EXP GROUP LLC v. FRES CO. LLC

2:23-cv-03180Njd4 mar 2026

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
EXP GROUP LLC,
Respondent-Appellant,
v.
FRES CO LLC,
Complainant-Appellee.
Civil Action No. 23-3180
OPINION
March 3, 2026
SEMPER, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Complainant-Appellee Fres Co LLC (“Fres
Co” or “Appellee”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF 60, “Mot.”) Respondent-Appellant EXP
Group LLC (“EXP” or “Appellant”) filed an opposition to the motion (ECF 68, “Opp.”) and Fres
Co filed a reply. (ECF 71, “Reply”.) The Court reviewed the submissions made in support of and
in opposition to the motion and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, Appellee’s motion
for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
The instant action is an appeal from a decision and order entered by a Judicial Officer of
the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (the “Secretary”) directing EXP to
1 The facts and procedural history are drawn from Appellee’s brief in support of the motion for
summary judgment (ECF 60), Appellee’s statement of undisputed material facts (ECF 60-3, “Fres
SMF”), Appellant’s opposition papers (ECF 68) and response to and counter-statement of material
facts (ECF 68-1), and the administrative record filed by the United States Department of
Agriculture (ECF 30, “Admin. Record”).
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reimburse Fres Co for a small sum pursuant to the Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, 7
U.S.C. § 499a, et seq. (“PACA”) for the shipping costs of a misdelivered container of plantains.
(See ECF 30 at 68-78, “USDA Op.”) On July 30, 2021, Fres Co agreed to purchase 1,080 cartons
of plantains from a grower, Exchangecorp, S.A. (“Exchangecorp”), based in Ecuador. (Fres SMF
¶ 3.) Fres Co incurred ocean freight charges of $6,205.00 to transport the plantains from Ecuador
to the port of Red Hook in Brooklyn, New York. (Id. ¶ 4.)
On August 12, 2021, upon arrival at the port of Red Hook, the plantains were misdelivered
to EXP’s warehouse rather than to Fres Co. (Id. ¶ 5; USDA Op. ¶¶ 5-6.) EXP’s truck driver had
not been given the opportunity to inspect the container or its contents before the truck left the Red
Hook marine terminal. (USDA Op. ¶ 5.) During the process of unloading, EXP discovered the
shipping container and presumed the Red Hook terminal had loaded the wrong container onto its
truck. (Id. ¶ 6.) That evening, EXP transported the container of plantains to Fres Co’s warehouse.
(Id. ¶ 7.) Fres Co immediately requested that the local USDA office inspect the shipment, but that
inspection did not occur. (Id.) Without the USDA inspection, Fres Co refused the shipment. (Id.)
EXP brought the plantains back to its own warehouse. (Id.)
The next day, Exchangecorp informed EXP that it was in their “best interest” to sell the
plantains to EXP to avoid a loss. (Id. ¶ 8.) EXP and Exchangecorp entered into a contract for the
sale of the shipment of plantains. (Id.) EXP then sold the plantains to various buyers on August
13, 2021, and paid Exchangecorp $14,310.00 for the shipment. (Id.; Fres SMF ¶ 6.)
On August 18, 2021, Fres Co commenced an administrative proceeding against EXP before
the United States Department of Agriculture (the “USDA”) pursuant to pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §
499f, and the interpreting regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 47.1, et seq. (Fres SMF ¶ 8.) Fres Co sought
compensation in the amount of $22,135.00, which represented the difference between the
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$30,240.00 market value of the plantains and the $14,310.00 that EXP paid Exchangecorp, plus
$6,205.000 for freight and handling. (USDA Op. at 4.)
On January 11, 2023, the Secretary found partly in Fres Co’s favor and directed EXP to
pay Fres Co the cost of ocean freight in the amount of $6,205.00, with interest at the rate of 4.73
percent per annum from September 1, 2021, until paid, plus $500.00, which represents the filing
fee paid by Fres Co. (Fres SMF ¶ 10.) The Secretary wrote that:
[EXP] received the plantains free of freight charges, and [EXP] sold the plantains
at market prices, which presumably include the cost of freight from origin to
destination…. As [EXP] should, under the circumstances, pay the freight charges
associated with bringing the container from Ecuador to New York, we conclude
that [EXP] is liable to [Fres Co] in the amount of $6,205.00 for ocean freight
expenses that were, in effect, paid by [Fres Co] on [EXP’s] behalf.
