APEX LAB SOLUTIONS, LLC v. CHEMISYS LABORATORIES, LLC

2:19-cv-09372Njd6 gen 2026

Testo completo

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
APEX LAB SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHEMISYS LABORATORIES, LLC,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 19-09372 (SRC)
OPINION
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Apex Lab Solutions, LLC’s
(“Plaintiff”) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim (the “Motion”), (Dkt. No. 127). 	Defendant
Chemisys Laboratories, LLC (“Defendant”) opposed the motion, (Dkt. No. 128). 	The Court
reviewed the papers submitted and proceeds to rule without oral argument, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). 	For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion will be GRANTED.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania. 	(Dkt. No. 1). 	On September 28, 2018,
Defendant removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 	Id. 	On January 17, 2019, Defendant moved to transfer the action to the District
of New Jersey, (Dkt. No. 14), and the motion was granted on March 5, 2019. 	(Dkt. No. 19).
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Plaintiff moved to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim on November 18, 2025. 	(Dkt. No.
127). 	Defendant filed opposition to the Motion on December 1, 2025. 	(Dkt. No. 128).
Through its Motion, Plaintiff seeks a dismissal of Defendant’s Counterclaim on the
grounds that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from a commercial relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant
governed by a written agreement (the “Agreement”). 	(Dkt. No. 1). 	Plaintiff initiated this action
asserting claims arising from that contractual relationship. 	Id. 	Defendant answered and asserted
counterclaims alleging, among other things, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 	(Dkt. No. 5). 	Plaintiff asserts that even if Plaintiff did indeed
materially breach the Agreement, Defendant’s counterclaims must be dismissed because of
Section 8(c) of the Agreement which provides:
“If [Plaintiff] does not perform in any material respect the services
required under this Agreement, [Defendant] shall inform [Plaintiff]
in writing, specifying the manner in which [Defendant] believes
[Plaintiff’s] services to be deficient. [Plaintiff] shall have a period
of thirty (30) days from the receipt of such notice to correct such
deficiencies in performance.... If [Plaintiff] does not correct the
deficiency within such period, [Defendant] shall, as its sole remedy
for [Plaintiff’s] nonperformance, have the option of terminating
this Agreement for cause. In connection with any termination by
[Defendant] under this Section [Defendant] shall be responsible for
the charges described in Section 8(a) and shall not be responsible
for the charges described in Section 8(b)(ii).”
(Plaintiff’s MTD, Ex. A.) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff now moves to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim, arguing that the Agreement’s
plain language expressly prohibits Defendant’s counterclaim. 	Id.
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true the
well-pleaded facts of a complaint and any reasonable inference that may be drawn from those facts
but need not credit conclusory statements couched as factual allegations. 	See id. 	(“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”). 	The issue before the Court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is not whether a
plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims.” 	In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 	“[A] district court ruling on a motion to dismiss
may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” 	Id. at 1426. 	The Court, however, may
properly consider documents that form the basis of a claim and documents that are “integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” 	Id. (citations omitted).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the Agreement expressly limited the remedies for an alleged breach of
contract to termination of the Agreement for cause. 	(Dkt. No. 127-2). 	Thus, Plaintiff argues that
the Agreement precludes Defendant’s counterclaim seeking damages for breach of the same. 	Id.
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Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s argument is contrary to public policy. 	(Dkt. No. 128).
Defendant argues that the Agreement is ambiguous and fails to define what “sole remedy” means.
Id. 	Defendant further contends that the Agreement does not state that Defendant agreed to waive
its right to assert causes of action against Plaintiff in Court seeking damages based upon Plaintiff’s
failure to perform pursuant to the Agreement. 	Id. 	Thus, Defendant argues that the Agreement
did not immunize Plaintiff from liability. 	Id.
Defendant’s counterclaim depends on the interpretation of the Agreement. 	Before a court
may enforce limitations on a party’s remedies, it must be established that the contract contains a
remedy “expressly agreed to be exclusive.” N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(1)(b). N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(2)
further provides that, “(w)here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.” 	Additionally, “(c)onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”
N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(3).
The Court is satisfied that the remedy in the Agreement was expressly agreed upon by
both Plaintiff and Defendant, satisfying the requirements of N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(1)(b). 	See
Garden State Food Distributors, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., Sperry Univac Div., 512 F. Supp. 975,
977 (D.N.J. 1981). 	The Court further finds that the limited remedy of termination of the contract
is not totally inadequate or unconscionable such that consequential damages are warranted under
N.J.S.A. 12A:2-719(3).
Defendant argues that it never waived its right to seek redress against Plaintiff. 	However,
the Agreement expressly designates that Defendant’s sole remedy for Plaintiff’s nonperformance
is termination of the contract following notice and an opportunity to cure. 	The Court finds no
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ambiguity in the phrase ‘sole remedy,’ which plainly limits all other contractual remedies.
Defendant’s counterclaim is premised entirely on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to properly
perform the services required under the Agreement. 	Accepting the counterclaim’s factual
allegations as true, the Court concludes that Defendant has not stated a claim for relief that is
available under the terms of the Agreement due to the express foreclosure of any remedy outside
of termination of the Agreement. 	Defendant argues that dismissal is premature at the pleading
stage. 	However, where a contract’s limitation on remedies is clear and unambiguous, and the
counterclaim seeks the relief foreclosed by that limitation, the Court’s dismissal of the same under
Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim is
GRANTED. 	Because amendment would be futile in light of the Agreement’s unambiguous
limitation on remedies, dismissal is with prejudice.
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/s/ Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
Dated: January 6, 2026
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