RITCHWOOD v. HORTEN et al

2:23-cv-22883Njd13 gen 2026

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JASON RITCHWOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS HORTEN, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 23-22883 (JXN)(JBC)
OPINION
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court are the application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”)
(ECF No. 1-3) and Complaint (ECF No. 1) filed by pro se Plaintiff Jason Ritchwood (“Plaintiff”)
against Defendants Thomas Horten, Mil Val Motors Inc. DBA Essex County Towing (“Essex
County Towing”), Township of South Orange, Sean Walker, Alan Dieso, Hipoleto Felix, and John
Does 1-8 (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2024, this Court dismissed a complaint (“Ritchwood I”) filed by Plaintiff,
which sought damages from Defendants, Township of South Orange and Essex County Towing,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See generally Ritchwood v. Essex Cnty. Towing, No. 23-
20374, 2024 WL 1537250 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2024). Plaintiff appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed
this Court’s judgment. See generally Ritchwood v. Essex Cnty. Towing, No. 24-1727, 2024 WL
5244549 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2024).
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on December 4, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s new
Complaint arises out of the same events, the towing of Plaintiff’s car on June 17, 2022, and lists
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the Township of South Orange and Essex County Towing once again as defendants. Plaintiff has
now, however, added several police officers as defendants and has raised Section 1983 and
conversion claims in lieu of his prior replevin claim. (See id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When a litigant petitions the Court to proceed without the prepayment of fees and the
petition is granted, the Court has an obligation to screen the complaint sua sponte to determine
whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Fair 	Wind 	Sailing, 	Inc. 	v. 	Dempster, 	764 	F.3d 	303, 	308 	n.3 	(3d 	Cir. 	2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application
Under Section 1915, this Court may excuse a litigant from prepayment of fees when the
litigant “establish[es] that he is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Walker v. People Express
Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff has provided the requested
information in his IFP application. (See generally ECF No. 1-3.) Plaintiff represents to making
$375 a month from self-employment; Plaintiff’s claimed monthly expenses dwarf his monthly
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income, totaling $11,400 in transportation as well as “[m]onthly [l]iving, food[,] and other
aproximate [sic] expenses on credit.” (ECF No. 1-3 at 2-5.) Therefore, because Plaintiff’s monthly
income is much lower than his monthly expenses, Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED.
B. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff’s complaint is duplicative of the Ritchwood I complaint that this Court dismissed
with prejudice in April 2024. See Demby v. Cnty. of Camden, No. 23-cv-2042, 2023 WL 5970925,
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2023). Both complaints allege that Plaintiff’s “property” was towed in the
presence of police officers or otherwise people “dressed as . . . law officer[s].” (See, e.g., ECF No.
1 at 5.) Indeed, it is well established that a plaintiff may not repackage their previously dismissed
complaint by adding new defendants or alternative legal theories. See, e.g., Ouaziz v. Murphy, No.
23-cv-2696, 2024 WL 397708, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2024) (citing Gambocz v. Yelencsis, 468 F.2d
837 (3d Cir. 1972)) (holding that a plaintiff could not reassert a dismissed claim even where he
has added new defendants); Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing United
States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)) (stating that “a plaintiff who
asserts a different theory of recovery” in their new suit must have their claim dismissed “when the
events underlying the two suits are essentially the same”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint must
be DISMISSED with prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 1-3) is
GRANTED, and the Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate
Order accompanies this Opinion.
_______________________
DATED: January 13, 2026 	JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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