(Id. ¶ 11) (quoting USDA Op. at 9.) The Secretary determined that Fres Co “bore the risk of any
damage and delay in transit not caused by Exchangecorp, S.A.” (USDA Op. at 5.) The Secretary
acknowledged that the parties disputed what happened after the Red Hook terminal personnel
loaded the container onto EXP’s truck in error (Fres Co alleged that EXP did not store the plantains
under the proper conditions at its warehouse and that when they were eventually delivered to Fres
Co, it “could immediately tell that the goods were in poor condition” while EXP claimed that Fres
Co refused to sign for and accept the container). (Id. at 5-6.) Regardless, the Secretary found that
EXP was not liable for the resale of the plantains because “the party in possession of a perishable
commodity under such circumstances has a positive duty to effect a prompt resale of that
commodity in order to mitigate damages.” 	(Id. at 6) (quoting Dew-Gro, Inc. v. First Nat’l
Supermarkets, Inc., 42 Agric. Dec. 2020, 2025-26 (1983).) The Secretary thus rejected Fres Co’s
attempt to recover its lost profit, while finding that EXP was liable to Fres Co for the ocean freight
charges “associated with bringing the container from Ecuador to New York” that were “in effect,
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paid by [Fres Co] on [EXP]’s behalf.” (Id. at 9.) The USDA affirmed the decision on May 11,
2023. (Fres SMF ¶ 12.)
EXP filed the instant appeal on June 9, 2023. 	(See ECF 1, “Compl.”) 	The appeal is
governed by 7 U.S.C. § 499g(c), which authorizes parties “adversely affected” by a reparation
order to appeal to a federal district court, and provides that the proceedings “shall be a trial de
novo and shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that the findings of
fact and order or orders of the Secretary shall be prima-facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
7 U.S.C. § 499g(c). The Court therefore adopts the findings of fact contained in the Secretary’s
September 1, 2021 decision and order herein.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted
if the movant shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact [and] the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204
(3d Cir. 2000); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Peters v. Del. River Port Auth. of Pa. & N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact
remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an issue on
which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be
discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
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Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A fact is only “material” for
purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” 	Id. 	Unsupported allegations, subjective beliefs, or argument alone, however, cannot
forestall 	summary 	judgment. 	See Lujan 	v. 	Nat’l 	Wildlife 	Fed’n, 	497 	U.S. 	871, 	888
(1988) (nonmoving party may not successfully oppose summary judgment motion by simply
replacing “conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an
affidavit.”). Thus, if the nonmoving party fails “to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. . . . there can be ‘no genuine issue of material fact,’ since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23). Moreover, the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
On a PACA appeal, “the Secretary’s findings [are] conclusive unless effectively rebutted.”
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1033 (1988); see also Genecco Produce, Inc. v.
Sandia Depot, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). Therefore, Fres Co, as the
prevailing party before the Secretary, meets its initial burden as movant “by showing that there is
an absence of evidence to rebut the prima facie case presented by the Secretary’s order.” Frito-
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Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (granting summary judgment to movant who demonstrated absence of
evidence to rebut Secretary’s finding of violation of 7 U.S.C. § 499b)). Unless EXP as the non-
moving party “identifies evidence which, if credited by the trier of fact, would rebut the prima
facie case established through the USDA’s decision,” Fres Co is entitled to summary judgment as
“a determination as a matter of law that [EXP]’s challenge to the USDA’s decision cannot
succeed.” 	Joe Randazzo’s Fruit & Vegetable, Inc. v. W-W Produce, Inc., 04-75045, 2007 WL
925795, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2007). With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the
present motion.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Fres Co argues that the USDA properly awarded the recovery of shipping expenses for
EXP’s failure to pay them in violation of Section 2 of the PACA (7 U.S.C. § 499b), and that
summary judgment should be granted in Fres Co’s favor because there are no material facts in
dispute. 	(Mot. at 2.) 	EXP asserts three bases for overturning the Secretary’s decision: (1) the
Secretary lacked jurisdiction to award Fres Co shipping costs, (2) the Secretary erred as a matter
of law when awarding reparations under PACA for shipping costs incurred through a transaction
with a third party, and (3) the Secretary improperly dismissed EXP’s counterclaim for
transportation expenses and attorneys’ fees. (Opp. at 9-21.) The Court will address each of these
points in turn.
