but it was provided in a medium that neither counsel could open
nor view.”3 (Id.) Coar moves to compel the disclosure of: Brady and Giglio evidence, Jencks
materials, 404(b) evidence, expert discovery, and, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure4 16,
every item the Government intends to use in its case in chief. (Id. at 3-13.) Coar joins Burns’
request for disclosure of grand jury witnesses, a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of prior
convictions, and leave to file additional pre-trial motions if needed. (Id. at 13-14.)
A. 	Burns’ Motion to Suppress
i. 	Request for an Evidentiary Hearing
The Court “may” schedule an evidentiary hearing on a pretrial motion. Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(c)(1). The party seeking an evidentiary hearing must “(1) state a colorable legal claim, (2)
identify facts material to that claim, (3) show why the facts are disputed, and then (4) request a
hearing to resolve the dispute.” United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2010). The
motion must be “sufficiently specific, non-conjectural, and detailed to enable the [C]ourt to
conclude” the defendant has raised material facts related to his constitutional claim. Id. at 105; see
also United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996).
3 The Government states it “is working with [Coar’s] counsel to remedy the issue expeditiously.” (Gov’t Opp’n Br. 7,
ECF No. 37.)
4 “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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Here, Burns states only that “[t]here are disputed facts in this case that are material.” (Burns
Moving Br. at 6.) He has not identified, however, what the facts are or why they are material or
disputed. The Court thus denies Burns’ request for an evidentiary hearing.
ii. 	Suppression Motion
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A search or seizure is generally reasonable if it was conducted with “a warrant based upon probable
cause.” United States v. Bey, 911 F.3d 139, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Brown,
448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006)). Conversely, a search or seizure without a warrant is
“presumptively unreasonable” unless the Government shows, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that each action constituting a search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 145.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967). To invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protections, a person must have “a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property searched and the item seized.” United States v. Shabazz, 533
F. App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-97 (1990)). That
expectation must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable. See Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“A Fourth Amendment search does not occur . . . unless ‘the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society
[is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
Consequently, “[i]t is clear that a passenger in a car that he neither owns nor leases typically has
no standing to challenge a search of the car.” United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 441-42 (3d
Cir. 2000). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) abrogated in part on other grounds
by Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1993) (“A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
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seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”).
Burns has no reasonable expectation of privacy in Coar’s Range Rover, a car he neither
drove nor owned. The Fourth Amendment does not protect him against the search of the Range
Rover. Accordingly, the Court denies Burns’ motion to suppress the handgun.5
B. 	Defendants’ Discovery Motions
i. 	Brady and Giglio Evidence
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “requires
prosecutors to affirmatively disclose evidence that is favorable to a defendant to his counsel.” Rega
v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.4th 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2024). Under Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972), “the government must disclose materials that go to the question of guilt or
innocence as well as materials that might affect the jury’s judgment of the credibility of a crucial
prosecution witness.” United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 357 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2002)). Brady and Giglio evidence must be disclosed
“in time for its effective use at trial.” United States v. Mangan, 747 F. Supp. 3d 740, 747 (D.N.J.
2024) (citation omitted). District courts have discretion “to order the pretrial disclosure of Brady
material to ensure the effective administration of the criminal justice system.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Giampa, 904 F. Supp. 235, 281 (D.N.J. 1995)).
Here, the Government acknowledges it has and will continue to comply with its
Brady/Giglio obligations. (See Gov’t Opp’n Br. at 7, ECF No. 37.) Defendants have not provided
any facts to the contrary. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motions to compel
5 Even if Burns had standing to contest the search, his challenge would still fail. Police had a warrant to search the
Range Rover. Searches based on warrants supported by probable cause are generally reasonable. Bey, 911 F.3d at 144-
45. And Burns does not challenge the warrant itself.
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Brady/Giglio disclosures. See Mangan, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (denying motion to compel
Brady/Giglio evidence where government acknowledged it had and would continue to comply
with both obligations).
ii. 	Jencks Materials and 404(b) Evidence
“The Court generally determines the dates for disclosure of Rule 404(b) and Jencks Act
materials after a final pre-trial conference between the parties.” Id. at 746 (quoting United States
v. Edwards, No. 20-572, 2024 WL 1620311, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2024)). “Pursuant to the District
of New Jersey’s Standing Order 15-2 ¶ 17, the final pretrial conference should occur ‘no sooner
than two weeks following the disposition of pretrial motions.’” United States v. Mix, No. 24-741,
2025 WL 2731379, at *26 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2025). Because the Court has not yet scheduled a final
pretrial conference, the Court denies Defendants’ motions to compel the early disclosure of Jencks
Act materials and 404(b) evidence.
iii. 	Grand Jury Materials
Burns seeks disclosure of the names of witnesses who testified before the grand jury under
Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) and general principles of due process. (Burns Moving Br. at 9). Coar joins his
request. (Coar Moving Br. at 14.)