A. Secretary’s Jurisdiction under PACA
EXP argues that the Secretary improperly awarded transportation expenses here because
“the underlying PACA claims asserted by Fres Co were brought fraudulently and were
subsequently dismissed by the Secretary.” 	(Opp. at 9.) 	Thus, EXP contends that the Secretary
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lacked jurisdiction because the only legitimate claim Fres Co presented was a transportation claim,
“which is outside the purveyance and jurisdiction of PACA.”2 (Id. at 10.)
First, though EXP alleges that Fres Co’s underlying PACA claims “were brought under
false pretenses” (id. at 11), EXP does not identify a single statement by Fres Co which it contends
is a ‘false pretense.’ 	EXP also makes this argument for the first time in the instant appeal.
Tellingly, EXP did not complain that Fres Co brought a fraudulent claim during the underlying
administrative proceeding. Therefore, the Court cannot find that Fres Co’s complaint contained
“false accusations” based on the record before it. (Id.) Additionally, it must reject this contention
because EXP has not provided the Court with any evidence to support its newfound allegation.
Moreover, the Secretary’s rejection of Fres Co’s lost profits claim does not make it
illegitimate or fraudulent. The Secretary’s partial dismissal of Fres Co’s complaint was grounded
in the Secretary’s legal interpretation of the UCC. (See USDA Op. at 7) (“Looking at the situation
another way, [Fres Co]’s refusal to accept [EXP]’s attempted redelivery of the plantains would fall
under section 2-401(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which states, ‘[a] rejection or other
refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation
of acceptance revests title of the goods in the seller.’ U.C.C. § 2-401(4).”)
Lastly, the Secretary explained in plain language why it retained jurisdiction to award
shipping costs to Fres Co despite dismissing Fres Co’s claim for lost profits. “As these charges
were incurred in connection with the original sale of the plantains by Exchangecorp, S.A. to [Fres
Co], and the ultimate resale of the plantains by Exchangecorp, S.A. to [EXP], we conclude that
the Secretary has jurisdiction to issue an award for recovery of these charges.” (USDA Op. at 9.)
2 Fres Co does not dispute that the Secretary does not have jurisdiction to hear transportation claims
on their own under PACA, but argues instead that the Secretary is not divested of jurisdiction
where transportation costs are awarded as part of an underlying transaction. (Mot. at 9.)
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The Court is therefore unpersuaded by EXP’s argument that the Secretary lacked jurisdiction to
award transportation expenses. The Secretary’s decision demonstrates otherwise.
B. Legal Error Under Section 499b
Next, EXP argues that “the Secretary erred as a matter of law in determining that Fres Co
was entitled to a reparations award related to Fres Co’s transaction with a third party.” (Opp. at
17.) 	EXP contends that it cannot be liable under 7 U.S.C. Section 499b where there is no
contractual relationship between the complainant (Fres Co) and the respondent (EXP). (Id. at 19.)
Fres Co counters that EXP’s argument that it cannot be liable for violating Section 499b
“because EXP was not the seller and Fres Co was not the buyer” is legally incorrect. (Mot. at 6.)
Section 499b makes it unlawful for any produce dealer to “fail or refuse truly and correctly
to account and make full payment promptly in respect of any transaction in any such commodity
to the person with whom such transaction is had[.]” 	7 U.S.C. § 499b(4) (emphasis added).
Nothing in this section requires privity of contract or even a direct relationship between the parties
to the dispute. EXP cites cases from outside this Circuit to support its argument. (See Opp. at 19.)
But none of these cases, which are non-binding on this Court, actually hold that privity of contract
or a direct relationship is required under 499b.3 The Secretary’s decision to award shipping costs
was based on the indisputable fact that “these charges were incurred in connection with the original
sale of the plantains by Exchangecorp, S.A. to [Fres Co], and the ultimate resale of the plantains
by Exchangecorp, S.A.” to EXP. (USDA Op. at 9.) EXP was a party not to the original contract
3 For example, in Mrs. Condies Salad Co. v. Colo. Blue Ribbon Foods, LLC, the court
acknowledged that “Defendant Blue Ribbon had a contractual relationship with Plaintiff” but did
not construe Section 499b as conditioning relief on the existence of a contract. 858 F. Supp 2d
1212, 1219 (D. Colo. 2012); see also Alpine Fresh, Inc v. Taisan Corp., No. 05-1560, 2008 WL
11404527, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 13, 2008) (same). 	The remaining cases cited by EXP are
inapplicable to the instant 499b analysis.
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between Fres Co and the shipper, but to the sale of the plantains from the shipper,4 and therefore
qualifies as a “person with whom such transaction is had[.]” 7 U.S.C. § 499b(4).
Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that the Secretary erred when it determined that EXP
failed to pay Fres Co in violation of Section 499b. (See USDA Op. at 10.)
C. EXP’s Counterclaim
Finally, EXP argues that the Secretary incorrectly dismissed its counterclaim against Fres
Co. 	(Opp. at 20-21.) 	In support of its argument, EXP claims that the Secretary overlooked
admissible evidence, specifically a sworn affidavit by Emil Serafino included in its answering
statement. (Id.)
The Secretary found that EXP “failed to substantiate the allegations of the Counterclaim”
seeking to recover transportation charges and attorney fees from Fres Co and thus dismissed EXP’s
counterclaim. (USDA Op. at 10.) The Secretary reasoned that EXP “failed to submit any evidence
to support its claim.” (Id.) The Secretary noted that, in addition to the lack of evidence submitted
to support this claim, EXP cited “slightly different amount[s]” related to the transportation costs
between its answer (over $1,000) and answering statement ($305). (Id. at 9.) 	On appeal, EXP
relies on a sworn affidavit from Mr. Serafino detailing additional transportation expenses in the
amount of $305 “that included delivery rate for the driver ($180.00), tolls ($95.00) and entrance
to the Hunt’s Point Market ($30.00) when it delivered the container of plantains” to Fres Co, as
well as $10,500 in attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in responding to and opposing “Fres Co’s
false and fraudulent claims[.]” (Opp. at 20) (citing Admin. Record at 133.)
4 The Secretary’s findings of facts, which this Court must accept as prima facie evidence, include
that EXP and Exchangecorp entered into a contract for the sale of the shipment of plantains.
(USDA Op. ¶ 8.) EXP does not dispute this fact.
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In reply, Fres Co points out that while Mr. Serafino’s affidavit “recites a laundry list of
alleged damages, he offers no documentary proof to substantiate them[.]” (Reply at 9.) In addition
to the lack of documentary evidence, Mr. Serafino “is a convicted felon who was sentenced to
eighteen months in Federal prison for tax evasion related to his former produce business.” (Id.)
(citing USA v. Serafino, et al., 96-cr-018 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y.).) 	The Court finds that the Secretary
did not err in dismissing EXP’s counterclaim, because it offered no evidence to support its claim.
The Court also finds that in this appeal, EXP has similarly failed to produce evidence to support
such a claim for transportation costs and attorneys’ fees and expenses.
IV. 	ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES
The statute governing appeals from the Secretary’s reparation orders, 7 U.S.C. § 499g,
provides that appellees “shall not be liable for costs in said court and if appellee prevails he shall
be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be taxed and collected as a part of his costs.” 7 U.S.C. §
499g(c). Fres Co argues that the award of attorneys’ fees is especially important here where “the
appellee must defend a small reparations award.” (Mot. at 7.) “After all, if ‘the costs of defending
its favorable decision by the Secretary were not reimbursed to a prevailing appellee, then the losing
party could destroy the value of the Secretary’s award, by merely noticing an appeal’ and forcing
the appellee to spend more defending the case then it stands to recover.” 	(Id.) (citing Koam
Produce, Inc. v. DiMare Homestead, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).)
The Court therefore grants Fres Co’s request for leave to submit an application for
attorneys’ fees. (See Mot. at 7) (“Fres Co requests leave to submit an application for attorneys’
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fees after the determination of this motion to ensure that all fees incurred, including those charged
in preparing any reply and argument related to this motion, are included in the fee application.”)
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellee’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 60) is
GRANTED. 	Appellant’s Complaint (ECF 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 	Appellee may
submit an application for attorneys’ fees and expenses within thirty (30) days. 	An appropriate
order follows.
/s/ Jamel K. Semper 	.
H ON. JAMEL K. S EMPER
United States District Judge
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Andre M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.
Parties
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