“It is settled federal policy that the grand jury system requires secrecy of grand jury
proceedings.” In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982). Rule 6(e) preserves
“secrecy by preventing the disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.” Id. Rule 6(e) is
“designed to protect from disclosure only the essence of what takes place in the grand jury room,
in order to preserve the freedom and integrity of the deliberative process.” Id. (quoting In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1980)). Accordingly, Rule 6(e) bars the direct or
indirect disclosure of “anything which may reveal what occurred before the grand jury.” Id.
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But grand jury secrecy is not absolute. The Court may disclose grand jury materials
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). The
party seeking disclosure “must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible
injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for
continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed.” Douglas
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). This is a high bar. The party seeking
disclosure must make “a strong showing of particularized need for grand jury materials before any
disclosure will be permitted.” United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983).
Burns does not make a strong showing of particularized need for the names of witnesses
who testified before the grand jury. He claims the information is necessary to “learn whether all
those who testified in support of his indictment testified at trial.” (Burns Moving Br. at 9.) Burns
further opines that, if some grand jury witnesses do not testify at trial, he could “evaluate whether
that witness possesses any favorable or useful information and whether to request an adverse
inference instruction.” (Id.)
But Burns’ arguments “fall short of proof that without the [names of grand jury witnesses]
a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without reference to it an injustice would be done.”
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). While the names of grand jury
witnesses would undoubtedly be useful to Burns, it does not outweigh the need for secrecy. The
Court must “consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular grand jury, but also the
possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries.” Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222.
“Persons called upon to testify will consider the likelihood that their testimony may one day be
disclosed to outside parties. Fear of future retribution or social stigma may act as powerful
deterrents to those who would come forward and aid the grand jury in the performance of its
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duties.” Id. And, in cases like this one, which arose out of an investigation into retaliatory gang
shootings, “[c]oncern as to the future consequences of frank and full testimony is heightened.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court denies Burns’ request for the names of witnesses who testified
before the grand jury.
iv. 	Expert Discovery
Burns requests “all scientific and expert reports or test results, as well as a summary of the
testimony which the government intends to introduce through any expert witness.” (Burns Moving
Br. at 10.) Coar states “[i]t is unknown at this time whether the government will seek to introduce
testimony of any experts,” but requests reports, results, and summaries if the Government calls
any experts. (Coar Moving Br. at 12.) The Government, meanwhile, “contemplates presenting
expert testimony that the firearms at issue are operable, or may readily be converted to be operable,
that the firearm attributed to Mr. Burns affected interstate commerce, and that the drugs at issue
were in fact controlled substances.” (Gov’t Opp’n Br. at 12.) But the Government assures it “will
provide expert reports and accompanying information with sufficient notice prior to trial.” (Id.)
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motions without prejudice.
v. 	Rule 16 Discovery
Coar requests the Government immediately produce and/or identify “any document,
photograph, video, building, place or document that the government intends to use in its case-in-
chief at trial.” (Coar Moving Br. at 12.) The Government argues Coar essentially requests the
Government’s exhibit list; Rule 16 does not require the immediate disclosure of the Government’s
exhibit list; the request is premature because a trial date has not been set; and once a trial date is
set, the Government will disclose its witness list. (Gov’t Opp’n Br. at 13-14.) The Court agrees
that the request is premature, and Coar has not demonstrated the Government will not abide by its
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Rule 16 obligations or fail to disclose the exhibit list. Accordingly, the Court denies Coar’s request
as premature.
vi. 	Rule 609 Hearing
Burns requests an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of his prior
convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. (Burns Moving Br. at 11.) The Government “does
not oppose [the request] in principle” but argues such a hearing should take place closer to trial
and the request should be denied as premature. (Gov’t Opp’n at 12.) The Court agrees that such a
hearing should take place closer to trial and denies Burns’ request without prejudice.
vii. 	Leave to File Additional Motions
Defendants request leave to file additional motions based on newly filed evidence. The
Government does not oppose. The Court, therefore, grants the motion so long as any additional
motion is based on future discovery or newly discovered information.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ omnibus pre-trial motions (ECF No. 32 (Burns);
33 (Coar)) are GRANTED in part. Burns’ motion to suppress and request for a Rule 609 hearing
are DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ motions to compel the immediate production of
Brady/Giglio evidence, Jencks Act materials, 404(b) evidence, the identities of grand jury
witnesses, expert discovery, and the Government’s exhibit list are DENIED. Defendants’ requests
for leave to file additional motions based on newly discovered evidence are GRANTED. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATED: _2/26/2026______ 	_______________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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